


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ST. THOMAS AND THE FREEDOM OF THE CREATIVE ACT

The understanding of the freedom of the creative act has challenged the minds of Christian theologians and philosophers down through the ages. It is among the questions which touch the limit of the human mind's ability to understand, and so it is not surprising that few systematic philosophers have affirmed the freedom of creation.

The particular aspect of the problem under discussion may be presented in the form of several questions. How is it possible for necessary being to act freely? Either God could have been without His free act to create, or He could not have been without it. If He could have been without it, if this act might never have been, what of God's immutability? How can immutable being be other than it is, ever was, and ever will be? Still further, of the creative act is in any way distinct within the divine being, what if God's simplicity? On the other hand, if God could not have been without this act, how is it a free act? In a word, is the act whereby God wills Himself the same as, or distinct from the act whereby He wills the existence of creatures?

All modern scholastics affirm that God is able to create or not to create, to create this order of finite beings or another; in other words, in creating, God acts with freedom of choice. When it comes to reconciling our understanding of this freedom with the necessity of divine being, there are a number of different approaches.

A traditional neo-thomist position maintains that the creative act is entitatively a necessary act, but terminatively, it is a free act.¹ A necessary act, because it is identical with God's being, it is free in its

¹ Est igitur actus liber divinus . . . in se absolute necessarius, qui, ita infert unum terminum seu dat esse huic mundo, ut idem actus in se immobiler permanens posset etiam non inferre terminum aut inferre alium terminum seu dare esse alteri mundo. . . . actus (est) absolute necessarius quoad se et non quoad terminum. J. GREDT, *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, Vol. II, 1937, pp. 235—237.

A number of other textbook authors are included in the summary of this position. Obviously, there are differences among them, but they do not appear substantial. Some of the authors consulted: Remer, Billot, Huarte, Boyer, Fillion, Esser, Garrigou-Lagrange, Arnou, Phillips, Guisquière.

relation to an extrinsic term. There is a virtual distinction, they say, between the necessary act whereby He wills Himself and the free act whereby He wills creatures. The foundation of this distinction, however, is in creatures. As in the case of all virtual distinction, whether major or minor, intrinsic or extrinsic, it does not exist before consideration of the mind. The perfections of God are virtually distinct in a minor and intrinsic manner, for they are not exclusive of one another, as in the case of animality and rationality. Rather, these perfections actually, though implicitly, from the viewpoint of the human mind's understanding, include one another. Simple perfections exist formally and eminently in God, though they are not formally distinct. Other divine attributes are virtually and extrinsically distinct, namely, those which in creatures involve the relationship of potency and act, for example, intellect and intellection. This is the case with the creative act; it is virtually and extrinsically distinct from God's necessary act of love for His own goodness. As free, the creative act is not a simple perfection; yet, as act, it is identical with the necessary, immutable, and altogether simple being of God.²

Another opinion considers that this traditional position involves considerable verbalism.³ If, argues Van Steenberghe, the creative act is entitatively necessary, and if the relation between God's will and creatures is only one of reason, then it is difficult to see how one can avoid the conclusion that creation is necessary. On the other hand, if the relation is a real one, then there must be some contingency in God, and a *real* distinction between His necessary act of love for His supreme goodness and the free creative act. However, since the divine being is perfectly simple, this is a real distinction *without composition*.⁴ The

² . . . actus liber creandi . . . non est perfectio simpliciter simplex saltem proprie dicta, quia haec definitur perfectio quae nullam imperfectionem involvit et quam melius est habere quam non habere. Atqui non melius est pro Deo habere actum liberum creandi, quam non habere. R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *De Deo Uno*, 1938, pp. 132—137, 405.

. . . even though He had not freely willed that His creative activity should take the form which is the production of creatures, it would still be fully present and perfectly exercised in His own immanent action. R. P. PHILLIPS, *Modern Thomistic Philosophy*, Vol. II, 1935, p. 340.

³ F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, *Ontology*, (translated by M. Flynn), 1952, pp. 221—226.

⁴ Real distinction without composition: These are not Van Steenberghe's words, nevertheless, they do appear to express his position. He writes: ". . . God creates by a free act which is distinct from His existence. To see that the divine simplicity does not exclude a certain 'contingency' in the free decisions of God, we must recall just what this attribute of divine simplicity means. Simplicity excludes from the Infinite Being only that kind of composition which we find realized in the finite being. It is a negative attribute which tells us nothing positive about the inner mystery of the divine Being.

foundation of his opinion appears to be this: Since we must always carefully distinguish between what we know, and the way we know it, and since so much of our knowledge of God is negative, if we must make a sacrifice in the face of a seeming contradiction, it should always be in favor of the more positive attribute, for example, freedom, as against a negative attribute, such as simplicity. The soundness of this procedure is confirmed, he maintains, when one considers the revealed truth that God is triune, three really distinct Persons in one nature—real distinction without composition.

What was the opinion of St. Thomas? How did he answer these questions? To understand his positions with regard to the freedom of the creative act, it is first necessary to describe briefly his approach to the doctrine of creation.⁵

To create is to make something, to do something unique in an altogether unique way, for to create is to give being, and to give being is to give everything.⁶ The production that is called "creation" is not simply the giving of bare existence to an essence which in some mysterious way already exists; nor is it an action that unites pre-existing elements or principles. Still less, is it the fashioning by reason of an ordered cosmos out of chaos, nor the giving of movement to an eternal and necessary universe. Rather, for St. Thomas, creation signifies the absolute beginning of things, not necessarily temporally, but radically, inasmuch as all beings, substantially distinct, depend totally on a

Thus, we know that the free, contingent creative act cannot be absolutely identified with the divine Being which is necessary. We also know that this act cannot be conceived as a 'second or accidental act,' because that would imply a composition of substance and accidents. But, on the other hand, we simply do not have any positive idea of the manner in which the creative act is distinguished from the necessary being of God." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 223. For Van Steenberghe, the distinction is certainly neither logical nor virtual, because it is in God Himself. It must, therefore, be a real distinction. The only other alternative, for Scotus—but not for St. Thomas—is a formal distinction.

⁵ The idea of creation, a distinctive element of Christian Revelation was firmly planted as a seed in the evolving systematic thought of the Western world by St. Augustine. It took centuries for it to flourish. Gropingly, and with difficulty, St. Thomas succeeded in integrating this idea into a scientific understanding of reality, thereby elaborating a metaphysics of creation. From the very beginning of his career, he considered this truth rationally demonstrable: "Respondeo quod creationem esse non tantum fides tenet, sed etiam ratio demonstrat." *II Sent.*, d. I, q. 1, a. 3.

⁶ "... creare est proprie causare, sive producere esse rerum. Creare convenit Deo secundum suum esse, quod est eius essentia. . . . *S. theol.* I, q. XLV, a. 6, c. "Agens autem agit secundum quod actu est; unde id solum se toto agit quod totum actu est, quod non est nisi actus infiniti, qui est actus primus; unde et rem agere secundum totam eius substantiam solum infinitae virtutis est." *De Pot.*, q. III, a. 4, secunda ratio.

Cause.⁷ This totality of dependence extends, not only to all beings, but to the whole of each being; to beings in their similarity and in their individuality and incommunicability. With creation, there are more beings; there is no more being; there are more good things; there is no more goodness.

St. Thomas expressed this truth in terms of participation, purifying it, however, of the pantheistic tendency that is inherent in the neo-platonic tradition. This he accomplished by integrating gradually, and from within his theological perspective, the fundamental intuitions of Parmenides and Plato, the Aristotelian doctrine of potency and act, and the Avicennian formulation of essence and existence. The result: a new metaphysics of being, of ESSE. It is particularly with Aristotle that St. Thomas gives to nature a consistency and a structure of its own, thereby safeguarding creatures from absorption into the unique reality of the One or the Good.⁸

It is reflection, however, on the concrete beings of our experience, and not intuition, which discovers the ontological value, ESSE. Being is not simply posed, as though the mind could pose that which constitutes it; nor does being impose itself as an object, for the mind itself is being. The point of view of ESSE is the privileged point of view wherein one recognizes that all beings are in contact, and are, in a certain sense, one.⁹ This unity is not that of an essence, still less of a unique substance, but a real analogical unity based on the total dependence of beings on their infinite cause, *ipsum esse subsistens*.

Further reflection reveals the presence of the creative cause at the heart of finite being. In creating, God manifests Himself as absolutely transcendent and mysteriously immanent.¹⁰ He is in all things, con-

⁷ "Creatio non dicit constitutionem rei compositae ex principiis pra-existentibus: sed compositum sic dicitur creari, quod simul cum omnibus suis principiis in esse producit." *S. Theol.*, I, q. XLV, a. 4, ad 2.

⁸ E. GILSON, *La Philosophie au Moyen Age*, 2^e édit., 1947, p. 343.

⁹ "Res ad invicem non distinguuntur secundum quod esse habent, quia in hoc omnia conveniunt." *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, c. 26.

"God in us and over us is . . . the synonym of *analogia entis*. The ultimate unity of the creaturely is not within itself, but with that which is above itself. Cf. E. PRZYWARA, *Polarity, A German Catholic's Interpretation of Religion*, 1935, pp. 33—34.

¹⁰ Nihil autem quod habet esse determinatum potest esse simile alteri nisi secundum rationem generis vel speciei: nam secundum quod est hoc aliquid, unumquodque est ab alio distinctum . . . Omne igitur agens finitum praesupponit ad suam actionem hoc unde causatum suum individualiter subsistit. Non ergo creat: sed solum hoc est agens cuius esse est infinitum, quod est omnis entis comprehendens similitudinem. *S. c. G.*, II, c. 21. For a remarkable analysis of this text, cf. A. HAYEN, *La Phénoménologie de M. Merleau-Ponty et la Métaphysique*, *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, T. 50, (1952), p. 122.

taining them in their existence.¹¹ The unity of beings is not God, but it is a real unity, revealing to reflection the presence of the Creative Cause.

For St. Thomas, then, a necessary creation is a contradiction. Such a position would sacrifice the Transcendent, *cuius esse est infinitum comprehendens similitudinem omnis entis*,¹² and reduce the creature to a mere mode of being. For God to be present to the creature, it must *be*, exercise its own being distinct from Him; on the other hand, in order that the creature be, God must be creatively present, since the creature of itself is nothing, depending totally on Him. God is not a part of the essence of creatures, and one need not know God first in order to truly know things. Nevertheless, ontologically, the creature cannot be, nor can the truth of things be understood except *within* the relation of total dependence on *Esse divinum, actus purus Essendi*.¹³ Weaken the absolute, divine transcendence, and inevitably, you endanger God's immanence, and vice versa.

Likewise, the principle, *bonum est diffusivum sui*, acquires a new meaning within this perspective. The good is no longer conceived in terms of efficient causality, as a nature which necessarily diffuses itself, but rather as a final cause, the end on account of which God freely wills the being of creatures.¹⁴ If the supreme good were a nature that had to

¹¹ Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, . . . (sed) ut causans omnium esse, . . . sicut continens res . . . dicuntur omnia esse in Deo, inquantum continentur ab ipso. *S. Theol.*, I, q. 8, a. 1, c., and ad 1 and 2.

¹² *S. c. G.*, II, c. 21.

¹³ ". . . licet causa prima, quae Deus est, non intret essentiam rerum creaturarum; tamen esse, quod rebus creatis inest, non potest intelligi nisi ut deductum ab esse divino. *De Pot.*, q. III, a. 5, ad 1.

"Quod aliquid praeter Deum habeat esse et non sit sub Deo non cadit sub apprehensione, quia implicat contradictionem. Hoc enim significat esse . . . subiici Deo per modum participationis." *De Malo*, q. XVI, a. 3.

The phrases, *nisi ut deductum* . . . and *quia implicat contradictionem*, must be understood ontologically, and not simply logically. To paraphrase the *De Potentia* text: "Although God is not a part of the essence of the creature, does not, therefore, enter into the definition of a thing, nevertheless, the creature cannot be or be understood except as actually receiving its being from divine being." These are indications of the correctness of Josef Pieper's observation: "The notion of creation determines the interior structure of nearly all the basic concepts of St. Thomas' philosophy of Being." Cf. Josef Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas*, 1956, p. 48.

¹⁴ In the *De Potentia*, St. Thomas confronts a very subtle argument: Every voluntary agent wills its ultimate end with necessity; thus, man necessarily wills to be happy. But, the ultimate end of the divine will is the communication of His own goodness *propter hoc producit creaturas*. Cf. *ibid.*, 14. This error was envisaged by the late Pius XII: "It is argued that the creation of the world is necessary, since it proceeds from the necessary liberality of divine love." Cf. *Humani Generis*, (N.C.W.C. translation) in

communicate, like the sun which would cease to be the sun if it ceased to shine, then, one would be placing within the cause a necessary relation to the effect. God would cease to be absolutely independent; the creature would cease *to be*, that is, would no longer have its own being.¹⁵ Containing everything, needing nothing, God knows and wills creatively. Not that God knows and wills because there are creatures who know and will; rather, He is known to have these perfections because some creatures have them. Strictly, all creatures are what they are, something thought and something willed, because God is what He is, — Someone actually thinking, Someone actually willing.

To create, then, for St. Thomas is to will to give being and goodness to others. When that will to give depends on no pre-existing subject, no instrumental cause, no plan that must be realized, no good that is needed, no end that must be pursued, then the will to give is sovereignly and absolutely free.

In all of his major works, Aquinas devotes much time and space to proving that God creates freely. In creating, God acts voluntarily and not with a necessity of nature. God's intellect and will, identical with His being, are the cause of things.¹⁶ Having proven this, St. Thomas invariably proceeds to ask whether in God there is free will.¹⁷ Why does He do this? For two reasons, it would seem. First, in order to explicitly reaffirm the divine transcendence. After all, both Plotinus and Avicenna admit that in God there is will, and that God is free as the exemplar of creatural freedom. Yet, their systems are emanationist. Implicitly, at least, they deny the freedom of divine causality. The freedom of

National Catholic Almanac, (1951) p. 65. The response is remarkable in its precision: "Communicatio bonitatis non est ultimus finis, sed ipsa divina bonitas, ex cuius amore est quod Deus eam communicare vult; non enim agit propter suam bonitatem quasi appetens quod non habet, sed quasi volens communicare quod habet: quia agit non ex appetitu finis sed ex amore finis." *De Potentia*, q. III, a. 15, ad 14.

¹⁵ "L'Agapé pose librement le tout de ce qu'elle aime. Parce qu'elle n'a besoin de rien, ni de personne, ni même de son 'rayonnement,' elle dote ce qu'elle crée d'une authentique consistance. Si nous étions nécessaires à Dieu, nous serions inexorablement réduits à la condition de modes, de parties ou de moyens. Notre contingence sauve ainsi, quand elle se rattache au premier amour, notre véritable indépendance." S. BRETON, *La Passion du Christ et les Philosophies*. 1954, p. 136.

¹⁶ "Quod Deus non agat ex necessitate naturae," *S. c. G.*, II, c. 23; "Quod Deus non agit naturali necessitate, sed a voluntate," *Comp. Theol.*, c. XCVI; "Utrum res processerint a Deo per necessitatem naturae vel per arbitrium voluntatis," *De Pot.*, q. III, a. 15; "Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum," *S. T.*, I, q. XIX, a. 4.

¹⁷ Cf. *II Sent.*, d. XXV, q. 1, a. 1; *De Veritate*, q. XXIV, a. 3; *S. c. G.*, II, c. 89; *S. Theol.*, I, q. XIX, a. 10.

the One for Plotinus is merely a freedom from external coercion.¹⁸ For Avicenna, the freedom of the divine will consists in consenting to what takes place necessarily, in giving some sort of existence to that which proceeds necessarily from the divine intellect.¹⁹ And so, to avoid any ambiguity, Aquinas repeatedly asserts that God is free, that is, absolutely transcendent in His being and activity.

A second reason appears to envisage what Augustine intended, but did not say,²⁰ namely, that God's freedom in creating is not only a freedom of independence, but a veritable freedom of choice. God wills His own goodness necessarily. He also may be said to will that goodness freely, with a freedom of independence because, as pure consciousness, He is necessitated neither from without nor from within. He knows perfectly what He is doing and why He is doing it. And so, the difficulty appears: Does God will creatures in a way that is truly different from the way He wills Himself, so that it is meaningful to say: "God could have willed not to create"?

Nowhere does St. Thomas define divine liberty, but he seems to make it abundantly clear that in creating, God enjoys the positive perfection

¹⁸ Plotinus never conceived the possibility of a free creation (in the sense of freedom of choice; his One is free from external coercion and cause of his own acts); nor, indeed, of creation at all, in the strict sense of *ex nihilo*. . . . The whole effort of Plotinus, in this explanation of the procession of multiplicity from unity, appears to depend on one supreme consideration: that although the One is the necessary cause of an eternally necessary world of multiplicity, although the power of the One pervades all and generates all, so that the 'All' must be regarded as an overflowing or radiation from the One, and although in virtue of the bilateral necessity of relation, we can justly say that the One would not be the absolute without the world, yet, the One is completely independent and unchanged when he produces; he is self-sufficient, distinct from all else, perfectly simple, unique, and even free. Cf. T. ROESER, *Emanation and Creation in New Scholasticism*, Vol. XIX, (1945), p. 92; also P. HENRY, *La Liberté chez Plotin*, in *R. N. S. P.*, T. XXIII, (1931), pp. 338—339.

¹⁹ . . . l'émanation à partir du Principe s'exerce aux yeux d'Avicenne, de la même façon nécessaire et intemporelle que concevait Plotin. Pour Dieu, comme pour chacune des Intelligences créer n'est rien d'autre que penser, en acceptant que cela même qu'on pense naisse à l'être du seul fait qu'on le pense. Cf. J. PAULUS, *Henri de Gand, essai sur les tendances de sa Métaphysique*, (1938), p. 262.

Dieu ne fait que consentir à cette émanation nécessaire qui procède de lui. Sa volonté donne l'être aux choses en ce sens qu'il laisse la fécondité infinie de sa nature se répandre sur les créatures . . . Cf. A. FOREST, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon St. Thomas d'Aquin*, (1931) p. 141.

²⁰ Que d'ailleurs cette volonté spontanée et gratuite de répandre sa richesse soit de l'essence du Souverain Bien, ou qu'il la faille concevoir comme une libre détermination, en quelque sorte contingente, Augustin ne précise pas cela. Il ne veut que soustraire l'action créatrice à toute nécessité d'indigence ou de sujétion. Il aime à dire avec Platon que Dieu est au-dessus de l'envie. Cf. J. DE BLIC, *Platonisme et Christianisme* . . . in *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, T. XXX, (1940) p. 179.

of free choice. He is careful to remove the imperfections of choice as we understand and experience it, for example, the possibility of sin. But, there are two imperfections which seem intrinsic to choice: First, choice implies unrealized possibilities, and in God, there is no potentiality whatsoever; secondly, choice is related to liberty, or freedom of independence, as a means is related to an end. Given the possession of the end, the means is no longer necessary.²¹

For St. Thomas, neither of these objections is serious. In many places, he phrases the following objection: Dionysius writes that, just as the sun, by its very being, without reasoning or choosing, illuminates all things that participate its light, so the divine goodness, by its very essence sends forth its rays to all existing things. Since everyone who acts voluntarily acts as one who reasons and chooses, God cannot act voluntarily, nor can His will be the cause of things.²² He replies: Dionysius does not intend to exclude choice from God *simpliciter*, but only in so far as choice would imply that He communicates being and goodness to some existing things and not to all. Things exist only in so far as they participate in divine being and goodness. In other words, choice in God does not imply that He chooses between things that in some way exist, but rather that He chooses in causing, in creating.²³ This is so precisely because He is infinite being, and creatures are finite. Causality—and there is no nobler kind of cause than a free one—does not presuppose a lack of perfection in the agent. It is true that in acting, in choosing,

²¹ Liberty envisages a *state* of being, whereas freedom of choice refers to the *acts* by which one achieves that state. A synonymous term for liberty is "freedom of independence."

"Freedom of spontaneity is not, as free will, a power of choice that transcends all necessity, even interior necessity, and all determinism. It does not imply the absence of necessity, but merely the absence of constraint. It is the power of acting by virtue of its own internal inclination, and without undergoing the coercion imposed by an exterior agent. (e. g., an electron spinning freely.) When freedom of spontaneity passes the threshold of the spirit, and is spontaneity of a spiritual nature, it becomes properly freedom of independence. To this extent, it does not consist merely in following the inclination of nature, but in being or making oneself actively the sufficient principle of one's own operation. . . . This, then, is why freedom of independence exists only in beings which also have free will; and presupposes the exercise of free will in order to arrive at its end." J. MARITAIN, *Freedom — Its Meaning*, (1940) p. 636.

²² *S. Theol.*, I, q. XIX, a. 4, 1. Also, *I Sent.*, d. XLIII, q. 2, a. 1, 1; *De Veritate*, q. XXIII, a. 1, 1; *De Potentia*, q. III, a. 15, 1.

²³ . . . cum divina virtus se extendat ad diversos gradus inaequalitatis in creaturis constituendos, quod in hoc gradu determinato creaturam constituit, ex arbitrio voluntatis fuit, non ex naturali necessitate. *De Potentia*, q. III, a. 15, secunda ratio. The difference between: Choice constituting things, and constituted choice selecting among existing possibilities, is the difference between *esse divinum* and *esse creatum*, between first cause and second cause.

every creature acquires some perfection which it lacked, but not in so far as the creature is an agent, but in so far as it is finite. Choice, then, is a perfection which is in God.

However, doesn't free activity suppose the existence of an end to be obtained? Consider the example of the blessed in heaven. They no longer have choice because they have attained their end, union with God. The will is related to the end; choice is related to the means.²⁴ Therefore, since God, Who is supreme goodness itself, cannot act for an end to be attained, He cannot be said to choose. Aquinas replies by distinguishing: Certain acts are ordained as means to an end not yet attained; certain others to the end already attained. Though the end, when achieved, is willed necessarily, nevertheless, one will always remain free in the choice of means to manifest one's joy in the possession of the end. In the sense, therefore, of an activity that accompanies the possession of the end, God can be said to have freedom of choice.²⁵ Supremely happy in the possession of His divine goodness, He freely wills, out of joyful love for that goodness, to communicate being and goodness to others—freedom of exercise. In this willing, God is also perfectly free in choosing the way in which things manifest His perfection—freedom of specification.²⁶

²⁴ "... electio est eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed veniente fine cessant ea quae sunt ad finem. *II Sent.*, d. XXV, q. 1, a. 1, 4.

²⁵ Ita dico quod quaedam ordinata sunt ad finem ultimum beatitudinis, quae ipsi fini coniunguntur, ut videre, amare, et huiusmodi; et respectu horum erit sempiterna et libera electio; ... *II Sent.*, d. XXV, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

Without any direct reference to the text of St. Thomas, M. BALTHASAR writes: "En la possession de Dieu fin dernière, je suis déterminé par l'objet, le bien complet; je demeure libre dans le choix des moyens de jouir de Dieu, de me dire à moi-même cette jouissance." *Mon Moi dans l'Etre*, (1946), p. 137. In an analogous way, one explains the freedom of Christ. Cf. M. J. SCHEEBEN, *The Mysteries of Christianity*, (translated from 1941 edition by C. VOLLERT), (1947) pp. 447—452.

²⁶ Would it not be of value to let experience reveal to us instances of free activity in the possession of an end? A most interesting attempt involved a long description of play, concluding that: "... in their play they, (children), are simply enjoying things, enjoying them for their own sakes. And in this, they are not, perhaps, unlike the blessed in heaven, who never ask themselves what use anything is, but simply enjoy it. To set an end to play is to destroy its essence." D. NICHOLL, *Recent Thought in Focus*, 1952, pp. 236—238. For the understanding of God's free activity, he continues: "God is His own happiness; He does not need anything outside Himself, and yet He creates the world. His creation of the world, therefore, was not necessary to Him, but supremely free. Obviously, then, this free act of God's had no end outside itself ... The activity of play is the best analogy by which most of us can reach toward some conception of God's creative act. By thinking of God as the sovereignly free player Who creates the world in His bounteous, gracious playfulness, we dimly perceive the eternal play of God's will at each moment of time." *Ibid.*, p. 239.

The perfection of divine freedom cannot be adequately defined, but it can be known within the affirmation of infinite, perfect being, *esse divinum*.

Having proven that God acts freely, Aquinas does not then go on to demonstrate how it is possible for God, necessary Being, to act freely. Generally, he is not concerned with the problem of reconciling the knowledge of divine attributes. However, in the first book of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, there are a number of arguments designed to prove that by one and the same act, God wills Himself and creatures.²⁷

Among the arguments, is one based on the divine immutability: There is discursiveness, he says, in the cognitive faculty when we know the premises apart from the conclusion, and draw the conclusion from them. However, if, in knowing the premises, we are able to see the conclusion in them immediately, just as, for example, when we see something in a mirror, then, our intellect is not said to function discursively. As the premises are related to the conclusion in speculative matters, so the means are related to the end in practical matters, for, as we know conclusions through premises, so the means lead to the realizations of the end. Accordingly, if a person wills the end and the means *separately*, there will be a certain discursiveness in his will. But this is impossible in God because He is outside all movement. It follows, then, that God wills Himself and all other things simultaneously by one and the same act of will.

Another argument rests on the simplicity of the divine will which is identical with the divine being, as he has already proven²⁸: Since God always wills Himself, if He were to will Himself by one act, and other things by another act, it would follow that there are two acts of will in God simultaneously. But, this is impossible because of one simple power, there cannot be two operations at the same time. Therefore, by one and the same act, God wills Himself and others.

Continuing, he appeals to the absolute independence of God's being: In every act of will, the object willed is compared to the one willing as

²⁷ "Quod Deus uno actu voluntatis se et alia velit." *S. c. G.*, I, c. 76.

²⁸ Sicut intelligere est perfectio intelligentis ita et velle volentis. Sed intelligere Dei est eius esse. . . . eo quod, cum esse divinum secundum se sit perfectissimum, nullam supervenientem perfectionem admittet. Est igitur et divinum velle esse ipsius. Ergo et voluntas Dei est eius essentia. *S. c. G.*, I, c. 73.

By the simplicity of the divine will, as also of God's being, he means the absence of composition. This is evident in the next chapter. "Multitudo autem intellectuum non inducit multitudinem in essentia divina neque compositionem in intellectu eius. Ergo neque multitudo volitorum inducit aut diversitatem in essentia divina aut compositionem in voluntate." *S. c. G.*, I, c. 77.

'mover' to 'moved'. Wherefore, if there be an act of the divine will by which God wills things other than Himself, and which, nevertheless, is distinct from the act whereby He wills Himself, it would follow that there is something other than Himself which moves the divine will. But this is impossible.

A further argument implies the doctrine of participation: It has been shown that God wills things to the extent that He understands. Hence, just as by one act, He understands Himself and all other things inasmuch as His essence is the exemplar of everything, so by one act, He wills Himself and other things, for His goodness is the likeness of all goodness.

Finally, the will of God is His being as has already been proven. Since in God, then, there is only one *esse*, there is in Him only one *velle*.²⁹

For St. Thomas, therefore, the unity of divine, voluntary activity is unquestionable. The free creative act is one with the act whereby He wills His own goodness. However, to appreciate these arguments, it is necessary to determine the purpose of this chapter. Why did Aquinas write it?

In this chapter, he is attempting to safeguard the complete transcendence of God's activity by proving that the divine will with respect to creatures is free. The act is *uncaused*, but *motivated*. The entire *Summa contra Gentiles* was written primarily for the instruction of the young Dominican missionaries.³⁰ It is not surprising, then, that he devoted many chapters to a discussion of emanation, an error common to the Greeks and Arabians.

According to Avicenna, the divine essence is the source from which all existing things necessarily emanate. Though he explicitly denies that the emanative act is an accident, he appears to conceive of it as a *property* which, in some way, is really distinct from the divine essence.³¹ This latter act, an act of will, necessarily presupposes, with a priority

²⁹ The last three of these arguments provide the frame within which the first two are more convincing. The key word in the first argument is *separately*.

³⁰ St. Thomas began this work in Paris in 1258, and completed there the first two books and about fifty chapters of the third. Cf. H. DONDAINE, *Le Contra errores Graecorum de S. Thomas et le IV^e livre contra Gentiles*, in *R.S.P.T.*, (1941), pp. 156—162. It was completed by 1264. For the nature and purpose of the *S. c. G.*, cf. M.-D. CHENU, *Introduction . . .*, (1950) pp. 247—253; F. VAN STEENBERGHIEN, *Aristotle in the West*, (1955) pp. 193—197.

³¹ Par un premier acte, acte de connaissance, l'Être nécessaire saisit son essence comme cause de tout bien existant. L'opération qui consiste à créer ce bien se présente comme un autre acte, postérieur par nature, étant commandé par le premier, mais non postérieur dans le temps. A.-M. GOICHON, *La Distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina*, (1937) p. 219.

of nature, an act of intellect which is identical with God's essence. Therefore, though the divine essence acquires nothing from the being of creatures, —it is, nevertheless, perfected by its own act of producing other beings.³² It is true that in Avicenna's system, the necessary act which is the cause of the divine will's operation is an act of intellect, whereas the error envisaged by St. Thomas is a prior and necessary act of will. Still, the result is the same: To affirm that the creative act is caused is to make the act necessary. And, as has already been said, a necessary creation is no creation at all. An intermediary creative act, whether it be a property, or an act of will *separate* from the act whereby God wills His own goodness, destroys the immediacy of the divine immanence and implicitly denies the absolute transcendence of God. It is significant, that, when a few years later, St. Thomas wrote his *Summa Theologica*, he used the principal argument of this chapter to answer the question: "Can any cause be assigned to the divine will?"³³ At the end of the argument, in one concise line, he expresses his understanding: Therefore, He wills this (the creature) *to be* in relation to that, (His goodness), but He does not will this (the creature) because of that (His goodness).³⁴ His free creative act is uncaused but motivated.

In the light, therefore, of the purpose of this chapter, it seems illegitimate to consider the above arguments as an attempt to explain how it is possible for God to act freely. Substantially, they are no more than further proof of the truth *that* God freely wills. Unquestionably, he is emphasizing here the unity of divine, voluntary activity. In other, later works, he does not express this truth. He assumes it. But, the unity which he insists on with these arguments is analogical, similar to the analogical unity of the generative and creative acts.³⁵ Could it not be,

³² L'expression avicennienne ne peut s'entendre que d'une distinction réellement fondée en l'Être nécessaire, puisque c'est à lui que manquerait quelque chose si la création n'existait pas. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

³³ "Utrum voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam causam." *S. Theol.*, I, q. XIX, a. 5.

³⁴ Unde, sicut in Deo intelligere causam non est causa intelligendi effectus; sed ipse intelligit effectus in causa; ita velle finem non est ei causa volendi ea, quae sunt ad finem: sed tamen vult ea, quae sunt ad finem, ordinari in finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc; sed non propter hoc vult hoc. *Ibid.*, c. It is the rationalist who attempts to deduce the existence of things. The realist accepts gladly and wonderingly what is.

³⁵ Generatio Filii et productio creaturarum non sunt unius rationis secundum univocationem, sed secundum analogiam tantum. Dicit enim Basilii . . . quod accipere Filius habet commune cum omni creatura, et rationi huius dicitur primogenitus omnis creaturae et hac ratione potest eius generatio productionibus creaturae communicari sub una distributione. *De Potentia*, q. 2, a. 5, ad 6.

that failure to appreciate this has led many thomists to speak of the creative act as entitatively necessary?

However, there is a sense, according to the Angelic Doctor, in which the creative act is necessary, namely, *ex suppositione*. Frequently, he distinguishes *necessitas absoluta* and *necessitas ex suppositione* when talking of God's free activity.³⁶ What is the meaning of this distinction? Is it merely logical, or does it have ontological value?

Consider the example St. Thomas employs to illustrate his point: If Socrates is sitting, it is necessarily true that he is sitting, and it will remain eternally and necessarily true that Socrates was sitting at that particular time, in that particular place. At first glance, this appears to be nothing more than the logical necessity of every judgment as a judgment— a necessity which Aristotle was never able to distinguish clearly from the necessity of things.³⁷ From the viewpoint of the object, the foundation of the above judgment is the real distinction between Socrates' power to act freely and the exercise of that power. From the viewpoint of the subject, the judgment is necessary because of the mind's power to abstract. Applied, then, to God, the *necessitas ex suppositione* would mean: Supposing that God freely created, it is now necessary that He be creating. Since, however, in God there is no distinction between the power to act and the exercise of that power, and since He is eternal, one must conclude that God's being is such that freedom and necessity, in some mysterious way, interpenetrate; the creative act is both necessary and free.

But is this St. Thomas' meaning? Does he consider it meaningful to speak of a purely logical necessity? It does not seem so. Reflection on his texts leads us to interpret the *necessitas ex suppositione* as the

³⁶ *De Veritate*, q. XXIII, a. 4, ad 1; *S. c. G.*, I, c. 83; *De Potentia*, q. I, a. 5; *S. Theol.*, I, q. XIX, a. 3, c.

The importance of this distinction has been emphasized by an outstanding Belgian Jesuit philosopher-theologian: HAYEN, A., *Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la vie de l'Eglise*. (Essais Philosophiques, 6, Louvain-Paris, 1952) *Le péché de l'ange selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Théologie de l'amour divin et métaphysique de l'acte d'être*, in *Teoresi*, (1954), T. IX, pp. 83—177.

Recently, Father Hayen published two volumes: *La Communication de L'Etre d'Après Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Publications du Museum Lessianum, Numbers 40 and 41). I: *La Métaphysique d'un Théologien*, II: *L'Ordre Philosophique de Saint Thomas*, 1957, 1959, in which he develops extensively this distinction. A review of these works will appear shortly in this publication.

³⁷ Though Aristotle placed the necessity of the judgment in the act of reason which unites the two terms, he was never quite able to disengage himself from Platonism, and therefore, found it difficult to understand how: "un savoir nécessaire et immuable puisse porter sur des réalités contingentes et mouvantes." S. MANSION, *Le Jugement d'existence chez Aristote*, (1946) p. 93.

concrete ontological necessity of being constituted by the creative presence. The logical necessity of every judgment, as a judgment, reveals ultimately the concrete ontological necessity of being.³⁸ Aquinas is a profound realist who reflects *à l'intérieur de l'être*, from within the necessary affirmation of being.³⁹ To what, then, is this concrete necessity opposed? To the abstract, absolute necessity of God—abstract in the sense that it is necessity of God alone, abstracting from the existence of the world which could have not existed.⁴⁰

It is not that God's necessity is not a real necessity, but rather that for us, His necessity does not reveal itself except in and through His immediate creative presence.

³⁸ Logical necessity is immediately explained, as already noted, in terms of man's power of abstraction. However, since the active intellect is the property of an individual being that is radically contingent, this explanation is not complete. For an interesting comparison of St. Bonaventure's doctrine of illumination as a metaphysical, not an epistemological or psychological doctrine, with that of St. Thomas' *esse as actus essendi*, cf. G. SCHELTENS, *La preuve de l'existence de Dieu dans la philosophie néoscholastique*, in *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 14, (1954), pp. 306—309.

³⁹ Cf. F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, *Ontology*, (1952) p. 42.

⁴⁰ There is another complementary meaning of this distinction, namely, that of conditional and unconditional necessity. In the *S. c. G.*, he writes that there is a sense in which creatures possess absolute necessity: "Sunt enim quaedam in rebus creatis quae simpliciter et absolute necesse est esse." *S. c. G.*, II, C. 30. Though all things proceed from God's free will, this does not prevent things from having a certain absolute necessity, for things, in proceeding from God, are as He willed them to be—some necessary, others contingent, still others, free. "Ex quo res creatae ex divina voluntate in esse procedunt, oportet eas tales esse quales Deus eas esse voluit." *Ibid.*, item; *De Pot.*, q. V, a. 3, ad 12. There is, therefore, in things a conditional and unconditional necessity. The absolute or unconditional necessity of things reveals itself in the study of the structure of created reality without considering formally the dependence of things on God's creative activity. To seek the causes of unconditional necessity in things is to discover their essences, their essential principles, and properties. "Diversimode autem ex diversis causis necessitas sumitur in rebus creatis. Nam quia sine suis essentialibus principiis, quae sunt materia et forma, res esse non potest, quod ex ratione principiorum essentialium rei competit, absolutam necessitatem in omnibus habere necesse est." *Ibid.*

There is also in things, a conditional necessity which reveals itself in creatural activity, in the order of movement. Thus, supposing that a certain end is to be obtained, certain means thereby become conditionally necessary. "Alio vero modo est ex fine necessitas non absoluta, sed conditionata: sicut dicimus necesse fore ut serra sit ferrea si debet habere serrae opus." *Ibid.*, concl.

Both types of necessity are real, but within the order of essence. The created world is, therefore, not contingent from every viewpoint. The liberty of creation does not destroy or exclude the absolute necessity of essence.

Nevertheless, St. Thomas also speaks of the distinction between *necessitas absoluta* and *ex suppositione* precisely when there is question of the world as created, as totally dependent on God. This is the meaning which is pertinent to our study. For a complete analysis of this distinction in St. Thomas, cf. A. HAYEN, *La Communication de l'être . . .*, Vol. II, pp. 153—177.

For St. Thomas, *ex suppositione* does not mean: 'supposing that', a logical hypothesis, a manner of speaking, but rather: 'given that', an affirmation from *within* being. Given that God is freely creating, there is a necessary relationship between creatures and God; not because God acquires any new perfection, not because God's necessity in some strange way triumphs over His liberty, not because of the immutability of the divine will, but because, in creating, God loves others, and to truly love is to love forever.⁴¹

In several instances, he does attribute this necessity to the immutability of the divine will. For example, he writes: Given that God wills, He cannot not will, because His will cannot change.⁴² But again, one must understand the divine immutability concretely, for elsewhere St. Thomas says that God, with an unchangeable will, can actually will that a particular thing happen, and that afterwards, its contrary take place.⁴³

In a masterful article of the *De Potentia*, St. Thomas expresses the heart of his metaphysical perspective. He is proving that God will not annihilate things. In the body of the article, the *necessitas ex suppositione* and the example of Socrates sitting reappear. He says that though it is not with necessity that God creates, given that He is freely creating, He cannot cease to will the existence of creatures because His will is immutable. However, he continues the argument and thereby reveals the source of this concrete necessity and also the purpose of creation: God's creative act is an act of love. To will that something *be* is to will something for itself; is to will that the creature exist in itself and be distinct as an existent. But, to will in this way is to love, and love is eternal. For, to will that something *be* for a time is to will that thing,

⁴¹ This is evidently the background within which Professor Grégoire writes: "à partir du moment où Dieu a créé une personne finie (ou, si l'on préfère, étant donné que Dieu s'est décidé, ce qu'il n'était pas tenu de faire, à créer une personne finie), Dieu et la personne finie forment un couple tel que si, par impossible, Dieu anéantissait la personne finie, il s'anéantirait nécessairement lui-même. Loin donc que l'existence de la personne finie soit comme nulle en regard de celle de Dieu, elle est devenue, par une suite nécessaire du vouloir gratuit de Dieu, une condition nécessaire de l'existence même de Dieu. Dieu a lié son existence propre au fruit de son libre amour. S'il a pu créer en dépit de cette conséquence, c'est parce que ce n'est pas déchoir que de créer par amour, et si ce n'est pas déchoir que de créer par amour, bien au contraire, c'est parce que c'est répandre et multiplier sa propre vie sous les espèces d'êtres qui sont en quelque mesure, pour Dieu, d'autres lui-mêmes." F. GRÉGOIRE, *Aux Sources de la pensée de Marx*, (1947), p. 167.

⁴² Cf. *S. Theol.*, I, q. XIX, a. 3, concl. Also, *S. c. G.* I, c. 83. In his earlier works, he refers to this as, among theologians, the necessity of immutability. *De Veritate*, q. XXIII, a. 4, ad 1.

⁴³ *S. Theol.*, I q. XIX, a. 7.

not for itself, but for another. To truly love something, however, is to will something for itself, more properly, to will the good, the very being of someone for himself.⁴⁴ The concrete, ontological necessity of being, is anchored in the love of God.⁴⁵

Therefore, in the light of the Angelic Doctor's metaphysics of being as *actus essendi*, his doctrine of participation, and the creative presence of Divine Love, the argument for the freedom of creation which most faithfully expresses his viewpoint is in the *Summa contra Gentiles*:

Quicumque amat aliquid secundum se et propter ipsum, amat per consequens omnia in quibus illud invenitur; . . . Sed Deus suum esse secundum se et propter ipsum vult et amat . . . Omne autem aliud esse est quaedam sui esse secundum similitudinem participatio . . . Relinquitur igitur quod Deus, ex hoc ipso quod vult et amat se, vult et amat alia.⁴⁶

Given the existence of beings which participate in *esse*, which *are* truly, because freely loved, the reason or motive—indeed, the guarantee—of the freedom of that creative love is God's necessary love for His own goodness. I am because God loves me, and God loves me because He loves Himself.⁴⁷ This is the truth which impregnates and gives meaning to everything Thomas Aquinas said about God and creation:

Amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.⁴⁸

With this background, it is not difficult to reply to the opening questions. Basically, St. Thomas answers them by not asking them. Having proven that God creates by an act of will, he invariably adds that this activity is *per arbitrium voluntatis*. He does not attempt to

⁴⁴ Quicumque autem vult aliquid propter se ipsum, vult ut illud sit semper, ex hoc quod illud propter se vult. Quod enim aliquis vult quandoque esse et postmodum non esse, vult esse ut aliquid aliud perficiat; quo perfecto eo non indiget quod propter illud perficiendum volebat. Deus autem creaturarum universitatem vult propter se ipsam, licet et propter se ipsum eam vult esse; haec enim duo non repugnant.

Vult enim Deus ut creaturae sint propter eius bonitatem, ut eam scilicet suo modo imitentur et representent; quod quidem faciunt in quantum ab ea esse habent, et in suis naturis subsistunt. *De Pot.*, q. V, a. 4, c.

⁴⁵ Certainly St. Francis lived this fundamental truth, without expressing it scientifically. Chesterton says that St. Francis was one of the few people who saw the world as it really is—created, *dependent*, hanging, as it were, on the tiny thread of the gratuitous love of God. Cf. G. K. CHESTERTON, *St. Francis of Assisi* Chapter V, *Le Jongleur de Dieu*.

⁴⁶ *S. c. G.*, I, c. 75. For an excellent, brief study of the relationship between analogy and participation in St. Thomas' metaphysics of being: Cf. JOSEPH OWENS, *St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics*, (The Aquinas Lecture, 1957) especially pp. 36—50.

⁴⁷ Grant that God loves persons, can He be said to love all creatures, for example, water? A reply involves recalling the unity of the creative act, and also that all things material exist for man in Christ for His Father. Cf. footnote 35.

⁴⁸ *S. Theol.*, I, q. XX, a. 2, c.

explain how it is possible for God to create, nor does he try to reconcile concepts of God's perfections. Such questions derive from an exterior, exclusive, and too abstract knowledge of God and His activity; whereas, St. Thomas' perspective is interior, inclusive, and concrete. The clearest index of this difference is the importance he attaches to the distinction between *necessitas absoluta* and *necessitas ex suppositione*.

Those who represent the traditional approach to the freedom of the creative act are certainly faithful to St. Thomas when they affirm the unity of the divine act of will. However, nowhere does he distinguish the creative act as *entitativa necessaria* and *terminative libera*.⁴⁹ In the *De Veritate*, he speaks of the divine will in such a way that this distinction might be inferred.⁵⁰ Yet, in the same article, the Angelic Doctor adds that this necessity is *ex suppositione*. Even if one were to interpret the distinction between *necessitas absoluta* and *ex suppositione* as signifying different aspects of God's being, then, as has been indicated, one could still not conclude that the creative act is entitatively necessary. Rather, since necessity and freedom interpenetrate, the creative act is both entitatively necessary and free.⁵¹

St. Thomas, with Van Steenberghe, certainly agrees that, "A cause which is necessary under every aspect can only cause something necessary."⁵² However, he would not use the term, "contingent," in speaking of the creative act, because, for him, this term signifies what is mutable.⁵³ Finally, it would not be possible, it seems, for St. Thomas to affirm a real distinction without composition between the act whereby God wills Himself, and the act whereby He wills creatures. Such a position tends to place an intermediary between God and creatures, and

⁴⁹ C. BOYER, *Cursus Philosophiae*, Vol. II, (1936), p. 395.

⁵⁰ ... divinum velle necessitatem habere ex parte ipsius volentis et actus, indubitabiliter verum est. *De Veritate*, q. XXIII, a. 4, c.

⁵¹ Something of the same mingling of necessity and liberty is found in creatures. In this life, the person loves God necessarily but unconsciously. The conscious love of God is free. However, in striving for the perfection of their being, persons tend toward that state in which they will necessarily and freely love God. When face to face with God, the blessed will enjoy perfect unity (cf. John 17:23) of being and action, —as perfect as it is possible for a creature to enjoy. Their beatitude will consist in one, unending, perfect act of love of God. The distinction between potency and act remains in so far as it is constitutive of the creature, but the unity will be deeper. This unity will not be incompatible with a multiplicity of activities expressing the joy of the blessed in the possession of God.

⁵² F. VAN STEENBERGHE, *Ontology*, p. 223.

⁵³ But, if *contingent* means *free*, then one can speak of contingency in God, as Cajetan says. Cf. *S. Theol.*, Editio Leonina, Vol. IV, p. 236b, paragraph 5.

to compromise the truth of the simple, immutable, *immediate* presence of Divine Love.⁵⁴

When a distinguished philosopher asks if "the rational concept of God as necessary being is not inevitably that of an emperor of the world,"⁵⁵ one may reply with St. Thomas, that the Author of the world is not sublimely indifferent; but rather, revealing Himself as the God Who knows and loves us, He is supremely interested in our smallest action, in the most banal of human events. To object further that if God is an emperor Who loves, then His love is necessarily tyrannical and enslaving, is to forget that Divine Love is creative. It is impossible to enslave what does not exist. In freely loving, God constitutes whom He loves, giving being and the power to love in return.

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⁵⁴ The notion of a real distinction without composition is unique. Van Steenberghe does not mean to say that there are separate acts. "The creative act is evidently a voluntary act, or an act of love, which is not foreign to the eternal act by which God enjoys His own infinite goodness." Cf. *Ontology*, p. 219. Could it not be, therefore, that they intend the same thing without using the same terms?

⁵⁵ M. MERLEAU PONTY, *Eloge de la Philosophie*, (1953), p. 65.

HISTORICAL NOTES CONCERNING TEN OF THE THIRTY-ONE RIGORISTIC PROPOSITIONS CONDEMNED BY ALEXANDER VIII (1690)

INTRODUCTION

THE decree of the Holy Office of December 7, 1690 condemning 31 rigoristic propositions,¹ is closely linked with that of March 4, 1679,² which condemned 65 lax propositions, although the two decrees are eleven years apart. While the earlier one represents the victory of the jansenists, the later is the fruit of intense anti-jansenistic activity. Since the external history of these two decrees has already been amply treated, we will give only a few necessary remarks of information.³

The University of Louvain, which was considered a center of Jansenism, in April, 1677 sent to Rome a delegation composed of three members in order to defend the doctrine of the University against accusations of jansenism, and to attack its adversaries.⁴ This delegation,

¹ DENZINGER, *Enchiridion symbolorum*, n. 1291—1321.

² *Ibidem*, n. 1151—1216.

³ Cfr. L. CEYSSENS, *Van de veroordeling der 65 lakse proposities in 1679 naar de veroordeling van de 31 rigoristische proposities in 1690*, in *Miscellanea moralia in honorem Eximii Domini Arthur Janssen*, vol. I, Louvain 1948, p. 77—109; IDEM, *P. Patrice Duffy, O.F.M. et sa mission antijanseniste*, in *Catholic Survey*, 1 (1951—52) 76—112; 228—266; F. CLAEYS BOUUAERT, *Autour de deux décrets du Saint-Office: celui du 2 mars 1679 condamnant 65 propositions de morale relâchée, et celui du 7 décembre 1690, condamnant 31 propositions rigoristes*, in *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 29 (1953) 419—444. For particular studies of the decree of 1690 see, F. DEININGER, *Johannes Sinnich, Der Kampf der Löwener Universität gegen den Laxismus*, Düsseldorf 1928, especially p. 59, 171, 196—198; L. RENWART, *Intention du Ministre et validité des sacrements, la position de Fr. Farvacques, O.E.S.A. et sa condamnation*, in *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 77 (1955) 800—821; 1075—1077; H. BOUSSE, *Intention du ministre et validité des sacrements*, in *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 77 (1955) 1067—1077; B. LEE-MING, *Presumption of Intention*, in *Irish Theological Quarterly* 23 (1956) 325—349; C. DAVIS, *Notes on recent works, dogmatic theology*, in *The Clergy Review*, 42 (1957) 163 ff.; G. RAMBALDI, *La proposizione 27 di Alessandro VIII ed il potere della Chiesa sui Sacramenti*, in *Gregorianum*, 31 (1950) 114—124; L. CEYSSENS, *La vingt-quatrième des trente-et-une propositions jansénistes condamnées en 1690*, in *Antonianum*, 32 (1957) 47—70.

⁴ Those appointed for this task were: Francis Van Vianen, Christian Lupus and Martin Steyaert. See, L. CEYSSENS, *De Leuvense deputatie te Rome (1677—1679)*, in *Historisch Tijdschrift*, 19 (1940) 252—312; 20 (1941)

which had been favorably received by Innocent XI, was endeavoring to obtain the condemnation of lax propositions attributed to the anti-jansenists. While the delegation was successfully accomplishing its mission in Rome, the anti-jansenists did not remain idle. They organized into a "secret society" which embraced members of the three religious orders, namely, Jesuits, Franciscans and discalced Carmelites.⁵ The society was placed under the nominal head of the secular Nicholas Du Bois, a zealous anti-jansenist.⁶

In the beginning of 1679 the "society" sent to its agent at Rome, Fr. Francis Porter of the Irish Franciscan Province, a list of 238 jansenistic propositions. It was the duty of this Irish Friar to work for the condemnation of these jansenistic propositions. Several months later, however, the decree censuring 65 lax propositions was published on May 2, 1679. Porter's list of 238, which in the meantime had been reduced to 105, was presented to the Holy Office on July 12, 1679. The source of each proposition and a brief commentary were presented in marginal notes.⁷

The <secret society> became very impatient in not obtaining immediate results. Thus, to further its cause by winning the support of the King of Spain, this anti-jansenistic group commissioned another Irish Franciscan, Patrick Duffy.⁸ For almost a year, that is, from June 12, 1680 till May 3/4, 1681, Duffy remained at the royal Court in Madrid and together with the Spanish theologians prepared a list of jansenistic

99—136; also in *Jansenistica*, I, 167—253; IDEM, *Documents relatifs à la seconde députation janséniste de Louvain à Rome durant les années 1677—1679*, in *Bulletin de l'Institut historique belge de Rome*, 30 (1957) 187—213. F. CLAEYS BOUUAERT, *Contribution à l'histoire de la faculté de théologie de Louvain — La participation de Martin Steyaert*, in *Miscellanea historica in honorem Alberti De Meyer*, vol. II, Lovain 1946, p. 1130—1145.

⁵ See, L. CEYSSSENS, *Een geheim genootschap ter bestrijding van het jansenisme in Belgie*, in *Jansenistica*, I, 343—397; IDEM, *De carmelitarum belgicorum actione anti-jansenistica iuxta chartas P. Seraphini a Jesu Maria (1668—1688)*, in *Analecta Ordinis Carmelitarum*, 17 (1952) 3—121;

⁶ See, L. CEYSSSENS, *Le Jansénisme. Considérations historiques préliminaires à sa notion*, in *Analecta Gregoriana*, vol. LXXI, Series Facultatis Historiae Ecclesiasticae, sectio A, n. 4, (Nuove ricerche storiche sul Giansenismo), Rome 1954, p. 13.

⁷ The list of 238 propositions is found in the following places: Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 899, fol. 371—386 (i. e. proposition 1—176); fol. 357—362 (i. e. proposition 177—238). Another copy is preserved at Rome in the Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico, ms. 1343.

The list of 105 is found: at Rome in the Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 899, fol. 277—286; again at Rome is the *Archivum generale Carmelitarum* (which is preserved in the College of St. Albert, Via Sforza Pallavicini, 10), ms. AOS, 193; finally at Pistoia in the Bibliotheca Fabroniana, ms. 22.

⁸ See L. CEYSSSENS, *P. Patrice Duffy, O.F.M. et sa mission antijanséniste*, in *Catholic Survey*, 1 (1951—52) 76—112; 228—266.

propositions which ultimately were to be submitted to the Holy Office. Although he had presented a list of 356 propositions, the number was reduced to 96.⁹ Thoroughly disappointed at this reduction, Duffy secretly made arrangements to still have printed a longer list. This unofficial list was entitled *Theologia Baio-ianseniana* and contained almost 500 propositions. Duffy left for the Eternal City as the representative of the Spanish King.¹⁰

After arriving in Rome various difficulties arose between Duffy and Porter, his confrere. The former, supported by the "secret society" asked for priority of the royal cause, insisting that his list be examined by the Holy Office in preference to that of Porter. On the other hand, however, Porter, backed by members of the Holy Office, wished to continue the cause of his 105 propositions, which was already under way. As a result, the relations between the two Irish Franciscans was not a happy one.

In the meantime the cause of Porter progressed. Four qualifiers, namely, Raymond Capizucchi, O.P., Master of the Sacred Palace, Dominic Mary Pozzobonelli, O.P., Commissary of the Holy Office,¹¹ Lawrence Brancati di Laurea, Conventual, soon to be created a cardinal,¹² and Michael Angelus Ricci, secular priest before long a cardinal,¹³ began the examination of the list of 105 propositions. It was the duty

⁹ Much of this information is contained in various letters which have already been published. Cfr. A. SOHIER—L. CEYSSSENS, *Correspondance de Pierre Cant sur les activités anti-jansenistes à Madrid (1679—1684)*, in *Bulletin de la Commission Royale d'Histoire*, 118 (1953) 1—114.

¹⁰ Duffy's list of 356 propositions is found in Simancas, *Archivo general, Secretarias provinciales*, n. 2477. His list of 96 is preserved in the following places: Pistoia, Bibliotheca Fabroniana, ms. 22; Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico, ms. 1343; Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 899. The complete title of Duffy's list of almost 500 propositions is: *Theologia Baio-ianseniana seu elenchus propositionum quibus potissimum in Belgio offensiones, scandala, contentiones, perturbationesque annis superioribus excitatae sunt, et scitantur quotidie, quasque zelosi et auitae Fidei tenaces Catholici censent ab Ecclesia, et Summis Pontificibus respective damnatas, damnatis consonantes, novas, periculosas et scandalosas; ac proinde impugnant, et ad examen requirunt, ne in perniciem animarum latius grassentur, Coloniae, Typis Guillielmi Friessem [sic]*. This work is rare but the text is reproduced in: M. A. TORRECILLA, *Propugnaculum orthodoxae fidei*, Madrid 1698, p. 200—248. Concerning the secret publication of this list, see L. CEYSSSENS, *P. Patrice Duffy . . .*, art. cit., p. 98—103.

¹¹ Concerning the two Dominicans, cfr. I. TAURISANO, *Hierarchia Ordinis Praedicatorum, editio altera*, Romae 1916, p. 58, 116, 75.

¹² See D. M. SPARACIO, *Il cardinale Lorenzo Brancati*, Gubbio 1924; L. CEYSSSENS, *Cardinalis Laurentius Brancati de Laurea*, in *Miscellanea Franciscana*, 40 (1940) 73—116.

¹³ See L. CEYSSSENS, *Le Petit Office de l'Immaculée Conception*, in *Virgo Immaculata* (Academia Mariana Internationalis), XVII, Rome 1957, 84—86.

of these men to see if the propositions were actually found in the sources indicated. After the investigation they qualified many as "non habetur apud auctorem".¹⁴ Accordingly, before September 1681 the number of propositions had been reduced from 105 to 32.¹⁵ Now that the work of establishing the authenticity had been completed, Innocent XI appointed a commission of eight theologians to determine the doctrinal import of the 32. Those selected for this task were the following: Thomas Mazza, O.P., Commissary of the Holy Office,¹⁶ Dominic Mary Pozzobonelli, O.P., who in the meantime had become Master of the Sacred Palace,¹⁷ Julius Mary Bianchi, O.P., later Secretary of the Congregation of the Index,¹⁸ Dominic of the Holy Trinity, a Frenchman and ex-general of the Discalced Carmelites,¹⁹ Alexander Maderno, praepositus general of the Barnabites,²⁰ Lawrence Fabri, Conventual, consultor of the Holy Office,²¹ Joseph Sabbatini, Italian and member of the Order of the Hermits of St. Augustine,²² Artieda Martin de Esparza, a Spanish Jesuit.²³ The examination began in January 1682 and was completed in March of the following year. The propositions then passed to the hands of the Cardinals of the Holy Office to be examined in the last instance.²⁴ On December 2, 1684 Porter announced that finally after five years of hard work his 32 propositions were censured by the Cardinals.²⁵ The list, however, was reduced to 31²⁶ and only on December 7, 1690 was the decree of condemnation published under Alexander VIII.²⁷

¹⁴ H. REUSCH, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher, ein Beitrag zur Kirchen- und Literaturgeschichte*, vol. II, Bonn 1885, p. 526.

¹⁵ Letters already published give much information on this affair. Cfr. L. CEYSSSENS, *Romeinse brieven uit de Ierse episode van het Belgisch anti-jansenisme (1680—1684)*, in *Bulletin de l'Institut historique belge de Rome*, 23 (1944—1946) 73—121.

¹⁶ Cfr. I. TAURISANO, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁷ See above.

¹⁸ Cfr. I. TAURISANO, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹⁹ Cfr. COSMAS DE VILLIERS, *Bibliotheca Carmelitana, Aurelianus 1753* (opus P. Cosmae de Villiers additis nova praefatione et supplemento luce exprimendum curavit P. Gabriel Wessels, Romae 1927), col. 420, n. 80.

²⁰ Cfr. G. BOFFITO, *Scrittori Barnabiti, vol. II, Florentiae 1933*, p. 382.

²¹ Cfr. N. PAPINI, *Minoritae conventuales lectores*, in *Miscellanea Franciscana*, 33 (1933) 252.

²² Cfr. D. PERINI, *Bibliographia augustianiana, cum notis biographicis, scriptores itali, vol. III, Florentiae, s. d.*, p. 143—144.

²³ Cfr. C. SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, vol. III, Parisiis 1892*, col. 449—452.

²⁴ For the names of these Cardinals, cfr. L. CEYSSSENS, *Romeinse brieven, art. cit.*, p. 92.

²⁵ On the attitude of Innocent XI to the anti-jansenistic activity, cfr. the letters of Porter in *Romeinse brieven, art. cit.*, p. 97, 103, 105, 107, 109, 116.

²⁶ The uncondemned proposition is: "Spes caritate destituta virtutis theologicae rationem amittit."

²⁷ With regard to the delay in publishing the decree, cfr. L. CEYSSSENS, *Van de veroordeling der 65 lakse proposities . . . , art. cit.*, p. 106—109.

In our treatment of this material we have proceeded in the following manner. Under each proposition we consider first, the source of the proposition; secondly, the examination of the text; thirdly, the doctrinal judgments; and finally, we proffer our conclusion. Under our first division, we indicate the source of the proposition as related by Porter in his lists of 238 and 105 propositions, and by Duffy in his *Theologia Baio-ianseniana*; we give also some general information on the author and the work from which the particular proposition has been taken. After presenting in the second division the words of the text, we pass to the third point, namely, the doctrinal judgments, as stated by Porter, the anti-jansenists, the Theological Faculty of the University of Louvain, the theologians of the Holy Office and various commentators on the decree of condemnation.

As we have already mentioned, Porter's remarks are found in his list of 105 in marginal notes next to each proposition.²⁸ That which we refer to as the *judgment of the anti-jansenists* has been taken from ms. 1343 Fondo Gesuitico in the Biblioteca Nazionale of Rome. The title of this document is: *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae definitionibus Ecclesiae et Sanctorum Patrum sententiis demonstrantur contrariae*. No author is given. Perhaps this document is a longer commentary written by Porter himself.

Besides the opinions of Porter and the other anti-jansenists, there is preserved a statement from the Theological Faculty of Louvain. In June 1681 Cardinal Cibo, the Secretary of State, had sent the 96 propositions of Duffy to Louvain and asked for a reply to the accusations.²⁹ The answer of the University is likewise contained in ms 1343, Fondo Gesuitico of the Biblioteca Nazionale of Rome under the title: *Iudicium facultatis theologiae Lovaniensis super 96 propositionibus hic iniunctis*. Since the theological faculty comments only on the 96 propositions of Duffy, we are not able to present its judgments but for those propositions which are found in the lists of both Duffy and Porter.

With regard to some of the 31 propositions there is preserved a résumé of the opinions of the eight theologians of the Holy Office appointed by Innocent XI to pass judgment on the doctrinal import of

²⁸ In the letter of Porter to Ignatius Diertins, rector of the College of Louvain, dated January 9, 1683, one reads: "cum (propositiones), ut iacent in meo catalogo, sint collectae cum suis auctoribus et habent notas marginales, quae ostendunt earum coincidentiam cum doctrinis olim proscriptis, quod multum iuvat theologos, et catalogus P. Duffii numquam fuerat collatus nec quaestio facti ab ipso usque modo probata . . ." See L. CEYSSENS, *Romeinse brieven*, art. cit., p. 106.

²⁹ See L. CEYSSENS, *Patrice Duffy*, art. cit., p. 242—243, especially note 147.

each proposition. Their answers are found in the *Franciscan Library*, Killiney (Co. Dublin), ms. D. 21 with the title: *Propositiones triginta duae excerptae ex catalogo 105 propositionum exhibitarum Summo Pontifici anno 1679 a P. Francisco Portero, Hiberno . . . et qualificatae per theologos deputatos a Sua Sanctitate*.³⁰ A briefer summary, now preserved in the General Archives of the Friars Minor, Rome, ms. III, 11, fol. 699r-702v, was written later by the Spanish Franciscan, Francis Diaz.³¹

Of the eight theologians there likewise exists a more detailed commentary of Sabbatini. In his official report which is found in Rome at the Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 899, fol. 249r-256r, this Augustinian writes:

Ex centum et quinque propositionibus quas P. Porterus detulit ad Sedem Apostolicam censurandas, 32 olim selectae fuerunt per Rev. mos Qualificatores ad hoc negotium deputatos . . . Verum cum ex illis triginta duabus propositionibus, aliaque nec auctorem nec thesim habeant, ideo Ill. mus D. Assessor Sancti Officii EE. VV. nomine saepe in privatis congregationibus monuit de eis rationem habendam non esse; sapientissime quidem, nam huiusce Vestri Supremi Tribunalis maiestatem non decet iudicium ferre de rebus sine certo auctore aut dicuntur aut finguntur. Itaque omissis propositionibus illis quae auctore carent aut thesi, de caeteris breviter ac sincere dicam quid sentio.

Sabbatini comments on only 15 propositions among which is: "Spes caritate destituta virtutis theologicae rationem amittit", which was not included in the decree of condemnation. Of the remaining there are three of which he reports, "non habetur thesis," while of the others he uses expressions such as, "non est apud auctorem."³²

Under our division entitled doctrinal judgments, we refer in the last place to the three commentaries written shortly after the decree of condemnation, namely, those of Dominic Viva, S.J.³³ who wrote: *Damnatae theses ab Alexandro VII, Innocentio XI et Alexandro VIII necnon Jansenii ad theologicam trutinam revocatae* . . ., which first appeared in Naples in 1708; then, the work of Martin Steyaert³⁴: *Novitas*

³⁰ This document is without doubt the one of which Porter speaks in a letter dated November 27, 1683: "quas (censuras) penes me habeo per viam secretissimam a me obtentas, acres quidem, quarum nonnullae sortiuntur hanc qualificationem: *erronea, temeraria, haeretica, haeresim sapiens, iniuriosa Christo, derogans divinae pietati, scandalosa* etc.;" cfr. CEYSENS, *Romeinse brieven*, art. cit., p. 118. Unfortunately, today this document is not complete.

³¹ Concerning F. Diaz, *ibidem*, p. 258—263. L. GÓMEZ CANEDO, *El P. Francisco Diaz de San Buenaventura y los Colegios-Seminarios de Misiones*, in *Liceo Franciscano*, 2d s. 4 (1951) 105—120.

³² Cfr., ms. 899, Bibliotheca Angelica, Rome, fol. 259r—259v.

³³ See SOMMERVOGEL, *op. cit.*, vol. VIII, col. 859—866.

³⁴ Cfr. *Opuscula ex D. Martini Steyaert, Sacrae Theologiae Doctoris et Professoris Regii in Academia Lovaniensi, tomus primus, Lovanii 1742*, p. 325—378. All my citations are from this edition.

utrimque de novo repressa per decretum duplex Sanctissimi Domini Nostri Alexandri PP. VIII. Quo propositiones XXXIII iustissime damnantur cum notis, ad Maioris Collegii Theol. Lovanii Alumnos, Lovanii 1691. It will be recalled that this author was a member of the delegation sent by the University of Louvain to Rome during the years 1677-1679. He played an important role in obtaining the condemnation of the 65 lax propositions in 1679. Toward the end of the 17th century, however, he was the leader of a group of militant anti-jansenists at Louvain.³⁵ Finally, the third of the early commentators we consulted is Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher, whose real name is Bonaventure Van den Dijcke,³⁶ Franciscan of Louvain and the author of: *Reflexiones breves ad triginta et unam propositiones nupero decreto de die VII Decembris 1690 . . . iustissime damnatas, quibus earum origo et falsitas et oppositae doctrinae veritas aperitur per Hilarum a S. Sepulchro, Coloniae 1691.* Another edition appeared in the following year, again at Louvain.³⁷ We also have consulted the recent commentary written by X. Le Bachelet for the *Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique*. The article has the title: *Alexandre VIII. Propositions condamnées par lui, le 24 août et le 7 décembre 1690.*

Although our original plan was to treat all 31 of the condemned propositions, we have limited ourselves to a study of ten, for the following reasons. In the first place, four propositions, namely, nos. 3, 24, 27 and 28 have already been considered by other authors.³⁸ Secondly, propositions 20 and 31 have no specific author, but the source is given as "passim inculcatur populo" and "sic doceri patet in praxi." Thirdly, there are twelve propositions whose sources we have not been able to find, namely, nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 19 and 29. The possibility of finding these sources is lessened due to the fact that copies of some theses from which most of the propositions had been extracted were so rare that the anti-jansenists were reluctant to send to Rome the copy in their possession lest it be lost. Furthermore, the fire of 1914 at the library of the University of Louvain has added to the difficulty of bringing these works to light. Fourthly, since our stay in Rome was limited, further research on the remaining propositions was rendered impossible.

³⁵ On Steyaert's change from a jansenist to an anti-jansenist, see L. CEYSSENS, *De rehabilitatie van Martinus Steyaert*, in *Historisch Tijdschrift*, 17 (1938) 189-228; also in *Jansenistica*, I, 305-341.

³⁶ See L. CEYSSENS, *De thesibus antigallicanis P. Bonaventurae Van den Dijcke, O.F.M. (1691-1692)*, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 41 (1948) 161-176.

³⁷ See L. CEYSSENS, *La vingt-quatrième des trente-et-une propositions jansénistes condamnées en 1690*, in *Antonianum*, 32 (1957) 57-60.

³⁸ Cfr. note 3 above.

I

PROPOSITIO 9: Revera peccat, qui odio habet peccatum mere ob eius turpitudinem et disconvenientiam cum natura, sine ullo ad Deum respectu.

SOURCE OF THE PROPOSITIO

According to the anti-jansenists¹ the 9th proposition is found in the *Tyrocinium* of Macarius Havermans.² At his baptism at Breda in the Netherlands on September 30, 1644 he was given the name of Lancelot. At the age of 22 he was professed in the Premonstratensian Order at the abbey of St. Michael in Antwerp. In 1669 he was ordained a priest and became a professor in this same abbey. He was esteemed for his great learning.

In the year 1674, when only 30 years old, Havermans published his *Tyrocinium* at Antwerp.³ A year later the second edition appeared, again in the same city, in two volumes with additions and corrections. It is to this second edition that the anti-jansenists attributed the ninth proposition in the second tract, fourth chapter, second paragraph, page 97.

A brief description of this work is in place. It has two parts. The title of the first part is: *Tyrocinium theologiae moralis ad mentem SS. Patrum praesertim S. Augustini. De novo auctum et correctum per F. Havermans Ordinis Praemonstratensis Canonicum S. Theologiae Professore. Editio secunda, Antwerpiae, apud Viduam Reneri Sleghers, Typographi in Platea de Cammerstraet, sub insignis Arthesiae, cum gratia et privilegio, 1675.* After a letter of dedication to the abbot of St. Michael's Abbey, and after two pages of verse in praise of the author, there follows a lengthy preface of 98 pages. Then begins the text of part one (pp. 99—408). It is divided into eight chapters which treat of topics as the

¹ This proposition is found, with Duffy: under n. 151 in the *Theologia Baio-ianseniana*, part one; n. 106 of the 356 propositions, n. 26 of the 96 propositions; with Porter: under n. 105 of the 238 propositions, n. 28 of the 105 propositions.

² Concerning the *Tyrocinium*, cfr. below; concerning the author, see *Biographie nationale*, vol. VIII, Brussels, 1884—1885, col. 798—801; J. HURTER, *Nomenclator literarius*, vol. IV, Innsbruck 1910, col. 273—274; *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. VI, Paris 1920, col. 2064—2065; L. GOOVAERTS, *Ecrivains, artistes et savants del'Ordre de Prémontré, dictionnaire bio-bibliographique*, vol. I, Brussels 1899, p. 356 and vol. III, Brussels 1907 p. 73.

³ For information on the historical background at the time of the writing of the *Tyrocinium*, one may confer, A. SOHIER, *Gilles Estrix S.J. (1624—1664), un important controversiste oublié*, in *Gregorianum*, 28 (1947) 255 ff.

human acts in general, the free will, acts of the will, the impediments of the voluntarium. Finally, are four letters of approbation.⁴

The next part of the book has a slightly different title, namely, *Tyrocinii christianae moralis theologiae ad mentem SS. Patrum, Partis primae. Tractatus secundus, auctore F. Macario Havermans . . . 1675*. This section, which is divided into fourteen chapters (pp. 3—303), treats of the morality of human acts, intention, relation of works to God, indifferent acts, etc. At the end is the index followed by the *Summa Privilegii*, a paragraph concerning rights of the printer.

Not long after the publication of the *Tyrocinium*, the author was accused of holding jansenistic doctrine.⁵ Not only the 9th proposition, but also the 10th, as we shall see later, are ascribed to this book. Havermans, however, answered his attackers with; *Defensio brevis Tyrocinii Moralis Theologiae F. Macarii Havermans contra Theses R. P. N. e Societate Jesu illi oppositas, Coloniae 1676, pp. 461*.⁶ He even addressed a "letter" of 215 pages to Pope Innocent XI in which he defends himself against the accusations of the anti-jansenists.⁷ It has been claimed that Havermans, several hours before his death, received communication from Innocent XI approving his works.⁸ He died on February 20, 1680 at the early age of 35.

EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT

In the *Tyrocinium* it is the fourth chapter with which we are concerned. Paragraph two of this chapter bears the title: "Variae intentiones ex quibus possumus opera bona facere." The author presents eight

⁴ Approbation was given by the following: 1) Libertus [De Pape] Abbas Parchensis et Vicarius Generalis, die 13 julii, 1674; 2) Arnoldus Eyben, Ecclesiae Cathedralis Divae Virginis Antwerpiensis, canonicus theologus, librorum censor, die 29 aprilis, 1675; 3) Laurentius Neesen, Ecclesiae Metropolitanae [Mechliniensis] canonicus theologus, librorum censor, die 19 martii, 1675; 4) F. Joannes de Witte, quondam Prior S. Michaelis, S. theologiae Licentiatius et Professor, die 6 augusti, 1675. The first three were to a certain extent jansenists.

⁵ Concerning these accusations one may consult A. SOHIER, *art. cit.*, p. 261; also [L. PATOUILLET], *Dictionnaire des livres Jansénistes*, vol. IV, Antwerp 1755, p. 133 where one reads: "Ce M. Havermans a été un des plus ardents défenseurs du Jansénisme dans les Pays-Bas."

⁶ Propositio 30 in the list of 31 is attributed to this work. In one of the approbations found in the *Defensio brevis* this Jesuit is identified as Philip de Hornes. Cfr. C. SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*, vol. IV, col. 460; vol. VI, col. 355.

⁷ The title of this letter is: *Epistola apologetica ad Summum Pontificem Innocentium XI, contra accusationem Francisci Simonis, S. Theologiae lectoris, Coloniae 1676*. Concerning its contents, cfr. A. SOHIER, *art. cit.*, p. 261 ff.

⁸ See *Biographie nationale*, VIII, col. 800, and *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, VI, col. 2065.

reasons which may motivate man to avoid evil and do good. He asserts one may act from the motive merely to please man, to act as becoming a rational creature, to avoid hell, to enjoy spiritual delights, to obtain heavenly glory, to acquire this glory so that one may glorify and love God, to please the Divine Goodness, and finally, purely *propter Deum*. We shall now give our consideration to the second reason listed by the author, namely, avoiding evil and doing good because this is becoming a rational creature. The text is as follows:

Secunda intentio potest vocari *intentio Stoica*, quia Stoici quidem in suis actionibus appetebant honestatem rationis, verum non nisi ut ipsis commodam, et naturae rationalis ornativam; altius enim amore naturali ascendi nequit... Unde ipsorum virtutes verae Christianaeque virtutis nomine non sunt honorandae. Stoicismum resuscitant, qui docent actum virtutis illum exercere, qui bonum morale operatur praecise propter naturalem honestatem sine relatione ad Deum, mirandumque valde non tantum Philosophos, sed et nominatos Theologos hodie adhuc docere taliter operantes non peccare, imo non desunt, qui adhuc jactitare audent quod id ex ipso Augustino convincant. Augustino nostro variis locis reclamante ac docente⁹: "Absit autem ut virtutes verae cuiquam serviant, nisi illi, vel propter illum cui dicimus: Deus virtutum converte nos. Proinde virtutes quae carnalibus delectationibus, vel quibusque commodis et emolumentis temporalibus serviunt, verae prorsus esse non possunt. Quae autem nulli rei servire volunt, nec ipsae verae sunt. Verae quippe virtutes, Deo serviunt in hominibus, a quo donantur hominibus; Deo serviunt in Angelis, a quo donantur et Angelis. Quidquid autem boni fit ab homine, et non propter hoc fit, propter quod fieri vera sapientia praecipit, etsi officio videatur bonum, ipso non recto fine peccatum est." Et alibi¹⁰: "Licet a quibusdam tunc verae et honestae putentur esse virtutes, cum ad seipsas referuntur, nec propter aliud expetuntur; etiam tunc inflatae ac superbae sunt et ideo non virtutes, sed vitia iudicanda sunt." Nec mirum, cum clarissime doceat¹¹: "Non esse veram virtutem, nisi quae ad eum finem tendit, ubi est bonum hominis, quo melius non est." Vere ergo illos virtutum actus seipsum suasque operationes habet, cum sibi det locum finis cui ultimi, suisque operationibus finis cuius ultimi; quod est seipsum nimis efferre, sibi quae tribuere honorem, qui soli Deo debetur.

Ex illis fit consequens quod sicuti revera peccat, qui amat virtutes propter earum pulchritudinem et conformitatem cum natura rationali sine respectu ad Deum, ita etiam revera peccet qui odio habet peccatum mere ob eius turpitudinem et disconvenientiam cum natura rationali sine ullo ad Deum offensum respectu, quamvis enim talis actio ex officio sit

⁹ This quotation is from the *Contra Julianum*, book 4, chapter 3. See MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. 44, col. 749, par. 21.

¹⁰ *De civitate Dei*, book 19, chapter 25. See MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. 41, col. 656.

¹¹ *De civitate Dei*, book 5, chapter 12. See MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. 41, col. 156, par. 4.

optima, ipso tamen non recto fine peccaminose fit. Unde liquet non sufficere ad Sacramentum poenitentiae, si quis doleat propter turpitudinem peccati: accedente et hoc quod ille dolor viribus naturae facile haberi possit, dolor autem naturalis non sufficiat ad Sacramentum poenitentiae, cum saepius definitum sit neminem posse poenitere sicut oportet sine divinae gloriae dono.¹²

In the above text is clearly found our 9th proposition with only two minor changes, namely, *peccat* instead of *peccet*, and *cum natura* instead of *cum natura rationali*. It is interesting to note that Duffy in his *Theologia Baio-ianseniana*, as well as in his list of 96, omits the phrase *sine ullo ad Deum offensum respectu* -- a phrase which is deeply significant, as we shall see later.¹³

DOCTRINAL JUDGMENT

In the judgment of the anti-jansenists our 9th proposition repeats the doctrine of Luther. Among his errors which were condemned by Leo X in the bull *Exsurge Domine* of June 15, 1520, we find the following¹⁴:

Contritio, quae paratur per discussionem, collationem et detestationem peccatorum, qua quis recogitat annos suos in amaritudine animae suae, ponderando peccatorum gravitatem, multitudinem, foeditatem, amissionem aeternae beatitudinis, ac aeternae damnationis acquisitionem, haec contritio facit hypocritam, immo magis peccatorem.

In the Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4 we find the positive doctrine relative to attrition thus expressed¹⁵:

Illam vero contritionem imperfectam quae attritio dicitur, quoniam vel ex turpitudinis peccati consideratione vel ex gehennae et poenarum metu communiter concipitur, si voluntatem peccandi excludat cum spe veniae, declarat non solum non facere hominem hypocritam et magis peccatorem, verum etiam donum Dei esse et Spiritus Sancti impulsus, non adhuc quidem inhabitantis, sed tantum moventis, quo poenitens adiutus viam sibi ad iustitiam parat.

In their criticism of the 9th proposition the anti-jansenists¹⁶ also appealed to this passage of the Council of Trent.

¹² Of the 65 laxist propositions condemned by the Holy Office on March 4, 1679, the 57th proposition is as follows: "Probabile est, sufficere attritionem naturalem, modo honestam." Cfr. DENZINGER, n. 1207.

¹³ It is only in the list of 356 that Duffy cites the entire proposition. Number 106 in this list reads: "Peca en realidad de verdad, el que meramente aborrece el pecado por la torpeza y disonancia disconveniencia que tiene con la naturaleza racional, si falta algun respecto a que Dios es ofendido por el pecado."

¹⁴ DENZINGER, n. 746.

¹⁵ DENZINGER, n. 898.

¹⁶ Cfr. *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae* . . . , at proposition 28, Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico, ms. 1343.

Porter¹⁷ in his short commentary relative to this proposition indirectly refers to Luther in as far as he says it is contrary to the Council of Trent, session 14, canon 5.¹⁸ He explicitly states, however, that it is *ad mentem Baii*, for it follows from the necessity of having a love of God in every human act.¹⁹

Let us now consider the different opinions of the official examiners of this proposition. Upon his first examination Sabbatini refused to give a final statement, until he was able to consult the book itself and speak with the author. This hesitation is due to the fact that Cardinal Ricci previously had stated that some words, which were missing, should be added. Sabbatini, however, did say that the proposition, as presented by the accuser, is erroneous because it approached the errors of Luther, as we mentioned above. Later, we discover he does not wish to censure this proposition.²⁰

Of all the examiners Fabri and the Master of the Sacred Palace were the most mild.²¹ The former merely stated it was scandalous, and the latter, scandalous and disturbing to the faithful. Three others bring in the notion of heresy. Dominic of the Holy Trinity holds that the proposition is rash, erroneous, and tasting of heresy. For Esparza it is scandalous, disturbing to the faithful, tasting of heresy. In the opinion of Mazza

¹⁷ Cfr. Porter's list of 105 at proposition 28. AOS, 193.

¹⁸ Canon 5 is as follows: "Si quis dixerit, eam contritionem, quae paratur per discussionem, collectionem et detestationem peccatorum, qua quis *recogitat annos suos in amaritudine animae suae* [Is. 38, 15], ponderando peccatorum suorum gravitatem, multitudinem, foeditatem, amissionem aeternae beatitudinis, et aeternae damnationis incursum, cum propositio melioris vitae, non esse verum et utilem dolorem, nec praeparare ad gratiam, sed facere hominem hypocritam et magis peccatorem; demum illam esse dolorem coactum et non liberum ac voluntarium, a. s." Cfr. DENZINGER, n. 915.

¹⁹ The 38th condemned proposition of Baius is: "Omnis amor creaturae rationalis aut vitiosa est cupiditas, qua mundus diligitur, quae a Ioanne prohibetur, aut laudabilis illa caritas, qua per Spiritum Sanctum in corde diffusa Deus amatur." Cfr. DENZINGER, n. 1038. According to the anti-jansenists the 9th proposition in our list of 31 implies that attrition is sinful, because it does not proceed from love.

²⁰ The words of Sabbatini are as follows: "Si ista propositio his terminis constaret quibus ab accusatore defertur, dicerem, esse erroneam, quia accedet ad errorem Lutheri, qui dicebat attritionem et contritionem, ex metu gehennae et turpitudinem peccati conceptas, esse peccata. Sed quia Emmus Riccius, ut habetur in folio A, dixit illi addenda esse verba, idcirco de illa iudicium ferre pro nunc suspendo quousque authorem ipsum, cui tribuitur, videre ac legere potero, quod hactenus mihi non licuit. Scio enim accusatoribus temere non esse credendum, ut qui plerumque, dummodo causam obtinere possint, apud etiam incorruptos iudices calumniis agere non verantur; et quod propositiones a contextu avulsae aut deportatae saepe alium sensum quam ab auctore intentum generare solent." Cfr. ms. 899, Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, fol. 251 v.

²¹ See *Killiney Papers*, ms. D. 21.

it is rash and tasting of heresy in as far as it is contrary to the decrees of the councils and popes. Two of the examiners made distinctions. Bianchi says: "Si nomine *respectus* intelligatur tendentia in Deum per verum actum caritatis stricte dictae, est haeresi ut minimum proxima. Si non per *respectum* intelligatur tendentia in Deum per aliquem actum elicited caritatis, non est censurabilis." According to Maderno: "Si intelligatur *sine ullo respectu* tam ex parte operis quam operantis non est censurabilis; in sensu vero ab auctore intento, est scandalosa et suspecta de haeresi et coincidit cum 36a²² Baii damnata.²³

Concerning the comments after the condemnation of the 31, Viva²⁴ traces the 9th one back to the errors of Baius, Luther, Calvin and others. He sees its connection with the 7th (which he says is bainistic) in our list of 31.²⁵ The judgments of Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher,²⁶ Steyaert²⁷ and later, Le Bachelet,²⁸ are all substantially the same, that is, the proposition is based on the necessity of all action proceeding from a love of God.

CONCLUSION

Let us examine our proposition in its context. It seems to me that Havermans is innocent of the charges laid against him by the anti-jansenists, for by the phrase *sine ullo ad Deum offensum respectu* he understands a *complete* exclusion of God as our ultimate end. My reasons for this assertion is based on the following. Recall that in the fourth chapter the author is discussing various intentions from which our actions may proceed. The second intention (*intentio stoica*) consists in avoiding evil and doing good because this is befitting a rational

²² DENZINGER, n. 1036.

²³ The summary report of F. Diaz is as follows: "Censura quinque theologorum fuit quod haec propositio sit suspecta de haeresi, haeresique proxima; duorum vero quod sit scandalosa et perturbativa fidelium." See AGOFM, III, 11, fol. 700r.

²⁴ Cfr. D. VIVA, *Damnatae theses ab Alexandro VII, Innocentio XI, et Alexandro VIII, Patavii 1709*, part three, p. 43—45.

²⁵ Propositio 7 is: "Omnis humana actio deliberata est Dei dilectio vel mundi: si Dei, caritas Patris est; si mundi, concupiscentia carnis, hoc est, mala est." DENZINGER, n. 1297.

²⁶ *Reflexiones breves ad triginta et unam propositiones decreto de die VII decembris 1690 . . . justissime damnatas, quibus carum origo et falsitas et oppositae doctrinae veritas aperitur per Hilarium a S. Sepulchro, Coloniae 1692*, p. 19—20.

²⁷ M. STEYAERT, *Novitas utrimque de novo repressa per decretum duplex Sanctissimi Domini Nostri Alexandri PP. VIII, Lovanii 1691*, p. 353—354. I cite the edition which appears in the: *Opuscula ex D. Martini Steyaert, S. Theologiae Doctoris et Professoris Regii in Academia Lovaniensi, etc., vol. I, Lovanii, 1742*.

²⁸ X. LE BACHELET, *Alexandre VIII, Propositions condamnées par lui, le 24 août et le 7 décembre 1690*, in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. I, Paris 1910, col. 755.

creature. According to our Premonstratensian, they resuscitate Stoicism "qui bonum morale operatur *praecise* propter naturalem honestatem *sine relatione ad Deum*." This statement of itself does not prove our point, but let us continue the examination of the context. Havermans cites three effective quotations from St. Augustine (confer the text above). Note for example the following: "Licet a quibusdam tunc verae et honestae putentur esse virtutes, cum ad seipsas referuntur, nec propter aliud expetuntur; etiam tunc inflatae ac superbae sunt, et ideo non virtutes, sed vitia iudicanda sunt." After presenting the quotations, Havermans makes the important statement:

Vere ergo illos virtutum actus superbiae accusat S. Augustinus quia talis operans nimis alto loco seipsum suasque operationes habet, cum *sibi det locum finis cui ultimi, suisque operationibus finis cuius ultimi*; quod est seipsum nimis efferre, sibique tribuere honorem, qui *soli Deo debetur*.

In other words there is expressed here a situation in which *man* is substituted for *God* as the final end. Such is the meaning, therefore, which the author attributes to the words, "*sine ullo ad Deum offensum respectu*." The same is deduced from what proximately follows: "quamvis enim talis actio ex officio sit optima, ipso tamen non recto fine peccaminose fit." In other words, the act itself — hatred of sin "*ob eius turpitudinem et disconvenientiam cum natura rationali*" is good, but because of the *finis* "*sine ullo ad Deum offensum respectu*" it becomes sinful.

The anti-jansenists were correct in saying the 9th proposition according to their interpretation repeats errors of Luther and is baianistic — and for these reasons it has been condemned. They are mistaken, however, in saying that the 9th proposition thus understood is found in the *Tyrocinium* of Macarius Havermans.

II

PROPOSITIO 10: Intentio, qua quis detestatur malum et prosequitur bonum mere, ut coelestem obtineat gloriam, non est recta nec Deo placens.

SOURCE OF THE PROPOSITION

Our tenth proposition, as the preceeding one, is attributed to the *Tyrocinium* of Macarius Havermans, and in the same tract and chapter as proposition 9.¹ We shall, therefore, immediately pass to the consideration of the context.

¹ This proposition is found with Duffy: under n. 42 of the *Theologia Baio-janseniana*, part three; under n. 95 of the 356 propositions, n. 61 of the 96 propositions; with Porter: under n. 107 of the 238 propositions, n. 30 of the 105 propositions.

EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT

It will be recalled that the author in the fourth chapter discusses eight intentions from which our actions may proceed. In the fifth place he says that one may avoid evil and do good *mere ut coelestem obtineat gloriam*. Havermans writes:

Quinta intentio vocari potest *intentio mercenaria*; cum mercenarii sua opera faciant mere, ut promissum suis laboribus praemium consequentur; unde si non sperarent se consecuturos illud praemium, opera illa non facerent. Tali intentione multi Christiani hodie sua faciunt opera, solam, aut saltem praecipue, intuentes mercedem, et quidem non alium ob finem quam propter propriam utilitatem, seu ex amore proprio; quales isti esse solent, qui Deo non serviunt nisi mercedem aliquam ab illo expectarent, quique viso lupo fugiunt, et dimittunt oves, quoniam non pertinet ad eos de ovibus, id est non salutem ovium, sed suam tantum quaerunt utilitatem. Intentio haec non est recta nec bona, ut enim recte observat S. Bernardus (Liber de diligendo Deo): "Vacua caritas esse non potest, nec tamen mercenaria est."²

Thus we have the obvious passage from which our proposition has been taken. The slight change is also noted. Where the condemned proposition has *non est recta nec Deo placens*, the text of Havermans reads *non est recta nec bona*. Many of the earlier lists of the propositions give this latter reading.³ Although Haverman's treatment of the *intentio mercenaria* extends from page 101 to 108, in no place have I found the direct and explicit statement *non est recta nec Deo placens*.

DOCTRINAL JUDGMENT

As with proposition 9, Porter⁴ in like manner judges this one to be according to the mind of Baius, following from the necessity of the love of God in every human action. In the list of 105 this proposition is included under the heading, "De caritate, eius praecepto, necessaria relatione operum in Deum ex caritate." It is not surprising that Porter claims that the proposition is contrary to the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 31⁵: "Si quis dixerit, iustificatum peccare, dum intuitu aeternae

² *Liber de diligendo Deo, cap. VII*. See MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. 182, col. 984.

³ I found the reading "non est recta nec Deo placens" in the following places: Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 899, fol. 280r; Pistoia, Bibliotheca Febroniana, ms. 22, in a special packet containing information on the propositions; finally, Rome, Vatican Archives, Nuntiatura di I'andria, 203, near the end.

⁴ AOS, 193. See Porter's note in connection with proposition 28 in his list of 105.

⁵ DENZINGER, n. 841.

mercedis bene operatur, a. s." The comments of the other anti-jansenists even see here the errors of Luther and Calvin.⁶

In the judgment of the faculty of Louvain⁷ the proposition was understood as excluding every relation to God. Therefore, it is correct as it stands and not to be censured. On the other hand, if one wishes heavenly glory, so that in the first place God may be glorified, this is a good act. The comments of the faculty concludes with the following remark:

Ergo mentem suam sic aperuit facultas cum Cardinale Bellarmino, tom. 4, lib. 5 de iustificatione, cap. 9 in responsione ad 1. 2. 3. argumentum⁸: "Nos non dicimus in bonis operibus solam, ac praecipue, spectandam esse mercedem, sed Deum, eiusque gloriam tamquam finem ultimum, mercedem autem, ut finem secundarium qui propter Deum, eiusque gloriam expectatur; cupimus enim Deum videre, atque ex ea visione felices effici, ut tanto ardentius, et securius Dominum diligamus."

Sabbatini defends our tenth proposition for he understands it in the sense that God is excluded as the ultimate end. He writes⁹:

Non est censurabilis eo sensu intellecta, quo casu auctor intellexisse videtur, scilicet, quod si quis solum detestatur malum et prosequitur bonum ut pro ultimo fine habeat gloriam, tamquam et quatenus sibi commode est. Nam ut ait S. Augustinus Liber 50 homiliarum, homilia 38,¹⁰ "cavere debemus, ne ad praemium diligamus Deum." Praeterea nisi amor suipsius ad Deum referatur actu vel virtute, est vitiosus, sed "qui detestatur malum etc." ad praemium tantum respicit et intendit beatitudinem tamquam ultimum finem, ergo.

Hoc idem docere S. Thomas 2. 2. q. 19. a. 3 in corpore mihi videtur, ubi ait amor sui tripliciter se potest habere ad caritatem uno, nempe, modo

⁶ Their complete comment is as follows: "Haec sententia est etiam Calvini in antidoto Tridentinae ad sessionem 6, cap. 25. [The *Acta Synodi Tridentinae cum antidoto* was written by Calvin in 1547 against the Council of Trent]. Lutheri assertionem 6 damnata a Leone X, *contritione quae paratur per amissionem aeternae beatitudinis facit hypocritam immo magis peccatorem* [DENZINGER, n. 746], pugnat cum Trid. sess. 6, can. 31: *si quis dixerit iustificatum peccare dum intuitu aeternae mercedis bene operatur, a. s.* [DENZINGER, n. 841]. Si autem intentio faciendi bonum vel detestandi malum mere ob coelestem gloriam non sit recta nec Deo placens igitur iustus habens talem intentionem non placet Deo cum tamen Christus (Math. 19) dicat, *si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata*, ubi pro motivo servandi mandata, adeoque bene faciendi, proponit vitam seu coelestem gloriam." Cfr. *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae* . . . , Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico, ms. 1343.

⁷ Cfr. *Iudicium facultatis theologiae Lovaniensis super 96 propositiones hic iniunctis*, at proposition 61, Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico, ms. 1343.

⁸ *Opera Omnia*, vol. IV, Naples 1858, Part I, p. 617.

⁹ Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 899, fol. 251v—252r.

¹⁰ MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. IV, col. 1692. In the new order it is listed as sermon 385.

contrariatur caritati secundum quod aliquis in amore proprii boni finem constituit; alio vero modo in caritate includitur secundum quod homo se propter Deum et in Deo diligit; tertio modo a caritate quidem distinguitur sed caritati non contrariatur, puta, cum aliquis diligit seipsum secundum rationem proprii boni ita tamen quod in hoc proprio bono non constituat finem. Haec S. Thomas, ex quibus sic arguo. "Intentio qua quis detestatur malum etc." in amore proprii boni finem constituit, ergo ipsius intentio non est recta et Deo placens.

Only one of the theologians of the Holy Office was in accord with Sabbatini in saying our tenth proposition is not to be censured. Three proclaimed it heretical and two judged it *sapiens haeresim*. Dominic of the Blessed Trinity made the following distinction: "Si li mere accipiatur excludendo alium finem non est censurabilis; absolute tamen est de haeresi suspecta, si non haeretica prout definit Trid. sessio 6, canon 31."¹¹

In General, the various commentators after the condemnation of this proposition, as Viva,¹² Steyaert,¹³ Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher,¹⁴ as also Le Bachelet,¹⁵ raise the same objections, namely, reducible to the errors of Luther, Calvin, Baius and Jansenius. However, we do notice another point indicated by these men. They say the tenth proposition is contrary to the doctrine of the Church concerning the theological virtue of hope, for to avoid evil and to do good that heaven may be obtained is to act formally from a motive of christian *hope*, not of charity.

CONCLUSION

What is to be said regarding the tenth proposition? As usual, we do not wish to enter deeply into all the theological disputes. However, several remarks are in place. First of all, Havermans was not unaware that his doctrine was being denounced as bainistic. As already mentioned in our consideration of proposition 9, he answered his opponents by his *Defensio brevis Tyrocinii Moralis Theologiae* and the *Epistola apologetica* to Innocent XI. For example, in the latter work he writes¹⁶:

¹¹ Bianchi agreed with Sabbatini in not censuring this proposition. Esparza, Maderno and Mazza held it as heretical. Fabri and the Master of the Sacred Palace judged it as *sapiens haeresim*. See *Killiney Papers*, D. 21.

Later in his summary report Diaz stated the following: "Censura sex theologorum fuit quod dicta propositio sit suspecta de haeresi, vel haeretica absolute et periculosa." AGOFM, III, 11, fol. 700r.

¹² VIVA, *op. cit.*, p. 45—48.

¹³ STEYAERT, *op. cit.*, p. 350—352.

¹⁴ HILARIUS A S. SEPULCHRO, *op. cit.*, p. 21—23.

¹⁵ LE BACHELET, *op. cit.*, col. 755.

¹⁶ *Epistola apologetica ad Summum Pontificem Innocentium XI contra iniustam accusationem Francisci Simonis*, S. Theologiae lectoris, Coloniae 1676, p. 30, par. 21.

Interim non desunt qui et illam doctrinam in Bayo condemnatam asserant, inter quos hic est accusator in quem finem asserunt sequentes propositiones condemnatas: "Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia" et "omnis amor creaturae rationalis aut vitiosa est cupiditas qua mundus diligitur quae a Joanne prohibetur; aut laudabilis illa caritas qua per Spiritum Sanctum in corde diffusa Deus amatur."¹⁷ Verum neutram ex hisce vel quoad apparentiam sequi ex nostra doctrina usque ad nauseam ostendi, fateorque utramque illam propositionem iure merito tamquam falsam esse damnatam, neque ullam cum nostra ex Augustino aliisque Patribus deprompta doctrina habere connexionem.

Secondly, it seems that the anti-jansenists were somewhat over enthusiastic in seeking the condemnation of our Premonstratensian. If we examine the section of the *Tyrocinium*¹⁸ where the author treats actions placed *mere ut coelestem obtineat gloriam*, we note the following. Havermans says those acting from such a motive have a mercenary intention. Mercenaries perform actions only to obtain the promised reward. Many Christians act in a like manner. They regard only the prize. They act for no other end than their own advantage and own love. If we compare this passage (as given above) with a text of Cardinal Bellarmine, a striking similarity is noted. In the section under consideration Bellarmine is also treating of acting *intuitu mercedis aeternae*. He writes¹⁹:

Mercenarios proprie non vocari, nisi qui mercedem solam, aut praecipue intuentur. Isti enim sunt, qui si merces nulla praesto esset, Domino non servirent. Isti etiam sunt, qui viso lupo fugiunt et dimittunt oves; quoniam non pertinet ad eos de ovibus, id est, non ovium salutem, sed propriam tantum utilitatem propositam habent. Hos igitur Dominus reprehendit, nec non S. Bernardus et S. Thomas.²⁰

To further understand the position of Havermans, it will be very useful to quote another passage of the *Tyrocinium*, still in the section concerning the *intentio mercenaria*. He writes²¹:

Petes an ergo non habeant rectam intentionem qui operantur intuitu mercedis aeternae? Respondeo catholicum dogma est, quod licite et laudabiliter cum Psalmista "inclinemus cor nostrum ad faciendas iustificationes

¹⁷ These are the condemned propositions of Michael Baius, n. 25 and 38. See DENZINGER, n. 1025 and 1038.

In the *Tyrocinium*, chapter VI "De relatione operum in Deum" Havermans gives his views on this matter and in the following pages he answers various objections.

¹⁸ As mentioned above, this is referring to the *Tyrocinium*, 2nd edition, Antwerp, 1675, tract 2, chap. 4, p. 101—108.

¹⁹ *Opera omnia*, ed. cit., p. 617.

²⁰ It is to be noted that the texts of Havermans and Cardinal Bellarmine are very similar. Probably they made use of the same sources.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 103—105.

Dei in aeternum propter retributionem" non solum ipsi dandam, sed et ab ipso recipiendam qui iuxta sacram Scripturam se posuit mercedem nostram, iuxta illud, "Ego sum merces tua magna nimis." Et nihil Scripturae tam familiare, quam excitare homines ad bene operandum promissione vitae aeternae bravium comprehendamus. Et de Moyse dicit quod respiciebat in remunerationem. Et hanc sententiam unanimiter contra modernos haereticos docent SS. Patres; sufficiet nobis unicus S. Augustini locus ubi dicit: "Quando facis bonum opus, propter vitam aeternam fac . . . Noli facere nisi propter vitam aeternam; ideo fac et securius facies: hoc enim mandavit Deus."

Bonam ergo et rectam, et non mercenariam habet intentionem qui operando intuitu mercedis aeternae, illam solummodo secundario exspectat, primario autem "ut in primis glorificetur Deus," quod sollicitate exigit Tridentinum ab illis qui intuitu mercedis operantur. Tunc autem solummodo secundario mercedem exspectamus, quando operamur propter mercedem in eum finem ut illa obtenta Deo melius et exactius serviamus, hocque non ut mercenarium, sed filiale habendum est, quando quidem tunc illud quod operans principaliter intendit, non sit merces, sed mercede obtenta magis et stabilius placere Deo, et exactius facere illa, quae ipsi grata et accepta sunt.

Is not this in substance what had been related by Cardinal Bellarmine as presented by the faculty of Louvain, as we mentioned above? Furthermore, the Cardinal after citing a passage from the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 11²², remarks²³:

Ubi clare videmus non tantum nec praecipue amore mercedis operandum esse ex doctrina concilii, sed primum quidem propter gloriam Dei, deinde etiam propter mercedem felicitatis aeternae.

Our tenth proposition, as it stands, has been justly condemned — understood especially in a baianistic sense. I do not believe it has been condemned according to the mind of Macarius Havermans, its proposed author according to the anti-jansenists.

III

PROPOSITIO 14: Timor gehennae non est supernaturalis.

SOURCE OF THE PROPOSITION

This proposition is attributed to the *Dissertatio dogmatica*, cap. 15, fol. 74 et 75 of Christian Lupus. It is found in all the lists of Porter, but lacking in Duffy's list of 96.¹

²² DENZINGER, n. 804.

²³ *Op. cit.* p. 616.

¹ Duffy gives this proposition in his *Theologia Baio-ianseniana*, part III, n. 36; among the 356 propositions, n. 93. Besides giving the name of Lupus as its source, he adds: "Macarius Havermans in Tyrocinio, tract. 1, cap. 4, par. 2, num. 77, pag. 185 et alii." With Porter it is found in the following places: among the 238 propositions, n. 121; among the 105, n. 37.

Christian Lupus² was born at Ypres on July 23, 1612. He was professed in the Order of the Hermits of St. Augustine in 1628. Later, while teaching philosophy at Cologne, he became acquainted with Cardinal Fabio Chigi, the future Alexander VII.³ It was in 1640 that he was called to Louvain where he successfully fulfilled his duty as professor of theology, basing his teaching on the doctrine of St. Augustine. From this time till his death on various occasions he was accused of Jansenism, but more than once he justified himself at Rome. It was reported that Lupus, who studied about fifteen hours every day, assimilated all that he read. For this reason he was called the walking library.

In his effort to obtain the doctorate, he was at first impeded, having been accused of Jansenism. He did obtain this title, however, at Louvain on February 4, 1653. In the autumn of 1655 Lupus went to Rome, where he cleared himself of the charges made against him. For five years he remained in the Eternal City keeping occupied with intellectual pursuits, and refusing various positions of honor and dignities which were offered to him.

After his return in 1660 Lupus became at Louvain one of the eight regents of the faculty of theology. It was in 1677 that he again visited Rome as a member of a committee of the University to petition the condemnation of some propositions concerning laxity in moral theology.⁴ He died in Louvain on July 10, 1681.

The *Dissertatio dogmatica* of Lupus has been cited by the anti-jansenists as the source of this proposition. On the title page of this work is found: *Dissertatio dogmatica de germano ac avito sensu sanctorum Patrum, universae semper ecclesiae, ac sacrosanctae praesertim Tridentinae Synodi circa christianam contritionem et attritionem per Fr. Christianum Lupum Ipreensem Ordinis Eremitarum S. Augustini, in universitate Lovaniensi Sacrae Theologiae doctorem et professorem. Lovanii, Typis*

² For information on Christian Lupus (De Wolf) one may consult: *Biographie nationale*, vol. VI, Brussels 1878, col. 24—27; *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. 15, Paris 1950, col. 3583; HURTER, *Nomenclator literarius*, vol. IV, Innsbruck 1910, col. 521—528; M. BAEKELANDT, *Leven en werken van P. Christianus Lupus*, in *Augustiniana*, 2 (1952) 150—167. A. Legrand — L. Ceyskens, *Documents romains concernant certains Augustins belges à l'époque du premier jansénisme*, in *Augustiniana*, 8 (1958) 200—236; 328—355.

³ See A. LEGRAND — L. CEYSSENS, *La correspondance antijanséniste de Fabio Chigi, nonce à Cologne* (Bibliothèque de l'Institut historique belge de Rome), Brussels-Rome 1957; L. CEYSSENS, *Sources relatives aux débuts du jansénisme et de l'anti-jansénisme*, (Bibliothèque de la Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, t. 32), Lovain 1957, passim.

⁴ See L. CEYSSENS, *De Leuvense deputatie te Rome (1677—1679)*, in *Historisch Tijdschrift*, 19 (1940) 252—312; 20 (1941) 99—136. On the friendship between Innocent XI and Lupus, cfr. L. CEYSSENS, *Patrice Duffy*, in *Catholic Survey*, 1 (1952) 235 and 241.

et sumptibus Viduae Bernardini Masii sub viridi Cruce, anno 1666. As is evident from the title, the work deals with various questions of attrition and contrition, concerning which lively discussions were being waged by theologians of that time.⁵

EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT

It is chapter 15, p. 74 and 75 which is of interest to us. The general topic under discussion is (servile) fear of hell. This fear is not concerned with the seventh gift of the Holy Spirit by which one, moved by a filial love of God, fears lest by sinning he offend his beloved Father. Also the fear which Lupus is treating greatly differs from that which is called initial or mixed, which already contains the beginning, although imperfect, of love of God. This latter is a mixture of love of God and love of self. On the contrary, our proposition concerns the servile fear of hell. Already in chapter 12 Lupus presents various notions of this fear. Whereas chapter 13 is concerned with the usefulness of servile fear, the following chapter discusses its various imperfections. Chapter 15 is introduced by the question: "An ob istas imperfectiones servilis gehennarum metus sit peccatum?" To the question Lupus responds by refuting two errors of Luther, who held that not only the fear of hell was a sin, but also the imperfect contrition conceived from it.

Against the first error of Luther, the author cites the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 8: "Si quis dixerit, gehennae metum, per quem ad misericordiam Dei de peccatis dolendo confugimus vel a peccando abstinemus, peccatum esse aut peccatores peiores facere, a. s."⁶ After

⁵ Concerning these controversies see; L. DÖLLINGER—F. H. REUSCH, *Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten*, vol. I, Nördlingen 1889, p. 85 ff.; REUSCH, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher*, vol. II, Bonn 1885, p. 531 ff.; L. CEYSSENS, *L'Origine du décret du Saint-Office concernant l'attrition* (5 mai 1667), in *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 24 (1949) 83—91; A. SOHIER, *Gilles Estrix*, in *Gregorianum*, 28 (1947) 238 ff.; A. JANSSEN, *Contritionisme tegen Attritionisme, strijd tusschen de pastoor van Gent en de Jezuïeten (1661—1670)*, in *Miscellanea historica in honorem Alberti de Meyer*, Louvain 1946, p. 1107—1129.

After consulting the above it will be evident that discussion on this matter existed long before the publication of the work of Lupus. Wherefore Estrix in his *Specimen* is somewhat hasty when he writes: "Anno 1666. Exarsit Lovanii contentio de attritione, quae tenuit annos plures scriptis hinc et hinc disputationibus polemicis non paucis. Quis principium huic pugnae dedit? CHRISTIANUS LUPUS S.T.D. Lovaniensis, qui Anno 1666 edidit *dissertationem dogmaticam* de contritione et attritione." Cfr. *Specimen*, part VII, chapter 14, p. 53.

⁶ DENZINGER, n. 818. Of this canon Lupus says: "Quidam non de pure servili, sed de initiali seu mixto, adeoque et ab adiuncta servilitate purgato metu existimant statui a Synodo. Et opinio non caret fundamentis. Ego credo statui etiam de pure servili." Cfr. LUPUS, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

various explanations which indicate that the fear of hell is not a sin, the text from which proposition 14 was extracted, thus occurs:

Hinc item laudatus timor [servilis gehennae], licet infusum ac supernaturallem fidei actum frequenter praesupponat, non est tamen ipse actus infusus aut supernaturalis. Quod fidem istam frequenter supponat, diserte tradit sanctus Augustinus . . .

Dico timorem hunc non posse esse *sine aliqua fide*, et fidem infusam ab ipso *frequenter supponi*. Haec enim non semper supponitur. Etenim haeretici etiam, quin et quidem pagani, a quibus remotissima est infusa fides, gehennam timent et timuerunt. Sufficit ergo animalis fides, et quaevis humana credulitas aut persuasio, qualem carnalibus Iudaeis infuisse scribit in libro *De spiritu et litera*, cap. 32 sanctus Augustinus. Addo etiam illum, qui fidem infusam praesupponit, non esse infusum aut supernaturallem. Quod enim non ex speciali Dei per Iesum Christum dono, sed ex proprio sui amore, adeoque ex puro libero arbitrio nascatur, est supra ostensum ex sancto Augustino. Et res ipsa clamat. Nam qui aequae de infligenda peccatis suis per iustum et optimum Deum gehenna, ac de infligendo per hominem Regem capitali supplicio non dubitat, utrumque malum non potest non aequaliter, immo istud longe magis fugere et horrere. Licet porro timor ille non sit infusus, est tamen a Deo incussus actus, quarum divinarum causalitatum differentiam exponere non spectat ad quaestionem praesentem. Gehennae metum, uti sanctum et Dei donum laudari vario sancti Augustini et aliorum Patrum testimonium novi: nempe, non omni istius mali metus est servilis; aliquis etiam castus est, qualis fuit in Adam ante lapsum, et in multis postea Sanctis, timentibus illud, non quia ipsis durum sit, sed quia intellectualis creaturae a naturali eius fine separativum.

Lupus continues by refuting the second error of Luther, which is that attrition conceived from fear of hell is a sin. Against this error the author proposed the teaching of the Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4 which states that such attrition does not make one a hypocrite and more of a sinner, but is a true gift of God and impulse of the Holy Spirit.⁷

In concluding this chapter the Augustinian refers to two movements in the soul of the penitent: the one a fear of hell or of other punishments from which imperfect contrition is commonly conceived; the other, the attrition itself conceived from this fear. On the latter Lupus writes:

Hanc definit [Concilium] esse motum, non dumtaxat utilem, sed et, licet non perfectam, tamen veram contritionem, Spiritus Sancti donum et impulsum, actum non incussum, sed infusum, impetrandae peccatorum remissioni praeparationem cum Sacramento aptam et omnino sufficientem. Quae omnia coeae ac impie Lutherus impugnavit.

⁷ DENZINGER, n. 897—898.

Behold, therefore the context from which the 14th proposition was taken. There is no doubt that it is almost verbally contained in chapter 15. We say *almost* because in the extracted proposition there is left out the word *servile*. This word is of great importance because it indicates the author is not treating of initial or mixed fear, but only of that fear which is based entirely on love of oneself.

DOCTRINAL JUDGMENT

In the opinion of Porter⁸ the doctrine of the 14th proposition "parum videtur coherere cum doctrina Tridentini, sess. 14, cap. 4 et 5," where it is defined that attrition conceived either from the turpitude of sin or the fear of hell and its punishments, is a gift of God. The anti-jansenists give a similar judgment⁹:

Pugnat cum declaratione Tridentini, sessione 14, capite 4, "illam vero contritionem imperfectam quae attritio dicitur, quoniam vel ex turpitudinis peccati consideratione vel ex gehennae et poenarum metu communiter concipitur, si voluntatem peccandi excludat cum spe veniae, declarat" (scilicet Synodus) "non solum non facere hominem hypocritam et magis peccatorem, verum etiam donum Dei esse et Spiritus Sancti impulsus;" impulsus, autem, Spiritus Sancti et donum Dei, est quid supernaturaliter, attritio autem ex gehennae metu concepta secundum Concilium est impulsus Spiritus Sancti, igitur est supernaturalis.

The individual opinions of all the examiners of the Holy Office are lacking. There is, however, the full text of the view of Sabbatini, who comes to the defense of his confrere in religion¹⁰:

Hac propositione iterum a delatore in iudicium vocatur P. Lupus,¹¹ sed diminute ipsa propositio refertur, ita, nempe, habetur et sub his terminis in disputatione dogmatica cap. 15 fol. 74 "laudatus timor (scilicet servilis, qui ex metu gehennae concipitur) licet infusum ac supernaturalem fidei actum frequenter praesupponat, non est tamen ipse actus infusus et supernaturalis," ex quo apparet a P. Lupo supernaturalitatem ab ipso timore gehennae non semper excludi, immo frequenter praesupponi; sed propositio ipsa sub censura cadere non potest, nam neque ex S. Patribus neque ex conciliis contrarium colligitur, nec colligi potest. Verum quidem est a Concilio Tridentino, sessione 6, canone 8 decerni contra errores Lutheri qui docuit timorem gehennae peccatum esse, et peccatores peiores facere: "si quis dixerit," inquit Concilium, "gehennae metum per quem ad misericordiam Dei de peccatis dolendo confugimus, vel a peccato abstinemus, peccatum esse, aut

⁸ AOS, 193 at proposition 34.

⁹ Cfr. *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae* . . . , Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico, ms. 1343.

¹⁰ Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 899, fol. 253 v—254 v.

¹¹ Among the 31 condemned propositions, the 4th and 5th are also attributed to Lupus.

peccatores peiores facere, anathema sit." Caeterum, an supernaturalis sit timor gehennae necne ab ipso non decernitur, neque ex hoc canone colligi potest, sicuti neque etiam ex alio loco, nimirum sess. 14 de poenitentia, capite 4, ubi ait: "illam vero contritionem imperfectam, quae attritio dicitur, quoniam vel ex turpitudinis peccati consideratione, vel ex gehennae et poenarum metu communiter concipitur, si voluntatem peccandi excludat cum spe veniae, declarat non solum non facere hominem hypocritam et magis peccatorem, verum etiam donum Dei esse et Spiritus Sancti impulsum non adhuc quidem inhabitantis sed tantum moventis."

Quidem scio aliquos, qui contra P. Lupum scripserunt hoc Tridentini testimonio uti ut minus acutis persuadeant timorem gehennae esse supernaturalem, sed profecto ipsi insigniter hallucinantur, nam Concilium agit de attritione quae ex timore gehennae concipitur, quam contra Lutherum declarat non solum non facere hominem hypocritam etc., sed etiam donum Dei esse et Spiritus Sancti impulsum etc., ex quo manifeste patet, quod illi qui ex hoc loco timoris gehennae supernaturalitatem probant, causam cum effectu imperite confundunt: effectus, nempe, metus gehennae est attritio, ipse autem metus gehennae est causa seu motivum attritionis.

Nec ratione destituitur propositio quia si timor gehennae esset supernaturalis, vel esset quoad substantiam, vel quoad modum, at neutro modo est supernaturalis, ergo, etc. Maior est certa; minor probabilis: non est supernaturalis quoad substantiam, quia qui timet habet pro fine proprium commodum, nempe, fugam mali; nec quoad modum, quia oritur ex puro arbitrio, nec indiget auxilio supernaturali quo eliciatur, ergo, etc.

Huic doctrinae consonat S. Thomas 2. 2. q. 19, art. 9, timor servilis, inquit, non est numerandus inter dona Spiritus Sancti, licet sit a Spiritu Sancto. Similia habet articulo 5 in cuius commentario Petrus de Aragonia scribit quod, supposita divina revelatione, qua poenae supernaturales manifestantur, potest homo sine alio auxilio ex parte voluntatis metuere ac fugere gehennam etc. Haec Petrus de Aragonia. In quo sensu dicit etiam P. Lupus, ut a principio dixi, timorem gehennae infusum ac supernaturalem fidei actum frequenter praesupponere, et pag. 75 dicit hunc gehennae timorem non esse infusum et supernaturalem, propterea "quod non ex speciali Dei per Iesum Christum dono, sed ex proprio sui amore, adeoque ex puro libero arbitrio nascatur," et mox, "licet porro," inquit, "timor ille non sit infusus, est tamen a Deo incussus actus;" qui demum sic concludit, "gehennae metum, ut sanctum et Dei donum laudari vario S. Augustini et aliorum Patrum testimonio novi."

Quod si P. Lupus damnandus est propterea quod in illo libello *disertationis dogmaticae* etc. scripserit timorem gehennae non esse supernaturalem, graviori censura notandi essent Scotus, Dominicus Soto et Melchior Canus qui docuerunt attritiones naturales dari posse quac in sacramento poenitentiae ad iustificationem sufficiunt. Certe Scotus in 4 dist. 14 quaest. 2 docet quod peccator existens in peccato potest ex puris naturalibus habere attritionem de peccato omnibus circumstantiis circumstantionatam, ut ipse loquitur, ac licet noster Gregorius Ariminensis illum reprehendat dist. 27 art. 3, ubi ostendit expresse contrarium doceri a SS. PP., nullus tamen hac de causa Scotum damnavit. Similiter Scotus in 4 dist. 17, quaest. 2, art. 5

et 2 de natura et gratia cap. 15 docet attritiones ex fine naturali et metu poenarum conceptas quae in sacramento poenitentiae ad iustificationem sufficiunt posse esse naturales. Idem docuit Melchior Canus . . .

The summary given by Diaz¹² states that the majority of the theologians held that the proposition is *male sonans et scandalosa*; some claimed it was heretical in a certain sense; and others in another sense excused it from condemnation.

In his treatment of the 14th proposition Viva¹³ neither refers to the name nor the opinion of Lupus, when he writes that, according to Baius, Jansenius and Carolus ab Assumptione,¹⁴ that fear is bad and is not supernatural even if it would proceed from a motive which is known by supernatural enlightenment, e. g., from the fear of hell or its punishments, in as far as inflicted by God. Viva himself holds that fear conceived from a motive known supernaturally is certainly supernatural. As a proof he appeals to the Council of Trent, to those passages cited above. Although in session 14, chapter 4 we read: "*Illam vero contritionem imperfectam, quae attritio dicitur, quoniam vel ex turpitudinis peccati consideratione vel ex gehennae et poenarum metu communiter concipitur, si voluntatem peccandi excludat cum spe veniae . . . verum etiam donum Dei esse et Spiritus Sancti impulsus*," Viva asserts: "*Et capitulum 4 huiusmodi timorem appellat bonum motum, Dei donum et Spiritus Sancti impulsus*." Steyaert¹⁵ in the same manner interprets this passage of the Council of Trent, i. e., as referring also to the fear itself as well as the attrition conceived from this fear. Neither does he give any indication to Lupus as the author of the 14th proposition.

Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher¹⁶ in the very beginning of his consideration presents his definition of the *timor gehennae* in the following manner: "*Porro timor gehennae, de quo hic agitur, non respicit nude poenas gehennae propter poenas, quatenus sunt malum aliquod naturale ibi sistendo: sed respicit poenas illas, quas homo fide praelucente credit a Deo propter peccata infligendas, quibus in aeternum et in sensibus crucietur et adeptione, ac possessione summi boni, quod Deus est, privetur*." It is therefore evident according to this anti-jansenist the *timor gehennae* always includes a supernatural element. Thus he differs from the opinion of Lupus, as we have seen above.

¹² AGOFM, III, 11, fol. 700v.

¹³ VIVA, *op. cit.*, p. 55—57.

¹⁴ Cfr. P. COSMAS DE VILLIERS, *Bibliotheca Carmelitana*, Rome 1927, col. 311—312.

¹⁵ STEYAERT, *op. cit.*, p. 352—354.

¹⁶ HILARIUS A S. SEPULCHRO, *op. cit.*, p. 26—28.

Hilary also asserts that according to Luther, Jansenius and his disciples, namely, John Sinnich, Christian Lupus, Francis Van Vianen and Gummarius Huyghens, this fear is bad and pernicious, if it lacks the *dilectio benevolentiae Dei*. Likewise, as the other anti-jansenists, he declares that proposition 14 is contrary to the Council of Trent in the places already indicated. Although he refers to the *Dissertatio dogmatica* of Lupus, he does not indicate the place designated by Porter as the source of the proposition.

Le Bachelet,¹⁷ who treats propositions 14 and 15 together, attributes our 14th proposition to Lupus in chapter 15. He says that the doctrine of these two propositions have a twofold basis: the one baianistic, by which it is denied that attrition which does not proceed from a love of God but from a fear of hell and punishments is able to be a good and supernatural movement; the other, by which it is asserted that attrition without an efficacious will of avoiding sin is not able to be supernatural.

CONCLUSION

It seems to me that the anti-jansenist who extracted this proposition did not accurately and fully express the mind of Lupus. For the proposition which simply asserts that the fear of hell is not supernatural, does not take into account the distinction which the author has in the text concerning the servile fear itself and the attrition conceived from this fear. Of the fear, as distinct from attrition, and of the fear alone, according to Lupus, although it is a movement *a Deo incussus* and for the most part presupposes an infused and supernatural act of faith, in itself it is not supernatural.

What is to be said concerning this view of Lupus? The anti-jansenists, who have interpreted chapter 4 of the Council of Trent (session 14) not only of attrition but also of the fear of hell, are by this very fact forced to judge the view of Lupus as contrary to the teaching of Trent.¹⁸ Of the authors writing immediately after the decree of condemnation Viva and Steyaert give no mention of Lupus or his work. A third, namely, Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher, merely mentions the treatise of Lupus at chapter 15. For the rest, he is prudently silent. All this seems to indicate that according to these authors the view of Lupus

¹⁷ LE BACHELET, *op. cit.*, col. 756—757.

¹⁸ Estrix in his *Specimen* refers to the *Dissertatio dogmatica*, chapter 15, p. 74 and 75 under the paragraph entitled: "Assertiones affirmantium attritionem ex timore gehennae, aut ipsum gehennae timorem, non esse donum Dei, aut Spiritus Sancti impulsus." Cfr. *op. cit.*, part II, chapter 4, par. 2.

is one still open for free discussion. On the other hand, proposition 14 in its obvious sense certainly is to be judged as *male sonans* and *scandalosa*, and is worthy of condemnation.

IV

PROPOSITIO 16: Ordinem praemittendi satisfactionem absolutioni induxit non politia aut institutio Ecclesiae, sed ipsa Christi lex et praescriptio, natura rei id ipsum quodammodo dictante.

SOURCE OF THE PROPOSITION

The source of the 16th proposition according to Porter is "auctor compendiosae deductionis seu typographus Gandensis in praefatione, 1672."¹ Duffy, while citing the same source in his *Theologia Baio-ianseniana*, also refers to Anthony Arnould's *De la fréquente Communion*, part 2, chapter 8, p. 228. There are others, who, writing after the decree of condemnation, not only indicate the source as given above, but also make mention of Arnould.² Since however, Porter in his official list of propositions presented to the Holy Office cites only the "auctor compendiosae deductionis," we will not enter further into this question concerning Arnould.

After investigating we have discovered that the above notation of Porter refers to the following: *Canones poenitentiales a S. Carolo Borromaeo ex antiquis poenentialibus collecti, quibus praemittitur compendiosa deductio in cognitionem originis, vigoris et declinationis dictorum canonum. Gandavi, Typis Francisci d'Ercle, Typog. et Bibliopolae ad insigne Phoenicis, 1672.*³ A brief description of this book is in place. The title already gives some indication of its contents, namely, a collection by St. Charles Borromaeo of the ancient penitential canons.⁴ In the very

¹ This proposition is found with Duffy: under n. 101 of the *Theologia Baio-ianseniana*, part three; n. 247 of the 356 propositions; it is not found in his list of 96 propositions; with Porter; under n. 152 of the 238 propositions; n. 52 of the 105 propositions.

² See, e. g., Steyaert, Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher, Viva, the anonymous work, *Jansenismus plurimas haereses et errores damnatos pertinaciter defendens*; even Le Bachelet. In defense of Arnould, cfr. A. ARNAULD, *Difficultés proposées à M. Steyaert, IX part; 96 difficulté*, Cologne 1692, p. 260 ff.; G. GERBERON, *Quaestio iuris pontificii circa decretum ab inquisitione Romano adversus 31 propositiones latum... a P. Le Prestre*, Toulouse 1692, p. 16.

³ For a historical background at the time of the appearance of this work, see A. SOHIER, Gilles Estrix S.J. (1624—1964) un important controversiste oublié, in *Gregorianum*, 28 (1947) 236—290, especially p. 258; L. CEYSSENS, L'influence de Gilles Estrix sur l'origine de la Députation louvainiste à Rome 1677—1679, in *Gregorianum*, 30 (1949) 130—157, especially p. 139.

⁴ Cfr. *Acta Ecclesiae Mediolanensis a Carolo Cardinali S. Praxedis Archiepiscopo condita, Federici Card. Borromaei Archiepiscopi Mediolani*

beginning there is a paragraph in large print with the title *Typographus lectori*. In this paragraph the printer asserts that these penitential canons are frequently referred to, yet copies of them are rarely found. Therefore, he now presents them, especially for the benefit of those who have the care of souls. He also states that the canons are preceded by the "compendiosa ac lucida deductio" which he has received "a viro istarum rerum studioso."⁵ Immediately follows an historical treatise of about 150 pages by an anonymous author concerning the origin, use and decline of these canons. Then follows an approbation of the work by P. De Mey, canon and treasurer of the cathedral of Ghent and censor of books.⁶

Finally, there is the collection of canons themselves, which occupies about the last 50 pages of the book. This section is entitled: *Canones poenitentiales, quorum cognitio parochis, confessoribusque necessaria est; dispositi pro ratione ordineque Decalogi. Per Sanctum Carolum Borromaeum, S. R. E. Cardinalem, Archiepiscopum Mediolanensem*. In the first place, penances are given for the various violations of each of the Ten Commandments of God. Then follow the canons relative to the seven capital sins and various other sins. At the end are some declarations "ex poenitentiali Romano," followed by other brief declarations. In marginal notes are indicated the sources of various canons. Examples of some of the penances are as follows: who kills a priest must do penance for twelve years; who speaks ill of his parents must eat bread and water for forty days; the priest who celebrates the Sacrifice of the Mass without receiving Holy Communion, must do penance for a year, and in the meantime, is forbidden to say Holy Mass.⁷

iussu. Mediolani, ex officina typographica quon. Pacificii Pontii Impressoris Archiepiscopalis, 1599. Cardinal Borromaeo had included these penitential canons in his instructions for the administration of the Sacrament of Penance (p. 518—534). His intention was not that these canons be literally adhered to. Rather, they are to be as a norm for the confessor in giving penances for various sins. (cfr. p. 523). According to St. Charles a knowledge of these canons was necessary, for in the administration of the Sacrament not only prudence and piety must be exercised but also justice (cfr. p. 525). For those cases when absolution must be deferred, according to St. Charles, cfr. p. 11; 765—768; 774—775.

⁵ Occasionally this work is referred to as *Typographus Gandensis*, a title which is false and misleading, for it would seem that the typographus is the author of the *compendiosa deductio*. From a careful reading of the first paragraph one discovers this is not true. This work is sometimes called *prae-fatio Gandensis*.

⁶ Cfr. A. E. HELLIN, *Histoire chronologique des évêques et du chapitre exempt de l'Eglise cathédrale de S. Bavon à Gand; suivie d'un recueil des épitaphes modernes et anciennes de cette Eglise. Gand 1772*, vol. I, p. 170.

⁷ A recent study regarding the pastoral ministry of St. Charles Borromaeo has appeared, namely, R. MOLS, *Saint Charles Borromée, pionnier de la pastorale moderne*, in *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 79 (1957) 600—622;

As mentioned above, the author of this preface or "compendiosa ac lucida deductio" is anonymous. Le Bachelet,⁸ who probably took his information from the *Specimen*⁹ of Estrix, says that the author (whoever he is) was well known in Belgium. Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher¹⁰ gives the same information. As noticed above, the printer at the beginning of the book relates that he has received this preface from some one acquainted with such matters. The only bit of positive information concerning the author that I have found is contained in a second edition of this work published at Cologne in 1678. After the title, one reads: "Per D. I. Gillemans S. T. L.¹¹ ecclesiae Cathedralis Gandavensis Canonicum et Archipresbyterum. Editio secunda ab auctore recognita. Coloniae Agrippinae, Typis Francisci Deckerii ad insigne SS. Petri et Pauli, 1678." Gillemans was no stranger to the anti-jansenists. In the years 1649—1653 he had accompanied to Madrid John Recht, jansenistic representative of the Belgian bishops and of the University of Louvain, regarding the bull of Urban VIII *In eminenti*.¹²

EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT

Let us now examine the text of the *praefatio Gandensis* relative to our 16th proposition¹³:

Hic itaque poenitentiae ordo et decursus erat. Primum confessio peccatorum poenitentiaeque postulatio. Deinde, impositio poenitentiae, postea, impositae poenitentiae expletio. Ad extremum, absolutio. Ad huius vero

715—747. According to the author one of the characteristics of this ministry was rigorism, and this rigoristic aspect was due to the severe character of the saint himself, as well as to the spirit of the times of the Counter-Reformation. (Cfr. especially p. 715 ff). Cardinal Borromaeo died in 1584.

⁸ LE BACHELET, *op. cit.*, col. 757.

⁹ [G. ESTRIX], *Specimen doctrinae theologiae per Belgium manantis ex academia Lovaniensis ab anno 1644 usque ad annum 1677*, part 2, chap. 5, par. 7. For information on this work, see A. SOHIER, *op. cit.*, p. 268 ff.

¹⁰ HILARIUS A S. SEPULCHRO, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹¹ See A. E. HELLIN, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

¹² See L. CEYSSENS, *Jean Recht en mission à Madrid pour l' "Augustinus" et l'Augustinisme*, in *Augustiniana*, 1 (1951) 21—47; 107—139; 192—204; IDEM, *Le Cardinal Jean Bona et le Jansénisme*, in *Benedictina*, 10 (1956) 304 ff.; P. HOFFER, *La dévotion à Marie au déclin du XVII^e siècle*, Paris 1938, p. 140 ff and p. 199 ff.

¹³ In his list of 105, Porter writes the proposition is to be found on page 19. In his earlier list of 238 he gives page 20. Duffy in his *Theologia Baio-ian-seniana* mentions page 24. Sabbatini apparently noticed this discrepancy in the enumeration of pages for he writes: "adscribitur propositio praefationi Gandavi pag. (ut refertur a delatore) 19 et 20." (Cfr. ms. 899, fol. 254 v—255 r, Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica). However, in producing the indicated text of the preface of Ghent, Sabbatini has the same as I indicate above, which was found on page 24, as Duffy stated.

ordinis demonstrationem, quem tot saeculis tam eximium ac salutiferum censuit Ecclesia, unum alterumve dumtaxat proferemus testimonium.

Ac primum, S. Gregorius Magnus Hom. 26 in Evang.¹⁴: "Videndum est quae culpa praecessit aut quae sit poenitentia secuta post culpam: ut quos omnipotens Deus per compunctionis gratiam visitat, illos Pastoralis sententia absolvat. Tunc enim vera est absolutio praesidentis, cum aeterni arbitrium sequitur iudicis." Similiter, Innocentius I in Epistola I Decret. ita scribit¹⁵ "Coeterum de pondere aestimando delictorum, sacerdotis est iudicare, ut attendat ad confessionem poenitentis, et ad fletus atque lachrymas corrigentis, ac tum iubere dimitti cum viderit congruam satisfactionem." Denique, S. Leo Epistola 91¹⁶ haec habet: "Mediator Dei et hominum Homo Christus Iesus, hanc praepositis ecclesiae tradidit potestatem, ut confitentibus actionem poenitentiae darent, et eosdem salubri satisfactione purgatos, ad Communionem Sacramentorum per ianuam reconciliationis admitterent."

Ordinem vero hunc non consuetudo, non politia, aut institutio Ecclesiae induxit, sed ipsa Christi lex ac praescriptio, natura rei idipsum quodammodo dictante, quod Synodus Tridentina indicare videtur, dum dicit, sessio 14, capitulum 5¹⁷: "Cum sacerdotes a Christo constituti sint iudices, incognita causa iudicium exercere atque in poenis iniungendis aequitatem servare non possunt." Deinde, "si erubescat aegrotus vulnus medico detegere, quod ignorat, medicina non curat." Ac demum S. Eligius Hom. 4¹⁸: "Quicumque peccando factus est Deo inimicus, nisi satisfaciendo non potest reconciliari ut fiat amicus." Atque, "adeo unusquisque vestrum ad se rediens," inquit idem Hom. 16,¹⁹ "consideret si per amaritudinem poenitentiae Deo satisfecerit pro suis offensis ac delictorum maculis; nam licet ministerium reconciliandi Episcopali auctoritate complere velimus, tamen nisi Spiritus Sanctus, per cuius invocationem istud officium agitur, corda vestra intrinsecus purificata invenerit, a reconciliationis gratia vacui remanebitis."

Patet itaque quod confessio peccatoris ad hoc potissimum servat, ut detecto sacerdotibus tamquam medicis ac iudicibus a Christo constitutis, peccati vulnere et crimine, ipsi congruas adhibeant poenitentias medicinales ac satisfactorias, quibus et pravae voluntatis vitium, atque ita peccati malitia curetur, et divinae iustitiae satisfiat: ac demum, ita dispositus, idoneus fiat quin Deo et Ecclesiae per Sacerdotis ministerium reconcilietur.

Thus is recognized the place from which our 16th proposition was drawn. We notice the change, namely, the addition of the words "praemittendi satisfactionem absolutioni." Where the term *ordo* of the above text has a broader extension, in the condemned proposition it is limited

¹⁴ MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. 76, col. 1200.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, vol. 3, col. 1030. n. VII.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, vol. 54 col. 1011. In the new order it is epistle 108 "ad Theodorum Foroiulianensem episcopum."

¹⁷ DENZINGER, n. 899.

¹⁸ MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. 87, col. 610.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, vol. 87, col. 652.

to the order of placing the satisfaction before the absolution. In other words, the anti-jansenist who extracted the proposition places emphasis on just one phase of this order, namely, the relation of the absolution to the satisfaction. Sabbatini objects that this proposition is not found word in its indicated source. His complete judgment will be given later.

DOCTRINAL JUDGMENT

Porter's judgment is included in a general statement embracing several propositions in his list of 105.²⁰ He says that these propositions are contrary to the common opinion of theologians and with the accepted practice of the Church for centuries of absolving those who are disposed, before the performance of the penance. Likewise, according to Porter, these propositions are in agreement with the teaching of Peter de Osma, namely "non peracta poenitentia poenitentem absolvi non debere" which was condemned by Sixtus IV.²¹

The anti-jansenists, who repeat what we have mentioned above with Porter, add yet other items of reproach. Their judgment is as follows²²:

Hanc eandem sententiam tradit ille apostata Marcus Antonius de Dominis, lib. 5 de republica ecclesiastica cap. 7²³. Vult ista propositio non esse conferendam absolutionem poenitenti nisi prius persolvat iniunctam sibi satisfactionem, idque ortum habere in institutione divina, quod si verum esset, Ecclesia Dei quae a tot saeculis habet in praxi dare absolutionem ante impletam poenitentiam, erraret in re gravissima, idque contra institutionem Christi; deinde, raro aut numquam liceret absolvere moribundos aut proximo mortis periculo expositos: dicta sententia fuit etiam Petri de Osma doctoris Salamanticensis cuius assertionem inter alias eiusdem Sixtus IV in decreto edito anno 1478 quinto Idus Augusti Pontificatus sui anno octavo declaravit falsam, Sanctae catholicae fidei contrariam, erroneam, scandalosam, ab evangelica veritate penitus alienam; Sanctorum Patrum et apostolicis constitutionibus contrariam ac manifestam haeresim continere.

Thus we find reference not only to Peter de Osma, but also to the apostate Marcus Antonius de Dominis. Furthermore, it is important

²⁰ Cfr. AOS, 193 at proposition 47.

²¹ Peter Martinez, who was called de Osma from the town of his birth, taught at Salamanca. His errors were condemned by Spanish theologians and later by Pope Sixtus IV by the bull *Licet ea* of August 9, 1479. Cfr. DENZINGER, n. 728.

²² Cfr. *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae* . . . , ad propositionem 52, Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico, ms. 1343.

²³ De Dominis (1566—1624) was an ex-Jesuit, bishop and convert to Anglicanism. Cfr. *Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche*, vol. III, Freiburg im Breisgau 1931, col. 398. The first part of his principal work *De republica ecclesiastica* was first published in London in 1617. For an analysis of this work, cfr. *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. IV, Paris 1911, col. 1668—1675.

to note that they clearly bring in the notion of the *divine institution* and its effects, that is, if this proposition would be true, the Church would find herself in a very serious situation, and acting contrary to the prescription of Christ. It is interesting to note that Estrix had previously in his *Specimen* treated the quoted passage from the *Praefatio Gandensis* in a paragraph entitled: "assertiones affirmantium, satisfactionem absolutioni praemittendam esse ex institutione Christi, idque ita, ut irrita sit absolutio, si secus fiat."²⁴

Sabbatini does not wish to censure our 16th proposition, because the author of the preface relates the order which according to the Fathers is from the law of Christ. In his explanation and attempt to free this proposition from censure, he thus draws a paralleled case: a similar proposition, namely, "ordinatio Dei induxit immunitatem ecclesiasticorum" cannot be censured because the notion of immunity is had from the divine institution of the clerical order as from its final source. Furthermore, even according to the Council of Trent, the immunity of ecclesiastics has been constituted by the ordinance of God. The complete judgment of Sabbatini is as follows²⁵:

Adscribitur propositio praefationi Gandensi, id est, praefatione ad Canones poenitentiales editae Gandavi, pag. (ut refertur a delatore) 19 et 20. Caeterum illic propositio non habetur saltem ad verbum, an vero quoad sensum mox dicam. Dicta praefatio citat tria testimonia: primum, ex S. Gregorio Magno homil. 26 in Evangelio ubi ait: Quos omnipotens Deus per compulsionis gratiam visitat, illos pastoralis sententia absolvat etc.: secundum, ex Innocentio I in epist. 29 decretali qui dicit sacerdotem debere attendere ad confessionem poenitentis et ad fletus atque lacrymas corrigentis ac tum iubere dimitti cum viderit congruam satisfactionem; tertium, ex S. Leone epist. 91 qui scribit in hunc modum: Mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus hanc praepositis Ecclesiae tradidit potestatem ut confitentibus actiones poenitentiae darent, et eosdem salubri satisfactione purgatos ad communionem sacramentorum ianuam reconciliationis admitterent. Quibus omnibus praefatio immediate subiicit sequentia. Ordinem vero hunc non consuetudo, non politia aut institutio Ecclesiae induxit, sed ipsa Christi lex ac praescriptio, natura rei idipsum quodammodo dictante. Ex quibus omnibus mihi videtur quod propositio non sit censurabilis, quia praefatio dicit quidem ordinem a Patribus assertum ab ipsa Christi lege, quod cadere non potest sub censura, alioquin haec propositio similis expressionis, immunitatem ecclesiasticorum induxit Dei ordinatio. Quae tamen ideo censurari non potest quia ex divina institutione ordinis clericalis tamque ex primo fonte

²⁴ [G. ESTRIX], *Specimen doctrinae theologicae per Belgium manantis* . . . , part 2, chap. 5, par. 7.

²⁵ Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 899, fol. 254v—255r.

habetur ratio immunitatis ecclesiasticorum, et propterea Concilium Tridentinum sessio 25, capitulum 20 de reformatione dicit²⁶: personarum ecclesiasticorum immunitatem Dei ordinatione esse constitutam.

The particular views of each of the examiners of the Holy Office are lacking. However, according to the summary report of Diaz the censure of the majority of theologians was that the proposition is rash and injurious to the Church and gravely suspected of other defects.²⁷

Concerning the commentators after the decree of condemnation in 1690, in general the same accusations were brought forth. Viva and Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher as usual present a more elaborate and at times confusing treatise. According to Viva the author of the proposition proceeds from a false understanding of the doctrine of matter and form, for he would think that with the sacraments the matter must always precede the form; and since according to Trent the three acts of the penitent, namely, contrition, confession and satisfaction are the *quasi-materia*, these three must come before the form. Secondly, according to Viva, it is based on an ancient practice of the Church, which he rejects however, by distinguishing between *canonical* absolution for the external forum and *sacramental* absolution for the internal forum.

Hilary basing his arguments on the Council of Trent tries to prove that from the institution of Christ the order for the Sacrament of penance is: contrition, confession, absolution then satisfaction. Steyaert occupies himself more with denying that the doctrine of the condemned proposition follows from the text of St. Leo as quoted above in the *præfatio Gandensis*.

A point worthy of note is the fact that while the above make reference to the *divine institution* expressed in the proposition, Le Bachelet does not. In treating propositions 16, 17 and 18 together he says they are false in themselves, injurious to the Church and scandalous in their consequences.

CONCLUSION

The 16th proposition is truly found in its indicated source. Although the text of the *compendiosa ac lucida deductio* refers to the order of the sacrament of penance in general, the extracted proposition emphasizes just one part of this order. Such a stress is indeed valid since the particular is contained in the general.

On the other hand, we should avoid the mistake of some anti-jansenists who unduly stressed the notion of divine institution. These

²⁶ The title of this chapter is: "Quae sunt iuris ecclesiastici principibus saecularibus commendantur."

²⁷ AGOFM, III, 11, fol. 701r.

seem to indicate that according to the author, Christ himself *directly* established the order of parts in this sacrament. I don't think this assertion is well-founded for the following reasons. The proposition reads: "Ordinem praemittendi satisfactionem absolutioni induxit . . . ipsa Christi lex et praescriptio . . ." The word *induxit* should be taken in its obvious sense of *introducing* or *leading into*.²⁸ Concerning the phrase *lex et praescriptio Christi*, I believe the author wishes to understand it not as from a special mandate of Christ relative to the order of the parts of penance, but as from the general disposition by which Christ instituted this sacrament as a tribunal and constituted the priests as judges and doctors. From this general mandate or prescription of Christ, there naturally follows the order of the parts — the order which was observed in the early Church, without nevertheless thinking such an order is entirely unchangeable. Our interpretation is suggested by the quotation from Trent which occurs in the text (cfr. above), namely: "cum sacerdotes a Christo constituti sint iudices, incognita causa iudicium exercere atque in poenis iniungendis aequitatem servare non possunt;" also, "si erubescat aegrotus vulnus medico detegere, quod ignorat, medicina non curat." It is again suggested by the last words of the paragraph which state: "Patet itaque quod confessio peccatoris ad hoc potissimum servat, ut detecto sacerdotibus tamquam medicis ac iudicibus a Christo constitutis, peccati vulnere et crimine . . ."

As already indicated, according to the report of Diaz, this proposition taken in itself is truly rash, injurious to the Church and gravely suspected of other defects. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to over-stress by Gillemans the idea of immediate divine institution of the order of the parts of the sacrament of penance.

V

PROPOSITIO 17: Per illam praxim mox absolvendi ordo poenitentiae est inversus.

SOURCE OF THE PROPOSITION

In the list of the 31 propositions condemned in 1690 two propositions, namely, the 17th and 22nd, are attributed by Porter to the *Specimina moralis christianae et moralis diabolicae in praxi*. The author Giles

²⁸ Cfr. A. FORCELLINI, *Lexicon totius latinitatis*, Padua 1940, vol. II, p. 808, where one reads: "Inducere est, in aliquem locum ducere, introducere, inferre, adducere. εἰσάγω It.: condur dentro, introdurre. Fr.: conduire dans, faire entrer, introduire, mener. Hisp.: introducir, conducir. Germ.: ein-, hinein-führen, bringen. Ang.: to lead or bring in, lead into, introduce."

Gabrielis¹ was born in Haccourt in 1636. He studied philosophy at Louvain. On July 26, 1664 he received the religious habit of the Third Order Regular of St. Francis. Thirteen years later he obtained the licentiate in Sacred Theology. In the service of his Order, Gabrielis not only served as professor of philosophy and theology, but was also provincial and general definitor. He died at Louvain in 1697 at the age of 61.

The *Specimina moralis* first appeared in 1675 at Brussels and Louvain.² On September 27, 1679 it was condemned by a decree of the Holy Office. After various corrections were made, the book was re-edited at Rome in 1680, only to be condemned a second time by the Holy Office toward the end of 1683.³

Not only Duffy and Porter,⁴ but also Steyaert, Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher and Le Bachelet indicate the *Specimina moralis* as the source

¹ Cfr. *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. VI, Paris 1920, col. 985. HURTER, *Nomenclator literarius*, vol. IV, Innsbruck 1910, col. 616—617; *Biographie nationale*, vol. VII, Brussels 1883, col. 403—406; REUSCH, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher*, vol. II, p. 525—526; A. Noché, *Dans le sillage de la "Fréquente."* La doctrine de Gilles de Gabriel sur la communion, in *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique*, 17 (1936) 397—410. L. CEYSENS, *Le Cardinal Jean Bona et le Jansénisme. Autour d'une récente étude*, in *Benedictina*, X (1956) 311—315; IDEM, *Gilles Gabrielis à Rome (1679—1683), épisode de la lutte entre rigorisme et laxisme*, in *Antonianum*, 34 (1959) 73—110.

² See L. CEYSENS, *L'influence de Gilles Estrix sur l'origine de la Deputation louvaniste à Rome (1677—1679)*, in *Gregorianum*, 30 (1949) 140, note 18.

The title of the work which I consulted is as follows: *Specimina moralis christianae et moralis diabolicae in praxi, autore R. P. F. Aegidio Gabrielis, S.T.B.F. Tertii Ordinis S. Francisci de Poenitentia, vulgo Beggardorum S. Theologiae Lector. Bruxellis, Typis Eugenii Henrici Fricx, retro Curiam, e regione Fontis Mariani, 1675.*

³ According to Hurter, Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher and J. Hilgers (*Der Index der verbotenen Bücher*, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1904, p. 432) the book was condemned on September 2. However, Reusch indicates September 9, and E. H. J. Reusens (in *Biographie nationale*, l. c.) gives December 2. A letter of F. Porter to J. Pollenter dated November 27 has: "Laeter decretum contra Gabrielem esse utile. Instabo, ut etiam iubeatur ibi publicari. Nemo inde praeter Reverentiam Vestram scribit, gratum ibi fuisse decretum illud, sic scilicet flocci fiunt tot impensi labores, tot toleratae persecutiones usque ad minas exilii in causa dicti libri . . ." See, L. CEYSENS, *Romeinse brieven uit de Ierse episode van het Belgisch antijansenisme (1680—1684)*, in *Bulletin de l'Institut historique belge de Rome*, 23 (1944—1946) 118; IDEM, *Gilles Gabrielis à Rome . . .*

Further information regarding the action of Porter toward the condemnation of the *Specimina moralis* is to be found in various letters of Porter to Nicolaus du Bois and John Pollenter. See *Romeinse brieven . . .* p. 81, 83, 95, 108, 117, 118. Cfr. also SOHIER-CEYSENS, *Correspondance de Pierre Cant sur les activités antijansénistes à Madrid (1679—1684)*, in *Bulletin de la Commission Royale d'Histoire*, 118 (1953) 53, 88, 110.

⁴ The proposition is found in the following places: with Porter: among the 238 propositions, n. 156; among the 105 propositions, n. 55; with Duffy: in his *Theologia Baio-janseniana*, part III, n. 105; among the 356 propositions, n. 250.

of the 17th proposition. While Viva makes no mention of the name of Gabriellis on this point, the author of *Jansenismus plurimas haereses et errores damnatos pertinaciter defendens* cites Arnauld.

Although this proposition is found in all the lists of Porter, and in the earlier ones of Duffy, it is lacking in this latter's list of 96. This omission, however, can easily be explained — the presence of a similar proposition, n. 69, which reads: "Praxim absolvendi ante completam satisfactionem censet execrabilem Toletanum Concilium Tertium, can. 11: cui non acquiescere est temerarium." One must remember that Duffy's earlier lists were excessively long and contained many repetitions. It was the constant desire of the various examiners to eliminate all the superfluities. In fact, Dominic of the Holy Trinity, in examining Duffy's list of 96, noted the similarity between these two propositions.⁵

The meaning of the 17th proposition, as it stands, is not entirely clear. For example, what precisely is to be understood by the phrases "per illam praxim mox absolvendi" and "ordo poenitentiae?" After considering its position in the list of 31 and noticing the connection between propositions 16, 17 and 18, it is possible to conclude that the proposition concerns the sacrament of penance and the order of the parts in this sacrament, especially regarding the order of absolution and satisfaction. This conclusion is affirmed by the remarks of Porter and the other anti-jansenists, as we shall soon see.

EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT

Let us now consider the indicated source of the 17th proposition, namely, the *Specimina moralis* of Gabriellis, paragraph 42, p. 154—155. The author is advocating performance of the penance imposed by the priest before reception of the sacramental absolution. In paragraph 40 he begins to present some objections which can be raised against the practice he favors. After each objection he gives his answer. Thus in paragraph 40 (p. 140—145) the objection is raised: if the performance of penance is required before the absolution, what if some one dies before being absolved? After responding, Gabriellis passes to the next objection, which is found in paragraph 41 (p. 145—153), namely, if some one can be absolved "in articulo mortis" without first performing the penance, why not also in the case in which the penitent agrees to make the satisfaction? The third objection in paragraph 42 (p. 154—162) is of more importance to us. Therefore, we present the exact text of the *Specimina moralis*:

⁵ Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 899, fol. 245—246.

Obicitur etiam: Quod si haec ita se habent, cur ergo Ecclesia moderna non curat practicari poenitentiam pro quolibet peccato mortali ante absolutionem?

Ad quam objectionem respondetur: Ecclesiam in nullo concilio universali aut particulari approbasse praxim absolvendi post confessionem criminum, nulla praevie ad absolutionem facta poenitentia; sed refrigescente paulatim caritate, a tribus aut quatuor saeculis antiquus rigor est relaxatus: ita ut soleat impendi absolutio in confitentibus, de quorum contritione confessario sufficienter constat etiam ante impletam poenitentiam, sic tamen ut si non constet de illa sufficienter, etiam nunc absolutio differatur, ut interim magis probetur dispositio poenitentis. Hanc praxim autem pia Mater Ecclesia filiorum infirmitati indulgens tolerat, ita ut nunc simul ac iudicatur poenitens contritus ac poenitentia iniuncta est, communis absolutio impendatur, et ei Corporis Christi communio tradatur. Quid, dico, poenitentia iniuncta? Sane, quod iam communiter pro gravissimis delictis imponitur, ne nomen quidem poenitentia meretur, quia in eo nihil poenale est. Quinimo tanto horrore nunc est poenitentia, ut si centesima pars poenae, quae a sacris canonibus pro certo delicto olim imponebatur, pro eodem iam imponeretur, forte vix centesimus, ne dicam millesimus confitentium sua peccata, eam acceptaret. Adeo ut non tantum ordo poenitentiae sit inversus, sed pene ipsa poenitentia subversa, et quodammodo evanida nomenque poenitentiae hominibus carnalibus factum odiosum, in nomen confessionis sit mutatum; quam confessionem heretici nostri temporis non sunt veriti appellare carnificinam et conscientiarum lanienam, asserentes sufficere propositum novae vitae, ut quis agat poenitentiam ab evangelio praescriptam. Unde non est mirum, quod Ecclesia toleret impendi absolutionem post auditam confessionem, et impositam levem poenitentiam; quia si hoc saeculo corrupto exigeret poenitentiam proportionatam peccatis, et eius impletionem ante absolutionem, forsitan multi transirent ad partes haereticorum, vel libertinorum, et reiicerent ipsam confessionem.

In the context from which the proposition has been pulled, it is to be noted that the author is treating of proportionate penance for sins and not the order of parts. One also observes that the first five words of the condemned proposition are an addition. The last four words, namely, "*ordo poenitentiae est inversus*" occur in the work of Gabrielis, only the tense of the verb being changed, that is, *sit* is had in place of *est*. Therefore, textually the 17th proposition is not completely found in the above text. Before we can judge as to its sense, it will be necessary to investigate for which reasons was it condemned.

DOCTRINAL JUDGMENT

In the opinion of Porter this proposition is contrary to the practice of the Church of absolving those who are rightly disposed before the

performance of penance. His judgment is found in two places. First of all, in connection with proposition 47 in his list of 105, we read⁶:

Haec et sequentes propositiones usque ad 59 universim pugnant cum communi Theologorum sententia, deinde cum accepta totius Ecclesiae praxi ab aliquot saeculis absolvendi, scilicet, rite dispositos ante impletam poenitentiam, denique cum Constitutione 17 Sixti IV contra Petrum de Osma inter cuius propositiones erat ista: "non peracta poenitentia poenitentem absolvi non debere" ubi subdit Constitutio: omnes et singulas propositiones praefatas falsas Sanctae Catholicae fidei contrarias erroneas ab evangelica veritate alienas ac manifestam haeresim continere declaramus.⁷

Secondly, at proposition 54, in the same list is the following⁸:

Haec et sequens per summum nefas impingit errorem Ecclesiae Dei quae tamen in sua praxi universali errare non potest ut notat D. Augustinus, epistola 118 ad Ia.,⁹ Ecclesia quae sunt contra fidem aut bonam vitam nec tacet nec facit nec approbat.

The anti-jansenists, besides presenting a similar criticism, assert another point, namely, the proposition in placing satisfaction before absolution seems to deny the power of the absolution in forgiving sins. Their complete judgment is as follows¹⁰:

Haec iterum est iniuriosa praxi Ecclesiae et utique sonare videtur peccata debere esse remissa ante absolutionem, ac si haec non haberet vim remittendi peccata, cum tamen Trid., sessione 14, cap. 3 dicat,¹¹ "docet Sancta Synodus Sacramenti poenitentiae formam in qua praecipus ipsius vis sita est in illis ministri verbis positam esse: *ego te absolvo*," et rursus sessione 6, cap. 14,¹² "docendum est christiani hominis poenitentiam post lapsum, multo aliam esse a baptismali eaque contineri non modo cessationem a peccatis et eorum detestationem, aut *cor contritum et humilitatum*, verum etiam eorundem sacramentalem confessionem saltem in voto ex tempore suo faciendam, et sacerdotalem absolutionem itemque satisfactionem per ieiunium, eleemosynas, orationes, etc.," in ordine a Concilio declaratum, scilicet, confessionem, absolutionem ac demum satisfactionem, ubi satisfactio postponitur absolutioni, si igitur per praxim mox absolvendi ordo poenitentiae est inversus, erravit Tridentinum designando talem ordinem, quod est iniuriosum Ecclesiae.

Sabbatini does not see the value of considering the 17th proposition. Since, he says, the entire book has already been condemned by the Holy

⁶ AOS, 193, at proposition 47.

⁷ DENZINGER, n. 728 and 733. Regarding Peter de Osma, cfr. HURTER, *op. cit.*, vol. II, col. 1025—1026.

⁸ AOS, 193, at propositionem 54.

⁹ Cfr. MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. 33, col. 200 ff. In the new order it is epistle 54.

¹⁰ See *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae* . . . , at proposition 55, Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico, ms. 1343.

¹¹ DENZINGER, n. 896.

¹² *Ibidem*, n. 807.

Office, it is not necessary to consider a part of it.¹³ Although the individual judgments of the official examiners are lacking, we have the brief report of Diaz, who says that according to the examiners the proposition is rash, injurious to the Church and greatly suspected of other defects.¹⁴

According to the later authors, Viva,¹⁵ Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher¹⁶ and Steyaert,¹⁷ this proposition implies an order in the sacrament of penance established by Christ himself, therefore impossible to be changed. Steyaert, for example, in giving the reason why this proposition merits condemnation, says, if it is admitted that Christ is the author of the order in the sacrament of penance, then the proposition is worthy to be condemned. For, as he says: "Nam alioquin ordinem inter partes poenitentiae inverti, qui aliquando in Ecclesia fuit, nihil tantopere mali habere videtur."¹⁸ In like manner does the author of *Jansenismus plurimas haereses et errores damnatos pertinaciter defendens* understand the condemnation of proposition 17.

Le Bachelet,¹⁹ treating propositions 16, 17 and 18 together, states that they are false in themselves, injurious to the Church and scandalous in their consequences. For by demanding first the performance of the penance, one would seem to hold that the *satisfactio in re* is an essential, not integral part of this sacrament.

CONCLUSION

The anti-jansenists and later authors have condemned the 17th proposition in the first place, because it accuses the Church of error in her practice of immediately absolving those disposed; secondly, because it implies that the order of penance has been established by Christ and hence cannot be changed; and thirdly, because it seems to lessen the power of absolution.

Upon re-examining the above text of the *Specimina moralis*, can it be said that the author admits these errors? Certainly, he does not admit the second and third listed above. Nor does he *directly* hold the Church has erred. Whether he intends *indirectly* to accuse the

¹³ Sabbatini wrote: "cum ipsius liber a supremo hoc tribunali sit proscriptus, ab hac propositione iudicanda supersedeo, cum enim totum opus damnatum sit, partem damnari non est opus." Cfr. ms. 899, vol. 255r, Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica.

¹⁴ AGOFM, III, 11, fol. 701 r.

¹⁵ VIVA, *op. cit.*, p. 66—69.

¹⁶ HILARIUS A S. SEPULCHRO, *op. cit.*, p. 32—34.

¹⁷ STEYAERT, *op. cit.*, p. 355—358.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 357.

¹⁹ LE BACHELET, *op. cit.*, col. 757—758.

Church of error in her modern practice of absolving a penitent before he makes satisfaction, should not too quickly be admitted.

It must be remembered that Gabrielis says the Church, considering the weakness of man, is tolerating the present practice. She realizes if she demanded the strict discipline of the earlier centuries, perhaps many would fall away from their Catholic Faith. It seems that he places no blame on the Church, but rather on the corruption and laxity of the times.

We do not so much condemn Gabrielis, whose words "adeo ut non tantum ordo poenitentiae sit inversus" in context can be taken in a correct sense, namely, as merely referring to a past historical fact. We do, however, believe that the anti-jansenists have too readily given these words a jansenistic interpretation.

VI

PROPOSITIO 18: Consuetudo moderna quoad administrationem sacramenti poenitentiae, etiamsi eam plurimorum hominum sustentet auctoritas et multi temporis diuturnitas confirmet, nihilominus ab Ecclesia non habetur pro usu sed abusu.

SOURCE OF THE PROPOSITION

This proposition, which is found in all the lists of Porter and Duffy,¹ is ascribed to the work of Anthony Arnould, *De la fréquente Communion*, in the preface, pages 66 and 67. Both Duffy and Porter are clear in citing its *French* edition and not the Latin translation.

It will not be necessary to go into detail concerning the author and his book on communion, since both are well known.² Nevertheless, a few general remarks are in place. Anthony Arnould (1612—1694) was

¹ In Porter's list of 238, this is the 158th proposition; among the 105 propositions, n. 57; with Duffy: it is found in his *Theologia Baio-Ianseniana*, part III, n. 107; among his 356 propositions, n. 252; among his 96 propositions, n. 70.

² For information on Arnould one may consult the following: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. I, Paris 1903, col. 1978—1983; HURTER, *Nomenclator literarius*, vol. IV, Innsbruck 1910, col. 441—444; *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, vol. IV, Paris 1930, col. 447—484 (a list is also given of the main works of Arnould with the circumstances under which they were written); J. F. Thomas, *Essai sur la morale de Port-Royal*, Paris 1942; J. Laporte, *La doctrine de Port-Royal. La morale (d'après Arnould)*, 2 vol. Paris 1951—1952.

G. Koehle, *La historia en la controversia entre Arnould y Petavio*, Buenos-Aires 1953. *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, vol. I, Paris 1934, col. 881—888; *ibidem* vol. II, Paris 1953, col. 1278 ff.

the last of twenty children of the famous Arnauld family.³ He was ordained a priest in 1641 at the age of 29 years. It was two years later in 1643 that his book on frequent communion was first published at Paris with the title: *De la fréquente communion, ou les sentimens des pères, des papes, et des conciles, touchant l'usage des sacremens de pénitence et d'Euchariste, sont fidèlement exposez: Pour servir d'adresse aux personnes qui pensent sérieusement à se convertir à Dieu; et aux Pasteurs et Confesseurs zélés pour le bien des Ames*. The long preface of about 150 pages was followed by 16 pages (in the first edition) containing approbations of the book by members of the hierarchy and doctors of theology. Needless to say, the work enjoyed a grand success. Within six months there were already four editions. The first Latin translation was made in 1647 at Paris.⁴ It was not long before this work became the object of vigorous attack by the anti-jansenists. Strong agitation was being carried on at Rome for its condemnation, which however never took place.⁵

EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT

As mentioned above Porter cites pages 66 and 67 of the preface as the source of our 18th proposition. In the part which precedes, Arnauld is exhorting his readers to become disposed for the reception of the Holy Eucharist by a life of penance, of mortification, of self-denial. In order to arouse such sentiments of mortification he refers to the strict discipline of the early Church as had been expressed in various canons, which had regulated the Christian way of life. He does not intend that the former discipline again be observed in its full rigor, but hopes that the knowledge of this discipline will at the present time lead to a greater spirit of penance and of mortification. His emphasis, therefore, is on various penitential works.

³ His father, also named Anthony (1560—1619), was a well-known lawyer in the Assembly of Paris and a Counsellor of State under Henry IV. In 1594 as orator of the University of Paris before the assembly of Paris he delivered an address in which he greatly attacked the Jesuits.

⁴ I have consulted the following editions: of the French, the first edition at Paris 1643; the second of Paris 1643; the third of Paris 1644; the fourth of Paris 1644; the seventh of Paris 1653, and an edition of Paris 1669. Of the Latin translation I have consulted that of Paris in 1647 and that of Louvain in 1674.

⁵ On the measures taken to condemn the book of Arnauld, see: REUSCH, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher*, vol. II, Bonn 1885, p. 448 ff.; A. de Meyer, *Les premières controverses jansénistes en France (1640—1649)* (Dissertations doctorales de la Faculté de Théologie de Louvain, 2^e série, t. 9), Louvain, 1917. P. DUDON, *Sur la "Fréquente" d'Arnauld, commentée par M. Brémond*, in *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique*, 14 (1933) 47—48.

Arnauld, in commenting on part of a sermon which was delivered in the last session of the Council of Trent,⁶ wished to indicate that it was even the intention of the Fathers of the Council to re-establish the early discipline of the Church in all things and as much as possible. From this paragraph of the sermon, three things, according to Arnauld, should be noted.

In the first place the Council of Trent recognized that the discipline of the Church can become corrupted; since such corruption is the source and cause of heresy, there must be a re-establishment of discipline. Secondly, the bishops of the Council, assuring us that they have regulated everything in as far as it was possible, would have been happy to put things in a state still more perfect. We can best second their intentions, says Arnauld, by always leading the faithful in a way more canonical and more conformed to the guidance of the Holy Spirit. For although that discipline has not been commanded in the following centuries, as it had been in the earlier ones, nevertheless, this discipline has always been approved and even imposed in certain cases, and its traces are still conserved in most of the Church. Thirdly, because of the miserable conditions of the times, the Fathers of the Council of Trent did not change the ecclesiastical discipline to a higher form. Arnauld says under the circumstances what else could the Fathers have done? It is necessary to admire their wisdom in not obliging all the Christians to the full penance contained in the Canons. The author indicates that the Fathers turned especially to the priests obliging them to the old canons regarding the purity of their life and morals. For once the clergy is re-established in the way of perfection, it will be easier to restore discipline with the faithful. He explains this last idea as follows:

Ainsi parce que le Prestre enferme en soy en éminence toute l'Église, le Concile a jugé avec raison, que c'estoit restablir la discipline en tous les Fidelles, que de la restablir en sa personne, reduisant ainsi toutes les suites dans le principe d'où elles doivent naistre, et tous les effets dans leurs cause.

⁶ The title of the sermon is: "Oratio habita in sessione nona et ultima sacri concilii Tridentini celebrata duobus continuis diebus, tertia et quarta decemb. MDLXIII. sub Pio IV. Pont. Max. A.R.P.D. Hieronymo Ragazzono, Veneto, episcopo Nazianzeno et coadiutore Famaugustano." See, *Concilium Tridentinum diariorum, actorum, epistolarum, tractuum nova collectio, edidit Societas Goerresiana*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1924, vol. IX, p. 1098. In his book Arnauld cites the following from this sermon: "Ayant esté obligez de faire deux choses, l'une de défendre la doctrine de la Foy, et l'autre de restablir la discipline de l'Eglise, puis que les Hérétiques assurent, qu'ils se sont principalement séparés de nous, à cause du dérèglement de la discipline; nous nous sommes acquittez de nostre charge en l'une et en l'autre, autant qu'il a esté en nostre pouvoir, et que les circonstances de ce temps nous l'ont permis."

Car comme dans l'ordre de la Nature, lors qu'il a créé toutes choses, il n'a fait qu'allumer le Soleil dans le Ciel pour éclairer toute la Terre, et tirer les sources de la Mer pour arroser tous les pais; Et comme dans l'ordre civil, lors qu'il veut rendre un peuple heureux, il ne fait que choisir un Prince, à qui il donne les qualitez vraiment Royales, c'est à dire, vraiment chrestiennes; Et comme dans l'ordre de la grâce, lorsqu'il a voulu former son Eglise, il n'a fait que répandre dans les Apostres un feu divin, qui brûlant leurs ames; a embrasé tout le monde, comme S. Chrysostome dit excellemment, aussi lors qu'il a voulu rétablir dans le Concile de Trente la discipline de son Eglise, dont toutes les choses naturelles civiles ne sont que des figures; il n'a fait que d'appeller en leur premier esclat, et en leur première pureté, les Prestres et les Pasteurs, qui sont la véritable lumière du monde, et une lumière qui ne fait pas voir les choses visibles, mais les invisibles, qui sont des sources vivantes, qui ne sortent pas de la Mer, pour retourner dans la Mer, mais qui sortent du Ciel, pour retourner dans le Ciel, qui sont des Roys établis, non par une dignité humaine, mais par la Royauté de Jesus-Christ, et dont les Roys d'Israel n'ont esté que les images, et enfin qui sont les heritiers de ce feu celeste, aussi bien que du Ministère des Apostres, dont ils doivent brûler eux memes, pour fondre la glace des pecheurs, et pour jeter sans cesse de nouvelles flammes dans le coeur des justes.

Et certes le Concile nous a bien fait voir, combien l'Eglise se trouve obligée à l'observance des anciens Canons, puis qu'encore qu'au temps qu'il s'assembla, les Ecclésiastiques fussent tombez dans un horrible déreglement, et que plusieurs choses semblaient alors permises parmi eux, comme estans autorisées, par le grand nombre, et par des personnes memes d'une qualité tres-illustre, comme on peut voir dans la Bulle de Pie IV, le Concile neantmoins n'a pas laissé de rappeler tous les anciens Canons, qui avoient esté faits pour les Clercs, les y obligeant *sous les memes peines, ou sous des peines encore plus grandes, que celles qui ont esté ordonnées dans tous les Conciles precedens;*⁷ nous tesmoignant par cette action, que quelque grand nombre qui s'y oppose, elle veut tousiours qu'ils soient observez, et que lors qu'il introduira des coustumes qui leur sont contraires, quand bien elles seroient soutenues de plusieurs, comme elles estoient alors, et qu'elles eussent déjà duré beaucoup d'années, elle ne les tient point pour des usages, mais pour des abus.⁸

C'est pourquoy le Cardinal Bellarmin soûtient, que la coustume de rompre le jeusne à midy, et de faire une collation sur le soir, *n'est que tolerée dans l'Eglise* et qu'il y en avoit encore assez de son temps, qui gardoient le jeusne ancien, comme le plus parfait et le véritable. Que si selon cet Auteur celebre, l'Eglise souhaiteroit que l'on jeusnast encore comme autrefois, et ne fait que tolerer le jeusne ordinaire, bien qu'il soit pratique presque universellement par tous les Fidelles. Qui ne voit qu'on peut dire par consequent la mesme chose de la Penitence, dont le jeusne est une partie, laquelle n'a

⁷ In a marginal note is the following: "Eadem in posterum iisdem poenis. vel maioribus arbitrio Ordinarii imponendis, observentur. Concil. Trident, sess. 22. De Reform. c. 1."

⁸ In a marginal note one reads: "Des coustumes qui sont contraires aux loix de l'Eglise."

esté changée en l'estat où elle est maintenant, que par le relaschement des Fidelles, aussi bien que le jeusne, et non point par aucun Canon d'aucun Concile, comme S. Charles, et tant d'autres prelates avec luy l'ont tesmoigné tant de fois, en renouvelant la practique des anciens Canons.

De sorte que ceux qui voudront suivre ou dans la Penitence ou dans le jeusne, la coustume premiere et originalle, ne seront coupables d'autre crime, que d'avoir suivy avec plus d'exacteté les loix et l'intention du S. Esprit et de l'Eglise.

Without a doubt the 18th proposition as it stands in the list of 31 is not found word for word in the above text. The phrase "*consuetudo moderna quoad administrationem sacramenti poenitentiae*" has been added by the anti-jansenists. Furthermore, they have changed the context. It must be kept in mind that in his introduction or preface, Arnauld is speaking not of the sacrament of penance, but of penitential acts to be performed before the reception of Holy Communion. That this is the case, is clear from context. And in the section from which our proposition has been extracted the author claims that to restore discipline in the entire Church, it is necessary to begin with the reform of the clergy. At that time the morals of the clergy had fallen to such a low level that the Council restored all the ancient canons which concerned their life, imposing these canons under the same penalties or greater ones if necessary. It was thus the wish of the Church that the ancient canons of clerical discipline be observed. Furthermore, according to Arnauld, when one shall introduce contrary practices, although these would be upheld by many (as was the case then) and they might have endured already for many years, the Church considers them as an abuse and not a legitimate practice. Arnauld himself, who writing after the decree of condemnation, claims that in this particular place he is speaking of canons which regulate the life and morals of the ecclesiastics.⁹ In the defense of Arnauld is also the brief remark of Sabbatini, namely, "*non est apud auctorem.*"¹⁰

We may propose the question: what did the anti-jansenists intend by the expression *consuetudo moderna*? After reading the two previous propositions in the list of 31, namely, 16 and 17, it is possible to conclude that the *consuetudo moderna* refers likewise to the practice of absolving from sins before the performance of the penance. This same conclusion

⁹ Arnauld writes: "... et que c'est une insigne falsification du Delateur qui l'y a ajouté pour faire croire qu'on y parloit de la coustume qui est aujourd'hui en usage dans l'administration du Sacrement de Penitence, au lieu qu'il n'y est parlé que des Canons pour le reglement de la vie, et des moeurs des Ecclesiastiques." Cfr. A. ARNAULD, *Difficultés proposées à M. Steyaert, IX part. 96 difficulté*, Cologne 1692, p. 259.

¹⁰ Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 899, fol. 259v.

is suggested by the position which the proposition occupies in Porter's list of 238 and 105, and in Duffy's *Theologia Baio-janseniana*. Moreover, it is expressly affirmed in the comments of Porter and the anti-jansenists, as we shall see later.

The inaccuracy of the indicated source for the 18th proposition is suggested by various remarks. After stating this proposition is imputed to Arnauld in the preface pages 66 and 67 of the French edition, Steyaert adds: "neque rursus in mentem eius inquirō."¹¹ Somewhat later in his same commentary, while referring to this proposition as being from the preface of Arnauld's work, he adds the side remark, "recte an secus."¹² The author of *Jansenismus plurimas haereses et errores damnatos pertinaciter defendens* claims that the words for the most part are taken from Arnauld's preface. Le Bachelet¹³ gives a similar view, namely, this proposition without being literally in the *Fréquente Communion* has been formed almost entirely from expressions found in its preface on pages 66 and 67. Perhaps, even the silence of Viva,¹⁴ who gives no specific reference, may indicate he realized the incertitude of the source indicated for this proposition.

DOCTRINAL JUDGMENT

Although Porter in his brief comment relative to this proposition in his list of 105 merely states that it impiously names a common practice of the Church as an abuse, in the same list at proposition 47 he is more explicit, in writing¹⁵:

Haec et sequentes propositiones usque ad 59 [thus including our 18th which is n. 57] universim pugnant cum communi theologorum sententia, deinde cum accepta totius Ecclesiae praxi ab aliquot saeculis absolvendi, scilicet, rite dispositos ante impletam poenitentiam, denique cum Constitutione 17 Sexti IV contra Petrum de Osma inter cuius propositiones erat ista: "non peracta poenitentia poenitentem absolvi non debere" [DENZINGER, n. 728], ubi subdit Constitutio, "omnes et singulas propositiones praefatas

¹¹ STEYAERT, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 361.

¹³ LE BACHELET, *op. cit.*, col. 757—758.

¹⁴ VIVA, *op. cit.*, p. 69—74. However, in his treatment of proposition 17, he says: "Iterum hic error in hac confixa thesi (i. e. 17) apud Belgas rigorismi sectatores erupit, illumque tuentur Estius et Arnaldus lib. de frequenti Communione . . . et in sequenti propositione (i. e. 18) addunt hanc consuetudinem etiamsi universalem et diuturnissimam, ab Ecclesia non haberi pro usu sed pro abusu, atque adeo non esse tolerandum." *Ibidem*, p. 67. The Jesuit gives no specific reference to any part, chapter or page of Arnauld's book.

¹⁵ AOS, 193 at propositionem 47 and 57.

falsas Sanctae Catholicae fidei contrarias, erroneas ab evangelica veritate alienas ac manifestam haeresim continere declaramus" [DENZINGER, n. 733].

The remarks of the anti-jansenists are of a similar nature, stating that the proposition repeats the error of Peter de Osma, and also is contrary to a legitimate practice of the Church.¹⁶

For the 18th proposition we do not have the judgments of the official examiners of the Holy Office. Diaz, however, in his summary report states that the censure of the majority of theologians was similar to that of the two preceding propositions, namely, rash, injurious to the Church and vehemently suspected of other defects.¹⁷

The various commentators after the publication of the decree as Viva, Steyaert, Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher, in substance agree that the 18th proposition in attacking a legitimate practice of the Church, accuses her of error. Viva and Steyaert, moreover, give a wider interpretation. Viva¹⁸ claims it may be taken in two ways: 1) as we explained

¹⁶ The complete text of the judgment of the anti-jansenists is: "Hic iterum accusatur de errore ecclesia, columna veritatis, quae utique errare non potest, et Augustinus epistola 118 [in the new order it is number 54] ad inquisitiones Ianuarii dicit, insolentissimae insaniae est disputare quin ita faciendum sit, quod tota iam frequentat ecclesia [MIGNE, Patrologia latina, vol. 33, col. 202, cap. 5]; rursus, sententia Petri de Osma requirentis ut satisfactio seu poenitentia praecedat absolutionem, fuit declarata falsa, erronea, haeretica, adeoque dicere quod moderna consuetudo absolvendi ante impletam poenitentiam sit abusum, est haeticum iuxta censuram Sixti quarti.

"Deinde, modernam consuetudinem confirmat rituale Romanum iussu Pauli quinti editum anno 1617 dicens, dum igitur poenitentem absolvere voluerit iniuncta ei prius et ab eo acceptata salutari poenitentia primo dicit misereatur tui, deinde dextera versus poenitentem elevata, dicit Indulgentiam etc. Dominus noster Iesus Christus; eandem praxim declarat expresse et confirmat manuale provinciae Remensis editum anno 1585, Spoletana Synodus anno 1583, Veneta anno 1592, cap. 3, manuale parisiense anno 1601, manuale Aurelianense anno 1585, manuale Burdegalense anno 1588; estne credibile quod tantus esset concertus ecclesiarum in statuendo et confirmando abusu in administratione Sacramenti poenitentiae, hoc est temerarium dicere." Cfr. *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae* . . . , Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico.

¹⁷ AGOFM, III, 11 fol. 701r. Regarding the 18th proposition, the theological faculty of Louvain wrote: "Facultas theologica illud non tradit, Arnaldus autem, cui tribuitur, posset inspicere in scripto intitulo *Defense de la vérité et . . .* pag. . . . et seqq. editionis Parisiensis 1644." Cfr. *Iudicium facultatis theologiae Lovaniensis super 96 propositionibus hic iniunctis*, at proposition 70. Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico, ms. 1343. The title of the work indicated by the theological faculty is: *Defense de la vérité catholique contre les erreurs et les hérésies du livre du sieur de la Milletiere, intitulé: Le Pacifique véritable; composée par M. Arnould, Docteur en Théologie de la Maison de Sorbonne, et adressée à MM. les Prélats, Approbateurs de son livre de la Fréquente Communion, Paris 1644*, p. 63.

¹⁸ l. c.

above, namely, that the Church considers as an abuse the modern practice of absolving penitents before the satisfaction for sins is completed, which therefore implies omitting the imposition of the canonical penances; 2) the Church condemns as an abuse the modern custom not only of imposing light penances, omitting the more rigid ones of the sacred canons, and of absolving immediately, and without a previous love of God *super omnia*, and without the most intense contrition, but also of indiscriminately conferring sacramental absolution for venial sins. Steyaert¹⁹ writes that the question arises as to the understanding of proposition 18. He says that some wish to limit its interpretation, that is, to understand it as we explained above according to Porter. They argue, he says, from its position in the list of 31. He points out, however, it should be considered as it stands in the context in the work of Arnould. He concludes, "sermonem in ea (i. e. proposition 18) esse de consuetudine moderna *universe*, qua Sacramentum illud hodie administratur;" and in another place, "culpat propositio *modum totum collective sumptum*, quo hodie poenitentia administratur".²⁰ Viva and Steyaert, therefore, disagree with Porter and Duffy, who at least seem to limit the proposition as referring only to absolution without previous satisfaction. Le Bachelet,²¹ who treats propositions 16, 17 and 18 together, remarks that they are false in themselves, injurious to the Church and scandalous in their consequences.

CONCLUSION

From the above, I think it can be said that the 18th proposition was condemned because it accuses the Church of error in her practice of absolving from sins before the penance is performed. However it is interesting to note that the proposition as it stands is not explicitly found in the passage cited by Porter. Furthermore, Arnould in the place indicated is not concerned with the sacrament of penance, but penitential works, acts of mortification and self-denial. The over eager anti-jansenists, however, by an addition to the text of Arnould, have read therein that which they desired.²²

¹⁹ l. c.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 388.

²¹ l. c.

²² We cannot agree with the following statement: "cette Proposition (i. e. 18) se trouve très-clairement exprimée dans la Préface du Livre de la Fréquente Communion p. 67." See, [L. PATOUILLET], *Dictionnaire des livres jansénistes ou qui favorisent le jansénisme*, Anvers, 1754, vol. I, p. 273.

VII

PROPOSITIO 22: Sacrilegi sunt iudicandi, qui ius ad communionem percipiendam praetendunt, antequam condignam de delictis suis poenitentiam egerint.

SOURCE OF THE PROPOSITION

Porter, as well as Duffy, cite the *Specimina moralis*, p. 139 of Giles Gabriellis as the source for the 22nd proposition.¹ This is therefore the second proposition in the list of the 31 which is attributed to this work.² In Porter's list of 105, this proposition is found with two others in the section titled, "propositiones concernentes frequentationem Sacrae Communionis."

A few preliminary observations are in place with regard to our 22nd proposition. First of all, it states that those are to be judged sacrilegious who claim the right to receive Holy Communion before performing proportionate penance for their sins. It must be noted that it does not merely state, in the circumstances expressed, those are to be judged sacrilegious *after* the reception of the Holy Eucharist, but those are guilty *who claim a right* to receive Holy Communion. A fortiori, then, they are culpable who actually partake of this Holy Sacrament.

Secondly, although the use of the word *delictis* implies serious crimes, the expression *condigna poenitentia* is ambiguous both concerning its quality and quantity. Judging from the background of the times, however, it is known that some advocated satisfaction to endure for weeks and months.

Finally, the entire last part of the proposition, namely, "antequam condignam de delictis suis poenitentiam egerint," is not exactly clear. It can be taken in three ways. In the first place, it may be thus understood: those are to be judged sacrilegious, who having confessed their sins *and received absolution*, assert their right to receive Holy Communion before performing the imposed(?) penance. In other words, then, this condemned proposition would require that after receiving absolution from mortal sins, it is necessary to perform the sacramental (?) penance before

¹ This proposition is found with Duffy: under n. 141 of the *Theologia Baio-Ianseniana*, part three; n. 276 of the 356 propositions; n. 80 of the 96 propositions; with Porter: under n. 181 of the 238 propositions; n. 68 of the 105 propositions. Gabriellis is also cited as the source by: Steyaert, Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher, Torrecilla, Le Bachelet. The author of *Jansenismus plurimas haereses et errores damnatos pertinaciter defendens* says it is according to the mind of Arnauld.

² As we have already seen, proposition 17 is also attributed to Giles Gabriellis.

going to Holy Communion. Still, another way of interpreting this last phrase is, that those are to be judged sacrilegious, who claim the right to receive the Eucharist, after having confessed their sins, nevertheless, are *refused absolution*, and consequently Holy Communion (even though they may be sufficiently disposed), *until the sacramental(?) penance is performed*. A third possibility may be that of Arnauld (cfr. above in our treatment of proposition 18), namely, before receiving the Holy Eucharist one should prepare himself by various voluntary(?) acts of mortification and self-denial.

It is in the second sense, however, that we should understand the last part of the 22nd proposition. For in the period of history under consideration there was a rigoristic element in the Church which advocated the deferment of absolution and reception of the Body and Blood of Christ, until sufficient penance was performed. This interpretation of the phrase will also be evident after considering the text of the *Specimina moralis* and the notations of the anti-jansenists.

EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT

We now proceed to examine the source of our proposition, namely, the *Specimina moralis* of Gabrielis. Paragraph 39 (p. 127—140) bears the title: "Rationes quae moverunt Sanctos Patres ad exigendam poenitentiae impletionem ante absolutionem sacramentalem." Four reasons are indicated. The fourth reason, however, which begins on page 138, is the one of interest to us. The text of the author is:

Quarta ratio, quae movit Sanctos Patres ad differendam absolutionem est praeparatio ad Eucharistiam, de qua supra. Unde Ambrosius in Psalmum 118 in haec verba: "Miserere mei, secundum eloquium tuum," ait: "In ipsa Ecclesia ubi maxime misereri decet, teneri quam maxime debet forma iustitiae, ne quis a Communionis consortio abstentus, brevi lachrymula, atque ad tempus parata, vel etiam uberioribus fletibus communionem, quam plurimis debet postulare temporibus, facilitate Sacerdotis extorqueat."³

Et quia solent peccatores urgere Confessarios suos, ipsisque irasci, dum eis absolutionem et communionem negant, donec condignam delictis suis poenitentiam egerint, dicit Cyprianus de lapsis [reference is given below]: Vis inferitur Corpori eius (nempe Christi) et Sanguini. Quod non statim Domini Corpus inquinatis manibus accipiat, aut ore polluto Domini Sanguinem bibat, sacerdotibus sacrilegus irascitur. Quid coeci oculi poenitentiae iter non vident, quod ostendimus? Et Clerus Romanus ad Cyprianum Epist. 31 . . .

Textually, the 22nd proposition is not found in the *Specimina moralis*, p. 139. We do, however, discover one phrase that resembles part of our

³ MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. 15, col. 1374, par. 26.

proposition, that is, "donec condignam delictis suis poenitentiam egerint" of the text, with "antequam condignam de delictis suis poenitentiam egerint" of the condemned proposition. The first part of the proposition, "sacrilegi sunt iudicandi, qui ius ad communionem percipiendam prae-tendunt" obviously has been extracted from the sentence in the *Specimina moralis*, "Quod non statim Domini Corpus inquinatis manibus accipiat, aut ore polluto Domini Sanguinem bibat, sacerdotibus sacrilegus irascitur."

If one carefully notices the original text of Gabrielis, something interesting will be observed. The sentence "Quod non statim . . . irascitur," just as the preceding, "vis infertur etc.," and likewise, "quid coeci oculi etc.," have all been copied verbatim from the *De lapsis* of St. Cyprian.⁴ However, in the *De lapsis* these sentences are not joined as they are in the text of Gabrielis. Upon examining the *Patrologia latina* edited by Migne, vol. IV, it will be noticed that the first sentence occurs in the *De lapsis* under number 16, col. 493: "Spretis his omnibus atque contemptis, ante expiata delicta, ante exomologesin factam criminis, ante purgatam conscientiam sacrificio et manu sacerdotis, ante offensam placatam indignantis Domini et minantis, vis infertur corpori et sanguini, et plus modo in Dominum manibus atque ore delinquent quam cum Dominum negaverunt . . ." The second sentence is found under number 22, col. 498: ". . . Tumens animus et superbus nec quia victus est, fractus est. Iacens stantibus et integris vulneratus miratur, et quod non statim Domini corpus inquinatis manibus accipiat, aut ore polluto Domini sanguinem bibat, sacerdotibus sacrilegus irascitur. Atque, o tuam nimiam, furiose, dementiam! irascaris ei qui abs te avertere iram Dei nititur . . ." and the third under number 23, col. 498: "Accipe potius et admitte quae loquimur. Quid surdae aures salutaria praecepta non audiunt quae monemus? quid caeci oculi poenitentiae iter non vident quod ostendimus? quid percussa et alienata mens remedia vitalia non percipit quae de Scripturis coelestibus et discimus et docemus? . . ." It is true that Gabrielis expressly states he is quoting from the *De lapsis* of St. Cyprian. However, let us remember that practice which even was used in the 17th century, namely, a writer, would not always indicate his citations with quotation marks or italics. Thus it happened that the particular unknown anti-jansenist, who formulated the 22nd prop-

⁴ "Nel sec. III furono chiamati lapsi quei cristiani che durante la persecuzione de Decio (250) apostatarono dalla fede." Cfr. F. CARPINO, *LAPSI, controversia dei*, in *Enciclopedia Cattolica, Città del Vaticano 1951*, vol. VII, col. 909—913.

osition, blundered by not reading far enough into the *De lapsis*. He unfortunately attributed the actual words of St. Cyprian to Gabrielis.

It is likewise to be noted that Gabrielis in the sentence introducing the citation from St. Cyprian uses the word *peccatores*, which certainly is not as strong as the *sacrilegus* of the *De lapsis*.

DOCTRINAL JUDGMENT

A summary of Porter's observation connected with this proposition may be reduced to the following points⁵: 1) this proposition condemns the practice of the Church; 2) it is contrary to the Council of Trent, which merely requires that he who is guilty of mortal sin must first go to confession before receiving the Blessed Sacrament; 3) the proposition places an obstacle to annual communion to say nothing at all of a daily participation of the Sacred Banquet.

The observations of the anti-jansenists⁶ substantially are the same as those of Porter, with only more detailed explanations of the various points. An addition, however, is the reference to Peter de Osma, and also to the impossibility of the dying to communicate. The complete text is as follows:

Haec propositio accedit ad damnatam a Sixto quarto Petri de Osma sententiam requirentem ut impleatur prius poenitentia quam conferatur absolutio;⁷ deinde, impingit in Tridentino, sessione 13, cap. 7⁸ declarans quae praeparatio sit tantum necessaria ad eucharistiam sumendam. "Probet seipsum homo," inquit, "ecclesiastica autem consuetudo eam probationem necessariam esse, ut nullus sibi conscius mortalis peccati quantumvis sibi contritus videatur absque praemissa sacramentali confessione ad sacram eucharistiam accedere debeat." Si autem sint sacrilegi qui accedunt ante peractam poenitentiam, igitur erravit Concilium non assignando istam etiam depositionem, cum tamen aliam non requirat quam praemitti sacramentalem confessionem; deinde, repentis morituri non deberent communicare, neque confitentes in Paschate possent eo ipso die communicari usque ad multas hebdomadas quod est transgredi canonem, "Omnis utriusque sexus,"⁹ et canonem 9 sess. 13 Trid.,¹⁰ "Si quis negaverit omnes et singulos Christi fideles, utriusque sexus cum ad annos discretionis pervenerint teneri singulis annis saltem in paschate ad communicandum etc., a. s."

⁵ AOS, 193 at proposition 68.

⁶ See, *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae* . . . , at proposition 68, ms. 1343, Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico.

⁷ DENZINGER, n. 728.

⁸ *Ibidem*, n. 880.

⁹ *Ibidem*, n. 437. To be noted is the following: "suscipiens reverenter ad minus in Pascha Eucharistiae sacramentum, nisi forte de consilio proprii sacerdotis ob aliquam rationabilem causam ad tempus ab eius perceptione duxerit abstinendum."

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, n. 891.

The theological faculty of Louvain¹¹ passed no specific judgment on this proposition for it believed Gabrielis himself had already sent his answers to Rome. The consultors of the Holy Office¹² apparently had some difficulty in interpreting this proposition. Their judgments, ranging from temerarious to near heresy, are as follows:

Sabbatinus¹³ dixit propositionem non habere auctorem, sed esse temerariam et scandalosam;

Bianchi: nullam mereri censuram theologicam si intelligatur de iis qui tale ius ad communionem percipiendam praetendunt ut ab Ecclesiae ministris numquam arceri possent a Sacra Communione non peracta condigna satisfactione;

Dominicus a S. Trinitate dixit quod promeretur easdem censuras qualis propositio quod absolutio non est concedenda nisi peracta poenitentia;

Esparza: esse temerariam, perniciosam, gravissime iniuriosam adversus Ecclesiam Catholicam et vehementer suspecta de haeresi;

Madernus: esse temerariam, iniuriosam, et de haeresi suspectam;

Fabri dixit esse erroneam et opponi Concilio Tridentino;

Commissarius: dixit esse erroneam et temerariam;

Magister: esse erroneam, immo forte haeresi proximam vel sapientem haeresim per Bullam Sixti IV cui videtur directe opponi, saltem in aliquo casu.

Later around the year 1689, Francis Diaz¹⁴ in summarizing the judgments of the consultors merely states that the 22nd proposition was judged to be temerarious, erroneous, scandalous and suspected of greater malice.

Viva,¹⁵ Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher,¹⁶ and Steyaert¹⁷ seek the basis on which the proposition rests. Thus according to Viva it is based on one of two errors: a) that the one rightly disposed to receive the Sacrament of Penance is never able to be absolved, and consequently does not have the right to receive Holy Communion, unless he first makes suitable satisfaction; or b) sin is not remitted by absolution unless the satisfaction precedes. Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher gives a similar judgment, and Steyaert says perhaps the proposition is based on the fact that formerly only through various stages of penance would one be allowed to approach the Holy Table, or based on a custom of the Greeks, i. e., to communicate only after having received absolution and performed the penance.

¹¹ Cfr. *Iudicium facultatis theologiae Lovaniensis super 96 propositiones hic iniunctis*, at propositionem 80, ms. 1343, Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico.

¹² See *Killiney Papers*, ms. D. 21.

¹³ See also ms. 899, fol. 259v, Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica.

¹⁴ AGOFM, III, 11, fol. 701v.

¹⁵ VIVA, *op. cit.*, p. 82—85.

¹⁶ HILARIUS A S. SEPULCHRO, *op. cit.*, p. 40—42.

¹⁷ STEYAERT, *op. cit.*, p. 365—367.

Le Bachelet¹⁸ who treats propositions 22 and 23 together, says they are temerarious, scandalous, depreciative of the Holy Eucharist in the way it is now administered in the Church and injurious to the Church herself.

CONCLUSION

Our 22nd proposition as it stands is certainly not clear. The phrase, "antequam condignam de delictis suis poenitentiam egerint," may be interpreted in three ways. Moreover, textually it is not in the work of Gabrielis. It was fabricated by an anti-jansenist who in all probability did not realize he was extracting it from the words of St. Cyprian.

VIII

PROPOSITIO 23: Similiter arcendi sunt a sacra communione, quibus nondum inest amor Dei purissimus et omnis mixtionis expers.

SOURCE OF THE PROPOSITION

Both Duffy and Porter agree in citing the *De la fréquente Communion* of Anthony Arnould as the source of the 23rd proposition.¹ This is therefore the second in the list of 31 that is claimed by Porter to have been extracted from this well-known book. Since we have already considered both the author and his work in our treatment of the 18th proposition, we shall at once pass to the examination of the context.

EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT

We are not concerned with the Latin translation, but with the French edition (as Porter and Duffy testify),² part one, chapter four. It is to be recalled that this book of Arnould is a reply to the work of Pierre des Sesmaisons, S.J.: *Question, s'il est meilleur de communier souvent que rarement?*³ In the fourth chapter, as in many others, after first quoting a passage from the treatise of Sesmaisons, Arnould presents his response.

¹⁸ LE BACHELET, *op. cit.*, col. 759.

¹ This proposition is found with Duffy: under n. 143 of the *Theologia Baio-ianseniana*, part three; n. 278 of the 356 propositions; it is not found in his list of 96 propositions; with Porter: under n. 183 of the 238 propositions; n. 69 of the 105 propositions.

² Duffy expressly mentions the French edition in his *Theologia Baio-ianseniana*, part 3 at proposition 143. Porter gives the same reference in his list of 238 at proposition 183.

³ Cfr. SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*, vol. VII, Brussels 1896, col. 1158.

The title of the fourth chapter proposes the question — according to St. Dionysius who are they who merit to assist at Holy Mass? There follows the quotation from Sesmaisons in which the Jesuit by citing early authorities wishes to indicate that those present at Mass are also to receive Holy Communion. Among other things Sesmaisons mentions Sts. Clement and Dionysius,⁴ disciples of the Apostles, as testifying that after the Gospel and the reading of Sacred Scripture, those who were not disposed to receive the Eucharist were sent out, and the priest having distributed Holy Communion to all, completed the Sacred Mysteries with thanksgiving.

In his response Arnauld indicates that if Sesmaisons had understood the true spirit of the discipline of the early church, he would not have appealed to it in support of his views. Instead he would have recognized that it is destructive of what he holds. Thus, for example, as mentioned above, the Jesuit said that according to Sts. Clement and Dionysius after the reading of Holy Scripture, those not disposed to receive the Eucharist were dismissed, and the priest then distributed the Sacred Species to all present. Arnauld raises the question — of what use is it to say that before the celebration of the Holy Mysteries all those not disposed to communicate were dismissed, if it is not clarified who are those judged not disposed?

Arnauld proceeds in a rhetorical manner. He lists several classes of people, among which, he says, Sesmaisons counsels frequent communion and an immediate reception of the Eucharist. Concerning all these various groups, Arnauld states that if it's discovered that these were judged not disposed to communicate, and if these groups coincide with those dismissed from the sacrifice, the conclusion is that those whom the Jesuit admits (even pushes) to frequent Communion, ought not even to be present at the Holy Sacrifice. Arnauld says that he does not wish that

⁴ By Dionysius the Areopagite is usually understood the judge of the Areopagus, who was converted to Christianity by the preaching of St. Paul. (Cfr. *Acts of the Apostles*, chapter 17, verse 22 ff.) In the course of time, however, two errors arose in connection with this name. In the first place, a series of famous writings of a rather peculiar nature was ascribed to the Areopagite, and secondly, he was popularly identified with the martyr of Gaul, Dionysius, the first bishop of Paris. The works of St. Dionysius were well esteemed in the Church. In the 15th century, however, Laurentius Valla (1407—1457) raised the doubt as to their genuine author. Two camps were formed. The defenders of St. Dionysius included such men as Baronius, Bellarmine, Lansselius, Cordier, Halloix, Delrio, de Rubeis, Lessius, Alexander Natalis etc. It was in the 19th century that the general opinion inclined more and more against the authorship of St. Dionysius. Cfr. J. STIGLMAYR, *Dionysius the Pseudo Areopagite*, in *Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. IV, New York 1909, p. 13—18; C. FABRO, *Dionigi l'Areopagita*, in *Enciclopedia cattolica*, vol. IV, Città del Vaticano 1950, col. 1662—1668.

his own words be believed, but the words of one of the witnesses referred to by Sesmaisons. He then presents a citation from the *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, chapter 3 of St. Dionysius,⁵ from which it then appears evident that Arnauld's prior classification is based on this passage of the Saint.

In other words, expressed more briefly and simply, in this fourth chapter of part one, Arnauld has presented a text from St. Dionysius in which the saint lists several groups of those to be excluded from assisting at Holy Mass beyond the point of the Mass of the Catechumens. Among this number, according to Arnauld, is found those whom Sesmaisons advises frequent communion and an immediate reception of Communion. Therefore, how is it possible that these receive Holy Communion, if they cannot even be present at the Sacred Mysteries?

We now present the complete response of Arnauld which comprises the fourth chapter of part one:

Si vous aviez bien compris l'esprit véritable de cette sainte Discipline, qui s'observoit à la naissance de l'Eglise, non seulement vous vous seriez abstenu de la rapporter comme vous étant favorable, mais vous auriez facilement reconnu qu'il ne se peut rien concevoir qui soit plus contraire à vos maximes, et qui ruine davantage toutes vos prétentions.

Car que sert-il de nous dire qu'avant la celebration des misteres, on chassoit tous ceux qui n'étoient pas disposez à recevoir l'Eucharistie, si vous ne nous enseignez qui étoient ceux qu'ils n'y jugeoient pas disposez? Et s'il se trouvoit qu'ils eussent mis de ce nombre, non seulement ceux qui ne font profession de vivre vertueusement, (à qui neanmoins vous conseillez la fréquente communion, ainsi que je le ferai voir); mais ceux-mêmes qui étoient une fois tombez de l'état d'une vie sainte et chrétienne, quoi qu'ils eussent dessein d'y rentrer: Non seulement ceux, qui portant à la hâte aux pieds d'un Prêtre leurs habitudes enracinées, et leurs crimes encore tout vivans, doivent, selon vous, être aussi-tôt admis à l'Eucharistie, mais ceux-mêmes qui s'étant déjà retirez de la vie contraire à la vertu, ne sont pas encore purifiez des images qui leur restent, de leurs déreglemens passez: Non seulement ceux, qui sont remplis de l'amour d'eux-mêmes, mais aussi ceux qui n'ont pas encore l'amour divin, pur et sans aucun mélange: Non seulement ceux, qui sont si attachez au monde

⁵ The *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia* treats of the nature and grades of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. After an introduction which discusses God's purpose in establishing the hierarchy of the Church and which pictures Christ as its holy and supreme Head, Dionysius deals with the three sacraments of Baptism, Holy Eucharist and Extreme Unction; then the three grades of the Teaching Church (bishops, priests, deacons); three grades of the "Learning Church," that is, monks, people and the class composed of catechumens, energumens and penitents; lastly, he considers the burial of the dead. The main purpose of the author is to disclose and turn to the use of contemplation the deeper mystical meaning which underlies the sacred rites, ceremonies, institutions and symbols. Cfr. B. STEIDLÉ, *Patrologia seu historia antiquae litteraturae ecclesiasticae, Friburgi Brisgoviae* 1937, p. 208.

que de merveille; mais tous ceux, qui ne sont pas encore parfaitement unis à Dieu seul, et entierement irreprochables.

Si, dis-je, il se rencontroit que toutes ces personnes eussent été chassées du sacrifice, cette sainte Discipline feroit-elle voir autre chose, sinon que ceux que nous admettez, ou plutôt que vous poussez à la frequente participation des misteres; ne devroient pas seulement y assister, selon le sentiment de ces grands Saints, que vous confessez avec tous les Catholiques au commencement de ce discours, nous devoit servir de regle.

Je ne desire pas que vous m'en croyez, mais écoutons tous deux vos propres témoins; et principalement celui d'entre eux qui vous en peut le mieux informer, comme étant le seul qui ait écrit particulièrement de ces choses.

Le grand saint Denis déclare ce que vousra portez, qu'après l'Evangile, et la lecture des saintes lettres, ceux qui n'étoient pas disposez à recevoir l'Eucharistie, étoient mis dehors: mais parce que vous avez oublié de nous dire quels étoient ces gens-là que l'on mettoit hors de l'Eglise, il faut que ses paroles vous l'apprennent; Ouvrez donc les yeux et les oreilles du coeur, et voyez si vous pourrez soutenir la splendeur de ces éclairs; et le bruit de ce tonnerre.

"On chasse," dit il,⁶ "ceux que je m'en vay vous nommer du temple de Dieu, et du sacrifice, comme étant trop sublime et trop élevé pour eux. Premièrement, ceux qui n'ont pas encore été instruits, ni recûs à la participation des misteres," c'est-à-dire, les Catechumenes, "Secondement, ceux qui sont tombez de l'état d'une vie sainte et Chrétienne," c'est-à-dire, ceux qui ont perdu la grâce de leur baptême en commettant quelque peché mortel. "En troisième lieu, ceux que leur propre foiblesse rend susceptibles de terreurs et de visions, que leur cause l'impression de l'ennemi," c'est-à-dire, les énergumenes, "comme n'étant pas encore parvenus à cette immobilité, pour dire ainsi, et à cette vigueur toujours agissante de l'habitude divin et deifiante par une application constante, et invincible aux choses de Dieu. Quatrièmement, ceux qui à la verité se sont bien déjà retirez de la vie contraire à la vertu," c'est-à-dire les pénitens, "mais qui ne sont pas encore purifiés des phantômes et des images qui leur restent de leurs dérèglements passez, par une habitude, et par un amour divin, pur, et sans aucun mélange. Et enfin, ceux qui ne sont pas encore parfaitement unis à Dieu seul, et pour user des termes de l'Ecriture, ceux qui ne sont pas entièrement parfaits, et entièrement irreprochables."

Cette doctrine est-elle conforme à la vôtre? Et si ce grand Saint avoit prévu tous vos excès, et tous les desordres que vous voulez établir, (comme l'esprit qui l'animoit les prévoyoit bien) les auroit-il pû étouffer avec des paroles plus pressantes?

There are two places in the text above which sound somewhat similar to the 23rd proposition. First of all, toward the beginning, in the classification given by Arnould is had: "mais aussi ceux *'qui n'ont pas encore*

⁶ In a marginal note is: "*De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, cap. 3". Cfr. MIGNE, *Patrologia graeca*, vol. 3, col. 436.

l'amour divin, pur et sans aucun mélange'' Secondly, toward the end of the chapter in the citation from St. Dionysius and upon which Arnould based his classification, one reads: *mais qui ne sont pas encore purifiez des phantômes et des images qui leur restent de leurs déreglemens passez, par une habitude, et par un amour divin, pur, et sans aucun mélange*. Thus it is evident that part of the condemned proposition has been formed from a citation of St. Dionysius.

Upon comparing the wording of the 23rd proposition with the text of Arnould, we note various differences. In the first place, we do not find in the *Fréquente Communion* the phrase, "similiter arcendi sunt a sacra communione." Secondly, where the text has the positive form of the adjective *pure*, the proposition gives the superlative, *purissimus*. It is true, however, that in the Latin translation of Arnould's work, we read in the place relative to his divisions: "non ii solum 'qui sui ipsorum amore pleni sint,' sed ii etiam 'qui divinum amorem ab omni alieno affectu purum ac liberum nondum assecuti sunt';" then afterwards in the citation from St. Dionysius we read: "sed animos a pristinae impuritatis phantasmatis nondum satis expurgatos gerunt habitu amoreque Dei purissimo ac simplici." At the time of Arnould there already existed many Latin translations which he could have consulted.⁷ Even Migne, who uses the edition of Balthasar Cordier, S. J.,⁸ gives the superlative form, namely, "nondum tamen a visis habitu amoreque divino eoque purissimo purgati sunt."⁹

There can be no doubt that the words of the 23rd proposition "quibus nondum inest amor Dei purissimus et omnis mixtionis experts" are based on the words of St. Dionysius, and presented by Arnould as "un amour divin, pur et sans aucun mélange." Likewise, there is no doubt that according to St. Dionysius those without such a love (καὶ ἔρωτι θείῳ καὶ ἀμυγῇ) should not participate in what we call today, the

⁷ *Ibidem*, col. 51 ff., where the various editions are given.

⁸ Cfr. SOMMERVOGEL, *op. cit.*, vol. II, col. 1438—1442.

⁹ The *Florilegium Patristicum*, fasciculus 7, part 6, 1937 uses the same edition as Migne.

In some of the editions of the *Fréquent Communion* the entire citation of St. Dionysius is printed in Greek in the margin. Concerning the phrase which concerns our proposition we read: οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν αὐτῆς ἔξεν καὶ ἔρωτι θείῳ καὶ ἀμυγῇ καθαρθέντες. Thus Dionysius speaks of those who have not yet been cleansed by love which is divine and genuinely so, by saying that the love is alloyed, ἀμυγῇ a common Greek word meaning not mixed with dross. In the German translation which is better than the Latin, is had: "aber noch nicht durch eine göttliche und lautere innere Fassung und Liebe von den Phantasiebildern des früheren Lebens gereinigt sind . . .". Cfr. *Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, Des heiligen Dionysius Areopagita Angebliche Schriften über die beiden Hierarchen*.

Mass of the Faithful. In the fourth chapter Arnauld merely draws the logical conclusion, namely, if these, according to the *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia* are to be dismissed after the reading of Sacred Scripture, they have been judged unworthy to receive Holy Communion.

Before considering the doctrinal judgment of our 23rd proposition, let us review the various comments of the authors relative to this dependence. In other words, what were the various reactions or explanations given concerning the relation between our 23rd proposition and the text of St. Dionysius?

We find two commentators who give no explicit mention of the Saint. Viva¹⁰ merely refers to the innovators who adhere to the errors of Baius. Le Bachelet,¹¹ treating propositions 22 and 23 together, in the beginning does refer to our part one, chapter four. Afterwards he says these two propositions do not represent the exact words of Arnauld, but they are conclusions made from many passages where he relates and interprets the ancient discipline. He then gives various vague references which offer no substantial support to his statements.

Next we have those commentators who refer to St. Dionysius. Sabbatini has the note¹²: "non est apud auctorem, qui refert sententiam S. Dionisii, et si non (!) est S. Dionisii, non est censurabilis." Gerberon¹³ claims this proposition, excluding the word *purissimus* is entirely of St. Dionysius, who was most esteemed in the earlier Councils. He continues in saying that Arnauld, purely and simply, without addition or subtraction has set forth the words of this Saint. Steyaert,¹⁴ likewise admitting the dependence on St. Dionysius, adds that the words of the saint, however, are to be understood as a sincere love of God from a pure heart, a good conscience and a genuine faith. As it happens frequently, Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher¹⁵ is perfect in avoiding the issue and adds only confusion. It seems that he purposely refrains from mentioning part one, chapter four of Arnauld's work. Instead, he refers the reader to part three chapter seven where Arnauld treats of the fruitful disposition

¹⁰ VIVA, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

¹¹ LE BACHELET, *op. cit.*, col. 759. In the same place he gives a reference to the preface of Arnauld's work, p. 24. I think this is an error which Le Bachelet carried over from Steyaert who also mentions the preface page 24. Most probably he is confusing this notation with that of the 18th proposition which was from the preface, p. 66 and 67.

¹² Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 899, fol. 259v.

¹³ GERBERON, *Quaestio iuris pontificii* . . . , p. 11 and 17.

¹⁴ STEYAERT, *op. cit.*, p. 365—367.

¹⁵ Although Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher does refer to part 1, chapter 5, he makes no mention of St. Dionysius in this place. Later when producing the French, he is sure to add the superlative, thus: "un amour *tres* pur, et sans aucun mélange."

necessary for frequent communion, and in citing the testimony of various Fathers, he reproduces again the paragraph from St. Dionysius. Hilary's interpretation and explanations of the relation between passages are often rash and without foundation.

Arnauld¹⁶ himself, writing after the decree of condemnation, claims that the proposition is a falsification and is not found either in his work or in that of St. Dionysius. He then explains that the ideas of this saint are similar to those expressed by St. Francis de Sales¹⁷ in his tract on the love of God; and adds that the love required in the proposition is not found on earth, but only among the blessed in heaven.¹⁸

DOCTRINAL JUDGMENT

In his remarks relative to our 23rd proposition Porter appeals to St. Cyril of Alexandria and to the Council of Trent.¹⁹ He writes:

S. Cyrillus Alexandrinus lib. 8 in Ioanne cap. 17²⁰: "probo meipsum et indignum invenio, quando igitur quicumque tu es qui ista dicis, dignus eris? Sedat cum in nobis maneat Christus saevientem membrorum nostrorum legem;" et Trid. sess. 13; cap. 2,²¹ ait: Eucharistiam esse antidotum contra culpas quotidianas.

The anti-jansenists in their criticism, also as Porter, find that the proposition is contrary to the Council of Trent, session 13, chapter 2,²²

¹⁶ Cfr. L. WILLAERT, *Bibliotheca janseniana Belgica*, 5500.

¹⁷ Among other things, on the love of God St. Francis de Sales says: "It is a love which must prevail over all our loves, and reign over all our passions. And this is what God requires of us — that among all our loves his be the dearest, holding the first place in our hearts; the warmest, occupying our whole soul; the most general, employing all our powers; the highest, filling our whole spirit; and the strongest, exercising all our strength and vigour. And inasmuch as by this we choose and elect God for the sovereign object of our soul, it is love of sovereign election, or an election of sovereign love . . . For as God is the only Lord, his goodness is infinitely above all goodness, and he is to be loved with a love which is eminent, excellent and mighty beyond all comparison. It is this supreme love which places God in such esteem in our souls, and makes us repute it so great a happiness to be agreeable in his sight, that we prefer him and love him above all things . . ." Cfr. H. MACKEY, *Library of St. Francis de Sales, works of this Doctor of the Church translated into English*, vol. II, *Treatise on the Love of God*, London, p. 425—426.

¹⁸ See, *Avis importants au Reverend Père Recteur du Collège des Jesuites de Paris, pour réponse a un Libelle intitulé: "Lettre à M. Arnauld sur le Plaintes etc. Touchant l'affaire de Douay, 1692*, at proposition 23.

¹⁹ AOS, 193 at proposition 69.

²⁰ In the *Bibliotheca Fabroniana*, Pistoia, ms. 22 gives the reading *liber 4*, which is correct. There is also a difficulty regarding the mentioned chapter. Again all the manuscripts indicate chapter 17, but probably to be understood is chapter 2. Cfr. MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. 73, col. 583.

²¹ DENZINGER, n. 875.

²² AOS, 193 at proposition 70.

and will be an obstacle to frequent communion. Moreover, this proposition wishes that the effects which are had from Holy Communion be placed before its reception.²³

The examiners of the Holy Office, realizing the errors inherent in the proposition, judged it in the following manner²⁴:

Sabbatinus: esse temerariam;

Bianchi: esse omnino improbabilem et temerariam;

Dominicus a S. Trinitate: esse temerariam, animarum perturbativam, scandalosam et erroneam;

Esparza: esse ineptam, scandalosam et erroneam;

Madernus: esse scandalosam, temerariam, erroneam, sapientem haeresim et contra Tridentinum;

Fabri: revocativam a Sacramento Eucharistiae;

Commissarius: esse erroneam, scandalosam et iniuriosam Sacramento Eucharistiae;

Magister: esse periculosam et male sonantem et errori proximam.

Of the commentators after the decree of condemnation, we are especially concerned with Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher and Viva. Hilary,²⁵ very rashly and without foundation, carries over the idea of sacrilege from the 22nd proposition to this one. He bases his inference on the first word of proposition 23, namely, "*similiter* arcendi sunt, etc.," — an inference which would be valid if both of these propositions were found in the same work and one following the other. Hilary boldly claims that there is no doubt that the sense of the 23rd proposition is that those without so great a love and perfection ought to be prohibited as guilty of sacrilege from the reception of the Holy Sacrament.

Viva,²⁶ likewise connects the 22nd and 23rd propositions thus introducing the notion of sacrilege into the latter. He goes yet further by basing our 23rd proposition on Baianistic principles. Thus he proceeds: all these innovators think that every love which is not of God *propter se*

²³ Their full comment is as follows: "Quasi vero non sufficeret attritio ex metu gehennae cum sacramento, qualis secundum Trid. sess. 14. cap. 4 [DENZINGER, n. 898] utpote donum Dei et Spiritus Sancti impulsus, peccatorem in sacramento poenitentiae ad gratiam impetrandam disponit; rursus, numquam liceret suscipere eucharistiam donec habetur ille amor tam purus, qualis nonnisi in magnis sanctis et in gratia confirmatis reperiri potest, deinde, Trid. sess. 13, cap. 2 [DENZINGER, n. 875] declarat esse antidotum quo liberemur a culpis quotidianis, et a peccatis mortalibus praeservemur, vult autem dicta propositio ut hi effectus qui habentur ex eucharistia praecedant eam, dum requirit amorem Dei purissimum et omnis mixtionis expertem." See, *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae* . . . , ms. 1343; Roma, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico.

²⁴ *Killiney Papers*, D. 21. Diaz relates in his report: "Censura omnium theologorum fuit quod huiusmodi propositio sit temeraria, et erronea ac animarum illaquetiva seu perturbativa." AGOFM, III, 11, fol. 701v.

²⁵ l. c.

²⁶ l. c.

and supernatural, is a vicious cupidity and a sin (as is had in proposition 38 of Baius);²⁷ and every human deliberate act, which is not of the love of God and the charity of the Father, is the love of the world and the concupiscence of the flesh, and thus bad (as in proposition 7 of the 31).²⁸ Consequently, according to these innovators, Viva says, the love which is not the purest and without mixture, involves a fault, which renders the eating of the Eucharistic Food a sacrilege.

According to Le Bachelet²⁹ this proposition is rash, scandalous, deprecatory of the sacrament of the Eucharist (such as it is usually administered in the Church), and unjurious to the Church itself.

CONCLUSION

The anti-jansenists have correctly asserted that our 23rd proposition is contrary to the teaching of the Church, and places an obstacle to frequent Communion. However, they have recklessly asserted it is found in the *Fréquent Communion* of Anthony Arnould.

Thus in our list of 31 this is the second proposition claimed by the anti-jansenists to be of Arnould. It is true that some have even attributed the 16th to him.³⁰ Nevertheless, as we have already indicated, Porter in his official list cites the source as: *Canones poenitentiales a S. Carolo Borromaeo ex antiquis poenentialibus collecti, quibus praemittitur compendiosa deductio in cognitionem originis, vigoris, et declinationis dictorum canonum*.

There have been some authors who exaggerated the number of propositions attributed to Arnould. Hurter³¹ for example, writes "et Alexander VIII damnavit plures quae in eo (i. e. libro Arnaldi) continentur propositiones 20 dec. 1690." Patouillet³² in his work *Dictionnaire des livres jansénistes* . . . thus asserts: "En 1690 plusieurs propositions qui étoient extraites du Livre de la Fréquente Communion, furent flétries par le Décret d'Alexandre VIII, du 20 Décembre." If Reusch³³ writes that according to the Jesuits the 16th, 18th and 23rd propositions have been extracted from the *Fréquent Communion*, he adds that Arnould in his work *Difficultez proposées à M. Steyaert* has proven the contrary.

²⁷ DENZINGER, n. 1038.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, n. 1297.

²⁹ l. c.

³⁰ For Arnould's reply cfr., *Neuvième partie des difficultez proposées à M. Steyaert* . . . Cologne 1692, p. 260 ff.

³¹ HURTER, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, col. 444.

³² *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 266.

³³ REUSCH, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher*, vol. II, Bonn 1885, p. 450.

IX

PROPOSITIO 25: Dei Patris [Viva: sedentis] simulacrum nefas est christiano in templo collocare.

SOURCE OF THE PROPOSITION

Both Duffy and Porter¹ agree in ascribing this proposition to John Hessels, Doctor of Louvain, in his *Catechism*, book 3, chapter 64. Hessels,² who was born in Louvain in 1522, embraced the ecclesiastical state and zealously applied himself to the study of theology. For eight years he taught sacred theology to the young religious of the abbey of Parc, located near Louvain. At the University of Louvain he obtained a chair of theology in 1559 and was also a canon of the chapter of St. Peter. All of his duties were fulfilled with zeal and success.

In 1562 Pius IV announced the re-opening of the Council of Trent, which had already been suspended on two occasions. Hessels and his friend Michael Baius³ were sent to the Council, since their doctrine was under suspicion.

After returning to Louvain, Hessels occupied himself with teaching and writing. He was a fierce opponent of the errors of Protestantism, as is evident from his writings. The work which is of interest to us is his *Catechism*, first published at Louvain in 1571 by Henry Van Grave.⁴ Rather than being a simple exposition of catholic faith, it is a remarkable treatise of dogmatic and moral theology based on the Fathers and especially on St. Augustine. This catechism treats of the Apostles' Creed, the Our Father, Hail Mary, Ten Commandments and the first three Sacraments. Before completing the tract on the last four Sacraments the author died on November 7, 1566. Others, however, from notes of Hessels, added this section to later editions. It is claimed that some infiltrations of baianism were eliminated by Henry Van Grave, the first editor.

¹ This proposition is found in the following places: with Duffy, in his *Theologia Baio-janseniana*, part 3, n. 160; among the 356 propositions, n. 298; among the 96 propositions, n. 87; with Porter: among the 238 propositions, n. 205; among the 105 propositions, n. 74.

² Cfr. HURTER, *op. cit.*, vol. III, col. 36—37; *Biographie Universelle*, Paris 1817, p. 330—331; *Biographie Nationale*, vol. IX, col. 320—322; *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. VI, Paris 1920, col. 2321—2324; FOPPENS, *Bibliotheca Belgica*, vol. II, p. 1739.

³ On the friendship between Baius and Hessels, cfr., *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. II, Paris 1905, col. 37 ff.

⁴ See, L. CEYSENS, *Un échange de lettres entre Michel Baius et Henri Gravius (1579)*, in *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis*, 26 (1950) 59—86. IDEM, *Hendrik van Grave . . . en zijn verhouding tot het jansenisme*, in *Mededelingen van het Nederlands historisch Instituut*, 3d s., 10 (1959) 227—241.

EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT

The edition of the *Catechism* which we consulted is divided into two volumes. The first volume, which is of interest to us, has the following title:

Catechismus solidam et orthodoxam continens explicationem symboli apostolici, orationis dominicae, salutationis angelicae, praeceptorum decalogi et priorum trium sacramentorum auctore Ioanne Hesselio Lovaniensi sacrae theologiae Doctore et Professore Regio, editio septima cui ad calcem subnectitur eiusdem Censura super legenda Sanctorum cum notis Ioannis Molani S. T. D. Lovanii, Typis Hieronymi Nempaei, anno 1674.⁵

As mentioned above, both Duffy and Porter agree in citing as the source of our 25th proposition, book 3 and chapter 64. Therefore, it is to volume one that we direct our attention. For the sake of better understanding the context, we shall begin with chapter 61 of book three. The title of Chapter 61 are the words of Sacred Scripture: "Non facies tibi sculptile, neque omnem similitudinem quae est in coelo desuper, et quae in terra deorsum, nec eorum quae sunt in aquis sub terra. Non adorabis ea neque coles."⁶ In explaining these words of Holy Scripture, Hessels asserts that God prohibits the making of "sculptile et similitudines," not because the art of sculpture or painting is displeasing to Him, but the Almighty forbids images to be employed for divine cult, as if the image itself would be God, or, that which is represented would be able to express the true divinity.

Of Chapter 62 is the heading: "De his qui imagines Deos esse sunt arbitrati." The author relates how stupid it is to think that an image of gold or silver, wood or stone, and made by the hands of man, can be considered as gods. Yet, this was the opinion of the Gentiles.

Chapter 63 treats: "De his qui creaturas imaginibus representatas coluerunt." Examples of those who fall in this class would be the worshipers of the sea, the sun, serpents, birds, beasts and the like. Finally, there is Chapter 64, the indicated source of our 25th proposition. For the title is: "De his qui Deum verum figurare conati sunt." For reasons which will be obvious later, we reproduce the text exactly as found in the book.

⁵ In the beginning of the volume is a letter of Henry Van Grave to John Soteaux, in which Hessels is thus praised: "Erat enim (ut non ignoras) vir ille incomparabilis, et praeter eximiam quandam pietatem, praeclaris animi dotibus excellenter a Deo exornatus. Ingenio imprimis summo atque amplissimo, ac prope divino: quippe ad comprehendendum celerrimus, ad excogitandum acutissimus, ad indagandum sagacissimus, denique ad omnes perumpendas difficultates acerrimus." A brief biography of Hessels is also given.

⁶ Cfr. Exod. 20, 4; Deut. 5, 8.

Fuerunt et alii, qui aestimaverunt se posse Deum exprimere aliquo simulacro: propter quod ait Moyses: *Locutus est Dominus ad vos in medio ignis, vocem verborum eius audistis, et formam penitus non vidistis. Et rursum: Non vidistis aliquam similitudinem in die, qua locutus est Dominus vobis in Ore de medio ignis: ne forte decepti faciatis vobis sculptam similitudinem, aut imaginem masculi vel feminae, similitudinem omnium iumentorum quae sunt super terram; vel avium sub coelo volantium, atque reptilium quae movetur in terra, sive piscium qui sub terra morantur in aquis: ne forte elevatis oculis ad coelum videas solem et lunam, et omnia astra coeli, et errore deceptus adores ea et colas quae creavit Dominus Deus tuus in ministerium cunctis gentibus quae sub coelo sunt.* Isaïas quoque: cui, inquit, similem fecistis Deum? Aut quam imaginem ponetis ei? Qui scilicet spiritus est, et in omnibus est, et ubique discurrit, et terram quasi pugillo continet. Et infra: *Cui assimilastis me, et adaequastis, dicit Sanctus?* Unde et Apostolus Paulus Atheniensibus dicebat: *Genus cum simus Dei, non debemus existimare auro et argento, aut lapidi, sculptaræ artis et cogitationis hominis, divinum esse simile.* Non igitur quasi humana forma circumscriptum esse Deum Patrem arbitrandum est, ut de illo cogitantibus dextrum aut sinistrum latus animo occurrat: aut idipsum quod sedere Pater dicitur, flexis poplitibus fieri putandum est, ne in illud incidamus sacrilegium, quo execratur Apostolus eos, *qui commutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem corruptibilis hominis.* Tale enim simulacrum Dei, nefas est Christiano in templo collocare: multo magis in corde nefarium est, ubi vere est templum, si a terrena cupiditate atque errore mundetur. De huiusmodi figura, sic habet Concilium Elibertinum Canon. 36.⁴⁾ Placuit picturas in Ecclesia

Hiron. in
40. cap.
Isaiam.¹⁾

Aug. cap. 7
lib. de fide
& symbol.²⁾

In Syn. 7
action. 6.³⁾

¹⁾ MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. 24, col. 422.

²⁾ *Ibidem*, vol. 40, col. 187.

³⁾ MANSI, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, vol. 13, Florentiae 1767, col. 203 ss.

⁴⁾ *Ibidem*, vol. II, col. 11.

esse non debere: ne quod colitur aut adoratur:
in parietibus depingatur. Supra omnem enim
circumscriptionem est divina natura, sed humana
circumscribi et definiri potest.

Upon examining this page, one recognized the text of the 25th proposition, with a few minor changes. To be carefully observed is the second marginal note on the right hand side of the page, namely, *Aug. cap. 7 lib. de fide et symbolo*. Upon investigating the seventh chapter of the *Liber de fide et symbolo* of St. Augustine, we find something most interesting. The ten lines of the text of Hessels, that is, from, "non igitur quasi humana forma circumscriptum esse . . .," all the way to, ". . . si a terrena cupiditate atque errore mundetur," are verbatim the words of St. Augustine. Included within these lines is also our 25th proposition.

We may ask, why did the anti-jansenists select the words of St. Augustine and propose this as a proposition to be condemned? In all probability they made a serious blunder. On examining the text of Hessels we can understand how this error happened. When quoting from Sacred Scripture, the author places the citations in italics. Even the Scripture text from St. Paul's epistle to the Romans, 2, v. 23, which is contained within his quotation from St. Augustine, is placed in italics. The anti-jansenist who extracted what is now the 25th proposition most probably considered these as the words of Hessels himself.

To comprehend the own opinion of Hessels in this matter, it is necessary to proceed to the following chapter of his *Catechism*. Chapter 95 is entitled: "De imaginibus Dei Patris, sive S. Trinitatis." As the author points out, although we read in Sacred Scripture phrases which represent God the Father as sitting, this is not to express his *persona*, but rather an *operatio*, that is, his judging. Likewise, when referring to the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove or of fiery tongues, this method of speaking does not intend to represent his person, but rather to designate a certain effect. Hessels then continues:

Licet autem periculum non sit, ne rudes opinentur Spiritum Sanctum esse columbam, vel linguas igneas; sicut nec Iudaeis periculum erat, ne putarent vocem quam audiverant in monte Sinai, aut ignem et fumum quem videbant, esse Deum, cum ex imaginibus, tamen, quibus Deus Pater, aut Spiritus Sanctus effigiatur in humana specie, facile in errorem Anthropomorphitarum, qui putant Deum secundum divinitatem habere corpus et humanam effigiem, esseque circumscriptum, incidant imperiti, propter quos praecipue imagines ponuntur (rudibus enim imagines non videntur tam facile

esse metaphoricae, quam spiritualibus viris visiones) non facile admittendae sunt huiusmodi imagines: sicut capitulo praecedenti ex Patribus fecimus manifestum.

Several lines later occurs another passage for our consideration:

Verum quidem est, imaginem Dei Patris in tali effigie, quali Ioanni et Danieli visus est, non fore reiciendam si nonnisi ab eruditiss et spiritualibus viris posset conspici: sed quia imago fixa manet et omnibus conspicua semper est, nec semper rudibus praesto est doctor, omittenda est eiusmodi imago.

Therefore, in this matter we are able to summarize the opinion of Hessels thus: because of the danger of anthropomorphism for the unlearned, an image of God the Father in human form should not be easily admitted, should be omitted. The two phrases of Hessels, *non facile admittendae* and *omittenda est*, are not as strong as the expression *nefas est* of the 25th proposition.

DOCTRINAL JUDGMENT

Regarding this proposition Porter⁷ briefly states that the Spanish inquisition ordered it to be removed from the *Catechism* of Hessels. The anti-jansenists⁸ in their criticism refer to the proposition as containing the opinion of Calvin, who condemned all sacred images. Moreover, they assert this proposition renews the error of the Iconoclasts condemned in the second Council of Nicaea; it is also contrary to the universal practice of the Church.

About the middle of the year 1683 the theological faculty of Louvain had prepared their answer to the attack launched against them.⁹ It was at this time that the faculty indicated that this proposition contained the words of St. Augustine. The faculty defended Hessels by saying he did not intend the prohibition of every image, but only the same kind as forbidden by St. Augustine.

About the time the Doctors of Louvain were preparing their statement to be sent to Rome, the consultors in the Eternal City gave the following judgment.¹⁰

Sabbatini: non esse censurandam;¹¹

Bianchi: esse temerariam et Ecclesiae iniuriosam;

⁷ AOS, 193, at proposition 74.

⁸ Cfr. *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae* . . . , ms. 1343, Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico.

⁹ Cfr. *Iudicium facultatis theologiae Lovaniensis super 96* . . . , at proposition 87, ms. 1343, Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico.

¹⁰ Cfr. *Killiney Papers*, ms. D. 21.

¹¹ In another manuscript Sabbatini says: "non est apud auctorem." Cfr. ms. 899, fol. 259v, Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica.

Dominicus a S. Trinitate: esse contra usum Ecclesiae pingendi imagines;
 Maderno: esse erroneam, temerariam et contra praxim ab Ecclesia approbatam;

Fabri: esse temerariam, scandalosam et iniuriosam Ecclesiae;

Mazza: esse contra praxim Ecclesiae, falsam, erroneam, temerariam et scandalosam;

Esparza: esse temerariam et ut minimum scandalosam.

In the summary presented by Diaz is the following¹²: "Censura maioris partis theologorum fuit quod praesens propositio sit temeraria et scandalosa, et alii addiderunt eam favere erroribus novatorum."

Viva¹³ who wrote toward the end of the 17th century makes no mention of the *Liber de fide et symbolo*, although he does refer to St. Augustine's *de Civitate Dei*, book 4, chapter 21. Writing shortly after the decree of condemnation, Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher¹⁴ makes no explicit statement that the 25th proposition contains the words of St. Augustine. He merely states that Hessels in explaining the First Commandment, cites various texts of Sacred Scripture, which prohibit representing God by an image. He then presents part of the text of the *Catechism* (including the words of St. Augustine), but in no way indicating that Hessels is quoting from the famous Doctor of the Church. However, after various explanations, he does state:

Adeoque pro se frustranee allegat S. Augustini *de fide et symbolo*, cap. 7. nam sanctus Pater aperte de simulacro loquitur, quo suo tempore perfectam Dei similitudinem, formamque exprimi aliqui putabant, et in idolatriam declinabant, quod periculum ut evitaret S. Pater, nefas dicebat tale simulacrum in templo Christianorum collocare.

Steyaert¹⁵ in the first edition of the *Novitas utrimque* makes no reference to the fact that Hessels was quoting from St. Augustine. Since this omission was called to his attention by *theologis eximiis*,¹⁶ he found it necessary to place an addition to his treatment of this subject. He justifies the Doctor of the Church, for one must consider the conditions and circumstances of the age. Yet, Steyaert disagrees with Hessels in holding that the same conditions prevail in the 16th century. It is also Steyaert who makes an interesting remark, namely, that in Belgium he has never seen such a doctrine held, taught or practiced; in fact, in that country are found many images of God the Father, the Holy Spirit and the Blessed Trinity. If this is the case we wonder about

¹² AGOFM, III, 11, fol. 702r.

¹³ VIVA, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

¹⁴ HILARIUS A S. SEPULCHRO, *op. cit.*, p. 46—48.

¹⁵ STEYAERT, *op. cit.*, p. 369—371.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 375—378.

the inclusion of this proposition in Porter's list which bears the title: "Propositiones e quibus potissimum in Belgio annis superioribus ac fere post constitutiones Urbani VIII *In Eminenti*, Innocentii X *Cum occasione*, Alexandri VII *Ad sacram Beati Petri* offensiones, scandala, contentiones, perturbationes exstiterunt, existuntque."

Torrecilla,¹⁷ a Spanish Capuchin, devotes over 20 pages to the treatment of this proposition. Although he claims to have been moved by his spiritual Father, Antonius de Fuente la Peña,¹⁸ without doubt he was also influenced by the fact that Spain at this time had been trying to obtain from the Holy See a feast in honor of God the Father.¹⁹ His fiery zeal led him to conclude that this proposition is heretical and as such was condemned by Alexander VIII. In referring to St. Augustine, Torrecilla does not make mention of *de fide et symbolo*, but rather *epistola 49* and *super Psalmum 113*, in which places, according to this Capuchin, the Doctor of Grace is referring to the prohibition of idols.

Le Bachelet²⁰ indicates that the 25th proposition is found in the *Catechism* of John Hessels, and is based on St. Augustine. However, he claims, in this regard no longer is there danger of anthropomorphism.

CONCLUSION

We have already seen in our treatment of the 22nd proposition how the anti-jansenists in all probability unknowingly extracted a proposition from the words of St. Cyprian. Likewise, they formulated the 23rd proposition from the words of St. Dionysius. Now, concerning the 25th proposition they have blundered once more. Because of the unfortunate practice in the 16th century of not always indicating direct speech by some sign, an anti-jansenist, thinking he was extracting the proposition from the words of John Hessels, a friend of Baius, in reality formed it from the words of St. Augustine. If Hessels respected the opinion of this renowned Father of the Church, still he did not hesitate to tone down the forcefulness of his words.

¹⁷ M. TORRECILLA, *Propugnaculum orthodoxae fidei*, Madrid 1689, p. 96—121.

¹⁸ Peña was a lector of theology, preacher, moderator of the Province of Castile, visitor and commissary general in Sicily. In his work *El Ente dilucidado* (Madrid 1677), he treats also of the mechanical possibility of man to fly. Cfr. *Lexicon capuccinum*, Rome 1951, col. 89—90.

¹⁹ See, M. CAILLAT, *La Dévotion à Dieu Le Père: une discussion au XVIIe siècle*, in *Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique*, 20 (1939) 35—49.

²⁰ LE BACHELET, *op. cit.*, col. 759—760.

X

PROPOSITIO 26: Laus, quae defertur Mariae ut Mariae, vana est.

SOURCE OF THE PROPOSITION

The second of the two propositions, which concerns the Mother of God in the list of 31,¹ is attributed to a small publication of less than twenty pages, namely. *Monita salutaria Beatae Mariae Virginis ad cultores suos indiscretos*. Printed by Francis d'Ercle it appeared anonymously the first time in November 1673 at Ghent with an approbation by Ignatius Gillemans.² In this opusculum consisting of eighteen small sections (each called *monitio*), most of which are less than a page, the author has placed in the mouth of the Blessed Mother a series of admonitions that she addresses to her devotees.

This work, at once taken as a Jansenistic production, excited great controversy, one may say, in all Europe.³ In the year 1674 and 1675 there appeared more than forty writings either for or against the *Monita Salutaria*.⁴ It was soon translated into French under the title *Avis salutaires de la B. V. Marie à ses dévots indiscrets*, as also with the title *Avertissemens salutaires . . .*⁵ A translation was likewise made in Flemish.

This work did not escape various condemnations.⁶ The Jesuitical University of Mainz, known for its anti-jansenistic program, in 1674

¹ As we have already mentioned, the other proposition regarding the Mother of God is the 24th. In the article of L. CEYSSENS, *La vingt-quatrième des trente-et-une propositions jansénistes condamnées en 1690*, in *Antonianum*, 32 (1957) 47—70, the author has proven that the 24th proposition historically speaking is not jansenistic, but a fabrication of the anti-jansenists.

² We have already spoken of this man under the treatment of the 16th proposition.

³ Cfr. P. HOFFER, *La dévotion à Marie au déclin du XVII^e siècle. Autour du jansénisme et des "Avis salutaires de B. V. Marie à ses dévots indiscrets"*, Paris 1938. In this book the author treats of the jansenists and the devotion to the Blessed Virgin, the history of the *Monita Salutaria* and the doctrine contained therein. See also the following articles of L. CEYSSENS: for certain information relative to the *Monita* in Holland, *Johannes van Neercassel en de Mariadevotie*, in *Archief voor de geschiedenis van het Aartsbisdom Utrecht*, 64 (1940) 1—49; then for details of the *Monita* in Belgium, *De Carmelitarum Belgicorum actione antijansenistica iuxta chartas P. Seraphini a Jesu Mariae (1668—1688)*, in *Analecta Ordinis Carmelitarum*, nova series, vol. IV, 1952, p. 33—39; in Spain, *Le sort des "Monita Salutaria" en Espagne*, in *Marianum*, 14 (1952) 451—456; finally, *Le Cardinal Jean Bona et le jansénisme, autour d'une récente étude*, in *Benedictina*, 10 (1956) 304—311.

⁴ A list of such writings may be found in [L. PATOUILLET], *Dictionnaire des livres jansénistes ou qui favorisent le jansénisme*, Antwerp 1754, vol. I, p. 164 ff. Cfr. also P. HOFFER, *op. cit.*, p. 369—381.

⁵ Gerberon made a French translation in 1674.

⁶ See, REUSCH, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher*, vol. II, p. 547—551.

condemned the *Monita* as: "scandalosa, noxia, officina Janseniorum olentia et gustui Luther-Calvinicorum vehementer aridentia." The Spanish Inquisition issued its condemnation in the same year. When the Holy Office condemned the Latin edition in June, 1674, it affixed an unusual phrase, namely, "Suspenditur. Donec etc." The other books mentioned in the decree were condemned without restriction. The adversaries of the *Monita* interpreted this *etc.* by *donec corrigatur*, while its defenders by *donec cedatur tumultus*. Heated discussions continued. By a new decree of June 22, 1676 it was again condemned *donec corrigatur*.⁷ The Flemish translation was condemned by a decree of June 22, 1676 and the French on January 25, 1678.

Even though this polemic work has been considered jansenistic,⁸ recent study has shown the author himself, Adam Widenfeld, a doctor of law of Cologne, was not a jansenist, but a militant Catholic who wrote against Protestantism and who was very devoted to the Blessed Mother. It was his claim that certain indiscreet Catholics in their devotion to Mary were hindering the conversion of the Protestants.⁹

We find our 26th proposition in all the lists of Porter and Duffy.¹⁰ Nevertheless, upon first reading its indicated source according to Porter in his list of 105, a difficulty presents itself. We read there, *epistola apologetica*, pag. 45.¹¹ This same source is also given in the list of 31 as found in the Vatican archives.¹² After investigating however, the *Theologia Baio-janseniana* of Duffy, as well as the lists of Porter, and making comparisons between the propositions of these lists, it is obvious we have here a case of a copyist error. There is no doubt that the source of our 26th proposition according to Porter should read, *Monita salutaria, monitio 6*.

⁷ Cfr. P. HOFFER, *op. cit.*, p. 178—180.

⁸ Estrix in his *Specimen* treats of the *Monita* in part III, chapter VII; again in part VI, chapter VI, par. 2. One of his criticisms is the fact that throughout the entire *Monita salutaria*, never is there found the explicit term *Mother of God*, although, he says, there were occasions to use this expression.

⁹ Cfr. HOFFER, *op. cit.*, p. 183—207.

¹⁰ This proposition is had with Duffy: in his *Theologia Baio-janseniana*, part III, n. 179; among the 356 propositions, n. 317; among the 96 propositions, n. 90; with Porter: among the 238 propositions, n. 226; among the 105 propositions, n. 90.

¹¹ It refers to the following: *Epistola apologetica quam author libelli cui titulus "Monita salutaria B. V. Mariae ad cultores suos indiscretos" scripsit ad eiusdem censorem, Michliniae, typ. Gisberti Lintsii, 1674, 64 pp.* Cfr. WILLAERT, *Bibliotheca Janseniana Belgica*, n. 3652.

¹² Cfr. Vatican Archives, *Nunziatura di Fiandra*, 203. This list will be found in a packet of papers near the end and bearing the title: *Extractum ex alio ampliori catalogi propositionum a quibusdam regularibus adversus Doctores Lovanienses oblatarum*.

EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT

We shall now present the text of the *Monita salutaria* relative to our proposition. We shall give the entire sixth section, or *monitio*, as it is called:

Non est pulchra dilectio, vel laus quae Deo non tribuit omnia. Illi soli debetur *laus, honor et gloria* (1 Tim. 1, 17). *Ego non quaero gloriam meam* (Ioan. 8, 50), sed gloriam eius qui creavit et redemit me.

Laus quae mihi defertur, is non redundet primo et principaliter in Deum qui dedit mihi omnia quae habeo, non est laus mea, sed vituperium (St. Aug., *De vera relig.* c. 55).¹³

Laus quae mihi defertur ut mihi vana est, quae vero mihi defertur ut Matri et Ancillae Domini sancta est.

Ego enim *ante pedes Agni mitto coronam meam* (Apoc. 4, 10), quamvis sit pretiosissima inter omnes alias, sciens quod a me nihil sum. Ego enim *conserva vestra sum* (ibid. 22, 9).

Cum itaque me laudes, praecipue Deum mecum lauda et *magnifica quia respexit humilitatem ancillae suae et fecit mihi magna qui potens est.* (Lu. 1, 48—49)

Si me invocas, ad hoc invoca, ut defectum et imbecillitatem tuam suppleam precibus meis ad Deum.

The place from which the proposition has been extracted is evident. To be noted is its position in a sentence, the two parts of which are in opposition. Textually, the 26th proposition, with the exchange of *mihi* for *Mariae* is found in the *Monita salutaria*, *monitio* 6, as indicated by the anti-jansenists. We will discuss its meaning later.

DOCTRINAL JUDGMENT

Porter¹⁴ remarks that the proposition is contrary to the *cultus dulciae* of the saints. The anti-jansenists in their criticism relate the following¹⁵:

Est Lutheri et Calvinii sententia damnata in Tridentino, sessione 25 titulo de invocatione et veneratione Sanctorum;¹⁶ et sane Angelus Gabriel Lucae 10 laudavit Mariam ut Mariam, id est, antequam fieret Mater Dei,

¹³ In his work *De vera religione*, chapter 55, St. Augustine has in effect expressions which support the opinion of Widenfeld, for example: "Justi autem homines, et in uno Deo habentes omnia gaudia sua, quando per eorum facta Deus benedicitur, congratulantur laudantibus; cum vero *ipsi tamquam ipsi* laudantur, corrigunt errantes quos possunt; quos vero non possunt, non eis gratulantur, et ab illo vitio corrigi volunt . . .," MIGNE, *Patrologia latina*, vol. 34, col. 171, n. 111. Since the references of Widenfeld are marginal, thus lacking a more accurate correspondence to the text, it is possible that the citation of St. Augustine refers equally or even more to the passage from which the condemned proposition has been extracted.

¹⁴ AOS, 193 at propositionem 88.

¹⁵ Cfr. *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae* . . ., at proposition 90, ms. 1343, Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico.

¹⁶ DENZINGER, n. 984—989.

dicens: "Ave gratia plena, Dominus tecum, benedicta tu in mulieribus;" haec sane est eximia laus etiam Mariae ut Mariae, et alia delenda erunt omnia praecclara eccemia, quibus Sancti Patres Augustinus, Ambrosius, Anselmus, Bernardus et alii Mariam efferunt.

The theological faculty of Louvain¹⁷ in defending itself against the attacks of the anti-jansenists says that it never held any such doctrine, and that the proposition, as it stands, is at least *male sonans*, even though the phrase *ut Mariae* is explained as excluding Mary as the Mother of God, and disregarding her sanctity.

The majority of the examiners of the Holy Office were quite severe in their judgment, as we see from the following¹⁸:

Sabbatini: esse scandalosam et piarum aurium offensivam vel ad minus male sonantem;

Bianchi: dixit in sensu Lutheri esse scandalosam, Sanctorum Patrum et Ecclesiae iniuriosam ac piarum aurium offensivam; in sensu vero personali prout distinguitur a dignitate maternitatis esse erroneam in fide, in sensu Constantini Copronymi esse pariter errorem in fide;

Dominicus a S. Trinitate: esse scandalosam, B. Virgini Mariae iniuriosam et forsan haeticam seu sapientem haeresim;

Maderno fuit absens ob malam valetudinem;

Esparza: esse captiosam, seductivam fidelium, temerariam et scandalosam;

Fabri, esse piarum aurium offensivam et sapientem haeresim;

Mazza: dixit quod si intelligatur de laudibus approbatis ab Ecclesia, est impia, sacrilega et iniuriosa Ecclesiae, si intelligatur quod Maria ut mulier non sit laudanda est temeraria et sapiens haeresim;

Pozzobonelli: dixit esse temerariam, scandalosam, piarum offensivam, erroneam, haeresim sapientem vel ei proximam.

The authors writing after the decree of condemnation see in this 26th proposition a denial not only to Mary, but to all the saints of the *cultus absolutus*.¹⁹ According to Viva,²⁰ this proposition in distinguishing between the praises given to Mary as the Mother of God, and that given

¹⁷ Cfr. *Iudicium facultatis theologiae Lovaniensis super 96 propositionibus hic iniunctis*, at propositionem 90, ms. 1343, Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gesuitico.

¹⁸ *Killiney Papers*, ms. D. 21. Later Diaz gave the following summary: "Censura omnium theologorum fuit quod ista propositio sit scandalosa, temeraria, seductiva fidelium et Beatissimae Virgini iniuriosissima; aliqui etiam subiungere eam esse haeticam." AGOFM, III, 11, fol. 702r.

¹⁹ *Cultus absolutus*: quando quis colitur propter excellentiam ipsi propriam et inhaerentem; talis est cultus Deo vel sanctis ipsis delatus; *cultus relativus*: quando res colitur propter aliam cum quo specialem relationem habet; talis est cultus imaginibus et reliquiis exhibitus, quia veneratio nostra in iis non sistit, sed ad eum quem repraesentant transit. Cfr. TANQUEREY, *Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae*, ed. 17th, vol. II, Paris 1920, p. 775—776.

²⁰ VIVA, *op. cit.*, p. 96—102.

to her as such (i. e. abstracting from this prerogative) is contrary to the doctrine of the Church regarding the cult of saints. For to all the saints, and a fortiori to Mary, by reason of their own proper holiness and excellence is due praise, honor and veneration.

Steyaert²¹ remarks: "haud dubie male sonat et simpliciter falsa est," and explains that praise and honor is not given to Mary only *relative* as to images. She is to receive *honor absolutus* because of her intrinsic and admirable qualities. Hilary of the Holy Sepulcher²² gives the same when he says that the Blessed Mother is honored *ratione sui*, and not only in as far as she is related to Christ.

According to Le Bachelet²³ this proposition distinguishes the cult given to Mary in as far as she is the Mother of God or handmaid of the Lord, and in as far as it is given to her as such. Widenfeld, according to Le Bachelet, approved the former but rejects the latter. This doctrine, therefore, of the proposition denies the cult due to the Blessed Mother by reason of her own proper holiness and excellence. In the opinion of this author the proposition is false in itself, scandalous, shocking to pious ears, and tends to diminish the *cultus hyperduliae*, which is owed to the Virgin Mary.²⁴

CONCLUSION

The 26th proposition, as it stands, is lacking in clarity, as is evident from the judgment of the examiners of the Holy Office presented above. Bianchi, for example, made three distinctions: *in sensu Lutheri*, *in sensu vero personali*, *in sensu Constantini Copronymi*. For Dominic of the Most Holy Trinity the proposition was scandalous, injurious to the Blessed

²¹ STEYAERT, *op. cit.*, p. 367—369.

²² HILARIUS A S. SEPULCHRO, *op. cit.*, p. 48—49; HOFFER, *op. cit.*, p. 293 in note 2 indicates that the argument of Hilary is illogical.

²³ LE BACHELET, *op. cit.*, col. 760.

²⁴ Gerberon, also writing after the decree of condemnation, interprets the proposition in a somewhat different manner. He writes: "Sensus huius propositionis obvius est, quod omnis laus quae defertur Sanctissimae Virgini, quae propter singularem suam excellentiam specialiter nomine Mariae indigitatur, vana est. Quo sensu propositio esset impia et blasphema. Et ideo Delator ut huic Auctori invidiam constaret, ac eius censuram a Sede Romana extorqueret, propositionem quam ipse ei tribuit sic confecit expresse nomine Mariae, quod in libelli enunciatione suppressum est. Sensus vero Auctoris omnino alienus est ab huiusmodi propositione intellecta iuxta sensum huiusmodi obvium, in quo ipsa esset impia ac blasphema. Nam iste Auctor non solum non dicit quod laus quae Beatissimae Virgini defertur vana sit, sed expresse asserit in sua propositione quod laus quae Beatae Virgini defertur ut est Mater et Ancilla Domini, sancta sit, quod ab Delatore truncatum est." Cfr. [GERBERON], *Quaestio iuris pontificii circa decretum ab inquisitione Romana adversus XXXI propositiones latum a P. Le Prestre, Tolosalibus 1693*, p. 20—21.

Virgin and *perhaps* heretical or tasting of heresy. Mazza also found it necessary to distinguish.

To the anti-jansenists there was no ambiguity. For them it attacked the *cultus duliae sanctorum*. If praise to Mary as Mary is vain, that is, abstracting from her prerogative as the Mother of God and considering her own proper excellence and sanctity, then the praise given to the saints because of their own excellence is likewise vain. In other words, according to the anti-jansenists the 26th proposition denies to Mary and the saints the *cultus absolutus*.

That the 26th proposition considered in its context can be taken in an orthodox sense, has been expressed by Hoffer in the following words²⁵:

Replaçons-la dans son contexte immédiat: "Laus quae mihi defertur ut mihi, vana est; quae mihi defertur ut Matri et ancillae Domini, sancta est." Entre les deux membres, l'opposition est manifeste. Le second exclut toute ambiguïté; le culte rendu à ma personne en tant qu'elle est revêtue des prérogatives de ma maternité divine et de ma sainteté,²⁶ fondements du culte d'hyperdulie, est saint. La signification du premier membre dépend du sens donné au second *mihi*, or, ce *mihi* a suggéré deux interprétations; ou il s'agit de la personne de Marie "abstraite" de ses privilèges, ou de cette personne revêtue de la dignité de Mère de Dieu et de la sainteté. Ce dernier sens est d'avance exclu par l'opposition marquée dans le second membre de la⁷ proposition. Reste le premier sens; dans ce cas, la proposition des Avis est parfaitement orthodoxe, car la personne "abstraite" de ses prérogatives serait privée par le fait de tout ce qui lui confère une supériorité capable de fonder le culte de *dulie*. Widenfeld en somme, prie les fidèles de ne pas faire de la Vierge un second Absolu à côté de Dieu et totalement indépendant de lui. Bref, la Vierge convie ses dévots à chanter avec elle le *Magnificat*.

From the context of *monitio* 6 it seems evident that the author in this particular place simply wished to emphasize that all praise given to Mary ultimately redounds to the glory of God.²⁷ Praise given to creatures does not ultimately terminate in them, but must always go back to the Creator. This view is substantiated by the reference of St. Augustine's *De vera religione* (cfr. the above text of Widenfeld). Perhaps

²⁵ Cfr. HOFFER, *op. cit.*, p. 292—294.

²⁶ In a footnote the author gives the following: "Il semble que le mot *ancilla* ait bien ce sens: c'est par là que Marie ressemble aux autres saints et mérite le culte de *dulie*; le culte d'hyperdulie est dû à sa dignité de Mère de Dieu."

²⁷ A similar idea was expressed by Bossuet: "L'honneur que l'on rend à la sainte Vierge (devait) être blâmé, s'il n'était pas religieux, c'est-à-dire, s'il ne se rapportait pas à Dieu, qui est l'objet de la religion." Cfr. H. BREMOND, *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France*, vol. IX, Paris 1932, p. 254.

Widenfeld had in mind the Italian alchemist, Joseph Borri, who was spreading his false opinions especially in Germany. Among his errors was the assertion that the Blessed Mother was divine and the possessor of divine attributes.²⁸

Also to be noted is that some of the accusers as Porter and Viva, and some of the examiners, thought that only the maternity of Mary was considered by Widenfeld as the object of praise. Thus they disregarded the clear words of the author himself: "laus quae mihide fertur ut *Matri et Ancillae*." Thus the 26th proposition, violently (?) extracted from the work of a non-jansenist, and wrongly interpreted, has been condemned.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

We now wish to consider the various conclusions relative to the source of the propositions treated, the examination of the texts, and then the doctrinal judgments.

Concerning the source of the ten propositions there are two, namely, the 18th and 23rd attributed to the well known jansenist, Anthony Arnould. Proposition 25 is ascribed to the *Catechism* of John Hessels, who was an intimate friend of Michael Baius. The Augustinian, Christian Lupus, who although frequently accused of jansenism, always liberated himself, is claimed to be the author of the 14th proposition. In the list of 31, however, two others, that is, the 4th and 5th are likewise said to be from his pen. Four propositions have been extracted from works on moral theology. Thus propositions 17 and 22 are attributed to the *Specimen moralis christianae et moralis diabolica in praxi* of Giles Gabrielis of the Third Order Regular of St. Francis; and the *Tyrocinium theologiae moralis* of Macarius Havermans is asserted as the source for propositions 9 and 10. From anonymous yet identified works, namely, the *Monita salutaria* and *Canones poenitentiales*, were extracted propositions 26 and 16 respectively.

With regard to the examination of the texts of our ten propositions, the 9th and 10th are textually the same as found in the indicated source, which is the *Tyrocinium* of Havermans. However, placed in their context, we believe they easily admit of an orthodox interpretation.

²⁸ Cfr. A. MAGNOCAVALLO, *Notizie e documenti inediti intorno all'alchimista Giuseppe Borri*, in *Archivio storico Lombardico*, serie 3a, 18 (1902) 381—400; L. CEYSSENS, *Le Petit Office de l'Immaculée Conception*, in *Virgo Immaculata*, t. XVII, 93.

Proposition 14 in omitting the word *servilis*, and considered as it stands, does not clearly and precisely relate the opinion of its proposed author, Christian Lupus. Although an addition has been made to proposition 16, we believe it is substantially found in its indicated source, but it does not seem to admit the interpretations indicated by anti-jansenistic commentaries.

In our consideration of proposition 18, that of Anthony Arnould, we have seen how the anti-jansenists have added to the original text and changed its meaning. The individual who extracted proposition 22 in all probability did not realize he was composing the proposition from the words of St. Cyprian. Proposition 23 was formed from the *De ecclesiastica hierarchia* of Pseudo-Dionysius, which was quoted by Arnould in his work on frequent communion. The 25th proposition unknowingly was fabricated by a careless anti-jansenist from the words of St. Augustine. A truncated sentence, which in its context can be correctly interpreted, forms our 26th proposition.

On the doctrinal judgments, in general, the brief commentaries of Porter as written in marginal notes next to each proposition, is substantially the same as the longer and more developed remarks of the anti-jansenists as found in the manuscript entitled: *Propositiones 105 Apostolicae Sedi exhibitae definitionibus Ecclesiae et Sanctorum Patrum sententiis demonstrantur contrariae*. It is to be noticed that the anti-jansenists try to prove that the propositions are contrary to the Council of Trent. This is the case with regard to all except the 16th, 18th and 25th. Furthermore, they have reduced five propositions, namely, 9, 10, 14, 25 and 26 to the errors of Luther, Calvin, Baius or Jansenius.

The three propositions, 16th, 17th and 18th, which concern the order of parts in the sacrament of penance, as well as the two, 22nd and 23rd, on Holy Communion, are asserted by the anti-jansenists to be contrary to the legitimate practice of the Church. Moreover, four of these, 16, 17, 18 and 22 are claimed to repeat the error of Peter de Osma, namely, "non peracta poenitentia confitentes absolvi non debere," which was condemned by Sixtus IV in the 15th century.

It must be kept in mind that the first four qualificators, Capizucchi, Pozzobonelli, di Laurea and Ricci were concerned with establishing the authenticity of the propositions, that is, to investigate if they were actually found in the indicated sources. As a result of this labor, Duffy's list of 105 was reduced to 32. The later examiners were more concerned with the doctrinal content. Of these latter it can be said that the eight official examiners appointed by Innocent XI, in general, were somewhat

severe in their judgment. Sabbatini, the Italian Augustinian remains alone in his attempt to defend those condemned of jansenistic doctrine. No doubt Porter in a letter dated April 25, 1682 was referring to Sabbatini when he wrote: "Examen nostrum aliquantulo lentius progreditur, ob infirmitatem Rmi. P. Alexandri Maderno, cuius absentia in ultimo congressu obfuit, ob detectum unum qui parti adversae ex illa congregatione acriter favet et in causa fuit, ut cum aliqui theologi digestas et discussas quinque propositiones damnare resolverunt, nonnisi tres damnatae fuerint . . ." (Cfr. *Romeinse brieven*, p. 85). In only one instance do we discover the simple unmodified statement of another examiner besides Sabbatini: "non est censurabilis." This was the judgment of Julius Mary Bianchi, O.P. concerning the 10th proposition attributed to the *Tyrocinium* of Havermans. Regarding six of the propositions, namely, 9, 10, 14, 22, 23 and 26, the notion of heresy in some way or the other was expressed by some of the examiners.

Of the later commentaries which we have considered, especially those of Viva and Hilary of the Sepulcher are more lengthy, elaborate and at times confusing. In general, they repeat the same criticisms of Porter and the other anti-jansenists, while adding yet other notations.

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THE EPISCOPATE AS AN ORDER AND SACRAMENT ON THE EVE OF THE HIGH SCHOLASTIC PERIOD

The recent study of three papal bulls in which the Supreme Pontiff committed to simple priests the faculty of conferring sacred orders, that of the priesthood, has occasioned among theologians a revival of even interest in the relation of the episcopate to the presbyterate.¹ The Council of Trent has declared it to be a matter of faith that the episcopate is of divine institution; it has also solemnly declared that the episcopate is superior to the presbyterate, and that the bishop's power of confirming and ordaining does not belong to priests.² Beyond the defined doctrine, however, it is permissible to discuss freely the exact nature of the episcopate and its relation to the presbyterate. The question is therefore asked whether the episcopal consecration is conferred as a sacrament or as a sacramental, and whether the episcopate constitutes an order distinct from the presbyteral order. In other words, there remains a controversy about whether in the episcopate there are conferred *ex opere operato* a grace, power, and character proper to itself.

Since the sixteenth century, the majority of theologians has held that the episcopate is indeed conferred *ad modum sacramenti*. Nevertheless, the aforesaid papal concessions have succeeded in arousing some moderns to a defense of the opinion of the High Scholastic theologians, who commonly taught that the episcopate is neither a sacrament nor a new order distinct from the presbyterate, but rather a dignity con-

¹ *Sacrae Religionis*, of Boniface IX (1400): J. Puig de la Bellacasa, *La Bulla "Sacrae Religionis" de Bonifacio IX*, in *Estudios Ecclesiásticos*, 1925, p. 3—19, 113—137.

Gerentes ad vos, of Martin V (1427): Karl A. Fink, *Zur Spendung der höheren Weihen durch den Priester*, in *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*, (63), 1943, p. 506—508.

Exposcit, of Innocent VIII (1489): P. de Langogne, *De Bulla Innocentiana, seu de potestate papae committendi simplici presbytero subdiaconatus collationem disquisitio historico-theologica*, in *Analecta Ecclesiastica*, (9), 1901, p. 311 ff.

² Council of Trent, Session XXIII, Canons 1, 4, 7 (*Denz.*, ed. 31: 961, 966, 967).

ferred by a sacramental which in some manner extends or amplifies the presbyteral character and power.³

In his excellent résumé of the traditional theological and canonical thought on this subject, Bishop Landgraf has delineated the broad outlines of development from Saint Jerome through the middle of the thirteenth century.⁴ The reverend author has demonstrated that it was the early scholastic authors who, by bringing the episcopate-presbyterate relation into sharp focus, first treated explicitly of the question whether or not the episcopate is an order. It is our purpose here to supplement that excellent study by investigating in closer detail some of the more important theologians immediately prior to the High Scholastic period.

Our investigation of the teaching of Guy of Orchellis and Alexander of Hales has been greatly facilitated by the recent editions of their works; for the opinions of William of Auxerre and William of Auvergne we have had recourse to older editions; we have taken the doctrine of Hugh of Saint Cher, Roland of Cremona, Philip the Chancellor, Guerric of Saint Quentin, and Richard Fishacre from manuscripts. For the purpose of convenient reference, we have included in an appendix those sections of the latter texts which pertain to our material.

Under the influence of Peter Lombard's systematization of theology, it was natural that the *Commentarii* should inquire about the number of graces or orders in the Church. Generally they answered that there are seven orders, giving as their reason only that of the Master: because of the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit.⁵ In accordance with a tradition extending all the way back to the Ambrosiaster and Saint Jerome, most of them held that the episcopate is a dignity and an office, but not an order. During the early years of the thirteenth century, some theologians expressed doubt about this opinion of sevenfold order, and in order to determine the number of orders more accurately, they asked explicitly whether or not the episcopate is an order.

³ A survey of the opinions of various theologians from the eleventh century to the present is given by E. Boularand, *La consécration épiscopale est-elle sacramentelle?* in *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique*, 54 (73), 1953, p. 3—36. Cf. also J. Beyer, *Nature et Position du Sacerdoce*, in *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, (76), 1954, p. 356—373.

⁴ A. M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, Teil III, *Die Lehre von den Sakramenten*, Band II, Regensburg, 1955, p. 277—302. An investigation of the opinions up to Peter Lombard is given by J. Lecuyer, *Aux origines de la théologie thomiste de l'épiscopat*, in *Gregorianum*, (35), 1954, p. 56—89.

⁵ *Petri Lombardi Libri Quatuor Sententiarum*, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1916, IV, d. 24, cap. 2, vol. II, n. 236, p. 892. The same idea has appeared already in St. Peter Damian, *Opusculum VI, Gratissimus*, ch. 15 (PL 145, 118).

Guy of Orchellis

The first scholastic to propose the theory of a ninefold division of Order is Guy of Orchellis, in his *Summa de Sacramentis et Officiis Ecclesiae* (c. 1215).⁶ Noting that the episcopate, archiepiscopate, and patriarchate are conferred by a true consecration, he asks whether they too may not be called orders. Against the "sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit" as a basis for the Master's opinion, he submits the authority of the Pseudo-Dionysius, which likened the nine clerical orders to the nine choirs of angels, a parallel which is confirmed by God's command to Moses to build a tabernacle according to the pattern which was shown to him on the mountain.⁷ But since such similarities as these can be understood either in a strict or loose sense, and thus present a poor criterion of the number of orders in the Church, Guy proposes a more direct method of solution to the problem, *scil.*, a consideration of the episcopate itself, in order to determine whether or not it should be classified as an order.⁸

In the episcopal consecration, the head of the subject is anointed with chrism; now, since in Baptism and Confirmation the effect of a similar chrismation is an imprinting of a character, Guy concludes that the rite of consecration should also imprint a character on the bishop, the more so because his duties, *viz.*, conferring orders and consecrating virgins, are works of excellence. And because of this character, Guy thinks that the episcopate is an order distinct from that of presbyterate.⁹ Although our author does not assert explicitly that the episcopal consecration is a sacrament, his reason for calling it a distinct order certainly points to that: the episcopate is a separate order because

⁶ D. and O. Van den Eynde, *Guidonis de Orchellis Tractatus de Sacramentis ex Eius Summa de Sacramentis et Officiis Ecclesiae*, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1953. The edition includes also the compendium of the *Tractatus* which is found in *Douai Bibl. Munic.* 434 I, f. 91a—93c. The *Tractatus de Officiis* was published under the title "*The Summa de Officiis Ecclesiae*" of Guy d'Orchelles, by V. L. Kennedy, in *Medieval Studies* (I), 1939, p. 23 ff.

⁷ Guy of Orchellis, *Tractatus*, p. 175, l. 15 — 176, l. 6. Cf. Dionysius, *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, VI, n. 5 (PG 3, 537).

⁸ Guy of Orchellis, *Tractatus*, p. 176, l. 7 ff.: "Ad quod dici potest quod penes numerum non attenditur similitudo, sed potius penes affectiones caritatis, et pia vota, et sancta desideria . . . Potest tamen et aliter dici. Sed prius discutiendum est an episcopatus sit ordo."

⁹ Guy of Orchellis, *Tractatus*, p. 176, l. 12 ff.: "Videtur enim quod imprimatur character in consecratione episcopi, cum ibi fit chrismatis in vertice inunctio: qua ratione enim in confirmatione et baptismo, eadem ratione et in episcopi consecratione . . . Dicimus ergo, sine praeiudicio melioris sententiae, quod sunt novem ordines ministrorum Ecclesiae, . . . videlicet septem praesignati, et episcopatus octavus, archiepiscopatus nonus vel patriarchus."

a bishop possesses a character comparable, and even superior to, the sacramental character of Baptism and Confirmation.

As a ninth order, Guy names the archiepiscopate or patriarchate, "which differ only by their lesser and greater power." Whereas these two offices are distinguished by jurisdiction, they are in turn distinguished from the episcopate by the power of order. Yet Guy furnishes no basis for separating episcopate from the archiepiscopate, other than the authority of the Pseudo-Dionysius; nor does he mention anything about a distinct character being conferred on the archbishop. His omission is noteworthy in view of the fact that succeeding theologians limited this controversy mainly to the episcopate.

Brief as Guy's discussion of this question is, his doctrine does set him apart from most of his contemporaries: he is the first scholastic to teach expressly that there are nine orders in the Church.¹⁰ And his teaching that the episcopate is an order distinct from the presbyterate, immediately adopted by William of Auxerre and later developed by post-Reformation theologians, is held today as the more common opinion.

William of Auxerre

Guy of Orchellis' dissatisfaction with the traditional opinion of sevenfold order is shared by William of Auxerre in the tract on Order found in his *Summa Aurea* (c. 1222—1225).¹¹

While William's development lends additional strength to the Orchellian view, his emphasis on a detail which Guy completely passes over serves to point up an item which is to become a mainstay of the opposite opinion: the importance of the inter-relation between Order and Holy Eucharist. Whereas Guy follows the Lombard in simply mentioning the confecting of the Body and Blood of Christ as one of the several offices of the priest,¹² William reflects the traditional thought more clearly by pointing out that it is *precisely because of* this power of consecrating the Eucharist that the presbyterate is said to be the supreme

¹⁰ H. Weisweiler, *Maître Simon et son Groupe de Sacramentis*, in "*Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense*," Louvain, 1937, p. CCIII, points out that Master Simon (1145—1160) taught that there are eight orders, the episcopate being the last. Van den Eynde, in the edition of Guy's *Tractatus*, p. xxii, notes that among the opinions of Guy which are new or not found elsewhere is the doctrine of nine orders of clerics.

¹¹ *Guillelmi Autissiodorensis Summa Aurea*, Paris (ed. Regnault), n. d. (but prob. after 1500), f. 43ra—vc.

¹² Guy of Orchellis, *Tractatus*, p. 175, l. 11: "Septimus ordo est sacerdotum, quorum officium est sacramentum corporis et sanguinis Christi in altari conficere, orationes dicere et dona Dei benedicere." The three offices are found *verbatim* in Lombard, *Lib. IV Sent.*, IV, d. 24, ch. 13, n. 247, p. 902.

order.¹³ Although it is true that the importance of this relationship was already noted by Saint Jerome and consequently recognized by many writers,¹⁴ yet its emphasis by William is striking in view of his teaching that the episcopate and presbyterate are distinct orders. Actually, by casting light on this traditional thought, he heightens the effect of his own opinion, for his principal objection to the denial of the episcopate as an order centers on this same idea. Conceding the dignity of the sacerdotal order in virtue of its power of confecting the Eucharist, he points out that it is the bishop who confers this power on priests; it is for this reason that William thinks that the episcopate is a higher and distinct order.¹⁵ While touching on one of the principal tenets of the seven-order theory, therefore, William has provided for theologians down to our own time a very cogent objection to that opinion.

William therefore joins forces with Guy in rejecting the traditional opinion; in considering the episcopate a distinct order, they differ only in the prominence which they give to their reasons: Guy stresses the imprinting of character, while William speaks mostly of the excellence of the bishop's works.

Confirming his position with Saint Paul's "that which is less is blessed by the superior,"¹⁶ William asserts that since a priest is ordained by a bishop, who has in turn been consecrated by an archbishop,¹⁷ the

¹³ William of Auxerre, *Summa*, f. 43rc: "(ordini presbyteratus) pertinet corpus Christi consecrare, propter quod finis est et consummatio aliorum ordinum." Cf. also (*ibid.*): "Summus est ordo sacerdotalis, . . . secundum quem fit consecratio corporis et sanguinis Domini, quod est corpus excellentissimum; unde supra ordinem sacerdotalem non est ordo."

¹⁴ St. Jerome, *Epistola CXLVI*, *Ad Evangelum*, PL 22, 1194. The traditional teaching is presented by J. Lecuyer, *op. cit.*, p. 59—83.

¹⁵ William of Auxerre, *Summa*, f. 43va: "Licet ordo sacerdotalis dignissimus sit quantum ad dignitatem rei consecratae, tamen episcopatus dignior est quantum ad qualitatem; episcopus enim dat potestatem consecrandi corpus et sanguinem Domini."

¹⁶ *Hebrews*, 7, 7.

¹⁷ William of Auxerre, *Summa*, 43va: "Aliorum est opinio quae nobis magis placet: quod tot sunt ordines in ecclesia militanti quot sunt in caelesti, scilicet, septem praedicti et praeterea episcopatus et archiepiscopatus." We note that the Regnault edition of the *Summa Aurea* has *archidiaconatus* in place of *archiepiscopatus*; E. Filthaut, *Roland von Cremona, O.P. und die Anfänge der Scholastik im Predigerorden*, Vechta, 1936, p. 190, reads *archidiaconatus* in the Paris (1500) edition of the *Summa*. Because of the context, we read *archiepiscopatus*, with M. Schmaus, in *Episcopus: Der Episkopat als Ordnungsgewalt in der Kirche nach der Lehre des heiligen Bonaventura*, Regensburg, 1949, p. 325.

The error must date back almost to the autograph, for c. 1232 Roland of Cremona wrote against it. At the beginning of his treatise on Order in *Summa*, *Mazarin* 795, f. 127d, he gives the traditional opinion: "Sed videtur quod plures debeant esse ordines, verbi gratia . . . episcopus et . . . archiepiscopus." But when discussing the question, he states that while some theologians hold for seven orders, others ". . . supra septem praecedentes apponunt duos alios, scilicet episcopatum et archidiaconatum."

two latter offices must be said to be distinct and respectively superior orders.

But if the archiepiscopate is an order because the archbishop consecrates bishops, what is to be said of the practice of the Church? Is not this argument destroyed by the fact that bishops occasionally consecrate archbishops, while even the Pope is crowned by a bishop? In answering this objection William expounds a very important aspect of his thought. An archbishop, he explains, is constituted in an order superior to the episcopate not simply because he possesses the *power* of consecrating bishops and other archbishops, but because he possesses this power *by his very office*.¹⁸ The radical power of consecrating bishops is not limited to the archbishop, but resides in bishops as well; when a man becomes archbishop he receives no new power, but rather the ability to use a power which he already possessed. In cases of necessity, therefore, a bishop can use this power, but he is then not acting by reason of his own office; necessity allows him to do that which ordinarily would be done by an archbishop.

Indeed, William proceeds further by assigning this radical power of consecrating not only to bishops but also to simple priests. Given a hypothetical situation in which there were only three simple priests in the world, William declares that necessity would demand that they exercise this power: one of them would have to consecrate another a bishop, and the third an archbishop. Our author sees an example of this in the Old Testament where Moses, although not a priest in the full sense, was said to be a priest because he exercised the office of anointing and consecrating Aaron.¹⁹

According to William then, the episcopal and archiepiscopal consecrations render their recipients the ordinary ministers of the orders of presbyterate and episcopate respectively; endowed with the ordinary use of this power of conferring orders, the bishop and archbishop are established in new and distinct orders.

It is true that William has left much unsaid in his exposition of this question. He is strangely silent on the character imprinted in Order;

¹⁸ William of Auxerre, *Summa*, f. 43va: "Dicimus . . . quod aliud est quod ex dispensativa necessitate sit, aliud quod ex dignitate officii. Archiepiscopus enim consecrat episcopum ex dignitate officii sui, et secundum hoc maioris dignitatis est. . . . Quando vero episcopus consecrat archiepiscopum, dispensatio necessitatis est."

¹⁹ William of Auxerre, *ibid.*: "Si non essent in mundo nisi tantum tres simplices sacerdotes, oporteret quod aliquis illorum consecraret alium in episcopum et alium in archiepiscopum. De Moyse dicimus quod non fuit sacerdos nisi in semiplena significatione sacerdotis, . . . sed dictus est sacerdos, quia consecravit fratrem suum in sacerdotem."

he tells us nothing about the effect which the episcopal consecration has on the character of the priestly order. Nor is it clear whether he would require the ordinary power of ordaining to be present for valid as well as for licit conferral of orders. If he thinks that the possession of the ordinary power which is granted in episcopal and archiepiscopal consecration is necessary only for liceity, then even outside a case of necessity a simple priest could ordain and even consecrate validly but illicitly; the presbyteral order would suffice for a valid ordination or consecration. But if the ordinary power is necessary even for validity, then, except in a case of extreme necessity, the presbyteral power would not suffice.

But despite some dark areas in his discussion, William's concentration on the powers of the bishop and archbishop sheds light on the terms *ordo* and *officium* — what a bishop is, and what a bishop does. For William the two are correlative: because a bishop can, in virtue of his own proper office, ordain priests, he exists in an order distinct from the priesthood. Later theologians will separate office from order; while agreeing that bishops enjoy proper offices, they will deny that such offices establish the bishop in a distinct order.

Alexander of Hales

In his *Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum* (c. 1223—1227),²⁰ Alexander of Hales follows the general format of the *Commentarii* by defining Order according to Peter Lombard: "*Ordo est signaculum quoddam, quo spiritualis potestas traditur ordinato et officium.*"²¹ The exposition which follows this definition gives us a clue to the Franciscan Doctor's own ideas about the episcopate. The word *signaculum*, he writes, is to be understood here not merely as the external rite which is common to all sacraments, but rather as an external sign which imprints a character; taken in this sense, its use in the Lombard's formula distinguishes Order from those sacraments in which no character is imprinted.²² Nor is this all. Even in the sacraments of Baptism and Confirmation, which do imprint a character, the word *signaculum* cannot be used, for the character imprinted in Order is a very special one, a *character excellentiae* which establishes its recipient as a mediator between God and

²⁰ *Alexandri de Hales Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, IV, In Librum Quartum*, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1957.

²¹ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 2, para. a. p. 399, l. 13. Cf. Lombard, *Lib. IV Sent.*, IV, d. 24, c. 13, p. 902.

²² Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 2, para. e, p. 400, l. 2 ff.

man.²³ The *signaculum* of the Master's definition, therefore, distinguishes the sacrament of Order not only from the four non-character sacraments, but also from the other character conferring sacraments of Baptism and Confirmation: it is an external sign which imprints on the soul of its subject a character of special excellence. This latter phrase plays an important part, as we shall see, in our Doctor's teaching on the episcopate.

The immediacy with which the question of the episcopate enters his treatise on Order gives us an idea of its importance to Alexander and his contemporaries; directly following the definition of Order we read, "*Secundum quam definitionem videtur quod episcopatus sit Ordo.*"²⁴ It might seem, writes Alexander, that since the conferral of the presbyterate is a *signaculum* because of an anointing with oil, surely then the conferral of the episcopate, in which the new bishop is anointed with chrism, must be a *signaculum*; consequently, the episcopate must be an order. Now this would certainly follow, he continues, if *signaculum* were understood to mean merely an external sign; since, however, it connotes the impression of a character of excellence, the episcopate cannot be considered an order, for in the episcopate no character is imprinted.

Just as Alexander declines to elaborate above on the "*character excellentiae*" which the *signaculum* imparts, so he passes over any explanation here as to why the episcopate imprints no character. His statements, however, are not arbitrary ones; it might be said that in this preliminary discussion he is preparing the ground for an exposition of the doctrine from which these statements spring.

Acceptable as the Master's definition of Order is when understood in the manner just described, Alexander ventures to formulate his own definition "whence one may see more clearly what is Order and what is not." "Order," he writes, "is a sacrament of spiritual power for some office which is directed in the Church to the sacrament of Communion."²⁵ It might seem strange to us at first that Alexander makes no mention of character in this definition, since he has just asserted that the episcopate does not conform to Lombard's definition precisely because in the episcopal consecration no character is conferred; we might expect that this new definition, designed as it is to show that the episcopate is not

²³ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 2, para. h, p. 411, l. 21 ff.

²⁴ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 2, para. a, p. 399, l. 15.

²⁵ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 2, para. a, p. 399, l. 16 f.

²⁶ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 2, para. k, p. 401, l. 3 f.: "Ordo est sacramentum spiritualis potestatis ad aliquod officium ordinatum in Ecclesia ad sacramentum communionis."

an order, would certainly include character in the essence of its formula. As a matter of fact, however, Alexander's definition probes deeper than a simple exclusion of character. It gives us the very reason why character is not conferred in the episcopate: the episcopate is not ordered to the sacrament of the Holy Eucharist. In the mind of our author the two notions — priestly character and the priest's office of consecrating the Eucharist — are so closely related that it may be said that his definition carries the connotation of character. The reason for this close relation is found, according to Alexander, in the unity of the Sacrifice of Our Savior — the Sacrifice of the Cross and the Sacrifice of the Mass. In offering Himself on the cross for our redemption, Christ was signed with a sacerdotal character. But since the Eucharist, which is by His command a commemoration of the cross, is consecrated by the priest, it follows that the priest himself should be distinguished by a sacerdotal character.²⁷ By his sacerdotal character, therefore, a priest is configured to Christ in offering the Holy Sacrifice, while by reason of his office he consecrates the Eucharist which Christ instituted in memory of His passion.

For this reason, the episcopate is excluded from order, not only by Lombard's definition but also by that of Alexander. We have already seen that William of Auxerre sustained the tradition thought by his awareness of the connection between Order and Eucharist. Alexander does much to develop the thought; he is the first theologian we have seen who expresses the connection by expressly including it in a definition of Order. According to his doctrine, the Blessed Sacrament becomes the absolute criterion of Order: if an ecclesiastical office is directed to the Eucharist, then and only then can it be called an order. It is this principle which formed the foundation of the opinion of most of the High Scholastic theologians, who reasoned with Alexander that since the episcopate is not *per se* directed to the Eucharist, it cannot be said to be an order.²⁸

²⁷ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 3, para. m, p. 410, l. 18 ff.: "Character vero ad distinctionem pertinebat: quae distinctio principaliter in Ordine pertinet ad principale opus Characteris divini. Aeternus enim Character se ipsum caracterizavit in cruce, praeciens quod sacramentum Eucharistiae fieret in eius commemorationem. Unde in sacerdote imprimitur character memoriae illius caracterizationis."

²⁸ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentarium in IV Libros Sententiarum*, IV, d. 24, q. 3, a. 2, q. 2: "Ordinator omnis ordo ad Eucharistiae sacramentum; unde, cum episcopus non habeat potestatem superiorem sacerdote quantum ad hoc, non erit episcopatus ordo..."

St. Bonaventure, *Commentarium in IV Libros Sententiarum*, IV, d. 24, p. 2, a. 2, q. 3: "Episcopatus proprie non est ordo... cum ordinis potestas principaliter sit ordinata ad dispensationem Sacramentorum et maxime illius Sacramenti nobilissimi, scilicet corporis Domini, quo ibi est status graduum et ordinum ascendentium, et ita ultra sacerdotium non est gradus ordinis."

Alexander's preoccupation with the Eucharist as the norm of order is further manifested in his discussion about the number of orders. When this question first came to be asked, writers like Guy of Orchellis and William of Auxerre solved it by an analysis of the episcopate, archiepiscopate, patriarchate, etc., to determine whether there are seven orders or more; for them the number of orders depended on the inclusion or exclusion of these offices.²⁹ The Irrefragable Doctor employs a different method. For him the question of the number of orders does not flow from the question of the episcopate. Rather, both questions are solved independently by the common principle of the Eucharist. We have seen how he solves the question of the episcopate; it is the Eucharist again which regulates the number of orders in the Church. Whereas those earlier theologians based the diverse orders on the various ecclesiastical orders in general,³⁰ Alexander bases them specifically on their respective relations to the Eucharist. Explaining that each individual order possesses a character, he warns that one must make a distinction: each character signs its possessor not only as a partaker of Order in general, and therefore of the memory of Christ's passion, but also as a member of one of the seven orders in particular, in which he receives grace to perform offices which pertain to the memory of that passion, which is the Holy Eucharist.³¹

Alexander's teaching about the episcopate has been sufficiently clear up to this point; proceeding from the development of his Eucharistic doctrine, he asserts unequivocally that the episcopate is not an order. When we attempt to discover his positive thought on the episcopate, however, we must confess that the Doctor is not so lucid. Yet, by examining several of his descriptions of the episcopate glimpsed *per transennam*, one can venture to establish something of his thought.

In agreement with the general teaching of his contemporaries, our author states that the offices proper to the bishop are the blessing of abbots and virgins, the dedication of churches, and especially the ad-

²⁹ Guy of Orchellis, *Tractatus*, p. 175, l. 15, and p. 176, l. 12: "Sed videtur quod plures sint ordines quam septem. . . . Sed prius discutiendum est an episcopatus sit ordo." Cf. also William of Auxerre, n. 17, *supra*.

³⁰ E. g., Peter Lombard, *Lib. IV Sent.*, IV, d. 24, ch. 5—12, n. 239—246, p. 894 ff.

³¹ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 8, para. m, p. 422, l. 27 ff.: "In quantum enim est character Ordinis, habetur respectus ad compatiendum ex memoria passionis; in quantum autem est character huius aut illius, designatur gratia potestatis spiritualis ad hoc opus vel illud sacramentale, *in quo habeatur memoria passionis*." He then proceeds to name the particular orders, together with their relation to the Eucharist.

ministration of the sacraments of Confirmation and Holy Orders.³² While the assignation of these offices to the episcopate does not constitute it an order, yet by reason of them it is a dignity, added to the sacerdotal order because of circumstances, in which the power of ordaining priests is given: "*Dignitas vero episcopalis, quae superadditur, est ratione causarum, et quia ibi suppletur potestas Domini in conferendo Ordinem sacerdotalem.*"³³

Several things about this statement are noteworthy. It is obvious, in the first place, that in calling the episcopate a dignity, Alexander does not have in mind a mere honor or title, since he states that a new power is given to the bishop; the episcopate is a dignity because of the excellence of this power.

Secondly, it is impossible to ascertain certainly what Alexander means by *potestas* in this sentence. He may mean power absolutely speaking, the ontological power of ordaining; in that case he would hold that the bishop acquires a power which the simple priest in no way possesses. On the other hand, he may mean power in a less strict sense, signifying the ability of using a power; in this case he would hold that the radical power of ordaining already belongs to the simple priest, while the episcopate gives him the faculty of using that power as the ordinary minister. As we have said, it is impossible to say apodictically what Alexander had in mind; nevertheless, we think that some indications of his position may be found in the context of his statement.

The first of these indications is his use of the word "*suppletur*," which seems to connote a completion or filling-up of the power of ordaining, rather than an outright conferral of it. The word seems to indicate that the episcopate confers the use of a power which already existed in the priest.

The second, and more cogent, indication may lie in the words, "*est ratione causarum.*" The phrase is rather obscure; perhaps it was on this account that, while it appears in all the principal codices of the Quaracchi editors, someone has expunged it from the text of the *Glossa* which is otherwise faithfully transcribed in the manuscript *Paris 3032*.³⁴ Be this as it may, we find a hint of Alexander's meaning in the *Quaestio de Ordine* of Philip the Chancellor, who adheres generally to the doctrine

³² Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 7, n. 6, para. c, p. 131, l. 14—18; d. 19, n. 7, p. 341, l. 9—12; d. 24, n. 3, para. g, p. 406, l. 6.

³³ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 2, para. k, p. 401, l. 16 ff.

³⁴ *Paris Nat. lat. 3032*, f. 150va: "*Dignitas vero episcopalis, quae superadditur (lacuna) et quia suppletur ibi potestas domini in efficiendo ordinem sacerdotalem.*"

of the Franciscan Doctor. Philip informs us that the number of orders was established "*secundum diversitatem temporum et causarum.*" Thus, he explains, there were three orders in the primitive church, according to a threefold division of powers; later there were nine, each of these powers having been divided into thirds; but in his time there are seven orders, based on sacramental character.³⁵ In the light of Philip's assertion, the mind of Alexander would seem to be as follows: the basic powers established in the sacrament of Order by Christ are common to both priest and bishop. Because of external circumstances, the Church has reserved the ordinary use of these powers, notably that of administration of sacred orders, to the bishop. In a bishop's consecration, the power to ordain is completed in him, i. e., it no longer exists in only a reserved state. When, therefore, the episcopate is considered as distinct from the presbyterate and only in virtue of its own office, i. e., the use of these powers which are reserved to itself, then, since these special powers are not ordered to the Eucharist as their object, no new character is imprinted in the episcopate, and it cannot be called an order.

It seems that for Alexander, then, the episcopate is to be considered under two aspects. Under the aspect of order, it adds nothing at all to the presbyterate. But under the aspect of the powers which it enjoys, it does add something, and is thereby distinct from the presbyterate, although it is not an order; in the episcopal consecration there is conferred on the bishop, along with other powers, the special *potestas Domini* which enables him to ordain and consecrate others. Whether Alexander thinks that this *potestas Domini*, as conferred on the bishop, is a completely new power or merely the faculty of using in an ordinary manner a power which was already latent in his priesthood, it is impossible to say.

If we ask whether Alexander considers the episcopal consecration a sacrament or a sacramental, we must again confess that an answer is difficult, since he did not treat *ex professo* of that question. He does mention some things about the consecration which might give the impression that he must consider it a sacrament: it confers grace on

³⁵ Philippi Cancellarii *Quaestio de Ordine*, in *Douai Bibl. Munic.* 434 I, f. 111b: "Assignatio (ordinum) facta est diversa secundum diversitatem temporum et causarum, et secundum hoc diversi ponuntur numeri ordinum et transmutatio ordinis, ut patet in subdiaconatu, qui in primitiva ecclesia non fuit sacer ordo, et modo est sacer."

The thought is reminiscent of St. Jerome's assertion, in his *Commentarium in Epist. ad Titum*, (PL 26, 562): "Sicut ergo presbyteri sciunt se ex Ecclesiae consuetudine ei qui sibi praepositus fuerit esse subiectos, ita episcopi noverint se magis consuetudine quam dispositionis dominicae veritate presbyteris esse maiores."

its recipient;³⁶ it is administered, like the priesthood, by an imposition of hands;³⁷ and, like the sacrament of Baptism, it cannot be repeated because of the grace which is infused.³⁸ But on the other hand, Alexander has excluded the episcopate from the definition of order, and denied it the conferral of a new character.

His position here must depend, of course, on what he meant above in declaring that in the episcopate a new power is conferred. If he meant by this that the basic power of ordaining is conferred by the episcopal consecration, then it would follow that that consecration must be a sacrament. But if we are correct in judging that he meant that the consecration merely gives a bishop the use, as ordinary minister, of that power which he already possessed as a priest, then it seems probable, although it is not certain, that he would consider the episcopal consecration a sacramental.

Now, if this latter alternative be true, if Alexander is of the opinion that consecration confers on the bishop no real power, but only the ordinary use of it, one may then validly inquire as to why the episcopal consecration should assume the form of an elaborate sacramental, or even possibly a sacrament. Our Doctor does not even broach the subject. But we might venture to suggest that such a sacramental, or even a sacrament, might be called for in order that a bishop might receive the grace which would establish him in the position which he occupies: successor to the Apostles, through whom the power given to them by Christ descends into the Church;³⁹ overseer, whose words and works are preeminent;⁴⁰ head of the Church, whose words sanctify;⁴¹ possessor of the power of Christ.⁴²

³⁶ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 9, para. u, p. 426, l. 17 ff.: "Si vero quaeratur propter quid sacerdos oleo sancto, episcopus vero chrismate ungitur, respondemus quod in hoc significatur abundantia gratiae ad se et ad alterum. Consecrantur autem non tantum manus episcopi, sed etiam caput: quod non fit in presbytero, ut significetur ei conferri potestas ut sit caput Ecclesiae, cuius verba, quae a capite procedunt, sanctificationem habent."

³⁷ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 9, para. x, p. 427, l. 17 ff.: "Si vero quaeratur a quo ortum habuit impositio manuum quae fit sacerdotibus, respondit Isidorus in libro *De Officiis*: . . . Ex hoc inolevit consuetudo imponendi manum sacerdotibus et episcopis."

³⁸ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 3, para. c, p. 403, l. 19 ff.: "Praeterea, videtur quod episcopatus sit Ordo, per hoc quod dicit Gregorius ut habetur 68 distinctione: 'Sicut semel baptizatus iterum baptizari non debet, ita semel consecratus iterum consecrari non debet, nec potest.' Unde accipitur quod non iteratur huiusmodi sacramentum. . . . (Tamen) nec sequitur, si non iteratur consecratio episcopalis, quod imprimatur character: character enim non sequitur ad naturam unctionis; sed in ea gratia figuratur."

³⁹ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 9, para. k, p. 435, l. 7.

⁴⁰ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 3, para. l, p. 410, l. 7.

⁴¹ Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, para. t, p. 426, l. 20.

⁴² Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 1, para. k, p. 401, l. 16.

This, then, is Alexander's teaching on the episcopate. His denial that the episcopate is a distinct order is evident and well expounded; his position on the positive aspects of the episcopate is somewhat vague and underdeveloped. We have attempted to cast some light on the latter by drawing inferences from his certainly established position and his general exposition of the episcopate. In one aspect of his doctrine Alexander exerts a great influence on his successors: his insistence on the Holy Eucharist as the touchstone of order, together with his emphasis on a distinction between powers which pertain to order and those which do not, were to become basic tenets of the theologians of the High Scholastic period.

William of Auvergne

The *Tractatus Octo de Sacramentis* (c. 1228) of William of Auvergne⁴³ represents, on the one hand, a return to the teaching of the older theologians; on the other hand, it augments their doctrine with some notable developments.

A discussion about indulgences and the remission of sins occasions William's treatment of the ecclesiastical offices which, while common to priest and bishop alike, exist in a perfect way only in the latter: while priests possess the power to confect some sacraments, the full sacramental power resides only in the bishop, who can ordain to sacred orders, confirm, and administer the more important sacramentals. The office of preaching is likewise limited in the priest, who cannot exercise it without the permission of the bishop.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the office of binding and loosing in the external forum belongs to the bishop, who receives the plenitude of the power of the keys in the reception of his pastoral crosier; and it is the bishop, as mediator between God and man, who has the greatest power of instituting canonical investigations.⁴⁵ Because of these reasons William concludes that the episcopate is the completion and perfection of the *sacerdotium*.⁴⁶ According to him, there is one order of *sacerdotium*, of which the presbyterate and episcopate are but different grades.

This fundamental teaching of William is precisely the same doctrine which was taught by the older theologians about the relationship between

⁴³ *Guillelmi Alverni Opera Omnia*, ed. Zenari, Venetiis, 1591, Pars. II, p. 500g—523c (in the Paris Dupuis edition, 1674, t. I, p. 528h—553c).

⁴⁴ William of Auvergne, *Tractatus de Sacramento Ordinis*, Ch. XIII, p. 523d.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*: "Et quia in solis episcopis plenitudo potestatis, et istorum officiorum perfectio est, manifestum est episcopatum plenum et perfectum esse sacerdotium. . . . Quicquid enim apostolis commissum fuit, totum commissum est et episcopis."

the episcopate and presbyterate: while the two grades are almost identical under one aspect, yet the bishop does enjoy, *de facto*, a certain superiority in his works.⁴⁷ But William does not merely embrace the traditional opinion; he develops it by trying to ascertain the nature of this difference between the two grades. Episcopal consecration, he explains, has an effect both on the person and the works of the new bishop. Through its operation, grace and sanctity are increased in the recipient himself, while he receives a plenitude of office and an amplitude of power. Just as the consecration of a virgin does not constitute a new union with God, but rather strengthens the one effected in her at Baptism, so the episcopal consecration does not establish the bishop in a new order, but rather amplifies the power and grace which he received in his priestly ordination. And this is the reason, declares William, why the episcopate, while it is not a new order, is nevertheless conferred by a consecration.⁴⁸

Regarding the question of whether the episcopal consecration is a sacrament or a sacramental, William's teaching is extremely clear. In his brief tract *De Sacramento Extremae Uctionis et De Sacramentalibus*, he explicitly names the episcopal consecration among the sacramentals.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Cf. St. Jerome, *loc. cit.*; St. Peter Damian (*ob.* 1072) writes in *Opusculum VI—Gratissimus*, Cap. 5 (PL 145, 118): "Ab his (episcopis) non tam novus ordo suscipi, quam in eodem ipso sacerdotio videntur excellentius sublimari."

In like manner, Hugh of Saint Victor (*ob.* 1141) asserts in *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, II, pars 3, c. 5 (PL 176, 419): "Sacerdos et pontifex sive summus sacerdos unus gradus est in sacramento, diversa tamen potestas in ministerio."

⁴⁸ William of Auvergne, *Tractatus*, Ch. XIII, p. 523d: "Si quis autem dixerit, cum episcopatus ordo non sit, ad quid ergo consecrantur episcopi, respondemus ad complendum et perficiendum, atque ad summum perducendum ipsos, non solum officii plenitudine et amplitudine potestatis, sed etiam ad cumulandum gratia, et pinguedine sanctitatis."

⁴⁹ A. Landgraf, *op. cit.*, p. 297 f., citing only the tract *De Sacramento Ordinis*, fails to note that William designates the episcopate a sacrament explicitly. The same author, in another place, (p. 301) does attribute such an explicit designation to the author of *Clm* 22233, declaring (perhaps through a *lapsus calami*) that it depends on William of Auxerre; actually, it bears a remarkable resemblance to Auvergne, as the following short excerpts will show:

Clm. 22233, f. 46:

Post sacramenta, quibus sacran-
tur homines, ut sint sancti ad hoc,
ut sint ministri sanctificationis, di-
cendum est de sacramentalibus, quae
sunt adiumenta sacramentorum et
similitudines ipsorum, quoniam eis
augetur et perficitur sanctitas, quae
sacramentis praestatur et ampliatur
ministerium et potestatis.

William, *Tractatus*, p. 523c:

Dicamus quod sacramentis utuntur
homines, ad ut sint sancti episcopi,
vel ad hoc, ut ministri sint aliis
sanctificationis; sacramentalia sunt
ut adiumenta sacrorum et augmenta,
quoniam eis augetur, et perficitur
sanctitas, quae sacramentis prae-
statur . . . potestatem autem et
ministerium sacerdotalis ordinis ex-
tendit et ampliat ad perfectum.

The reason for this flows directly from his theory of amplification of power and grace: the effect of a sacramental is to increase and perfect the sanctity already acquired in the reception of a sacrament; now, this is precisely the effect of the episcopate in regard to the sacerdotal order; therefore, the episcopate is not a sacrament but a sacramental.⁵⁰

Hugh of Saint Cher

The *Commentarium in Libros Sententiarum* (c. 1230) of Hugh of Saint Cher⁵¹ provides us with little more than a glance at its author's own position in our controversy, being content, it seems, to report the opinions of others.⁵²

In his exposition of the opinion of those who hold that the episcopate is not a distinct order, Hugh borrows almost *verbatim* from William of Auxerre's summary of it, emphasizing as he does the priest's office of consecrating the Eucharist;⁵³ strangely, he passes over completely

Sic etiam consecratione monialium sanctitas et perfectio matrimonii spiritualis, in signis et verbis (46v) exprimitur. Idem etiam de inunctione regum et reginarum et benedictionibus abbatum et in prima tonsura clericorum fiunt et benedictiones temporales et benedicuntur sponsae in nuptiis et peregrinationem facientes.

Sic in consecratione monialium sanctitas et perfectio matrimonii spiritualis in signis et in verbis expresse legitur. Idem est videre in regum, et reginarum unctionibus, et benedictionibus abbatibus. Sic et in benedictiones clericorum, hoc est, clericatione seu primae tonsuratione, et haec sunt quinque sacramentalia, quae impenduntur in ecclesia Dei hominibus in adiumentum sacramentorum, et perfectionem gratiae et sanctitatis.

⁵⁰ William of Auvergne, *Tractatus de Sacramento Extremae Unctionis*, p. 523c: "Et hoc apparet evidenter in eis sacramentalibus, quae impenduntur hominibus, sicut evidenter ostendimus in consecratione episcopali, quae sanctitatem sacerdotalem evidenter auget atque magnificat, nisi per indignitatem steterit recipientis; potestatem autem et ministerium sacerdotalis ordinis extendit et ampliat ad perfectum."

⁵¹ We have taken the text of Hugh's *Commentarium* from *Vat. lat. 1174*, f. 97a—98d, and *Vat. lat. 1098*, f. 169b—171c. We have also consulted Landgraf, *op. cit.*, p. 299, where he gives part of the distinction *De Ordine* from *Leipzig lat. 573*, f. 57f.

⁵² The problem of the chronological and doctrinal relationship between Guy of Orchellis, William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, and Hugh of Saint Cher is discussed by K. Lynch, *Some "Fontes" of the "Commentary" of Hugh de Saint Cher: William of Auxerre, Guy d'Orchellis, Alexander of Hales*, in *Franciscan Studies* (13), 1953, pp. 119—146, and again in *The Sacrament of Confirmation in the Early-Middle Scholastic Period*, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1957, p. XI f.

In Hugh's distinction *De Ordine* we have found a dependance of our theologian upon Guy and William, but none on Alexander.

⁵³ Hugh of Saint Cher, *Commentarium*, *Vat. lat. 1174*, f. 97a (*Vat. lat. 1098*, f. 169b): "Quidam dicunt quod tantum sunt septem ordines, quorum summus et maximus est ordo sacerdotalis, secundum quem fit consecratio Corporis et Sanguinis Christi, quod est opus excellentissimum; et ideo super

William's succinct refutation of that argument. Turning to the second opinion, our author unfortunately does not linger on the question of the episcopate, perhaps in tacit recognition that those theologians who held nine orders generally agreed that the episcopate is to be included among them. The only proof which Hugh offers in favor of the episcopate being an order is borrowed this time from Guy of Orchellis: since it is conferred by chrismation, it should be an order.⁵⁴

Our author seems far more interested in identifying the ninth order, which is held to be tonsure by some, while others teach that it is the archiepiscopate or patriarchate. But despite his preoccupation with the question, he seems reluctant to take a stand. His relatively lengthy exposition of the meaning, duties, and privileges of tonsure, together with an elaboration of the arguments which are used to demonstrate that it is an order, lead us to believe that he is convinced that the ninth order is not archiepiscopate but rather tonsure. His unwillingness to declare himself openly may be due to the authority enjoyed at Paris by Guy and William at the time of his writing. He is extremely careful to expound and refute the principal objections raised against their opinion on the episcopate. In a passage obviously taken from William, he solves the problem of the consecration of archbishops and the crowning of the Pope by simple bishops by means of the distinction between power which comes from one's office and power which comes from necessity.⁵⁵

Whatever may be his position on the question of the ninth order, it is certain that Hugh embraces Guy's and William's doctrine that the episcopate is an order distinct from that of presbyterate. His concern

ipsum non est alius ordo. Episcopus enim, ut dicunt, non est nomen ordinis sed dignitatis; unde Apostolus, *I Tim. 2*, nomen episcopi vocat presbyteros."

William of Auxerre, *Summa*, f. 43c: "Quidam enim dicunt quod non sunt nisi septem ordines, quorum summus est ordo sacerdotalis; et supra ipsum nullus est ordo. Omnes enim alii ordines redeunt ad istum ordinem, secundum quem fit consecratio Corporis et Sanguinis Domini, quod est corpus excellentissimum. Unde supra ordinem sacerdotalem non est ordo; apud eosdem vocat presbyteros ad *Thymotheum* et episcopos."

⁵⁴ Hugh of Saint Cher, *Commentarium*, *Vat. lat.* 1174, f. 97b (*Vat. lat.* 1098, f. 169b): "Et quod episcopatus sit ordo patet quia quando consecratur inungitur chrismate."

Guy of Orchellis, *Tractatus*, p. 176, l. 14: "Qua ratione enim (character imprimatur) in Confirmatione et Baptismo, eadem ratione et in episcopi consecratione."

⁵⁵ Hugh of Saint Cher, *Commentarium*, *Vat. lat.* 1174, f. 97b (*Vat. lat.* 1098, f. 169c): "Episcopus vero archiepiscopum vel papam consecrat ex commissa sibi potestate; . . . similiter papa, cum non habeat superiorem, dat potestatem Ostiensi ut eum consecret; hanc eandem potestatem dat cuilibet alio episcopo. Et si non essent in toto mundo nisi tres sacerdotes, oporteret quod unus alium in episcopum consecraret, sicut fecit Moyses ad Aaron." Cf. nn. 18 and 19, *supra*.

with naming a ninth order presupposes his agreement with them that the episcopate is the eighth. This judgment is confirmed by a passage found in one of the *Quaestiones* assigned to Hugh in the manuscript *Douai 434*. While asserting there that the sacrament of Order is founded on evangelical institution and observance rather than on mere natural law, he does admit that in one sense, "the *nine* orders of clerics are naturally ordered" according to their nature and dignity. Thus, the bishop is above the priest, the priest above the deacon, and the deacon above the subdeacon."⁵⁶ The influence of William is again felt here.⁵⁷

It seems reasonable to believe, therefore, that Hugh follows, albeit with some hesitancy, the opinion which taught that the episcopate is a distinct order. While he certainly was influenced by Alexander of Hales in some other questions, his doctrine on the episcopate is drawn not from the Franciscan Doctor, but from Guy of Orchellis and especially from William of Auxerre.

Roland of Cremona

A theory somewhat similar to William of Auvergne's is found in the *Summa Theologica* (c. 1232) written by Roland of Cremona,⁵⁸ whose tract on Order seems to have as its principal object the refutation of the opinion of William of Auxerre.⁵⁹ "Those," he writes, "who say that archdeacon is a distinct order, should by the same token say that archpriest is as well; and since they say that the episcopate is an order, they should say also that the archiepiscopate is."⁶⁰ This is the principal objection which Roland lodges against William's opinion; throughout his treatise on Order he asserts repeatedly that one cannot use the simple criterion of superiority and inferiority of office in order to determine order.⁶¹

⁵⁶ *Douai Bibl. Munic. 434 I*, f. 111b: "Et ita novem ordines clericorum sunt naturaliter ordinati . . . , quia naturaliter, id est, secundum naturam et dignitatem ordinum, episcopus est supra sacerdotem, et sacerdos supra diaconum, et diaconus supra subdiaconum."

⁵⁷ William of Auxerre, *Summa*, f. 43c: ". . . diaconatus est quidam ordo secundum quod diaconus subest sacerdoti; eadem ratione episcopatus est ordo, secundum quod episcopus praeest sacerdoti."

⁵⁸ Roland of Cremona, *Summa Theologica*, *Paris Mazarine 795*, f. 127b—128c.

⁵⁹ The general dependance of both Hugh of Saint Cher and Roland of Cremona on William of Auxerre has been noted by the editors of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, t. IV, lib. III, *Prolegomena*, 1948, p. CXXXI.

⁶⁰ Roland of Cremona, *Summa*, f. 127d: "Qua ratione ponunt quod archidiaconatus est ordo per se, eadem ratione debent ipsi dicere quod archipresbyteratus; et qua ratione ponunt quod episcopatus est ordo, eadem ratione archiepiscopatus."

⁶¹ He objects, for example (*ibid.*) in his typically grandiose manner that "Ad hoc aliter suadet quod plures sint ordines quam septem; quia subdiaconus est quidam ordo quia est sub diacono, et diaconus sub sacerdote;

In the face of William's opinion, which he is obviously attacking, the objection is unjustifiable, for William excluded from order the other dignities and offices besides the episcopate and archiepiscopate, not because they are not dignities, but expressly because "in them there is no *signaculum* by which a spiritual power is conferred."⁶² William's reason for including the episcopate and archiepiscopate, but not the other superior offices, as orders, is founded not on a simple preeminence, but on this, that a bishop and archbishop receive the new power of ordaining priests and consecrating bishops *ex officio*. William's point of view seems to have escaped Roland completely.

Positively speaking, Roland's position in our question points up the inclination on the part of his contemporaries to distinguish between *ordo* and *officium* in the various grades of the Sacrament of Order. The consecration of a bishop, according to him, confers an increase of grace and power in virtue of which he can ordain priests, to whom he gives therein the power of confecting the Holy Eucharist. In the case of an archbishop, consecration confers the power of consecrating bishops. From this it is evident that the bishop and archbishop are established in respectively higher offices, for they possess different and superior administrations.⁶³ Nevertheless, from this superiority of office it does not follow, says Roland, that they are superior in order. The sacerdotal order, because of its power to consecrate the Sacrament of the Altar, is the highest and last order.⁶⁴

Roland finds proof for the fact that the episcopate is a superior office, but not a superior order, in an example taken from William of Auxerre: in a case of extreme necessity a simple priest could consecrate a bishop, and, as a matter of fact, bishops do actually consecrate archbish-

ergo, eadem ratione episcopus est unus ordo secundum quod praeest sacerdotio; et archiepiscopus alius secundum quod praeest episcopo; et primatus alius secundum quod praeest archiepiscopo; et patriarcha alius secundum quod praeest primati; et papa alius secundum quod praeest patriarchis; et ita multi plures habemus ordines quam diximus!"

⁶² William of Auxerre, *Summa*, f. 43c: "Decanatus, vero, et archidiaconatus non sunt ordines; non enim ibi est sacrum signaculum quo confertur potestas spiritualis; . . . similiter, thesauraria et cancellaria officia quaedam sunt, et non ordines, quia ibi non est sacrum signaculum."

⁶³ Roland of Cremona, *Summa*, f. 127d: "Maior est ergo episcopus sacerdoti administratione et potestate quae ei data est, quia dat potestatem sacerdoti conficere corpus et sanguinem Christi. . . . Et ad archiepiscopum pertinet consecrare episcopum, et dat ei potestatem consecrandi sacerdotes et alias administrationes quas habet."

⁶⁴ Roland of Cremona, *Summa*, f. 127d: "Et ultimus et summus est ordo sacerdotalis, et alii ordines redeunt ad ipsum. Et illud summum quod potest facere ille ordo est consecratio corporis et sanguinis Christi, et haec est eius virtus summa. . . ."

ops,⁶⁵ According to Roland, the radical power of conferring the episcopate is not limited exclusively to the bishop, but exists already in the simple priest, ready to be unloosed in case of necessity. Consequently, under the aspect of order, the bishop and archbishop are priests and nothing more; but under the aspect of administration or office, they do have something which the priest does not have, *scil.*, the ordinary use of that power which all three possess.

In regard to the bishop's power of administration, therefore, Roland agrees with William of Auxerre that the episcopal consecration confers on a bishop the power to ordain *ex officio* — that is to say, it makes him the ordinary minister of sacred orders. But as regards the episcopate under the aspect of order, our author is again influenced by the excellence of the Holy Eucharist. Since the sacerdotal order possesses the power to consecrate the Sacrament of the Altar, all the orders are centered in it, and above it no order exists.

Philip the Chancellor

The compiler of the questions contained in codex *Douai* 434 (c. 1218—1236) includes only one question dealing *ex professo* with Order.⁶⁶ Influenced as it is by the *Glossa* of Alexander of Hales, this question, which

⁶⁵ Roland of Cremona, *Summa*, f. 127d: "... quod patet quia in necessitate unus simplex sacerdos posset consecrare episcopum, et episcopus consecrat archiepiscopum."

⁶⁶ *Quaestio "De Ordine," Secundum Can.*, in *Douai Bibl. Munic.* 434 I, f. 117c—118b.

In the entire *Douai* compilation we have found only three other allusions to our question; the first is attributed to Hugh of Saint Cher, while the other two are attributed to Philip. They are as follows:

A) I, f. 111a, l. 40 — 111b, l. 7 (*De Sacramentis in Communi*):

"Probo de ordine. Tres sunt hierarchiae, ut dicit Dionysius: supercaelestis, caelestis, et subcaelestis. Supercaelestis continet tres Personas, caelestis novem ordines angelorum, subcaelestis novem ordines clericorum.

"In hoc enim videtur ecclesia militans assimilari Trinitati, sicut dicitur *Exo. XXV*: 'Inspice et fac secundum exemplar quod monstratum est tibi in monte.' Sed naturaliter ordinati sunt novem ordines angelorum; ergo, naturaliter ordinantur novem ordines clericorum; ergo, ordo est de lege naturali. Non ergo omnia sacramenta legalia a lege Moysi vel Evangelica, sed quaedam de lege naturali.

"Sacramentum vero ordinis est evangelicum (f. 111b) proprie et observatione et institutione. Et quod obicitur quod novem ordines sunt naturaliter ordinati, et ecclesia militans facta est ad similitudinem triumphantis, et ita novem ordines clericorum sunt naturaliter ordinati, dico quod conclusio est vera, quia naturaliter, id est, secundum naturam et dignitatem ordinum, episcopus est supra sacerdotem, et sacerdos supra diaconum, et diaconus supra subdiaconum. Sed non propter hoc oportet quod sacramentum ordinis sit de lege naturali."

B) I, f. 79c, l. 10ff (*De Clavibus*):

"In episcopo autem non confertur nova clavis in baculi collatione, sed amplitudo potestatis in poenitentia et iurisdictione confertur circa sacerdotes et alios subditos."

is explicitly affirmed to present the doctrine of Philip the Chancellor, furnishes us with a clearer view of the Franciscan Doctor's thought.⁶⁷

According to Philip, the word *ordo* can be, and in fact was, used to signify either power or character.⁶⁸ The primitive Church enumerated the various orders according to three kinds of power which those in orders possessed, whence the Pseudo-Dionysius spoke of *ordo purgativus*, *illuminativus*, and *consummativus*. Later on, however, each of these three generic powers was divided into three specific powers, and this resulted in a reckoning of nine orders. But, Philip points out, there is a third manner of distinguishing the orders, *scil.*, by reason of character. This latter criterion, he asserts, is the one used by the Church in his day.⁶⁹

We said above that the writers of this time exhibited a growing tendency to distinguish between *ordo* strictly speaking and the *officium* which the possessors of the diverse ecclesiastical grades execute. The above mentioned information supplied by Philipp brings this distinction into sharper focus: the term *ordo* can be, and indeed is, used sometimes to signify *ordo* and sometimes to designate *officium*. We find some intimation of this trend in Alexander of Hales, who, writing about the *materia* of Order says that the rite of anointing cannot be the essential matter, since it is employed "only in the sacerdotal order, and in the episcopal, if that be called an order."⁷⁰ Again, this may be what William

C) *I, f. 79d, l. 55ff (De Relaxationibus):*

"Unde nota quod duo sunt in ministris: ordo et potestas quae ordinem comitatur. Ordo equaliter in omnibus ministris Christi sacerdotibus, sed non potestas; immo maior est potestas in domino papa quam in patriarchis, . . . et sic de aliis."

⁶⁷ *Alexandri de Hales Glossa*, IV, p. 29* and 34*.

⁶⁸ Philip the Chancellor, *De Ordine*, f. 118b: "Unde dicimus quod septem sunt characteres, et septem ordines; ordo vero quandoque nomen est potestatis, quandoque nomen characteris."

⁶⁹ Philip the Chancellor, *De Ordine*, f. 118a: "Secundum hanc diversitatem distinguitur quandoque numerus (ordinum) secundum genera potestatum, et hunc respectum habuit divisio in primitiva ecclesia; . . . sed possunt (ordines) multiplicari secundum species, quando potestatum multiplicatio attenditur; . . . sed multiplicatio fit in quolibet ordine per ternarium, et sic resultant novem . . . Sicut prima distinctio posita est secundum tria genera potestatum, et secunda secundum multiplicationem, ita tertia est secundum quoddam quae sunt in anima, secundum quod ipsa tendit ad perfectionem, . . . et sunt characteres."

Again he writes (f. 118b): "Ecclesia distinguit ordines in comparatione ad opus ultimum, scilicet consecrationem corporis Christi."

And again, in speaking of the new and old manner of division respectively (*ibid.*): "Haec autem divisio est secundum potestates et characteres, et est tropologica, data secundum confirmatam Ecclesiae; illa prima secundum potestates tantum, et est mystica."

⁷⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 9, para. d, p. 420, l. 19: "Neque secundum opus unctionis, nam hoc non convenit nisi in Ordine sacerdotali, et episcopali, si Ordo dicatur."

of Auvergne means when he writes that he would neither oppose nor contradict anyone who wanted to call the episcopate an order, although they would then be constrained to call the other high offices orders as well.⁷¹ We find the same idea in Roland, who states that he would agree to saying that the episcopate is order, even in the strictest sense, except for the difficulty which would arise concerning the other offices.⁷² And Philip himself expresses the same thought when he states that "all character is order, but not all order is character" — in other words, all the ecclesiastical offices can be called orders, although order taken in the strict sense always implies character.⁷³

For Philip, therefore, the word *ordo* can be used to designate any ecclesiastical office, for there is foundation for such usage in the history of the Church. But if one is speaking strictly, and in current ecclesiastical usage, one uses the word to mean only those offices which carry with them a character of excellence. Understanding the word in this latter sense, Philip approves a definition which is reminiscent of the one formulated by Alexander, and which he terms "*definitio magistralis*": "Order is an office and a spiritual power which is ordered to the ultimate work."⁷⁴ When *ordo* is thus understood to be directed to the Holy Eucharist, one cannot say that the episcopate is an order.

The three reasons which Philip adduces to show that the episcopate is not order in this strict sense are an orderly expression of what Alexander has said *passim* about the episcopate. First of all, since the presbyterate possesses the office of consecrating the Eucharist, it is fitting

⁷¹ William of Auvergne, *Tractatus*, Chr. XIII, p. 523c: "Si quis autem dicere voluerit episcopatum esse ordinem aliud a sacerdotio minori, non opponimus nos, nec contradicimus; verum non effugiet facile quin oporteat eum dicere archiepiscopatum ordinem esset, et deinde primatum, postea patriarchatum, et novissime papatum." C. Pesch, *Praelectiones Dogmaticae*, ed. V, Friburg, 1920, vol. VII, p. 308, citing only the first part of the above statement, erringly counts William among the supporters of the sacramentality of the episcopate.

⁷² Roland of Cremona, *Summa*, f. 128a: "Si quis autem rogat ut sustineamus quod archidiaconatus sit ordo, et episcopatus, quamvis proprie, . . . conceditur ei; sed quid faciet de aliis superioribus qui ita sunt ordines ut alii?"

⁷³ Philip the Chancellor, *De Ordine*, f. 118a: (Divisio Dionysii) "fit secundum officia et potestates, non secundum characteres, qui utique pauciores sunt quam ordines; quoniam omnis character excellentiae (est) ordo, sed non omnis ordo character."

⁷⁴ Philip the Chancellor, *De Ordine*, f. 118b: "Data est definitio magistralis talis: 'Ordo est officium et potestas spiritualis ordinata ad corpus ultimum'." The editors of Alexander's *Glossa* note, (IV, d. 24, p. 401, n. 1), that the similar definition given by the Franciscan Doctor is termed "definition of the ancient masters" by Albert the Great in *Comment. in IV Sent.*, IV, d. 24, a. 37.

that it be the highest order.⁷⁵ Secondly, Our Savior, as the *Character Increatus* and in the order of the priesthood, first exercised the office of consecrating the Eucharist; it is fitting that the priest, who possesses the priestly character and office, be constituted in the highest order.⁷⁶ Finally, since all other orders are directed toward the Eucharist, and the consecration of the Eucharist is the work of the priest, it follows that the priesthood should be the highest order.⁷⁷

Philip does recognize that the episcopate differs from the orders, and this on two counts: it confers a different power, and it is administered by a different anointing. But like Alexander, he rejects it as order because of a lack of direction to the Eucharist. The power received by a bishop does not imprint a character, because the character of order comes not from every distinction whatsoever, but only from that distinction which begets an excellence of faith in the suffering Christ. Despite any power which it may receive, therefore, such power is beside the point when one is speaking of order, and while the episcopate is most certainly distinct from the presbyterate, it is just as certainly not an order.⁷⁸ The same holds true for the special anointing which the bishop receives: granted that it does distinguish him in some way, it does not direct his office to the Eucharist, wherefore it does not establish him in a new order.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Philip the Chancellor, *De Ordine*, f. 118a: "Oportuit enim ut summus ordinum staret ibi ubi est opus principale, quod est opus Filii Dei, immo est verus Filius Dei, ideoque omnem ordinem et omne sacramentum est excellens, ut ultra non sit ordo." Cf. Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 2, para. k, p. 401, l. 8.

⁷⁶ Philip the Chancellor, *De Ordine*, f. 118a: "Item, alia ratione (episcopatus) non est ordo, quia increatus Character illud opus principale primo operatus est in eo ordine et in supremo caractere."

The argument is somewhat obscure here; Alexander states it more clearly by pointing out that the Eucharist is actually a commemoration of the characterization of Christ on the Cross: "Aeternus enim character se ipsum characterizavit in cruce, praecipiens quod sacramentum Eucharistiae fieret in eius commemorationem. Unde in sacerdote imprimitur character memoriae illius characterizationis." (*Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 3, para. m, p. 410, l. 20 ff.)

⁷⁷ Philip the Chancellor, *De Ordine*, f. 118a: "Tertia ratione non oportuit, quia omnes characteres et ordines tendunt ad illius opus principale, quia omnes characteres et ordines tendunt ad illius opus principale." Cf. Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 2, para. k, p. 401, l. 14.)

⁷⁸ Philip the Chancellor, *De Ordine*, f. 118a: (In episcopatu) "non est distinctio quae faciat characterem, quae triplex tantum est secundum fidem, et robur fidei, et consummationem sive fidei excellentiam Christi passi. Haec enim sunt in ordine sacerdotali, qui respicit illud opus principale. Unde impertinens est ordo ad hunc characterem sive ad hanc distinctionem, quisquis ad opus principale non ordinatur."

⁷⁹ Philip the Chancellor, *De Ordine*, f. 118a: "Ad illud quod indelebitas est ibi, dicimus quod hoc non facit ad esse characteris sive ordinis, quia (episcopatus) non est ad illud opus principale ordinatus, nec est ibi distinctio fidei."

These things considered, Philip concludes that the episcopate is not an order "*secundum quod tantum sunt septem (ordines), nec secundum eos qui dicunt novem esse.*"⁸⁰ By this he seems to imply that there are those who, using the term *ordo* in its older and less strict sense, will say that there are nine orders; but when *ordo* is used strictly, even they must admit that the episcopate is not an order.

Philip therefore excludes the episcopate from order strictly so-called; what does he see in the episcopate viewed positively? Like Alexander, he does not tell us much about his notions in so many words; unlike the Doctor, he does give us what might be called a definition of the episcopate. Throughout his rather brief treatise he describes the episcopate frequently, and always in virtually the same words: "*ordo sacerdotalis adiuncta potestate spiritualis gratiae.*"⁸¹ According to these words, the episcopate presupposes the priesthood, to which it adds a new power; but *per se* it is not an order, since the power which it receives is not directed to the *opus ultimum*. Whether or not the power received by the bishop is the entirely new fundamental power itself, or rather some sort of extension or ability to use that power; whether it is conferred by a sacrament or a sacramental; we must confess that, like Alexander, Philip does not provide us with explicit answers to questions such as these.

Guerric of Saint Quentin

In the *Quaestio de Ordine* (c. 1223—1242)⁸² composed by Guerric of Saint Quentin, we find another example of exclusion of the episcopate from the orders, but this time for a new reason. The difference, writes Guerric, between the sacrament of Order and the other sacraments of the New Testament, lies in this, that while the latter signify and effect grace, Order does something over and above that: it also con-

We note incidentally that there is a discrepancy between the above statement and the objection (f. 117d) which it answers. The objection was that the *initerabilitas* of the anointing would seem to make the episcopate an order; it mentioned nothing about *indelebitas*. Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 3, para. m, p. 410, l. 16, writes: "*Nec sequitur, si non iteratur consecratio episcopalis quod imprimatur character: character enim non sequitur ad naturam unctionis; sed in ea gratia figuratur. Character vero ad distinctionem pertinebat: quae distinctio principaliter in Ordine pertinet ad principale opus Characteris divini.*"

⁸⁰ Philip the Chancellor, *De Ordine*, f. 117c: "*Episcopatus non est ordo secundum quod tantum sunt septem, nec secundum eos qui dicunt novem esse, nec imprimit characterem.*"

⁸¹ Philip the Chancellor, *De Ordine*, f. 117d, where the formula is found twice; 118a, where it is found four times; 118b, where it is found once.

⁸² Guerric of Saint Quentin, *Quaestio de Ordine*, in *Assisi* 138, f. 152a — 152d, and *Paris Nat. lat.* 16417, f. 55d—57c.

stitutes its recipient a means of transmitting grace to others.⁸³ The unity of the various grades or orders into one sacramental unit is brought about by the fact that each of them has as its object the diffusion of grace to others — the sacerdotal order proximately, and the others more remotely.⁸⁴ Now, since the episcopate does not make its recipient the channel of grace, it is not to be taken as an order. Conferring, as it does, only an office, it is rather a dignity which has been established by the Church.⁸⁵

Guerric's explanation of his opinion, and his solution of objections, while based on a different principle, is reminiscent of Philip's discussion of our question. Like the Chancellor, Guerric considers two things which distinguish the episcopate: a difference of power, and a difference in the rite of anointing in its conferral. Although it is true, he says, that the bishop's office realizes the acts of purging, illuminating, and consummating; and although it is true as well that the chrismation in the ceremony of his consecration confers on the bishop a grace which is different from that conferred in the anointing of a priest; yet despite these things, the episcopate is not an order, for it bestows on a man no power of conferring grace on others. Guerric therefore rejects the criterion of order set down by the Pseudo-Dionysius, just as his contemporaries do; but his reason for rejecting it is peculiar to himself. Even though the acts of a bishop may perfect, yet unless they perfect in the order of grace, it is not an act of an order. A bishop, according to Guerric, *de facto* possesses two things, *scil.*, order, and the episcopal dignity itself. Hence, he is able to perfect either in grace or in office; when he perfects in grace, he acts by reason of order, which he has received prior to and outside of the episcopate; when he perfects in office, he is then acting by reason of his episcopal dignity and office.⁸⁶

⁸³ Guerric of Saint Quentin, *De Ordine*, f. 152b (*Paris*, f. 56a): "Sacramenta Novae Legis efficiunt quod figurant, unde sunt instituta ad faciendam gratiam, et hoc vel in proprio subiecto . . . vel etiam in alio, sicut sacramentum Ordinis."

⁸⁴ Guerric of Saint Quentin, *De Ordine*, f. 152b (*Paris*, f. 56a): "Unde dicitur sacramentum Ordinis non quia ordinetur in partibus, non enim ad hoc est; nec quia ordinetur ad alterum quocumque modo; sed quia ordinetur ad gratiam in altero."

⁸⁵ Guerric of Saint Quentin, *De Ordine*, f. 152c (*Paris*, f. 56c): "Traditur ibi (*scil.*, in episcopatu) potestas ad officium, non ad gratiam in altero; et ideo cum haec potestas sit in ordinibus, episcopatus non est ordo."

⁸⁶ Guerric of Saint Quentin, *De Ordine*, f. 152c (*Paris*, f. 56c): "Quod obicitur (episcopatus) habet istos tres actus — purgare et illuminare et perficere, respondeo distinguendum est: quia aut habet perficere in gratia, et hoc habet ratione ordinis; vel in officio, et hoc habet ratione dignitatis vel episcopatus."

From Guerric's position it would seem to follow that a priest possesses the power of order in its fullness, for, since he teaches that the episcopal consecration makes a bishop the dispenser of office but not of grace, then the power by which a bishop himself bestows grace while ordaining priests must already have existed in him in virtue of his previous priestly ordination; therefore, it would follow that the power to ordain priests must already exist, at least latently, in every simple priest. Logically enough, Guerric does teach this. Referring to the example given by William of Auxerre, in which, given that there were only three priests in the world, one of them would be obliged to consecrate another as bishop, Guerric explains that in such a case necessity would provide a dispensation from ordinary custom, thereby giving the simple priest the office of using the power which belonged to him already by reason of his priestly ordination.⁸⁷

This does not mean, however, that the conferral of orders generally requires nothing more than ordination to the priesthood. For, just as things in nature are composed of an *ultima dispositio materiae* and a *forma*, so the act of conferring orders, says Guerric, requires two constituents, *scil.*, the power of the presbyterate (which is a sort of *ultima dispositio*) and the authority of the Church (which stands in the relation of *forma*). While the latter is ordinarily supplied solemnly by the episcopal consecration, it can sometimes be supplied as well by necessity.⁸⁸

Guerric's position is, up to a certain point, the same as that of William of Auxerre. Both of them teach that in virtue of his ordination a priest receives, among other powers, the fundamental power of conferring sacred orders; by the rite of episcopal consecration the bishop receives no new power in this regard, but there is conferred on him the office of exercising that power which he already has, as its ordinary minister. For William, this ability to exercise the power *ex officio* constitutes the bishop in a new and distinct order. For Guerric, one has order only when one has the power of conferring grace on others. Now, when a bishop ordains, he gives to the new priest both office and grace. He gives office because he is a bishop. He gives grace both because he is bishop and priest: by his own priesthood he possesses the basic power

⁸⁷ Guerric of Saint Quentin, *De Ordine*, f. 152d (*Paris*, f. 56d): "Sed si non sit necessitas, non debet (auctoritas Ecclesiae ut ordinet) sine solemnitate venire, et ideo simplex sacerdos non potest ordinare sine necessitate dispensante."

⁸⁸ Guerric of Saint Quentin, *De Ordine*, f. 152d (*Paris*, f. 56d): "Dicendum quod ad collationem ordinis duo requiruntur: unum sicut dispositio ultima, alterum sicut forma; . . . dispositio ad collationem ordinis est sacerdotium, forma vero est auctoritas Ecclesiae quam habet episcopus."

to give grace; by his episcopacy he has the additional faculty of using this power as its ordinary minister. Since, therefore, his own episcopal consecration did not actually give him the power to bestow grace, but only allowed him to exercise that power, he cannot be said to be, in virtue of his episcopacy, constituted in a new and distinct order.

Richard Fishacre

Our final investigation of the episcopate as an order and sacrament is found in Richard Fishacre's *Commentarium in Libros Sententiarum* (c. 1241–1245).⁸⁹ Like Hugh of Saint Cher, whose influence is very apparent in his question of Order, Richard reports on the various opinions held at the time of his writing, without indicating explicitly which one he himself holds. Inquiring about the number of orders, he gives us the same information which Hugh furnished: some say that there are seven orders, the highest and greatest of which is the sacerdotal; among the others, who hold that order is ninefold, there is again a divergence of opinion. Although all teach that the eighth order is the episcopate, some hold that the ninth is the archiepiscopate, while others hold that it is tonsure.⁹⁰

Again, in his solution of the question “whether the bishop and archbishop should be said to be orders added to the *sacerdotium*,” our author describes the current theological scene as follows: the less probable and less common opinion is that they are both to be added to the seven generally accepted orders; the more probable and more common opinion holds that the episcopate is an order (a rather surprising assertion, in view of the opinions which we have seen above), while the archiepiscopate is not.⁹¹ Still a third group, reports Richard, teaches that neither of the two are orders.

It is to this last mentioned opinion that our author subscribes explicitly, albeit with some hint of diffidence.⁹² Although he does mention

⁸⁹ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum*, in *British Museum 10 B VII*, f. 334 va—339 rb, and *Oxford, Bodleian 57*, f. 297 va—302 vb.

⁹⁰ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 334 va (*Bodleian*, f. 297 va).

⁹¹ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 339 rb (*Bodleian*, f. 302 va): “Dicunt enim aliqui quod tam archiepiscopus quam episcopus sunt gradus duo, et faciunt novem cum septem aliis praecedentibus; sed haec est opinio minus probabilis et paucorum. Alii ponunt quod archiepiscopus non dicit ordinem alium, sed tamen episcopus dicit octavum; et haec est probabilior opinio et plurimorum.”

⁹² Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 339 rb (*Bodleian*, f. 302 va): “Tertii dicunt quod nec episcopus est ordo additus ad presbyterum, sed officium et dignitas tantum, et hii dicunt tantum septem gradus esse; et huius opinionis sunt Magister et Hugo de Sancto Victore, ut plane videtur; et huic magis consentio.”

that the supporters of the sevenfold order opinion teach that the supreme order is the sacerdotal "in which the Body which is the most excellent of human mysteries is confected,"⁹³ the only real argument in favor of the opinion is an appeal to the authority of Hugh of Saint Cher and Hugh of Saint Victor, both of whom our author has quoted previously as teaching that the archiepiscopate is not a distinct order.⁹⁴

But although Richard seems to treat the question of the episcopate thus hurriedly, he does develop his thought in some detail when he sets out to answer the objections thrown up against his opinion.

Thus, for example, the difference in the anointing of a priest and a bishop does not mean that in the episcopal consecration a new order is conferred, for the episcopate is not related to the presbyterate in the same way in which orders are interrelated. This is evident, he says, from the fact that if one who has not received the diaconate is ordained to the priesthood, he is nevertheless truly ordained a priest; on the other hand,

⁹³ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 334 va (Bodleian, f. 297 va): "Secundum quosdam enim tantum sunt septem gradus, quorum supremus est sacerdotum, in quo conficitur corpus quod est excellentissimum mysteriorum humanorum."

⁹⁴ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 339rb (Bodleian, f. 302 va): "Hic quaeritur an episcopus et archiepiscopus dicant ordines superadditos sacerdotio vel non. Et primo quaeramus de archiepiscopo. Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa de Sacramentis*, II, part 3, ch. 5 (PL 176, 423):

"Secundum Magistrum patet quod non de utroque hic, sed sunt tantum officia et dignitates superadditae sacerdotio."

"Cui consentire Magister H. de S. Victore in *Libro de Sacramentis* dicens: primus gradus est hostiariorum, secundus lectorum, tertio exorcistarum, . . . septimo sacerdotum. Hic gradus dispares in eodem ordine habent dignitates, scilicet episcopus, etc."

"Item, archiepiscopus non accipit aliam unctionem vel manuum impositionem quam episcopus, ergo non est ordo alius. Non aliter se habet, ut videtur, archiepiscopus ad episcopum nisi sicut archidiaconus ad diaconum et archipresbyter ad presbyterum sed constat archidiaconus et archipresbyter non dicunt ordines superadditos diacono et presbytero; ergo, nec archiepiscopus alium ordinem dicit quam episcopus."

"De episcopo, similiter videtur quod non sit ordo additus super sacerdotium, ex auctoritate praeposita H. et Magistri H."

"Primus gradus est hostiariorum, secundus lectorum, tertio exorcistarum, . . . septimo sacerdotum. Hii gradus dispares in eodem ordine habent dignitates."

Hugh of St. Cher, *Commentarium*, f. 97b (Vat. lat. 1098, f. 169c):

"Item, archiepiscopo non fit unctio vel manuum impositio alia quam episcopo; ergo non est alius ordo."

"Item, sicut se habet archiepiscopus ad episcopum, sic se habet archipresbyter ad presbyterum et archidiaconus ad diaconum; sed archipresbyteratus et archidiaconatus non sunt alii ordines quam presbyteratus et diaconatus; ergo, nec archiepiscopatus est alius ordo quam episcopatus."

if one were to be consecrated a bishop without having first received the priesthood, he would not be a bishop.⁹⁵ While Richard does not elaborate further on this answer, it appears that he sees the presbyterate as the consummation of all orders, since it contains all their powers along with its own; but the episcopate contains only its own particular power. Therefore, although a new power and office are conferred on the bishop, he is not thereby constituted in a new order, but is, in so far as his very episcopate is concerned, outside of order altogether.

Considering the objection that, since the bishop ordains priests, and the archbishop consecrates bishops, therefore the episcopate and archiepiscopate must be respectively greater orders, Richard neatly divides his answer into two parts. First of all, he says, the fact that a man in one grade sometimes ordains a man in another grade does not always ensure that he is superior to him. For while one may be inferior *simpliciter*, yet in a special case he can be greater *quoad aliquem actum*, in order to perform the office of a superior. This is evident from the example in which, given only three priests left in the world, one could have to consecrate another a bishop.⁹⁶ Richard, then, concedes part of William of Auxerre's opinion, *scil.*, that a bishop is superior to a priest in his ability to ordain priests not only in a case of necessity, but by his very office. The second part of the question, however, concerns whether such an ability constitutes the bishop in a new order. While granting the bishop's superiority in office and dignity, Richard denies outright that he is superior in order. Unfortunately, he does not proffer any positive arguments for his opinion.⁹⁷

In Richard's answer to the third and fourth objections, there is discernable the tendency which we found in Philip and some of his

⁹⁵ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 339rb (*Bodleian*, f. 302va): "In consecratione confertur episcopo nec novus ordo, sed novum officium et nova potestas. Si aliquis quippe ordinaretur in sacerdotem, omisso gradu diaconatus, tamen vere sacerdos esset. Sed omisso sacerdotio si quis consecraretur in episcopum, episcopus non esset. Et si hoc verum est, tunc non se habet episcopatus ad sacerdotium ut se habent ordines ad invicem."

⁹⁶ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 339rb (*Bodleian*, f. 302va): "Haec ratio non cogit quia Papa ab Hostiensi consecratur, qui tamen est eo minor. Et si non essent nisi tres sacerdotes in mundo, oporteret quod unus ab aliis in episcopum consecraretur, sicut Moyses nec sacerdos Aaron ordinavit et consecravit. Licet enim aliquis simpliciter sit minor, potest tamen quoad aliquem actum esse maior et officium maioris agere in casu."

The same thing is found, almost *ad litteram* in Hugh of Saint Cher, *Commentarium*, f. 97c (*Vat. lat.* 1098, f. 169d).

⁹⁷ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 339va (*Bodleian*, f. 302va): "Non ex necessitate, sed ex officio episcopus ordinat sacerdotem et benedicit, fateor concedo; et ideo est maior eo. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod sit in gradu ordinis altiori, sed potius est maior officio vel dignitate, non ordine."

other contemporaries to accept the use of the term *ordo* in either a strict or a loose sense. It is true, he writes, that Isidore and Pope Gelasius speak of the episcopate as being an order.⁹⁸ But while it is possible that they were really of the opinion that the episcopate is an order in the strict sense, it is also possible that they were using the word *ordo* loosely to signify power and office.⁹⁹

It is further objected that if the episcopate is not accepted as a separate order, then it must be a separate sacrament, since it is conferred by an anointing; but this cannot be, for there are only seven sacraments in the New Law; therefore, the episcopate must be a separate order. Richard's answer to this is not completely satisfactory, for again he gives no reason for his opinion. But on the other hand, it does shed some light on the question of whether the episcopal consecration is administered by a sacrament or a sacramental. The consecration of a bishop, explains Richard, like the pallium, its conferral, the mitre and crosier, etc., could be called a sacrament, since like them it is a *sacrarum rerum signum visibile*.¹⁰⁰

While we cannot be certain from this formula alone whether Richard is speaking of a sacrament in the strict sense, the examples which he gives, as well as his statement that these things "pertain to the sacrament of Order" certainly indicate that he is not; he is rather using the term *sacramentum* in what Hugh of Saint Cher called the "common sense."¹⁰¹ According to Richard, therefore, the consecration of a bishop is not a sacrament strictly speaking, but, pertaining as it does to the sacrament of sacerdotal ordination (a pertinence which Richard does not enlarge upon), it is called more properly a sacramental.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Gelasius, Dist. 77; according to Gratian (PL 187, 374) Canon 1 ("*Illud nos*"), in which these words appear, is not to be attributed to Gelasius, but to Pope Caius.

St. Isidore, *Etym.*, lib. VII, c. 12, PL 82, 290.

⁹⁹ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 339va (Bodleian, f. 302va).

¹⁰⁰ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 339va (Bodleian, f. 302va): "Fateor consecratio illa episcopi sacramentum est sicut et pallium, vel eius collatio archiepiscopo, et mitra et baculus episcopo, et cetera talia. Quidem sunt sacrarum rerum signa visibilia, et pertinent ad sacramentum ordinis."

¹⁰¹ Hugh of Saint Cher, *Quaestio de Sacramentis in Communi*, in *Douai Bibl. Munic.* 434 I, f. 110vb—111vb: "Prima (definitio, scil., 'Sacramentum est sacre rei signum') convenit omni sacramento tam Nove quam Veteris Legis, et multis aliis que nec sunt nec fuerunt sacramenta, ut serpenti eneo, cruci ecclesie et aque benedictae." (As cited by D. Van den Eynde, *Les Définitions des Sacrements*, Rome-Louvain, 1950, p. 135, 149).

¹⁰² Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 339va (Bodleian, f. 302va): "Sed in hoc est dicenda quod quaedam sacramentalia sunt praecedentia sacramentum ad quod pertinent, ut in baptismo cathecismus, exorcismus; quaedam subsequencia, ut ordinem sacerdotalem episcopi consecratio et palli collatio et huiusmodi."

In dealing with the last objection, Richard has recourse to Alexander of Hales' interpretation of the Lombard's definition of Order.¹⁰³ This definition, writes Richard, does not apply to the episcopate, for a bishop possesses no character except the one which he received by his priestly ordination.¹⁰⁴ It is also possible, he continues, that the Master intended to exclude the episcopate by saying that in Order a spiritual power is conferred "on one who is ordered." Those who hold that the episcopate is not an order teach that order is always directed to the Eucharist. Now, if one understands the "*ordinato*" in the Master's definition as meaning "ordered to the Holy Eucharist," then one can interpret Lombard's formula as excluding the episcopate from order; if one does not, then it would appear, says Richard, that Peter, who immediately after the definition explicitly says that the episcopate is not an order but a dignity, has contradicted himself.¹⁰⁵

Conclusion

The question of whether the episcopate is an order distinct from the presbyterate was at first treated by the theologians of the early middle Scholastic period as an adjunct to their investigation concerning the number of orders in the Church. Prior to the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, it was generally held, especially on the authority of Peter the Lombard, that there are only seven orders; the authors of that period commonly taught that the episcopate, along with the other higher ecclesiastical offices, is a dignity and an office. Around the time of that Council, however, some doubts arose concerning the validity of the Master's opinion, and theologians began to take sides in the ensuing dispute.

Guy of Orchellis, who first taught that there are nine orders in the Church, was supported by William of Auxerre. The same opinion was embraced, although in a somewhat hesitant manner, by Hugh of Saint Cher. Although their choice of a ninth order was not unanimous, Hugh

¹⁰³ Peter Lombard, *Lib. IV Sent.*, IV, d. 24, c. 13, n. 247, p. 902: Ordo est "signaculum, id est, sacrum quoddam, quo spiritualis potestas traditur ordinato et officium."

Cf. Alexander, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 2, p. 399—400.

¹⁰⁴ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 339va (*Bodleian*, f. 302va): "Signaculum dicit characterem ut videtur ex sequentibus statim; et secundum hoc, diffinitio non convenit gradui episcopali, in quo character non datur nisi ille qui fuit sacerdotii."

¹⁰⁵ Richard Fishacre, *Commentarium*, f. 339va (*Bodleian*, f. 302va): "Vel potest dici quod licet episcopo detur potestas spiritualis alia quam sacerdotii, tamen Magister, qui ponit quod episcopus non est nomen ordinis, exclusit potestatem illam episcopi et archiepiscopi, addendo "*ordinato*;" aut ipse Magister esset sibi contrarius."

evincing an inclination to name tonsure in place of Guy's and William's archiepiscopate, nevertheless, they agreed completely on the eighth order. The episcopate, since it is administered by a sensible rite similar to that of the presbyterate, and confers on its recipient a new power and character, is to be considered a new and distinct order.

The traditional opinion of sevenfold order, however, found a strong champion in Alexander of Hales, whose insistence on the Holy Eucharist as the center and norm of orders, influenced many subsequent theologians. According to this Doctor, order is had only when a sacramental character is imprinted; wherefore he interpreted the word *signaculum* of the Master's definition of order to signify an external sign imprinting a character of excellence. Character is always present in an order because every order, and more especially the order of presbyterate, has as its excellent object the Holy Eucharist. Now, since the episcopate is not directed to the Eucharist as its object, it possesses no character, and therefore it is not an order. In accordance with his theory, he formulated a new definition of order, which emphasized its relation to the Blessed Sacrament.

The Halesian emphasis on the Eucharist as the criterion of order was adopted by many contemporary and near-contemporary theologians: Roland of Cremona employed this principle in attacking the opinion of William of Auxerre; Philip the Chancellor, a faithful disciple of Alexander, used it to distinguish between the orders, whose object is the Eucharist, and the other offices of the Church, whose objects are more general; Richard Fishacre also followed the Irrefragable Doctor by interpreting the Master's definition as he had, and by basing his doctrine about the episcopate on the preeminence of the Eucharist.

Some other theologians joined Alexander in sustaining the traditional opinion, but for different reasons. William of Auvergne, for instance, stressed Saint Jerome's notion that the episcopate and presbyterate are two grades of one order; the office of the former are the fullness and perfection of those of the latter, whence the two grades differ, as do their offices, not in kind but only in degree. Gueric of Saint Quentin demonstrated that the episcopate is an order by employing a new principle: while all sacraments confer grace, the sacrament of Order makes its recipient a transmitter of grace as well; now, since the episcopate does not *per se* render its recipient a channel of grace, but merely permits him to act in that capacity, it cannot be said to be an order.

But while these proponents of the traditional opinion denied for various reasons that the episcopate is an order, they did agree that it is

certainly distinct from and superior to the presbyterate in some manner. Throughout this period one observes an increasing insistence on the distinction between order, which involves both power and sacramental character, and office, which pertains to power alone. The logical consequence of Alexander's opinion seems to be that one must distinguish between the orders, which imprint character because they have the Eucharist as their object, and certain dignities or offices like the episcopate, which confer new grace and power but no character. This distinction between order and office is almost the essence of the opinion of William of Auvergne, who saw the episcopate as one with the presbyterate in the order of *sacerdotium*, yet of a different grade within that order because of the superiority of its offices. Roland of Cremona acceded to William of Auxerre's insistence that the bishop is superior to the priest in his works; yet he held that this does not constitute a bishop in order. In this same direction, Philip the Chancellor pointed out that the word *ordo* could be used in an older and looser sense to signify any ecclesiastical office, while in his day the Church used it strictly to denote only those offices which, because they have the Eucharist as their object, carry with them a character. Finally, Richard Fishacre insisted that the bishop's superiority in office is beside the point when one is speaking of order.

Thus, the adherents of the opinion which denied that the episcopate is an order taught that it does nevertheless enjoy a special preeminence over the presbyterate. All of them attribute to the bishop a greater power or office which belongs to him alone. But concerning the exact nature of this greater power — whether it is of divine or ecclesiastical origin; whether it affects the validity or only the liceity of the bishop's acts; whether it belongs to the bishop absolutely or only ordinarily — about such details as these, the theologians of that time did not express themselves clearly. Alexander, Philip, and Richard wrote nothing explicit about the nature of this power. William of Auvergne stated merely that it is the fullness of that power which the priest possesses. Roland came close to reducing it to a matter of administration. Guerric seems to have inclined toward the notion that the bishop is the ordinary minister of a power belonging to both priest and bishop. William of Auxerre, while insisting that the episcopate is a special separate order enjoying the ordinary use of powers which all priests basically possess, declared that in a case of extreme necessity a simple priest could consecrate a bishop. We find his statement repeated by Roland, Guerric, and Richard; but it is only Guerric who said anything about the source

of such a power: in such cases, he asserted, the Church would supplement the power which the priest possesses with her authority.

About the question of whether the episcopal consecration is administered by a sacrament or a sacramental, only two of our theologians wrote anything *ex professo*. William of Auvergne, who seems to have been ahead of his time in this regard, stated clearly that the consecration of a bishop is a sacramental which amplifies or extends the power already received by priestly ordination. Richard Fishacre called the consecration a sacrament, but was obviously employing the term in the broad sense to mean a sacramental. None of the others, not even Guy and William of Auxerre, who considered the episcopate to be a separate order, treat of the nature of this consecration. While all of them conceded that a bishop's consecration confers some sort of a special grace and power, it would not be valid to conclude from this that they therefore thought it is a sacrament; both William of Auvergne and Richard, who taught that it is a sacramental, spoke of added grace and power. It does seem, however, that one can infer from their general doctrine what our theologians would have taught about this question had they adverted to it. Since Guy, Auxerre, and Hugh attributed to the episcopate a new order and character, it would seem that they should also teach that it is administered by a sacrament. On the other hand, it appears that those who denied these things to the episcopate must consequently hold that it is conferred by a sacramental.

In some respects, the doctrine of the theologians of this period concerning the relation of the episcopate to the presbyterate is incomplete and obscure. On the other hand, since their treatment of the problem served to clarify some points, and even to provide some new notions, which were adopted and developed by later theologians, it is our hope that this investigation of their opinions on the question may have yielded some profit.

HUGH OF SAINT CHER

COMMENTARIUM IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM

Mss. *Bibl. Vat. lat.* 1174 = A*Bibl. Vat. lat.* 1098 = B

A, 97a Ad primum¹ sic: Dicit Dionysius quod humana hierarchia similis est
B, 169b caelesti hierarchia;² sed in caelesti sunt novem ordines ministrorum.
Ergo, in humana debent esse novem ordines ministrorum.

Item, Exodus XXV:³ praecepit Dominus Moysi ut sibi fieret tabernaculum iuxta omnem similitudinem eius quod ostendum est Moysi in monte. Tabernaculum ostensum in monte est ecclesia triumphans; tabernaculum factum a filiis Israel est ecclesia militans. Ergo, ecclesia militans in omnibus quibus potest, similis est triumphanti. Sed in triumphante sunt novem ordines angelorum; ergo, et in militante sunt, vel debent esse, novem ordines ministrorum.

Contra: Dicit Magister⁴ quod sicut est septiformis gratia Spiritus Sancti, ita sunt septem gradus ecclesiastici qui praenuntiati sunt.

Solutio. Super hoc est duplex opinio.

Quidam dicunt quod tantum sunt septem ordines, quorum summus et maximus est ordo sacerdotalis, secundum quem fit consecratio Corporis et Sanguinis Christi quod est opus excellentissimum. Et ideo, super ipsum non est alius ordo. Episcopus enim, ut dicunt, non est nomen ordinis sed dignitatis; unde Apostolus, *I Tim. 2*, nomen episcopi vocat presbyteros.⁵ Hi idicunt quod similitudo ecclesiae militantis et triumphantis attenditur penes septem dona, in quibus ecclesia militans debet imitari triumphantem quantum potest, scilicet contemplando, bene operando, et ad invicem serviendo. Et ob hoc dictum est Moysi ut faceret sibi tabernaculum iuxta omnem similitudinem illius quod ostensum est ei in monte.

A, 97b Alii vero dicunt quod novem sunt ordines in ecclesia militante / sicut sunt novem ordines angelorum in triumphante, scilicet septem enuntiati, octavus et nonus. Octavus est episcopatus, cuius est alios praecedentes ordines conferre, et chrisina et ecclesias consecrare, abbates benedicere. Et quod episcopatus sit ordo patet quia quando consecratur, inungitur chrismate.

Sed de nono ordine diversa est opinio.

¹ Scil., "*Quot sint ordines?*"

² Ps.-Dionysius, *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, Cap. VI, PG 3, 537 sq.

³ *Exodus*, 25, 40.

⁴ *Petri Lombardi Lib. IV Sent.*, IV, d. 24, c. 2, tom. II, n. 236, p. 892.

⁵ *I Tim.*, 3, 2sq. Cf. etiam *Ad Titum*, 1, 5.

Quidam dicunt quod archiepiscopatus est nonus ordo, give patriarchatus, qui duo non differunt nisi in maiore et minore potestate. Patriarchae / enim sunt illi qui praesunt sedibus quibus Apostoli prae- B, 169c fuerunt, et sunt quinque. Primus et maximus est Romanus, qui successit Petro, qui fuit princeps Apostolorum; secundus est Constantinopolitanus, tertius Alexandrinus, quartus Antiochenus, quintus Ierosolimitanus. Isti quatuor ultimi, recepto pallio quod est in signo plenitudinis potestatis a Romano pontifice, praestito sibi fidelitatis et obedientiae iuramento, de hinc suis suffraganeis largiuntur pallium. Unde in hoc differunt archiepiscopus tantum et patriarcha, quod ille pallium potest dare, et alia huiusmodi potest facere quod non archiepiscopus; tamen idem est ordo.

Et quod episcopatus et archiepiscopatus sint duo ordines praeter alios septem qui dicti sunt, probant per hoc, quod dicit Apostolus, *Hebr.* 7, 7: "sine contradictione enim quod minus est a meliori benedicitur". Et ita melior est, id est maior, qui benedicit eo qui benedicitur. Sed archiepiscopus ex officio suo episcopum benedicit et consecrat, et ita maior. Et ideo dicunt quod alius et maior est ordo archiepiscopi quam episcopi.

Sed contra: Episcopus consecrat archiepiscopum et papam; non tamen est maior.

Item, archiepiscopo non fit inunctio vel manuum impositio alia quam episcopo. Ergo, non est alius ordo.

Item, sicut se habet archiepiscopus ad episcopum, sic se habet archipresbyter ad presbyterum, et archidiaconus ad diaconum. Sed archipresbyteratus et archi(diaconatus) non sunt alii ordines quam presbyteratus et diaconatus. Ergo nec archiepiscopatus est alius ordo quam episcopatus.

Quod concedunt multi, dicentes quod prima tonsura est primus ordo, postea alii septem qui enuntiati sunt, nonus est episcopatus.

Et quod prima tonsura sit ordo volunt sic probare: ordo est signaculum dignitatis; sed prima tonsura est signaculum dignitatis; ergo est ordo. Praeterea, ille qui coronam recipit dicit, "Dominus pars haereditatis meae." Quasi dicat, "Dominus est haereditas mea spiritualiter," quod non videtur esse nisi propter ordinem quem suscipit.

* * *

Si quis tamen vellet sustinere illam opinionem quam multi magistri A, 97b sustinent, qui dicunt quod tonsura non est ordo, quia non erat in Vetere B, 169d Testamento, sed archiepiscopatus, cuius figuram gessit Moyses quando / A, 97c

Aaron consecrav⁶, dicendum quod aliud est ex commissa sive dispensatoria potestate facere aliquid, aliud ex officii dignitate. Archiepiscopus enim consecrat episcopum ex officii dignitate, et ideo maioris dignitatis est. Et sic intelligitur auctoritas Apostoli: "Quod minus est a meliore sive a maiore benedicitur,"⁷ scilicet, ex officio. Episcopus vero archiepiscopum vel papam consecrat ex commissa sibi potestate, et ideo non est maior episcopus consecrans eo qui consecratur. Vel potest dici quod quoad hoc maior est, simpliciter tamen minor est. Similiter papa, cum non habeat superiorem, dat potestatem Ostiensi ut eum consecret; hanc eandem potestatem dat cuilibet alio episcopo. Et si non essent in toto mundo nisi tres sacerdotes, oporteret quod unus alium in episcopum consecraret, sicut facit Moyses et Aaron. Et quoad hoc habuit Moyses officium sacerdotis, unde Psalmus: "Moses et Aaron in sacerdotibus eius;"⁸ non tamen fuit sacerdos.

ROLAND OF CREMONA SUMMA THEOLOGICA

Ms. *Paris, Mazarine 795*

127^d Sed videtur quod plures debeant esse ordines (quam septem); verbi gratia, ordo qui signatur per illud nomen "episcopus," et alius qui signatur per istud nomen "archiepiscopus," et sic de aliis praesulibus. Item, videtur quod ordo debeat esse illud quod vocamus "primam tonsuram" sive "coronam."

Ad hoc dicimus quod non sunt nisi septem ordines, sicut probatum est per facta Christi. Episcopus, autem, et ceteri, nomina sunt dignitatum et non ordinum.

Sed de prima tonsura videtur quod sit ordo, quia quando accipit dicit, "Dominus est pars haereditatis meae." Separat enim se in haereditatem Domini, quod videtur esse quia recipit ordinem, unde se segregat communi plebe.

Item, dicimus quod humana hierarchia facta est ad similitudinem caelestis. Ergo videtur quod in humana hierarchia debeant esse novem ordines et tres hierarchiae, sicut est in caelesti. Et ideo etiam quia Dominus dicit Moyse in *Exodo*, "Vide et fac omnia sicut ostensum est tibi in monte."⁹ Quia ecclesia militans facta est ad similitudinem triumphantis, ergo videtur quod quantum ad ordines.

⁶ *Exodus*, 29, 4sqq.

⁷ *Heb.*, 7, 7.

⁸ *Ps.*, 98, 6.

⁹ *Exodus*, 25, 40.

Ad hoc dicitur quod corona est signum regalis dignitatis, quia bene se debet regere quicumque vult stare coram Domino et ministrare ei in mensa sua. Et hoc debent habere omnes ordinati quamvis quilibet hic bene se debent regere sub Deo. Unde dicitur quod corona facit quantum praeparationem ad suscipiendos ordines, sicut albedo subministratur ut alii colores possint fieri. Unde non est sacramentum, sed est sacramentale, sicut cathecismus et exorcismus non sunt sacramenta secundum communem opinionem, sed sunt sacramentalia. Et est signum quod ille qui suscipit coronam separatur in partem Domini, quod fit clericus; et hoc ostendit quando dicit, "Dominus pars haereditatis meae."

Et ad illud quod dictum est quod hierarchia ecclesiae est ad similitudinem caelestis hierarchiae, dicimus quod verum est. Non tamen oportet quod sit ibi omni modo similitudo, scilicet quod si ibi sunt novem ordines quod ideo sint in hierarchia ecclesiae. Sed similitudo est in sanctitate et obedientia et praelatione. Quia sicut homines praesunt hominibus in ecclesia militante, ita angeli angelis in ecclesia triumphante, usque in diem iudicii. Postea cessabit omnis praelatio, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus, sicut dicit Apostolus.

Attenditur ergo similitudo secundum gratias secundum quas imitatur Deum ad similitudinem angelorum. Et hoc fuit quod dictum est Moysi ut faceret tabernaculum sicut fuit ei ostensum in monte, quia Christus ordinavit ecclesiam in septem donis Spiritus Sancti, quibus imitatur angelos; et sumus eis similes, sicut et superior ecclesia ordinata est, et sicut Christus ibi volebat, ita hic. Et ideo non oportet quod hic sint novem ordines sicut ibi, quia non in hoc notatur similitudo. Et est fallacia consequentis in argumento, quia procedit ex particulari in similitudinem, quasi sit universalis similitudo. Ordines enim angelorum non distinguuntur secundum ea quibus sumus eis similes, sed secundum officia diversa.

Verumtamen ad hoc aliter suadetur quod plures sint ordines quam septem, quia subdiaconus est quidam ordo quia est sub diacono, et diaconus sub sacerdote. Ergo eadem ratione episcopus est unus ordo secundum quod praeest sacerdotio, et archiepiscopus alius secundum quod praeest episcopo, et primas alius secundum quod praeest primati, et papa alius secundum quod praeest patriarchis, et ita multi plures habemus ordines quam diximus.

Item, aliter istud suadetur. In Baptismo et Confirmatione, in quibus est unctio de chrismate, imprimitur character. Ita quod in Confirmatione imprimitur character excellentiae. Ergo, et in unctione episcopi imprimitur character. Ergo, episcopatus est ordo.

Item, dictum est secundum communem opinionem quod "ordo est sacrum signaculum quo confertur potestas spiritualis et officium."¹⁰ Sed in consecratione episcopi est sacrum signaculum, id est sacra unctio; et confertur ei potestas spiritualis et officium faciendi ordines, consecrandi ecclesias, et confirmandi, et alia. Ergo, est ordo per locum in definitione.

Similiter, in hierarchia angelorum est unus ordo qui dicitur "dominantium," quia quibusdam aliis dominatur.¹¹ Ergo, et omnes illi sunt ordines per easdem rationes quas supra memoramus, ut episcopi et archiepiscopi, etc. Eodem modo videbitur quod archidiaconatus et archipresbyteratus et decanatus sint ordines; et ita multo plures habebuntur in ecclesia militanti quam sint in triumphanti ecclesia. Et sic habebitur quod non est ad similitudinem eius quantum ad hoc.

Solutio praedictorum.

Ad praedicta, duobus modis solvitur, secundum duas opiniones.

Quidam dicunt quod non sunt nisi septem ordines, sicut supra diximus, et dicimus iterum. Et in hac opinione sumus nos. Et ultimus et summus est ordo sacerdotalis, et alii ordines redeunt ad ipsum. Et illud summum quod potest facere ille ordo est consecratio Corporis et Sanguinis Christi, et haec est eius virtus summa, secundum quod loquitur Ari(stoteles) de virtute in *Libro Coeli et Mundi*,¹² quod ipsa est ultimum de potentia. Unde supra ordinem sacerdotalem nullus est ordo. Unde et Apostolus ad Timotheum vocat episcopos "presbyteros."¹³ Et antiquitus solebat dici de summo pontifice "presbyter Romanus," et aliquando "episcopus Romanus."

Alii sunt qui docunt quod tot sunt in ecclesia militanti quot sunt in triumphanti, et supra septem praecedentes apponunt duos alios, scilicet episcopatum et archidiaconatum, ut sint novem sicut novem ordines angelorum.

Sed haec opinio nulla videtur mihi. Primo quia qua ratione ponunt quod archidiaconatus est ordo per se, eadem ratione debent ipsi dicere quod archipresbyteratus. Et qua ratione ponunt quod episcopatus est ordo, eadem ratione archiepiscopatus. Et ita multo plures sunt ordines in militante quam in triumphanti. Nomina ergo sunt diversarum administrationum et dignitatum, et non ordinum.

¹⁰ Petri Lombardi *Lib. IV Sent.*, IV, d. 24, c. 13, n. 247, p. 902.

¹¹ *Coloss.*, I, 16.

¹² Aristoteles, Bk. I, cap. 11; ed. Firmin-Didot, Paris, 1927—1931, Vol. II, p. 385, l. 30.

¹³ *I Tim.*, 3, 2 sqq.

Mirabile fuisset si episcopatus fuisset ordo, et Dominus non ostendisset in se illum ordinem sicut et ostendit alios. Et maxime cum dicat Petrus quod Christus fuit "episcopus animarum vestrarum."¹⁴

Alia ratio est quia in Sententiis convictio omnium est quod tantum sunt septem ordines.

Maior est ergo episcopus sacerdote administratione et potestate quae ei data est, quia dat potestatem sacerdoti conficere Corpus et Sanguinem Christi. Unde in consecratione episcopi non confertur character, quamvis augmentetur gratia, si digne accipit.

Et ad archiepiscopum pertinet consecrare episcopum, et dat ei potestatem consecrandi sacerdotes, et alias administrationes quas habet. Nec ideo archiepiscopus apponit ordinem, nec episcopus vel archi(diaconus), et sic de aliis; sed augent illa quae secundum ordinem presbyteratus sunt. Quod patet quia in necessitate unus simplex sacerdos posset consecrare episcopum, et episcopus consecrat archi(episcopum). Patet ergo, quod non sunt illa nisi nomina diversarum administrationum. Et etiam hoc probat, quod non est alia manus impositio super episcopum quam super archiepiscopum.

Sed cum huiusmodi non sint nisi quaedam accidentalialia supra ordinem sacerdotalem, mirum est de humana stultitia et contingentia, quod episcopus dedignatur vocari "presbyter," et archi(episcopus) et patriarcha et papa dedignentur, et velint denominari ab accidentibus. Patet quod illi qui gaudent in illis dignitatibus, et non magis quod sunt sacerdotes, quod arrogantes sunt, et "ad crimen apostasiae," secundum quod dicit Gregorius, "delapsi."¹⁵ Item patet quod sunt adventitiae / naturae 128 a hospitales, quia accidens est adventivae naturae, ut dicit Philosophus,¹⁶ et ita illi sunt hospites et advenae Testamentorum, et non sunt "cives et domestici Dei."¹⁷

Si quis autem rogat ut sustineamus quod archidiaconatus sit ordo, et episcopatus quamvis proprie, ut sit quaedam similitudo inter ecclesiam triumphantem et militantem quantum ad numerum ordinum, conceditur ei. Sed quid faciet de aliis superioribus, qui ita sunt ordines ut alii? Multa autem sunt vocabula modo in ecclesia, ut quidam sunt archidiaconi, et quidam archipresbyteri, et quidam cantores, et quidam succantores, et quidam episcopi, etc. Quia ecclesia modo multas habet

¹⁴ *I Pet.*, 2, 25.

¹⁵ S. Gregorius, *XL Homiliarum in Evang. Libri Duo*, I, Hom. 17, PL 76, 1503.

¹⁶ Aristoteles, *Metaphysicorum Liber*, III, cap. 4; ed. Firmin-Didot, Vol. II, p. 506, l. 7^{sqq}.

¹⁷ *Eph.*, 2, 19.

administrationes, et habet decanos et subdecanos, thesaurarios et praepositum, et magistrum scholarum — quasi nomina infinita — et ut plurima verba, plures vanitates. Multi enim sunt qui gaudent cum plurima vocabula adhaerent sibi, ut sint simul archidiaconi et diaconi et cetera nomina.

Isti autem qui contendunt quod plures sunt ordines quam septem probant isto modo, quia Apostolus dicit ad Hebraeos, "sine ulla contradictione, minor a maiore benedicitur;"¹⁸ ergo, maior est qui benedicit quam qui benedicitur. Sed archiepiscopus de officio suo benedicit episcopum. Ergo, archiepiscopus est maior quam episcopus.

Concedimus conclusionem, "quod maior est archiepiscopus quam episcopus." Sed non sequitur, "ergo est maior in ordine," et est fallacia secundum quid. Etsi maior quidem est digniori administratione, non autem ordine.

Item, "Moyses et Aaron in sacerdotibus eius."¹⁹ Aut ergo aequales aut alter maior. Non videtur dubitandum quin Moyses maior fuerit, quia Dominus dixit Moysi, "Tu eris ei in his quae ad Deum pertinent."²⁰ Ergo, maius fuit sacerdotium Moysi quam Aaron. Ergo, maiorem ordinem habuit, quia consecravat Aaron. Et in hoc argumento est fallacia eadem quam dixi superius. Sicut ergo archidiaconus maior est dignitate et administratione, ita Moyses fuit maior Aaron dignitate et administratione, non autem ordine. Quod autem dicit Apostolus, "minor a maiore benedicitur," intelligendum est a minore illius ordine, vel etiam dignitate aliqua, vel etiam administratione.

PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR QUAESTIO DE ORDINE

Ms. Douai Bibl. Munic. 434 I.

117d Item, quaeritur an in aliquo communi convenient omnes ordines? Si in actu ministrandi, quaeritur quis est ille actus, et quid ministrat?

Solutio. Omnes habent conformitatem ministrandi ad opus principale, quod est Eucharistia. Sed episcopus principalis est hierarchiae. Potestas igitur ministrandi communis est omnibus. Sed nota quod est opus principale, scilicet consecratio Eucharistiae, ad quod omnes ordines respiciunt, et est hoc opus ordinis sacerdotalis. Diaconus autem et

¹⁸ *Heb.*, 7, 7.

¹⁹ *Ps.*, 98, 6.

²⁰ *Exodus*, 4, 16.

subdiaconus ministrant ad illud opus, sicut proxime assistentes. Alii vero ministrant ad illud ut impedimenta removentes. Sit itaque est opus principale, opus proxime ministrantium, et opus impedimenta amovendum. Et haec reducuntur ad triplex opus gratiae: purgandi, illuminandi, et perficiendi; minorum est officium purgandi, aliorum illuminandi, sacerdotum perficiendi et consummandi.

Per hoc patet solutio ad illud quod quaeritur utrum ordo sit species specialissima, an sint diversae species characterum. Sed plures esse non possunt, quoniam plures qualitates eiusdem speciei esse simul in anima non possunt; si diversae species, ergo diversa sacramenta.

Solutio. In se considerati, plures sunt, quoniam diversas probant potestates, quae diversae sunt in se. Unde diversi sunt characteres, ideoque diversi ordines specie. Sunt tamen unum, ratione sacramenti, quia omnes tendunt ad unum opus principale, quod est consecratio Corporis Dominici.

Secundo quaeritur utrum episcopatus sit ordo.

Videtur quod sic, quia aut iudicas de ordine secundum distinctionem, aut secundum unctionem. Si primo modo, sed in episcopo est maxima distinctio; ergo episcopatus est ordo, quia in episcopo est distinctio excellentissima.

Item, in ipso est unctio, et est initerabilitas in ipso.

Item, non ordinatur nisi ab ordinato; ergo aliquis ordo est primus a quo omnes alii ordines conferuntur. Sicut est Character Increatus, a quo omnes alii characteres, ergo pari ratione aliquis erit character creatus, a quo omnes alii, vel sub quo omnes alii, sicut fides prima est virtutum cum qua omnes aliae.

Solutio. Episcopatus non est ordo secundum quod tantum sunt septem (ordines), nec secundum eos qui dicunt novem esse; nec imprimit characterem. Oportuit enim ut summus ordinum staret / ibi, ^{118 a} ubi est opus principale, quod est opus Filii Dei, immo est verus Filius Dei. Ideoque omnem ordinem et omne sacramentum est excellens, ut ultra non sit ordo.

Item, alia ratione non est ordo, quia Increatus Character illud opus principale primo operatus est in eo ordine et in supremo characterem. Unde ultra non est ordo, neque character. Primo enim characterizatus est Filius Dei Characterem Increatum in utero Virginis; secundo in circumcisione corporaliter; tertio in toto corpore et perfecte in passione. Ante passionem instituit illud opus excellentissimum characterizatum, ideoque ultra non est character neque ordo, quoniam in eo opere fit commemoratio illius summae characterizationis.

Item, tertia ratione non oportuit, quia omnes characteres et ordines tendunt ad illud opus principale. His rationibus, non est ultra ordo.

Ad illud quod obicitur de distinctione, dicimus quod ibi non est distinctio quae faciat characterem, quae triplex tantum est secundum fidem, et robur fidei, et consummationem sive fidei excellentiam Christi passi. Haec enim sunt in ordine sacerdotali, qui respicit illud opus principale. Unde impertinens est ordo ad hunc characterem, sive ad hanc distinctionem, quisquis ad opus principale non ordinatur. Sed ordines inferiores ad hoc ordinantur, et ideo habent characterem. Ordo vero sacerdotalis perficit et consummat; ideo ultra non est ordo. Sed ordo sacerdotalis adiuncta potestate spiritualis gratiae facit episcopum.

Ad illud quod indelebitas est ibi, dicimus quod hoc non facit ad esse characteris sive ordinis, quia (episcopus) non est ad illud opus principale ordinatus, nec est ibi distinctio fidei.

Ad illud de caractere, dicimus quod nullus est character creatus sub quo omnes alii. Nec illud de Caractere Increato facit ad rem, quoniam Filius Dei est character operativus; unde est in motiva sive in actione. Character vero creatus distinctivus est, et est in cognitiva. Si vis igitur dicere Characterem Increatum (esse) causam efficientem, falsa est; si vero causam disponentem ad alios characteres, bene concedo.

Item, quaeritur cum episcopus ex ordine sacerdotali adiuncta potestate spiritualis gratiae habeat potestatem alia conferendi, et non alius, quare non eodem est in Baptismo, ut scilicet non baptizatus baptizare non possit, sed solum baptizatus?

Solutio. Baptismus est sacramentum necessitatis, et non est dispositio. Ordo vero non est necessitatis, sed est ex ordine sacerdotali, et adiuncta potestate specialis gratiae; quare ordo non potest conferri nisi ab episcopo, sed bene Baptismus a non baptizato.

Consequenter, quaeritur sub quo numero cadant ordines?

Et videtur quod sub novenario, quoniam novem sunt ordines angelorum, ut sit conformitas in numero hierarchiae ecclesiasticae ad hierarchiam angelicam, iuxta illud quod dixit Dominus Moysi, "Fac omnia secundum exemplar quod tibi ostensum est in monte."²¹

Quae est, ergo, ratio quare tantum septem assignantur? Si dicas quod assimilatio militantis ecclesiae ad triumphantem non est secundum characterem, ordinum vero numerus assignatur secundum characterem, secundum hoc quaeritur: Cum character sit distinctivus, et angeli sint diversi inter se, sicut habes, quare non distinguuntur angeli per charac-

²¹ *Exodus*, 25, 40.

teres sicut homo, cum magis videatur indigere distinctione? Fortasse propter maiorem differentiam quae in angelis est.

Item, quaeritur secundum quam rationem ponuntur ordines septem, ut ait Apostolus, *Hebr. 1*: "Omnes sunt administratorii spiritus."²² Sed ordinati sunt administratorii; quare ergo non respondet numerus numero cum in ministerio conveniant?

Item, Dionysius assignat tantum tres ordines, dicens primam hierarchiam episcopos, secundum sacerdotes, ultimam levitas; et hoc secundum tria opera, scilicet, consummationis, illuminationis, et purgationis.²³ Ergo, tantum sunt tres ordines.

Solutio. Assignatio facta est diversa secundum diversitatem temporum et causarum. Et secundum hoc diversi ponuntur numeri ordinum et transmutatio ordinis, ut patet in subdiaconatu, qui in primitiva ecclesia non fuit sacer ordo, et modo est sacer. Iuxta hoc etiam fit multiplicatio ordinum.

Secundum hanc diversitatem distinguitur quandoque numerus secundum genera potestatum, et hunc respectum habuit divisio in primitiva ecclesia, considerans quod fuerunt Apostoli, quorum loco sunt episcopi. Item, septuaginta duo discipuli, in quorum locum minores sacerdotes successerunt. Item, additi sunt septem levitae in Actibus,²⁴ quorum locum tenent diaconi. Et his tribus ordinibus assignatis secundum gratiam potestatum, attribuuntur tria opera consummationis, illuminationis, et purgationis. Primum opus episcopis, secundum sacerdotibus, purgationis levitis.

Sed possunt multiplicari secundum species, quando potestatum multiplicatio attenditur. Hierarchia enim Divina triplex est tantum, ad quam angelica hierarchia conformitatem accepit, ut sint tres ordines. Sed multiplicatio fit in quolibet ordine per ternarium, et sic resultant novem. Eodem modo, hierarchia ecclesiastica conformis est angelicae, secundum tres ordines assignatos secundum tria genera potestatum; sed multiplicatur secundum species quia opus triplex est — purgationis, illuminationis, et consummationis — et unumquodque illorum multiplicatur.

Opus quippe purgandi triplicatur quoniam consistit in expulsionem demonum ab obsessis corporibus, et in excludendis immundis hominibus, et in excludendis spiritibus ab animabus. Primum pertinet ad exorcistas, secundum ad ostiarios, tertium ad acolitos, quia portant cereum in quo

²² *Heb.*, 1, 14.

²³ Ps-Dionysius, *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, Cap. VI, PG 3, 537 sqq.

²⁴ *Acta*, 6, 6.

duo sunt: ignis, et splendor sive lumen; ignis est purgativus, ideoque ad acolitum pertinet opus purgandi.

Item, opus illuminationis multiplicatur secundum triplicem doctrinam illuminativam, ut secundum doctrinam Veteris Testamenti, apostolicam, et evangelicam. Prima pertinet ad officium lectoris, secundum ad officium subdiaconi, tertia ad officium diaconi.

Item, opus consummationis multiplicatur ut primum pertineat ad simplices sacerdotes, quorum est baptizare; secundum ad episcopos, quorum est confirmare, ecclesias dedicare, virgines consecrare; ultimum est plenitudo potestatis, quae maxime ad papam pertinet. Haec igitur est ratio divisionis primae, quam facit Dionysius, et secundae, quae fit per novenum multiplicatione ternaria. Et fit secundum officia et potestates, non secundum characteres, qui utique pauciores sunt quam ordines; quoniam omnis character excellentiae (est) ordo, sed non omnis ordo character.

Quoniam ordines angelorum distinguuntur secundum officia et potestates, non secundum characteres. Character enim est „figura intelligibilis distinctiva imaginis Dei, secundum gradum fidei in membris ecclesiae indelebiter.”²⁵ Imago autem Dei proprie loquendo solus homo, non angelus.

Item, angelus fidem non habet, cum sit contemplator, et ideo characterem non habet.

Item, alia ratione non habet angelus characterem: character quippe est signum quoddam sive forma quaedam. Formae vero quaedam mediate, quaedam immediate a Deo imprimuntur: mediate, ut corpori organizato infunditur anima, mediante natura quae ipsum organizando quasi materiam praeparat; immediate, ut factum est in creatione mundi. Eodem modo est in voluntariis et sacramentalibus. In sacramentis quidem operatur Deus mediante ministro imprimendo characterem; sed inter Deus et angelum nihil est medium quo operetur Deus; quare ei character imprimi non potest.

Item, alia ratio ad idem. Character datur secundum rationem fidei. Angelus autem non habet fidem, cum sit contemplator.

Item, alia ratione. Character recipientem Deo obligat in tantum ut possit compelli ad eius observationem. Angelus vero non obligatur Deo nisi naturaliter, nec compelli potest. Non igitur est conformitas inter

²⁵ Cf. Alexander de Hales, *Glossa*, IV, d. 23, n. 7, para. g, p. 396, l. 17: “Character est figura intelligibilis discretiva imaginis (Dei) secundum statum membrorum in Ecclesia et perpetua.”

hierarchiam angelicam et ecclesiasticam in characterē, sed ratione potestatis et officii.

Item quaeritur: Septem sunt characteres sive ordines; quae est ratio huius?

Solutio. Sicut prima distinctio posita est secundum tria genera potestatum, et secunda secundum multiplicationem, ita et tertia est secundum quaedam quae sunt in anima, secundum quod ipsa tendit ad perfectionem. Quae non sunt tantum ex parte ministrorum, immo a Deo sunt, et sunt characteres.

Tendit autem hoc ordine ad perfectionem: primo purgatur a malo, secundo ornatur per bonum, tandem perficitur in bono. Caritas quippe immediate animam connectit Deo per opera bona quorum primum est opus purgationis, quod est in duobus / secundum illuminationis, quod 118b consistit in quatuor, tertium consummationis.

Primum in duobus consistit, quoniam duae sunt tentationes in anima. Una (est) ex parte sensualitatis, contra quam necessaria est exclusio quae significatur per officium ostiarii, cuius est excludere indignos. Item, alia est tentatio in inferiori parte rationis, in qua est consensus etiam ad mortale peccatum; contra hanc necessaria est expulsio demonum, et haec est expulsio significata in officio exorcistae, qui demones expellit. Quando ergo nec ex parte sensus nec ex parte inferioris partis rationis peccat anima, bene est ei. Sed requiritur amplius bonum opus, unde sequitur illuminatio, ut operetur bonum.

Prima autem illuminatio est cognitio vitandi mali. Haec autem significatur in officio lectoris. Vetus namque Testamentum timorem incutiebat, timor autem Domini expellit peccatum, *Eccl. III.*²⁶

Secunda illuminatio est ad faciendum bonum, et haec est triplex. Prima est illuminatio boni exempli, *Matt. V*, "Sic luceant opera vestra coram hominibus, etc."²⁷ Haec per appropriationem pertinet ad acolytum, cuius est officium cereos portare, in quibus est ignis et lumen; in lumine bonum exemplum accipe. Secunda illuminatio est ad faciendum bonum praecepti, quae appropriatur subdiacono propter doctrinam apostolicam quam legit subdiaconus. Tertia est non solum ad faciendum bonum praecepti, sed et bonum consilii, quod traditur in doctrina Christi, scilicet in Evangelio, et per appropriationem est diaconi.

Sequitur opus consummationis, quod est caritatis et voluntatis, quae omnia sua communicant. Haec recte appropriatur ultimo ordine, qui est sacerdotalis, cuius est Corpus Domini consecrare, quod est sacramen-

²⁶ *Ecclus.*, I, 27.

²⁷ *Matt.*, 5, 16.

tum caritatis et unitatis, et quia haec omnia ad unum ordinata sunt. Data est definitio magistralis talis: "Ordo est officium et potestas spiritualis ordinata ad opus ultimum."²⁸ Ad hoc enim illa opera praedicta ordinantur.

Haec autem divisio est secundum potestates et characteres, et est tropologica, data secundum conformitatem Ecclesiae. Illa prima secundum potestates tantum, et est mystica.

GUERRIC OF SAINT QUENTIN QUAESTIO DE ORDINE

Mss. *Assisi* 138 = A

Paris Nat. lat. 16417 = P

A, 152b
P, 56a Sacramenta Novae Legis efficiunt quod figurant, unde sunt instituta ad faciendam gratiam, et hoc vel in proprio subiecto tantum, sicut alia sacramenta, vel etiam in alio, sicut sacramentum Ordinis. Cum enim sit tempus gratiae et multiplicationis fidelium, non solummodo oportuit esse sacramentum ad faciendam gratiam in proprio subiecto, sed ad multiplicandam in altero. Hoc est autem sacramentum Ordinis.

Et dicitur Ordinis sacramentum quia ordinatur ad gratiam in altero, sed secundum prius et posterius. Proximus enim ordinatur sacerdotium ad gratiam in altero, alii autem ordines remotius.

Efficit ergo in altero quod figurat. Sed in altero efficere dupliciter est. Quia vel gratiam, et hoc facit sacramentum Ordinis; vel officium, et hoc facit episcopatus et huius(modi), quae potius sunt dignitates quam ordines. Unde episcopatus et superiores dignitates non sunt ordines, quia sacramentum Ordinis est ad conferendam gratiam in altero, dignitates vero istae sunt ad conferendum officium.

Unde dicitur sacramentum Ordinis non quia ordinetur in partibus, non enim ad hoc est; nec quia ordinetur ad alterum quocumque modo: sed quia ordinetur ad gratiam in altero. Ad hoc enim est institutum, et ab hoc nomen accepit. Nec dicitur sacramentum Ordinis quia ordinat sacramenta alia; quamvis enim ratione ordinis conferantur alia sacramenta, hoc est solum propter gratiam in altero conferendam, ad quod est proprie, et non ad ordinanda sacramenta. Et per hoc patet solutio ad prima obiecta, et ad id quod obicitur a simili de caritate.

²⁸ Cf. Alexander de Hales, *Glossa*, IV, d. 24, n. 2, para. k, p. 401, l. 5: "Ordo est sacramentum spiritualis potestatis ad aliquod officium ordinatum in Ecclesia ad sacramentum communionis."

Quod obicitur quod "in ordine est potestas," quae est ratio ordinandi membra ecclesiae, dicendum quod potestas ordinis est ratio ordinandi quantum ad collationem gratiae in altero, quae aequaliter confertur ex vi sacramenti / nec confertur ex vi sacramenti Ordinis gratia in altero per ordinem, et ideo non est hoc sacramentum ad ordinanda membra ecclesiae, sed ad confirmanda membra ecclesiae per gratiam, nec ordinis sacramentum. P, 56b

Ad illud quod obicitur quod huius(modi) sacramentum constituit ordinatum mediatorem, verum est ad collationem gratiae in altero, at non ad ponendum ordinem in membris ecclesiae. Ex his satis patet solutio ad obiecta.

Quod obicitur, "ordo est ordinatorum," respondeo: Non ordinatorum quantum ad mores, sed ordinatorum scilicet suscipientium ordinem ad collationem gratiae in altero. Unde "ordinatorum" aequivocum est: ad ordinatos in moribus, et ad ordinatos in sacramentum Ordinis.

* * *

De tertio, sic. In clericatu est aliud signum quam in aliis ordinibus, quare respondet ei aliud signatum. Dicitur ergo quod sit alius ordo, ergo plures sunt ordines quam septem. A, 152b P, 56b

Item, character dicitur quasi carens iteratione; se clericatus non iteratur; ergo, videtur quod in ea imprimitur character, / et sic est ordo; ergo, etc. A, 152c

Item, Dionysius ponit tres ordines: purgativum, illuminativum, perfectivum. Perfectivum est ipsius hierarchiae, scilicet episcopi. Est ergo episcopatus ordo; quare, etc.

Item, episcopus inungitur in alio membro quam sacerdos, scilicet in capite, et alia unctione, scilicet chrismate. Ergo, aliud est signum exterius; ergo aliud signatum interius. Ergo, etc.

Item, alia potestas ei confertur, et alia gratia. Ergo, etc.

Item, videtur quod solus episcopatus sit ordo, quia solus sufficit; habet enim istos tres actus qui sunt purgare, illuminare, et perficere, et non sunt alii actus pertinentes ad ordinem. Ergo, etc.

Solutio. Sicut dictum est, sacramentum Ordinis est ad conferendam gratiam in altero, quae confertur tripliciter, scilicet purgando, illuminando, perficiendo. Purgatio fit tripliciter, quia vel extra, per privationem mali consortii, et sic fit in ordine ostiarii, qui coerces immundos ab ingressu ecclesiae. Vel ut minus proprie dicitur templum, scilicet quantum ad corpus, et purgatur per exorcistam, qui expellit demones a corpore obsesso. Vel, ut proprie dicitur templum, scilicet quantum ad animam, et

sic fit purgatio in ordine acolythatus. Non enim iste ordo est ad illuminationem aeris per cercos materiales, sed magis ad purgationem mentis. Illuminatio autem fit in aliis tribus ordinibus, quia vel illuminant in rudimentis Veteris Legis, et sic est lector, cuius est legere Vetus Testamentum vel prophetias; vel in splendoribus gratiae, et hoc dupliciter: vel quantum ad rivulos gratiae quae in Epistolis sunt, et sic est subdiaconatus; vel quantum ad fontes gratiae in Evangeliiis, et sic est diaconatus. Sed perficiendo sic est septimus ordo, scilicet sacerdotium.

Quod obicitur de clericatu, dicendum quod prius oportet eligi in sortem sui in partem Domini, et postea in militiam. Clericatus autem significat electionem in sortem, ordo vero electionem in militiam. Et P, 56c confertur in ordine character / et milites signa stipendii recipiunt.

Quod obicitur de episcopatu, respondeo. Sicut dictum est, traditur ibi potestas ad officium, non ad gratiam in altero. Et ideo, cum haec potestas sit in ordinibus, episcopatus non est ordo.

Quod obicitur, "(episcopus) habet istos tres actus, purgare, illuminare, et perficere," respondeo. Distinguendum est, quia aut habet perficere in gratia, et hoc habet ratione ordinis; vel in officio, et hoc habet ratione dignitatis vel episcopatus.

* * *

A, 152d Septimo quaeritur si simplex sacerdos potest ordinare sacerdotes
P, 56d et episcopos. Et videtur quod sic, posito quod sint tantum tres sacerdotes simplices.

Respondeo. Non potest sine dispensatione. Sed si (obicitur quod) nullo modo sacerdos potest, secundum quod huius(modi) ordinare requirit aliud ultra sacerdotium ad collationem ordinis, dicendum quod ad collationem ordinis duo requiruntur, unum sicut dispositio ultima, alterum sicut forma. Quae duo sunt simul necessitate in naturalibus, et ideo ibi ultima dispositio necessitas dicitur. Sed in his quae sunt liberi arbitrii, non simul sunt de necessitate ultima. Ergo dispositio ad collationem ordinis est sacerdotium, forma vero est auctoritas Ecclesiae, quam habet episcopus. Quae forma potest venire supra materiam aut cum solemnitate, sicut cum episcopus ordinat, aut sine solemnitate, ubi est necessitas. Sed si non sit necessitas non debet sine solemnitate venire, et ideo simplex sacerdos non potest ordinare sine necessitate dispensante.²⁹

Similis est quaestio utrum possit confici Corpus Christi sine solemnitate, et utrum equitando possit confici. Et forte revelatum est Ecclesiae quod non potest sine solemnitate fieri.

²⁹ Cf. William of Auxerre, *Summa*, f. 43va: "Si non essent in mundo nisi tantum tres simplices sacerdotes, oporteret quod aliquis illorum consecraret alium in episcopum et alium in archiepiscopum."

RICHARD FISHACRE
COMMENTARIUM IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM

Mss. *Brit. Mus.* 10 B VII = M

Oxford Bodleian 57 = B

Sequitur quaerere specialiter de ordinibus clericalibus. Et primo M, 334
B, 297v
quaeritur de eorum sufficientia, sic cum dicat in principio huius distinctionis, septem esse gradus ecclesiae militantis: "Septem sunt," inquit, "spiritualium officiorum gradus sive ordines."³⁰

Videtur quod debeant esse plures, quippe cum sit hierarchia divina et angelica et humana. Et angelica haec est ecclesia triumphans, et humana haec est ecclesia militans, Cum dicat Dionysius quod humana est similis caelesti, deberent in humana novem esse gradus vel ordines, sicut in caelesti sunt novem ordines angelorum.³¹

Exo. 29: "Inspice et fac secundum exemplar quod tibi in monte monstratum est."³²

Apoc. 21: "Vidi civitatem sanctam Ierusalem novam descendentem de caelo."³³

Cant. 6: "Pulchra es amica mea, suavis et decora sicut Ierusalem."³⁴

Solutio. Ad hoc diversimode respondetur secundum diversorum opiniones.

Secundum quosdam, enim, tantum sunt septem gradus, quorum supremus est sacerdotium in quo conficitur Corpus quod est excellentissimum mysteriorum humanorum. Et ideo, secundum eos, super eum non est ordo alius, licet potestas alia, ut episcopus et archiepiscopus, qui non sunt ordines, ut dicunt illi, sed dignitates superadditae sacerdotio. Et ideo gradum episcopalem vocat Apostolus, *Tim. 4*, in fine, nomine presbyterii.³⁵ Hii ergo dicunt quod assimilatio triumphantis et militantis est secundum participationem septem donorum Spiritus Sancti.

Secundum alios vero, sicut quaerit quaestio praeposita, sunt novem gradus vel ordines in militante, sicut in triumphante; et hii dividuntur in duas opiniones.

Quidam enim dicunt quod episcopus et archiepiscopus sunt addendi illis septem gradibus, et fiunt novem. Et secundum eos episcopus et archiepiscopus dicuntur ordines, sicut ceteri septem.

³⁰ Petri Lombardi *Lib. IV Sent.*, IV, d. 24, n. 235, p. 892.

³¹ Ps-Dionysius, *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, Cap. VI, PG 3, 537sqq.

³² *Exodus*, 25, 40.

³³ *Apoc.*, 21, 2.

³⁴ *Cant.*, 6, 3.

³⁵ *I Tim.*, 4, 14.

Alii dicunt quod archiepiscopus non dicit ordinem alium quam episcopus, sicut archidiaconus non alium quam diaconus. Sed ponunt quod corona est primus gradus, et nonus episcopus.

* * *

M, 339rb "Sunt et alia quaedam non ordinum sed dignitatum vel officiorum
B, 302rb nomina, etc."³⁶ Hic quaeritur an episcopus et archiepiscopus dicant ordines superadditos sacerdotio vel non.

Et primo quaeramus de archiepiscopo. Secundum Magistrum patet quod non de utroque hic, sed sunt tantum officia et dignitates superadditae sacerdotio, cui consentire Magister H. de S. Victore in Libro de Sacramentis, dicens, "Primus gradus est hostiariorum, secundus lectorum, tertio exorcistarum, quarto acolitarum, quinto subdiaconorum, sexto diaconorum, septimo sacerdotum. Hic gradus dispares in eodem ordine habent dignitates,"³⁷ scilicet episcopus, etc. Item, archiepiscopus non accipit aliam unctionem vel manuum impositionem quam episcopus; ergo non est ordo alius. Non aliter se habet, ut videtur, archiepiscopus ad episcopum nisi sicut archidiaconus ad diaconum, et archipresbyter ad presbyterum. Sed constat archidiaconus et archipresbyter non dicunt ordines superadditos diacono et presbytero; ergo, nec archiepiscopus alium ordinem dicit quam episcopus.

De episcopo similiter videtur quod non sit ordo additus super sacerdotium, ex auctoritate praeposita H³⁸ et Magister Hu.³⁹

Contra. Alia est omnino consecratio episcopi et presbyteri; Ergo alius ordo qui in consecratione confertur.

Item, *Heb. VII*: "sine ulla contradictione quod minus est a maiore benedicitur."⁴⁰ Sed sacerdotem benedicunt episcopus, et episcopum archiepiscopus. Ergo sunt ordines et gradus excellentiores.

Item, Isidorus, *lib. VII, cap. 11*,⁴¹ "generaliter clerici nuncupantur omnes qui in ecclesia Christi deserviunt, quorum gradus et nomina hi sunt: ostiarius, psalmista, lector, exorcista, acolitus, subdiaconus,

³⁶ Petri Lombardi, *Lib. IV Sent.*, IV, d. 24, c. 13, n. 248, p. 902.

³⁷ Hugo de Sancto Victore, *Summa de Sacramentis*, II, pars 3, c. 5, PL 176, 423.

³⁸ Cf. n. 37, supra.

³⁹ Hugo de Sancto Caro, evidenter, qui scripsit, *Commentarium*, f. 97b (*Vat. lat. 1098*, f. 169c): "Item, archiepiscopo non fit inunctio vel manuum impositio alia quam episcopo; ergo non est alius ordo. Item, sicut se habet archiepiscopus ad episcopum, sic se habet archipresbyter ad presbyterum et archidiaconus ad diaconum; sed archipresbyteratus et archi(diaconatus) non sunt alii ordines quam presbyteratus et diaconatus; ergo, nec archiepiscopatus est alius ordo quam episcopatus."

⁴⁰ *Heb.*, 7, 7.

⁴¹ S. Isidorus, *Etym. Lib.*, VII, c. 12, PL 82, 290.

diaconus, presbyter, episcopus. Ordo episcoporum quadripartitus est." Ut infra, hac eadem distinctione, "ordo autem episcoporum est quadripartitus," in principio.⁴²

Item, *Dec., distinctio 77, cap. 1*,⁴³ octavus gradus dicitur episcopus a Gelasio Papa.

Item, unctio illa et consecratio episcopi erit sacramentum constat et Novae Legis, et non sunt in numero nisi septem. Ergo, est aliquod illorum non nisi ordo. Ergo, etc.

Item, illa diffinitio Magistri qua diffinit ordinem convenit episcopatu; supra, hac distinctione, "Septimus est ordo," etc., in fine fere, ubi "Si autem quaeritur quid sit, etc."⁴⁴ Ergo, est ordo.

Solutio. Fateor utrobique est opinio. Dicunt enim aliqui quod tam archiepiscopus quam episcopus sunt gradus duo, et faciunt novem cum septem aliis praecedentibus. Sed haec est opinio minus probabilis et paucorum.

Alii ponunt quod archiepiscopus non dicit ordinem alium, sed tamen episcopus dicit ordinem octavum. Et haec est probabilior opinio et plurimorum.

Tertii dicunt quod nec episcopus est ordo additus ad presbyterum, sed officium et dignitas tantum, et hii dicunt tantum septem gradus esse. Et huius opinionis sunt Magister et H. de Sancto Victore, ut plane videtur. Et huic magis consentio.

Et ad contra obiecta respondeo.

Ad primum dici potest quod in consecratione confertur episcopo nec novus ordo, sed novum officium et nova potestas. Si aliquis quippe ordinaretur in sacerdotem, omisso gradu diaconatus, tamen vere sacerdos esset. Sed omisso sacerdotio si quis consecraretur in episcopum, episcopus non esset. Et si hoc verum est, tunc non se habet episcopatus ad sacerdotium ut se habent ordines ad invicem. Unde *Act. 21*, "Spiritus Sanctus vos posuit episcopos;" non dicit "ordinavit."⁴⁵ Item, qui accipit ordinem in Sabbato non potest in crastino ordinem alium sacrum suscipere. Ordinatus autem in presbyterum in Sabbato potest in crastino fieri episcopus. Ergo, non se habet episcopatus ad sacerdotium ut sacerdotium ad alios. *Tim. 3*, "Si quis episcopatum desiderat, bonum opus desiderat;"⁴⁶ non dicit "bonum ordinem."

⁴² Petri Lombardi, *Lib. IV Sent.*, IV, d. 24, c. 14, n. 249, p. 902.

⁴³ Secundum Gratianum (PL 187, 374), Canon I, in quo haec verba inveniuntur, non Gelasio sed Caio Papae attribuendus est.

⁴⁴ Petri Lombardi, *Lib. IV Sent.*, IV, d. 24, c. 13, n. 247, p. 902.

⁴⁵ *Acta*, 20, 28.

⁴⁶ *I Tim.*, 3, 1.

Ad secundum. Haec ratio non cogit quia Papa ab Hostiensi consecratur, qui tamen est eo minor. Et si non essent nisi tres sacerdotes in mundo, oporteret quod unus ab aliis in episcopum consecraretur, sicut Moyses nec sacerdos Aaron ordinavit et consecravit. Licet enim aliquis simpliciter sit minor, potest tamen quoad aliquem actum esse maior et
 339 va officium maioris agere in casu. / Sed nondum est responsum ad propositum, quia non ex officio episcopus ordinat sacerdotem et benedicit fateor concedo; et ideo est maior eo. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod sit in gradu ordinis altiori, sed potius est maior officio vel dignitate, non ordine.

Ad tertium. Fateor, sicut mihi videtur, haec fuit opinio Isidori Magistri. Tamen, ut dixi, aliis adquiesco. Vel potest dici quod ipse numeravit gradus potestatis vel officii, non ordinis. Ibi et fateor alius
 302 vb gradus et excel/lentior officii est episcopus quam sacerdos.

Ad quartum. Respondeo similiter sicut ad tertium.

Ad quintum. Fateor consecratio illa episcopi sacramentum est, sicut et pallium vel eius collatio archiepiscopo, et mitra et baculus episcopo, et cetera talia. Quidem sunt sacrarum rerum signa visibilia, et pertinent ad sacramentum ordinis. Sic et tonsura et corona, quae potius dici possent sacramentalia quam sacramenta. Per se sicut exorcizatio et cathecismus sacramenta non sunt, sed pertinentia ad Baptismum et potius dicenda sacramentalia. Sed in hoc est dicenda quod quaedam sacramentalia sunt praecedentia sacramentum ad quod pertinent, ut in Baptismo cathecismus, exorcismus; quaedam subsequencia, ut ordinem sacerdotalem episcopi consecratio, et pallii collatio, et huiusmodi.

Ad sextum. Signaculum dicit characterem, ut videtur ex sequentibus statim, et secundum hoc diffinitio non convenit gradui episcopali, in quo character non datur, nisi ille qui fuit sacerdotii. Vel potest dici quod licet episcopo detur potestas spiritualis, alia quam sacerdotii, tamen Magister, qui ponit quod episcopus non est nomen ordinis, exclusit potestatem illam episcopi et archiepiscopi, addendo "ordinato;" aut ipse Magister esset sibi contrarius.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Jean-F. Bonnefoy, O.F.M. *La Primauté du Christ selon l'Écriture et la Tradition* Rome: Herder, 1959 xii P 467 pp. \$ 8,00

Christianity is by definition Christocentric. Christ is its Alpha and Omega, the Center of its philosophy, its theology, and its life. All this is implied in virtually every page of Scripture; so well was it understood by ancient and medieval Christians that there was no need even to formulate an explicit teaching on the "place of Christ in the divine plan."

But in the Twelfth Century, Robert of Dietz raised the question of whether Christ would have existed at all if it were not for Adam's sin. Other Scholastics treated the question too, and with few exceptions (e. g., St. Albert the Great) they answered it in the negative, basing their teaching on St. Augustine's famous dictum that where there is no illness no physician is needed.

Duns Scotus was the first important theologian to see that St. Augustine's answer applied strictly to the Redemption, rather than to the Incarnation *simpliciter* (for Christ is no mere physician). When the Subtle Doctor explained that *de facto* God thought first of the God-Man, who would give Him a perfect return for His love, he envisioned not a useless and shaky hypothesis of a sinless world, but the vital and firm fact of a world containing the God-Man as well as sinful men. After all, it is not particularly important or enlightening to know what God would have done, but it is very important and enlightening to know what He has actually done.

Not until recently, however, was Scotus' reversal of the question fully appreciated; only with the brilliant work of such scholars as M. J. Scheeben and E. Mersch, S. J., have theologians come to see the value of the primacy of Christ as a proximate unifying principle of Catholic theology—one which may revitalize its entire structure.

Few, if any, theologians of our times have done more to develop and propagate this Scotistic teaching than Fr. Jean-F. Bonnefoy, O.F.M. (1897 - 1958). In fact, his greatest contribution to its cause may have been to show that it is not a mere Scotistic teaching, but, in the words of Fr. H. M. Féret, O.P., "a datum of faith, prior to any particular theology and imposing itself on it."

Fr. Bonnefoy spent a good deal of time teaching Sacred Scripture, but early in his priestly career his mind was captivated by the more speculative doctrine of the Primacy of Christ; Bishop Socche has with good reason called this doctrine the "passion" of Fr. Bonnefoy's life. It was eminently fitting,

then, that this, the last work of the French theologian, is basically scriptural, but enriched with the nature and solid speculation of an internationally known scholar.

Indeed, the experience gained from his years of teaching, from attending several major theological conventions, and from writing a good many articles on the subject has made Fr. Bonnefoy uniquely qualified to write this work, which should almost certainly replace Fr. Risi's four-volume synthesis, *Sul motivo primario dell'Incarnazione* (Rome: 1898), both as an authoritative exegetical work and as a doctrinal exposition of the primacy of Christ.

La Primauté du Christ is not a book that can be evaluated *in globo*, for it is made up of three parts which are quite distinct in subject matter, in method, and in probative force.

It may be well, first of all, for us to state exactly what Fr. Bonnefoy understands by the "primacy of Christ." By this expression, he means Christ's priority in the order of divine intentions and its immediate corollary, His universal secondary efficient, exemplary, and final causality vis-à-vis all creation excluding His own human nature. The author explains this primacy on the basis of the Old Testament (Part I) and the New Testament (Part II). The third part of the book is a systematic synthesis of the subject comprising the conclusions of the first two parts and many *obiter dicta* which could not be included in the line-by-line exegesis of the first two parts.

The First Part necessarily presupposes the metaphysical proof of the primacy given in the brief Introduction. To miss (or ignore) this point is to fail completely to understand Fr. Bonnefoy's whole teaching. It would be grossly superficial to maintain that he really thinks that the inspired writers of Proverbs, Ecclesiasticus, and Wisdom consciously referred to the Incarnate Word. It should be abundantly clear to the careful reader, on the other hand, that the "second literal sense" that Fr. Bonnefoy derives from these passages is in reality the result of combining exegesis with metaphysical speculation. The reader is at liberty, of course, to condemn such a practice; but he should be able to defend his condemnation.

To evaluate the First Part, then, we should like to make this brief observation. The Christological interpretations Fr. Bonnefoy gives are the only ones which are fully satisfactory from every point of view, but they depend so heavily upon New Testament revelation and speculative theology that they can hardly serve as independent proofs in support of the primacy.

The case is quite otherwise with the Second Part of the book, however. Here, in a first-rate exegetical study of Col. I and Eph. I, we are brought face to face with a formal, explicit revelation of the primacy of Christ as defined earlier in this review. The author gives a thorough explanation of text, context, and *analogia fidei* with respect to these passages and, after dealing with the opposite opinions still held by some prominent scholars, leaves no doubt at all as to the true Christological sense of the Pauline texts.

Tradition is not treated separately, as the title may seem to indicate, but is brought to bear upon the pertinent texts of Scripture as they are interpreted. Occasionally a separate section of a chapter is devoted to the teaching of Tradition on a particular point; a particularly good instance of

this is the section on Col. 1 : 15: "Firstborn of all Creation according to Tradition."

Despite its quite poor typography— there are errors on practically every page— this is an important book, because it gives the basis in Scripture, in Tradition, and in theological reason for the doctrine which more than any other may serve as a unifying principle for all the positive, kerygmatic, Christ-centered work now being done by theologians throughout Western Christendom.

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Schumacher, William A., *Spiritus and Spiritualis: A Study in the Sermons of Saint Augustine*. St. Mary of the Lake Seminary (Mundelein, Ill., 1957), pp. 236. Index.

This is another excellent contribution to that fine series the *Dissertationes ad Lauream* published by the Pontifical Theological Faculty at Saint Mary of the Lake Seminary. Fr. Schumacher's dissertation is limited to a study of the terms *spiritus* and *spiritualis* as they occur in the Sermons of Augustine. The broad sense of the word "sermon" is used so that the study also includes the *Ennarationes in Psalmos* and the various tractates of Augustine. The importance of the sermons for such a study is clearly evident from the fact that the sermons cover the entire period of Augustine's intellectual life from the priesthood to his death and thus are highly representative of Augustine's activity as a writer and theologian. Fr. Schumacher's research is far more than a mere philological exercise; he is constantly aware of the need of interpreting the language of St. Augustine within the historical, philosophical and theological context of the saint's writings. And his interpretations display considerable erudition and a wide range of acquaintance with the more significant texts of Augustinian scholarship.

The book has two main divisions: the first, and major part, deals with the study of the word *spiritus*; the second part is concerned with the various meanings attached to the word *spiritualis*. Several sections in the first part of the book are devoted to the use of the term *spiritus* as it is applied to the divine nature (excluding the Holy Spirit), to angelic beings, to evil spirits, and to man. On the difficult question of the nature of angels, i. e. whether they are pure spirits or can have some kind of bodies, the author competently sums up all the evidence from the sermons on this obscure point and then rather wisely accepts the verdict of Portalié that: "It is not true that Augustine categorically affirmed that angels have a body, however, delicate or subtle it might be, but we cannot deny that he remained uncertain and undecided on this question to the end." (p. 44)

Philosophers will find the analysis in chapter three of most interest for here the author considers the various meanings of *spiritus* as they apply to human nature. The Augustinian psychology is described as basically Christian

and theological. Despite the fact that some of Augustine's earlier essays on the soul were wholly philosophical, I would agree with the author's evaluation of the Augustinian psychology. The difficulties and imprecisions of the Augustinian terminology are well illustrated with many citations from the sermons noting how *spiritus* is identified with soul, with the separated soul, with the composite nature of man, and even occasionally equated with *pneuma*. One of the more significant of the author's conclusions regarding the use of the term *spiritus* in the sermons is his judgment that Augustine emphasized the unity of man without stressing either a hylomorphic or Platonic psychology. He cautions against accepting too readily a Platonic dualism merely because of Augustine's definition of man as a soul using a body. And despite the fact that a number of the citations from the sermons would tend to support an Aristotelian view of the substantial union of man, the author wisely refrains from the temptation to settle this difficult philosophical issue in favor of either point of view. Similarly with respect to the question of a dichotomy (soul and body) or trichotomy (spirit, soul and body), the author indicates passages from the sermons to support either of these interpretations but does not attempt to settle the issue. The most definitive conclusion he arrives at in all of this analysis is that the term *spiritus* as used in the sermons "has been the name for a strictly incorporeal, immaterial element of human nature." (p. 77).

The analysis of the term *spiritus* concludes with an extensive account of the many ways in which Augustine employed the term in relation to the Christian life, more particularly with respect to the divine economy of salvation and as divine gift in the supernatural life of the soul. In the author's judgment: "We believe that most, if not all, of the elements of the life within the divine economy of salvation have been revealed by the Saint's use of *spiritus* in his sermons." (p. 117)

The second part of this study is concerned with the adjective *spiritualis*. Here the problems of interpretation are more difficult because of the lack of adequate criteria for the determination of precise meanings and the ambiguities that run through Augustine's use of the term in his sermons. Context alone offers a guide and precludes us from reducing the terms to their more precise modern usage. Much of the discussion in the first two chapters parallels the analysis of the term *spiritus* as it was applied to the various aspects of the Christian life and the economy of salvation. Of greater interest are the concluding chapters with their discussion of the Paulinian conceptions of the "spiritual man" and the "spiritual body" and the traditional Christian account of the "spiritual" sense of Scripture. We are shown how Augustine developed the Paulinian notion of the "spiritual man" and applied it to those Christians who are noted for their intellectual insights into the mysteries of revelation. The knowledge attained by the "spiritual man" is neither esoteric nor mystical; it is neither scientific nor scholarly knowledge. Essentially it would seem to be (if I interpret the author correctly) a deeper insight or wisdom into revealed truth obtained through the "gift of understanding." Such a conclusion may not be to the liking of those who are inclined to find more of a mystical quality in the wisdom of the "spiritual man," but personally I have never been quite persuaded to the mysticism of Augustine.

On the spiritual interpretation of Scripture, the author cautiously limits his explanation to the context of the writings of the Church fathers, avoiding the broader and often more confused range of modern meanings. Essentially the sermons of Augustine reveal that the spiritual interpretation means just those insights given to the spiritual man by the Holy Spirit and the use of such insights for the instruction of individual Christians. In addition, the spiritual understanding and interpretation of Scripture includes the meaning of figurative, allegorical, and metaphorical passages; the saint's reconciliation of apparent contradictions in Scripture and his own exegesis of historical passages in the Old Testament. Yet Augustine was always aware of the literal and historical nature of the text and never departs as radically from it as did some of his contemporaries.

Philosophers and theologians will find this study of Augustine quite rewarding. A great convenience in the text are the frequent and excellent summaries at the conclusion of each chapter. Some readers may be disappointed that greater light was not thrown upon the epistemological problems in Augustine's philosophy and others (like myself) may have desired a closer study of the relation of mysticism and the insights of the "spiritual man." But I am sure that the author would concur with me that these are problems that would require additional dissertations.

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O'Donohoe, James A., *Tridentine Seminary Legislation, Its Sources and Its Formation*. Louvain, 1957. Pp. vi & 187.

Father O'Donohoe says his purpose is "to investigate the sources of the Tridentine seminary legislation and to expose its gradual formation during the course of the sessions of the Council." (p. v.) This statement makes the content of this monograph seem more comprehensive than it is. Actually, Father O'Donohoe's primary, and nearly sole, interest is in the well-known decree formulated at the Council's 23rd session which called for the establishment of diocesan seminaries. Fr. O'Donohoe publishes the text of the Tridentine decree side by side with the text of the eleventh decree of the Legatine Synod sponsored by Cardinal Pole in 1556 to reform the English clergy (pp. 135—139). The texts of the two decrees are so closely parallel that there can be no doubt — if ever any existed — that the Counciliar Fathers borrowed liberally from the English cardinal. The author's convincing explanation as to how Pole's legislation came to the attention of the council is a measure of his diligent work with original source material (pp. 142—145).

Cardinal Pole and Claude Le Jay are, according to Fr. O'Donohoe, the principle progenitors of Tridentine legislation for seminaries. The role of Le Jay, however, is not so well documented as that of Pole. At the 5th session Le Jay certainly pointed out however well managed seminaries be, they are ineffectual if they are empty (p. 35, n. 14); but there is no reason to believe that he alone was aware of this deficiency.

Since this doctoral dissertation was originally composed as a study in canon law, one would expect more frequent citation of the "fontes." Direct quotation of the regulations drawn up for the *Germanicum*, for example, would perhaps, have substantiated the assumption — valid, I believe — that Tridentine legislation reflects the organization found in the seminaries which flourished in the mid 16th century under the aegis of the Society of Jesus.

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Corrigendum

On p. 226 of volume 19, 1959, please read Robert J. Roth, S. J. *instead* of Robert J. Roch. S. J.

MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA'S THEORY OF COGNITION

PREFACE

From Plato and Aristotle, through Kant and Descartes, down to the present time, a key to the study of any philosopher is an analysis of his theory of cognition. Though such an interest in epistemology may seem „modern,” the same basic emphasis can be found in the idealism of Platonic doctrine or in the fundamental realism of the *corpus Aristotelicum*, as well as in the later developments of the great Medieval syntheses. Because of this developmental and historical importance, the theory of cognition offers an excellent point of departure for study of the various philosophical schools.

In addition to its importance as a point of comparison and contrast in an historical study, a philosopher's ideogenetic theory also offers valuable insights into his whole system. The basic theses on the soul, its relation to the body, the activity/passivity of both intellect and object, divine intervention in the act of cognition, all of these must be integrated into a solid theory of cognition. Consequently, ideogenesis affords a uniquely fruitful opportunity for the study of the doctrinal orientation of any philosopher.

On the basis of these two considerations — the advantages for a comparative historical study of a theme which has received *ex professo* treatment from earliest times and the importance of ideogenesis in the doctrinal development of any philosopher — the author has chosen the theory of cognition as subject for this article.

To follow up both the historical and doctrinal advantages afforded by this subject, two goals are proposed for this study. In the first place, it will attempt to present a detailed analysis of the ideogenetic theory of Matthew of Aquasparta, a thirteenth century Franciscan. In the text, *De cognitione*, Matthew develops his theories on the role of the intellect and the object in cognition, the formation of the species, and the need for illumination. He also treats in separate questions, the soul's knowledge of itself and the cognition of non-being. From this source and other

published writings of Matthew, the author hopes to present the first complete study on this important Scholastic's theory of ideogenesis.

Excellent articles have appeared on individual questions of Matthew's theory but no previous analysis has considered the totality of his theses on cognition. Even though this article must admit to the limitations of currently available material, nevertheless, thanks to the text editions published at Quaracchi, it aims to present a doctrinally complete study.

In addition to the analysis of Matthew's theory of cognition, the author also aims to investigate the historical implications of Matthew's doctrine when compared with the theories of Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus. In terms of chronology, the dates of Matthew's career coincide with those of all three of the above mentioned philosophers.

It is the contention of this study that the historical coincidence of Matthew's connection with these three philosophers serves to indicate his importance as a transitional figure. Not only is Matthew a faithful follower of Bonaventurian Augustinianism, but he also points toward some of the positions characteristic of the more Aristotelian inspiration of Scotus' synthesis. Because of his transitional role, Matthew's ideogenetic theory seems especially worthy of study.

In tracing doctrinal development this study confines itself, however, to a consideration of three central figures: Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus. Now it is conceivable that an historical study of ideogenesis could proceed by taking any one particular doctrine, for example, the theory on the species, and tracing it through a succession of philosophers with a minutiae of developments. Such a procedure would have the merit of completeness but it would suffer the proverbial danger of "not seeing woods for the trees."

This study will consider the totality of Matthew's cognition theory and limit comparison to the main doctrines found in three central figures. Bonaventure is the *terminus ad quem*, representing the Franciscan scholastic doctrine at the middle of the thirteenth century. In a mediate position, Henry of Ghent, a secular master teaching at the same time as Matthew, gives evidence of the spirit of compromise existing among some of the philosophers in the 1270's. At the other extreme of this study, Scotus shows late developments found only germinally in Bonaventure and still inchoate in Matthew and Henry of Ghent.

In addition to this discussion of Matthew as a transitional figure, this study also hopes to point out that he is not only a faithful follower of Bonaventure, a title given him in the history of philosophy, but that

he is also in some respects a forerunner of Scotus. Such a presentation should also serve to strengthen the belief that Scotus himself is more in accord with the Franciscan Augustinian tradition than has generally been conceded.

Because of this two-fold aim of presenting both historical and doctrinal developments, this study will begin with a detailed analysis of Matthew's theory on a particular item of ideogenesis and then indicate parallel or divergent teachings in Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus. Such a method, admittedly, puts Matthew's position out of proper chronological sequence; it does, however, enable the reader to focus attention on that theory which is the purpose of this article. Such an arrangement should also enable the reader to obtain a better view of Matthew against the background of historical developments.

PART I

PROLEGOMENON

Chapter I

LIFE, WORKS AND DOCTRINE OF MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA

Doctor at the university of Paris, Minister General of the Order of Friars Minor, Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, Matthew of Aquasparta was an influential figure in his own day and is an interesting historical study in modern times. Student at the university of Paris in the troubled years of the 1270's and professor at Paris and at Rome between 1278 and 1287, Matthew's career coincides with the crisis of Scholasticism, when the currents of Augustinianism, Aristotelianism and Averroism were at their crest.

Called by Martin Grabmann, one of the most "prominent and original representatives of the Franciscan school of the thirteenth century,"¹ Matthew's synthesis of the Augustinian doctrine perpetuated by Bonaventure points the way toward the more Aristotelian position of John Duns Scotus. This transitional character is apparent not only in Matthew's life but also in his general philosophical orientation.

¹ M. Grabmann, *Die Philosophische und Theologische Erkenntnislehre des Kardinals Matthaeus von Aquasparta* (Vienna, Verlag Von Mayer, 1906), p. 1. This early study remains the only complete work on the doctrine of Matthew of Aquasparta.

Life of Matthew of Aquasparta

Thanks to the researches of the Fathers of Quaracchi, the chronology of Matthew's biography is fairly well established. According to best estimates, he was born in 1235—1240 of the family of Benterengis; his birthplace was Aquasparta, near Todi in Umbria. While still young, he joined the Friars Minor at Saint-Fortunat in Todi,² having been received around 1254 according to the opinion of Gondras.³

Concerning his early studies there are no exact details as to time or place. From the educational program customary at his time, it is evident that he passed through the trivium and quadrivium and studied in the school of arts. Thus, he became familiar with grammar, logic and rhetoric, along with arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy.

As a student in the school of arts, sometime around the 1260's, Matthew would have been exposed to the entire *corpus Aristotelicum*, including the *libri de naturali philosophia*. By this time the skepticism and rejection of the early part of the century would have been gradually replaced by an ever increasing interest in the philosophical synthesis of Aristotle. Evidence of this broad philosophical background appears, for example in Matthew's *De cognitione* where he quotes, not only from the *Organum*, but also from the *De anima*, the *Metaphysics*, the *Physics*, the *Nicomachean ethics*, and even from some of the minor works of Aristotle.

Matthew's studies at the university of Paris began, according to Doucet, in either 1268 or 1269, with a commentary on the Bible.⁴ Glorieux, however, lists a sermon, given by a Matthew of St. Francis on September 21, 1268.⁵ Today scholars generally agree in identifying this Matthew of St. Francis, as well as Matthew of Lombardy, with Matthew of Aquasparta, since no other Matthew is listed among the writers of the order at this period; moreover, Lombardy was often used as a synonym for Italy.

In 1268, then, Matthew was studying at the university of Paris where he came under the instruction of such masters as John Peckham

² E. Longpré, "Matthieu d'Aquasparta," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, X (1928), p. 375.

³ A. J. Gondras, "Les 'Quaestiones de anima VI,' manuscrit de la Bibliothèque Communale d'Assise no. 159, attribuées à Matthieu d'Aquasparta," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, XXIV (1957), p. 204.

⁴ V. Doucet, "Introductio critica," *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1935), p. xvi. In his introduction Doucet gives the most complete analysis of the life and works of Matthew. Subsequent to Longpré's article in the *Dictionnaire* (see note 2), it is more analytical and scientific, incorporating the later researches of Quaracchi.

⁵ P. Glorieux, "Sermons universitaires parisiens de 1267—1268," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, XVI (1949), p. 60.

and William of Mare.⁶ The first of these, John Peckham, who later became Archbishop of Canterbury and promulgated the condemnations of Oxford in 1284, was an eager and zealous defender of the Augustinian synthesis. In an interesting text John Peckham sums up his own position by asking:

What is more solid and more sound, the doctrine of the sons of St. Francis, that is, of Brother Alexander of sainted memory, of Brother Bonaventure and others like him, who rely on the Fathers and the philosophers in treatises secure against any reproach, or else that very recent and almost contrary doctrine, which fills the entire world with wordy quarrels, weakening and destroying with all its strength what Augustine teaches concerning the eternal rules and the unchangeable light, the faculties of the soul, the seminal reasons included in matter and innumerable questions of the same kind; let the Ancients be the judges, since in them is wisdom, let the God of heaven be judge, and may He remedy it.⁷

Noteworthy is Peckham's emphasis on illumination and the faculties of the soul, questions on which Matthew was carefully to follow the "orthodox" teaching of his master.

William of Mare's name is most often associated with his famous "correctives" which were officially adopted by the Franciscan order in 1282, the very year in which Matthew became provincial of Umbria. According to the general chapter of that year, the friars were cautioned against using the *Summa Theologica* without consulting the "corrections" of William.⁸ As a student, then, Matthew came under the influence of two teachers who were to stand in direct opposition to the Thomistic "innovations", yet he himself was never to make any such drastic rejection of St. Thomas. It is even quite possible that Matthew heard the Angelic Doctor, since Thomas was lecturing in Paris from 1268 to 1272, the very period of Matthew's studies.

Of greater importance is St. Bonaventure's influence on the man who was to go down in history as one of his most faithful disciples. Since Bonaventure was elected general of the order in 1257, Matthew was not his student, yet it is probable that he heard the illustrious doctor deliver his *Collationes in hexaëmeron* in 1272 or 1273. In addition, the indirect influence of Bonaventure was to pervade the atmosphere of the university of Paris during the whole period of Matthew's studies.⁹

⁶ A. J. Gondras, *art. cit.*, p. 204.

⁷ E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 359. The quotation cited is taken from *Registrum epistolarum* III: 901—902.

⁸ F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (Westminster, Maryland: Newman, 1950), II: 433.

⁹ M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

Under such teachers, then, Matthew continued his student career, beginning his lectures on the *Sentences* in 1271—1272. He was master of theology by 1276—1277 and finally *magister regens* in 1278, occupying the chair of philosophy at Paris.¹⁰

Sometime during his early career, Matthew taught at the university of Bologna. Glorieux dates this immediately after his promotion as *magister regens* at Paris, saying that Matthew was at the Italian university during the years 1278 and 1279.¹¹ Doucet follows this latter set of dates in his introductory life in the *De gratia*.¹² In a subsequent study, however, he revises this earlier opinion and dates Matthew's teaching at Bologna from 1274 to 1276.¹³ Matthew's Italian lectorship, then, would have been intermediate between his commentary on the *Sentences* and the reception of his degree as Master of Theology.

Further divergencies occur in the dating of Matthew's later professorial career. According to the opinion of Longpré, Matthew lectured at Paris from 1279 to 1282 and became *lector* at Rome in 1282.¹⁴ In Doucet's revised system of dating, Matthew taught at Paris from 1278 to 1279 and then in Rome from 1279 till his election as minister general.¹⁵ Despite variations in chronology, Matthew undoubtedly lectured at Paris, Bologna and finally at Rome.

As in the case of Bonaventure, Matthew's teaching was abbreviated, when he became involved in the administration of the order. Already in 1282, he was elected provincial of Umbria and in 1287 his teaching ended, when he became minister general of the whole order. He held this office until 1289, when he resigned because of other duties. On May 16, 1288, Matthew was elevated to the dignity of the cardinalate. Thus the last years of his life were spent in administration, rather than in teaching. He died at Rome in the fall of 1302.¹⁶

Matthew's teaching career, if one accepts the revised dates of Doucet, covered the thirteen years from 1274 till 1287. It is evident, however,

¹⁰ V. Doucet, "Introductio critica," p. xvi.

¹¹ P. Glorieux, "Maîtres franciscains régents à Paris," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, XVIII (1951), p. 325.

¹² V. Doucet, "Introductio critica," p. xvi.

¹³ V. Doucet, "L'enseignement Parisien de Matthieu d'Aquasparta," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XXVIII (1935), p. 570.

¹⁴ Longpré, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

¹⁵ V. Doucet, "L'enseignement Parisien de Matthieu d'Aquasparta," p. 570.

¹⁶ E. Longpré, *op. cit.*, pp. 375—382. — This study does not attempt to give all the details of Matthew's later career. The interested reader is referred to this excellent study for a complete account of his activities as minister general and as cardinal. Also see C. Piana, "Matteo d'Acquasparta," *Enciclopedia Cattolica*, VIII (1952), p. 483.

that Matthew remained interested in studies even after his election as general. He reformed the statutes of the house of studies in Paris and assigned Peter Olivi to lecture in the *studium* of Florence.¹⁷

Such is the professorial career of Matthew of Aquasparta, a man educated at the university of Paris during the time when Bonaventure and Thomas were still exercising their greatest influence, and when the secular master, Henry of Ghent, was just beginning his teaching. By historical coincidence, Matthew's career embraces some of the most critical times in the development of scholasticism. At the beginning of his studies, Bishop Tempier had just issued his first set of condemnations; the year before Matthew became *magister regens* the famous theses of 1277 were promulgated. Thus Matthew occupies a central position in the convergence of Augustinianism and Aristotelianism; during this same time the Franciscan school is moving from the position of Bonaventure towards that of Scotus.

Works of Matthew

Despite the brevity of his scholarly career, Matthew's philosophical and theological works are extensive. They include: *Introduction*, *Commentary* and *Concordance* on the *Sentences*, as well as a number of *Quodlibets* and *Disputed Questions*; he also composed commentaries on the various books of the *Old* and *New Testament*, an *Introduction to Scripture* and another *Introduction to Theology*, a *Breviloquium on the Trinity*, a tract on the *Procession of the Holy Spirit* and two sets of *Sermons*; finally he wrote a treatise on the *Power of the Pope*.¹⁸

To date, the Fathers of Quaracchi have edited several volumes of Matthew's works: *De fide et de cognitione*,¹⁹ *De Christo*,²⁰ *De gratia*,²¹

¹⁷ V. Doucet, "Introductio critica," pp. xxi—xxii.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. clii—cliv. For a complete listing of his works see V. Doucet, *Commentaires sur les Sentences* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1954). P. Glorieux, *La Littérature quodlibétique* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1935). P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1935).

¹⁹ Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de fide et de cognitione* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, editio prima, 1903; editio secunda, 1957). The pagination of the second edition has been used throughout our article.

An early edition of parts of the *De cognitione* is found in *De humanae cognitionis ratione* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1883). An English translation of Question I is given in R. McKeon, *Selections from Medieval Philosophers* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), I: 240—302.

²⁰ Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de Christo* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1914).

²¹ Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1935).

De rerum productione et de providentia,²² and *De anima separata, de anima beata, de jejunio, et de legibus*.²³ The first of these, the main source for our study, dates from the period immediately following Matthew's appointment to the chair at Paris, i. e. in 1278 or 1279. The *terminus post quem* of its composition can be determined from the allusions to the condemnations of 1277, found in Matthew's first question.

Another work used extensively in this article is the newly edited *De anima* VI, which is attributed to the time of Matthew's lectorship at Rome. Gondras, the editor, claims that the manuscript tradition, internal evidence of style, the ordering of material within the question, as well as doctrinal correspondence all indicate that it is a genuine work.²⁴ This present study would seem to corroborate the evidence of doctrinal correspondence, as will be seen repeatedly in the subsequent chapter on the soul.

In addition to the above mentioned text editions of complete works, certain fragments have been published, including a question on the immortality of the soul,²⁵ another on the plurality of forms,²⁶ as well as Question V of *Quodlibet* VI, on the elements of justice.²⁷ Finally, several theological texts and a number of letters²⁸ have been published but are not pertinent to our subject matter.

Doctrinal Orientation

Our brief biographical section has shown that Matthew of Aquasparta lived during the transition period between Bonaventure and John Duns

²² Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de productione rerum et providentia* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1956).

An earlier edition of Question IX is given by E. Longpré, "Thomas d'York et Matthieu d'Aquasparta, Textes inédits sur le problème de la création," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, I (1926), pp. 293—308.

²³ Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima separata, de anima beata, de jejunio et de legibus* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1959).

²⁴ A. J. Gondras, *art. cit.*, pp. 214—215.

²⁵ S. Vanni Rovighi, *L'immortalità dell' anima nei maestri francescani del secolo XIII* (Milan: "Vita e pensiero," 1936), pp. 255—272.

²⁶ R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes* (Louvain: Instit. supér. de phil., 1951), pp. 199—210.

²⁷ H. Lio, "De elementis traditionalibus iustitiae," *Franciscan Studies*, X (1950), pp. 449—451.

²⁸ L. Amorós, "La teología como ciencia practica en la escuela franciscana en los tiempos que preceden a Escoto," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, IX (1934), pp. 284—285. A. Daniels, "Geschichte der Gottesbeweise," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, VIII (1912), pp. 52—63. A. Emmen, "Die Glückseligkeitslehre des Matthäus von Aquasparta," *Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, XXII (1959), pp. 43—59.

His letters are given by C. Piana, "Dall'Archivio di S. Francesco di Bologna," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, L (1957), pp. 54—55; 68—69.

Scotus. The subsequent presentation of some of Matthew's philosophical theses will indicate that his doctrine was likewise reflective of the intermediate position between the Augustinianism of Bonaventure and that of Scotus. Needless to say, this survey does not pretend to be a complete enumeration of Matthew's philosophical doctrine, a project beyond the scope of this analysis and one that would be very difficult in the present state of research. Rather, an attempt will be made to summarize Matthew's position on such salient questions as: the immediate creation and immortality of the soul; the supremacy of the will, hylomorphism, the eternity of the world, causality, arguments for God's existence and the Divine Ideas.

According to Matthew's formulation, the soul is not only an independent substance capable of *per se* subsistence; it is also naturally ordained to a body with which it forms a *per se* union. In line with this stress on the unity of the soul, Matthew likewise claims that the powers of the soul are really identified with the substance of the soul and can only be distinguished by means of their operations. The union of the soul with the body and with its own powers will be explained in subsequent sections of this study, especially in the following chapter.

As to its origin, Matthew establishes that the human soul is created immediately by God. In proof of this Matthew asserts that such a creation follows from the soul's dignity as an image of God; he likewise maintains that something with existence *per se* should also be produced *per se*. The immediate creation of the soul follows then from its independent nature as an existing substance and from the fact that the powers of the soul are free and absolute. As an instance of the latter, Matthew cites intellectual operations which are independent of the body. Finally, the permanency and duration of the soul, as well as its ultimate perfection, all argue that the soul is created immediately by God.²⁹

Not only is the soul the product of Divine creation, it is also destined for immortality. In *De anima* XIII, Matthew offers the following proofs for his thesis. The first he bases on the very nature of the soul which possesses life *per se*, for everything which is living *per se* is immortal. Matthew explains that the soul does not receive life from any principle differing formally from its essence; in other words, the soul as a form confers life on the body but it is also animate of itself. Another argument for the immortality of the soul is based on the fact that the soul's powers transcend the activities of the body. As an example, Matthew cites the soul's ability to reflect on itself; in such activity, Matthew

²⁹ *De anima* VI, Q. VI, pp. 337—341.

asserts that the soul is even hindered by the body. Now the objective of all cognition is the true and such truth must be enduring. Consequently, the soul must likewise endure, if it is to achieve its objective of perfect truth. He also reasons that the will desires everlasting beatitude and therefore must be capable of eternal existence. Recapitulating, Matthew states that since the soul is not dependent on the body, nor moved by the body, since it is the most perfect form in the universe, desiring everlasting truth and beatitude, therefore the soul must be immortal.³⁰

In a passage taken from his commentary on the *Sentences*, Matthew repeats these same arguments dividing them into considerations on the soul as a substance, as the source of independent operation and in relation to its cause. In this latter section, he says that the soul must be immortal because of its final cause, since its end is beatitude, because of its material cause, since it is the most noble of creatures, because of its efficient cause, since God is the immediate author and conserver of the soul.³¹

In his proofs for the immediate creation and immortality of the soul, Matthew stresses the fact that the soul is a complete substance, independent in its activities. Here is a typical Augustinian thesis which influences Matthew's cognition theory.

Another position consonant with trends in the Franciscan school, is Matthew's emphasis on the supremacy of the will. He maintains that all the other faculties look to the will as to their last end. Thus the habit of the will, which is charity, is superior to the habit of the intellect, which is faith; the same is true of the will's object, the good, in comparison with the object of the intellect which is truth.³²

As a further indication of the supremacy of the will, Matthew points out that it is the more active faculty. In cognition, there is a partial movement from the object and a corresponding degree of passivity on the part of the soul but in the exercise of love the soul is completely active as it goes out to meet its object. Thus the supremacy of volition follows from the basic principle that activity is more perfect than passivity.³³

This doctrine of the superiority of the will must be interpreted, however, against Matthew's other thesis that the faculties of the soul are not really distinct from the soul itself, nor from each other. In the

³⁰ S. Vanni Rovighi, *op. cit.*, pp. 276—280.

³¹ *Ibid.* pp. 262—266.

³² *De cognitione*, Q. IX, p. 380.

³³ *De gratia*, Q. I, p. 24.

light of this latter principle, one can more easily understand Matthew when he says that the freedom of the will is nothing distinct from the intellect or from the will. Rather, he explains, this freedom to choose may result either from the joining of the intellect and the will (as St. Thomas had maintained) or it may be essentially one with the will itself (as St. Bonaventure had said).³⁴ For Matthew this is purely an academic question of terminology, though his own position on the identification of the powers of the soul with its substance would seem to be more in harmony with the Bonaventurian theory.

Since Matthew's cognition theory forms the main subject matter of this article, it will not be given any special exposition here. As this study limits itself to natural knowledge it might be worthwhile, however, to note that Matthew, like Bonaventure, also gives an extensive treatment of supernatural and mystical cognition. For example, in the eighth question of his *De cognitione*, Matthew asks whether the intellect can be elevated to see the Divine essence without rapture or any alienation of the senses. In answer to this question, Matthew agrees that God can elevate the mind in such a way as to enable it to continue its natural operations. Only those operations of the senses which require the "intention" of the mind must be suspended but not the vegetative acts, nor those which are purely natural.³⁵ For Matthew these vegetative powers, however, are not really distinct from the substance of the soul nor from the superior powers; consequently, he can say that the soul may be elevated without the complete suspension of its activities, i. e. the activities of these lower powers of the soul. Also in line with Matthew's philosophical principles is his statement that rapture belongs essentially, principally and perfectly to the will.³⁶ This would follow from his insistence on the supremacy of the will.

Another thesis of some relevance to Matthew's doctrine on the soul, is his theory of hylomorphism. Here, too, he follows Bonaventure, speaking of seminal reasons, spiritual matter, plurality of forms.

Matthew defines a form as the *ratio essendi* of a particular being,³⁷ so that the form gives the object a particular type of being or the reason of being this particular thing. It is also the source for the activities of the being.³⁸ For example, the soul gives "to be living" to the body which it animates and is, at the same time, the source of the spiritual activities of the being, i. e. of the human compositum.

³⁴ *De fide*, Q. VIII, pp. 188—189.

³⁵ *De cognitione*, Q. VIII, pp. 365—366.

³⁶ *De cognitione*, Q. IX, p. 382.

³⁷ *De gratia*, Q. I, p. 29.

³⁸ *De gratia*, Q. VI, p. 153.

The forms of beings lower than man are educed from the potencies of matter;³⁹ but the human form, because of its dignity and its independence of matter, could not be brought forth from matter. Natural forms, however, are present in a seminal fashion in matter and can be educed from it. This same doctrine is repeated in *De Anima* VI and serves as one indication of the authenticity of this work.⁴⁰

Matthew's theory of hylomorphism further explains that just as there are grades of forms so there are different kinds of matter, either corporeal, or incorporeal and spiritual.⁴¹ Here it would seem that Matthew agrees with Bonaventure in holding that the more spiritual the form, the more noble the matter which it informs. This point will be further discussed in the section on the soul's union with the body. Confirmation of this proportion of matter and form is found, whenever Matthew speaks of prime matter as that which is immediately united to a prime form.⁴² Such a thesis indicates that prime matter, for Matthew as for Scotus, has a greater claim on being than was given it in the Aristotelian formulation of hylomorphism. In fact, Matthew says that matter has a distinct essence of its own and since it has a nature different from the nature of its form, it also has its own existence and its own idea in the mind of God.⁴³

Having thus postulated the possibility, at least, of the independent nature and existence of matter, Matthew also opens the way to a doctrine of the plurality of forms. In his *De anima* XIII, question VI, Matthew reviews the Aristotelian doctrine of unicity of form and rejects it as contrary to the teaching of Augustine. As usual, when there is a question of dispute between the Bishop of Hippo and Aristotle, Matthew follows the authority of the former.⁴⁴ Further explanation of this point will be reserved for the subsequent chapter on the soul.

Matthew's cosmology explains the Aristotelian four causes: efficient, final, material and formal.⁴⁵ He further differentiates between causes properly speaking, i. e. efficient causes and causes *sine qua non*. As an example of the latter, he cites the relation of the phantasm to the spiritual powers of the intellect.⁴⁶ Finally, Matthew rejects an infinite series of *per se* causes, though he admits that an infinite series of accidental causes would be possible.⁴⁷

³⁹ *De gratia*, Q. VIII, pp. 209—210.

⁴¹ *De anima* VI, Q. I, p. 241.

⁴³ *De productione rerum*, Q. III, p. 80.

⁴⁴ R. Zavalloni, *op. cit.*, pp. 199—210.

⁴⁵ *De productione*, Q. V., p. 113.

⁴⁶ *De providentia*, Q. VI, p. 360.

⁴⁰ *De anima* VI, Q. III, p. 287.

⁴² *De anima* VI, Q. II, p. 263.

⁴⁷ *De productione*, Q. IX, p. 211.

One entire disputed question is devoted to the problems of creation. Salient points in these questions include Matthew's insistence on the role of all creatures as vestiges of God,⁴⁸ while man is called, in a rather typical fashion, the *imago*.⁴⁹ Creation is defined as production out of nothing and without the use of any intermediary.⁵⁰ In line with these Bonaventurian concepts, Matthew also insists on the impossibility of an eternal creation. He devotes one entire question to a series of arguments against this thesis and re-presents a number of the points which had been made by Bonaventure.⁵¹

Matthew's natural theology features the usual discussions on the nature and attributes of God. Of more particular interest is his thesis that God is charity, essentially and formally.⁵² But the most distinctive description of the nature of God is the identification of *an est* and *quid est* in the Divine nature.⁵³

As consequence of this last thesis, Matthew develops his argument for the existence of God as follows: If God is the highest and most perfect being, then He must exist, otherwise He would not be the highest and most perfect being.⁵⁴ In addition to this Anselmian formula, Matthew also presents an *a posteriori* proof from the existence of creatures. If the effect, the created universe, exists, then the cause which is God must also exist.⁵⁵

Consonant with the development of his illumination theory, which will be discussed later, Matthew maintains that the Divine Ideas are the exemplars of all that God produces.⁵⁶ Though these Ideas are one in the Divine essence, they produce the multiplicity of things which are seen in the world.⁵⁷

The above brief survey of Matthew's psychology, cosmology and natural theology serves to buttress the thesis that Matthew is basically Augustinian. As will be seen later, many of these ideas enter into subsequent discussions of the doctrines of Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus.

⁴⁸ *De productione*, Q. V, p. 124.

⁴⁹ *De providentia*, Q. V, p. 346.

⁵⁰ *De gratia*, Q. VI, p. 163.

⁵¹ *De productione*, Q. IX, pp. 213—218. To confirm Matthew's debt to Bonaventure on this point see II *Sent.*, I, I, 1, 2; II: 19—24.

⁵² *De gratia*, Q. VIII, pp. 218—219.

⁵³ *De productione*, Q. I, p. 12.

⁵⁴ *De productione*, Q. I, p. 12. Si optimum est optimum, optimum est.

⁵⁵ *De productione*, Q. II, p. 45.

⁵⁶ *De productione*, Q. II, p. 36.

⁵⁷ *De productione*, Q. IV, p. 106.

Critique of Matthew

Even a slight evaluation of his doctrine and style helps to place Matthew historically. It now remains to present some critique of his doctrine, style and importance in the history of philosophy.

By way of introduction, Matthew is an Augustinian who follows Bonaventure's interpretation. On this general classification all seem in agreement.

Maurice De Wulf classifies Matthew as one of the most pure Augustinians, a peaceful spirit who tries to avoid much of the controversy of his day.⁵⁸ Grabmann concurs with this, saying that Matthew's happiest characteristic is his ability to harmonize Aristotle and Augustine while accepting the authority of Augustine on disputed questions. As an example of the latter he cites Matthew's strong defense of the illumination theory.⁵⁹

It seems necessary before going any further with this evaluation to digress here on the meaning of the label "Augustinian." By way of an analogy, one could refer to a picture of Augustine, holding in his hand a white plume from which rays of light descend on the philosophers grouped around him. On Augustine's right is seated St. Thomas, while the next place is occupied by John Duns Scotus.⁶⁰ Without filling in further details, this picture will serve to illustrate the wide meaning given to the term "Augustinian." Though both Scotus and Thomas invoke the authority of the Bishop, they do not agree on their interpretations; nor does either of them completely adhere to the doctrine of Augustine. Thomas, for instance, does not hold that the soul has any direct knowledge of itself; Scotus rejects the theory of special illumination; yet both appeal to the authority of Augustine in support of their interpretation.

It becomes apparent, then, that Augustinian can be used very broadly to include all the philosophers who invoke Augustine's name; if one were to be consistent, then almost every Medievalist could be called Augustinian. Such, however, is not the commonly accepted meaning of the term; and in this study it will refer rather to the so-called Augustinian school.

But here again difficulties arise, since it is almost impossible to get any complete description of what is implied in the doctrinal synthesis

⁵⁸ Maurice De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* (Louvain: Institut. supér. de phil., 1924), I: 359.

⁵⁹ Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

⁶⁰ S. Belmond, "A l'école de S. Augustin," *Études franciscaines*, XXXIII (1921), p. 145.

so conveniently called Augustinian. Perhaps this is simply the effect of the very fluid nature of any school of philosophy. However, in order to give direction to this discussion it may be useful to cite a few of the doctrines which Veuthey lists as characteristically Augustinian:

1. Intimate union of philosophy and theology.
2. Substantial identity of the soul and its faculties.
3. Greater autonomy of the soul in regard to the body so that compositum can not simply be reduced to the Aristotelian notion of matter and form.
4. Primacy of the will.
5. Active nature of cognition and the importance of sense experience. Use of intuition and the need for special divine illumination.
6. Universal hylomorphism and the plurality of forms.⁶¹

The Augustinian doctrinal synthesis outlined above received particular support among the Franciscans. Especially during the latter half of the thirteenth century, the friars rallied around Augustine in opposition to the more radical teachings of the followers of Siger of Brabant and the Averroists.

Augustine, then, becomes the common denominator of Franciscan thought but with many variations. Veuthey makes three subdivisions: the Aristotelian Augustinianism of John Duns Scotus; the Augustinian Neo-Platonism of St. Bonaventure, and finally the "mathematical/experimental" Augustinianism of William of Ockham.⁶² According to these classifications of Veuthey, Matthew would be grouped with Bonaventure, though he is no slavish imitator of the Seraphic Doctor but rather develops his own synthesis, incorporating elements which later become part of the Scotistic interpretation.

In placing Matthew among the followers of the Bonaventurian synthesis, it is, however, necessary to call attention to the disagreements among historians as to the exact nature of Bonaventurian philosophy. Van Steenberghen holds that Bonaventure is a Neo-Platonic Aristotelian; that it is impossible, in fact, to speak of the Seraphic Doctor as presenting an Augustinian philosophy. According to this analysis, Bonaventure's philosophical speculations are "an eclectic Aristotelianism with Neo-Platonic tendencies put at the service of Augustinian theology."⁶³ In other words, there is no possibility of an Augustinian philosophy.

⁶¹ L. Veuthey, "Les divers courants de la philosophie augustino-franciscaine au moyen âge," *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda* (Rome: Antonianum, 1951), p. 629.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 629—630.

⁶³ F. Van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955), pp. 161—162.

Gilson, in his monumental work, is equally vehement in justifying Bonaventure as a philosopher, though, at the same time, declaring that the Seraphic Doctor is essentially a mystic in his outlook. Granted that Bonaventure knew the works of Aristotle, basically he follows the traditional principles of Augustine. Both Bonaventure and Thomas are Christian philosophers but with entirely different approaches to truth — the former Augustinian, the latter Aristotelian.⁶⁴

As has already been seen, Matthew is classified with Bonaventure as a Neo-Platonic Augustinian. But like his master, he makes extensive use of Aristotle. According to the judgment of Longpré, Matthew underlines the Augustinian elements of Bonaventure; "from the point of view of philosophy and criticism, he gives the most complete justification of the Bonaventurian synthesis and the most completely developed term of its metaphysical intuition."⁶⁵ Rohmer goes so far as to say that Matthew is a stricter Augustinian than his master, since the latter makes concessions to Aristotle in developing his ideogenetic theory.⁶⁶

In support of Matthew's debt to Bonaventure one can cite the almost exact parallel found between Matthew's doctrine on illumination as given in the second question of the *De cognitione* and chapters three and four of the *Itinerarium*. Both Bonaventure and Matthew claim that the soul is an "image" of God and that it is moved immediately by Him.⁶⁷ Both hold that man's cognition is essentially dynamic and finalistic.⁶⁸

Thus Matthew's philosophy can be called not only Neo-Platonic but also Bonaventurian. According to Gondras, the way Matthew debates a question, his mentality and fundamental viewpoints all reveal his allegiance to the post-Bonaventurian school.⁶⁹ In style and doctrine, he belongs to the Franciscan school of his times.

However, Matthew is not merely a slavish imitator of the synthesis which Bonaventure elaborates. Rather he develops his own interpretation which incorporates some of the Aristotelian Augustinianism of John Duns Scotus. Like Scotus, Matthew holds a type of partial causality of the part of both subject and object in cognition. Again, he posits a

⁶⁴ E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), pp. 489—495.

⁶⁵ E. Longpré, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

⁶⁶ Jean Rohmer, "La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halès à Jean Peckham," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, III (1928), pp. 183—184.

⁶⁷ A. Pegis, "Matthew of Aquasparta and the Cognition of Non-being," *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda*, p. 475.

⁶⁸ L. Veuthey, *op. cit.*, p. 641.

⁶⁹ A. J. Gondras, *art. cit.*, p. 221.

direct knowledge of the material singular via a special kind of singular species, comparable to the Scotistic doctrine of intuition.

All of which serves to substantiate the thesis that Matthew's transitional position lies somewhere between the Augustinianism of Bonaventure and that of Scotus. Both Križovljan⁷⁰ and Rohmer⁷¹ point out that the field of cognition is especially fruitful in examples of the meeting of these various doctrinal currents. Therefore this study of ideogenesis hopes to explain the unique blend of Augustinian and Aristotelian elements which reveal Matthew of Aquasparta as an important figure both historically and doctrinally.

Chapter II

BODY/SOUL PROBLEM

This section will not attempt to give the entire doctrine of any one of the philosophers on the soul, since such a discussion would be beyond the scope of this study and outside of its purpose. Rather this chapter will confine itself to those questions which seem to bear on the theory of cognition, i. e. on the substantial nature of the soul and its union with the body, as well as the relation of the powers to the soul itself. In the presentation of the doctrine of each philosopher these general divisions will be followed.

Matthew of Aquasparta

Thus far no analytic study has been made of Matthew's psychology, though several texts on the creation and immortality of the soul, the plurality of forms, as well as the entire *De anima* VI have now been published. Valuable as such a complete study would be, it cannot be attempted within the scope of this article. This section will simply indicate the general pattern of Matthew's teaching, his stress on the substantial independence of the soul and his insistence on the naturalness of the soul's union with the body. Other typically Augustinian theses are Matthew's doctrine of plurality of forms and the consubstantiality of the powers with the soul itself.

⁷⁰ H. Križovljan, *Philosophia S. Bonaventurae* (Rome: Collegium Internationale S. Laurentii, 1956), pp. 164—165.

⁷¹ J. Rohmer, *art. cit.*, p. 105.

Body/Soul Relations in Matthew

The fundamental nexus of the body/soul problem for all philosophers, in the judgment of Gondras, is the difficulty of reconciling the soul as a substance subsisting by itself, and the soul as form of the compositum. Matthew resolves this question by saying that the soul has a natural and essential inclination towards the body and it is this very inclination which is the ultimate foundation for the soul's double role of form and subsisting substance.¹ In Matthew's own phrasing, the soul has a *per se* subsistence, independent of matter and able to be separated from it;² as a form, however, the soul remains essentially and naturally inclined to union with the body.³

In proof of this fact that the soul is *per se* substance, Matthew points out that the soul has powers and operations which exceed matter and which are not exercised through the body.⁴ As will be seen in subsequent chapters, the soul has a knowledge of itself and of other spiritual substances which is not derived from the senses; moreover it is the recipient of special divine illumination. From these powers and activities, the soul's superiority over the body, as well as its substantial independence is proved.

Despite such substantial independence, the soul is so joined to the body in this life, that if the body is impeded in any way, the actions of the soul are likewise affected. For example, distractions and extraneous concerns occupy the soul's attention; the intellect is "clouded and confused" by the phantasm; bodily emotions can disturb the will.⁵

¹ A. J. Gondras, "Les 'Quaestiones de anima VI,' manuscrit de la Bibliothèque Communale d'Assise no. 159, attribuées à Matthieu d'Aquasparta," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, XXIV (1957), p. 222.

In subsequent citations this will simply be referred to as the *De anima* VI.

² *De anima* VI, Q. V, p. 320. Sic igitur dico quod anima rationalis sive intellectiva et vere forma corporis est humani, et tamen est hoc aliquid et per se subsistens.

³ *De anima* VI, Q. III, p. 274. Et ideo, istis erroribus reiectis et repudiatis, alia est vera sententia tam secundum Philosophum, quam secundum Scripturam Sacram quam secundum fidem rectam quod anima vel spiritus intellectualis unitur corpori non ut captivus carceri vinculis corporis alligatus, nec tantum sicut motor mobili, nec in postremo, sicut posuit Averroes, coniungatur nobiscum ratione phantasmatum sed sicut prima perfectio suo perfectibili et sicut forma materiae, ita quod ex corpore et spiritu intellectuali fit vere unum in essendo quod est homo ex anima et corpore vere subsistens, sicut dicit Athanasius.

In this same question, Matthew presents an interesting review of other opinions on the body/soul relation, including the theories of Origen, Plato, Aristotle and Averroes. See pp. 271-74.

⁴ *De anima* VI, Q. V, p. 318.

⁵ *De cognitione*, Q. X, pp. 394-400.

In contrast to the deleterious effects of these bodily indispositions, the soul may be aided by a positive causality. Though the inferior bodily powers are not *causae coagentes*, still they are *causae sine qua non*. For example, in cognition, the lower powers of the senses are not equal causes of cognition but they are instrumental causes of man's contact with extra-mental reality, at least in this life.⁶ Here Matthew quotes with approval from Aristotle who says that to know is the act of the body and soul joined together; in other words, it is the *compositum* which acts. This causality of the body will be further explained in the next chapter on the ideogenetic process.

But it is to be noted here that this positive/negative influence of the body is something limited to this life and is not intrinsic to the nature of the soul. As Matthew states elsewhere, the soul is an independent substance in its own right, yet it requires in this life a certain disposition on the part of the body. In proof of this dependence on the body, when death occurs the soul continues to exist but its activities are changed. Thus the soul does not need the body, absolutely speaking, for its continued existence, still for its being in the body, it requires a body. This dependence is mutual, so that after death the body is called a corpse and is no longer considered to be a man.⁷ For Matthew, then, the body and soul are mutually perfected in terms of their existence in the *compositum*.

Thus Matthew attributes a degree of independence and *per se* subsistence to this spiritual substance while still maintaining that the soul is naturally inclined to the body and constitutes a unity with it.⁸ Even though he asserts that the soul is a complete substance, still as a form it is only an incomplete act because of its inclination toward the body.⁹ In this sense, neither the soul nor the body has its own proper "to be"; neither exists simply but only the *compositum* can be said to exist.¹⁰

⁶ *De cognitione*, Q. V, pp. 310—11. . . . anima est perfectio naturalis corporis: quamvis ad suum esse a corpore non dependeat, tamen ad suum esse in corpore exigit dispositionem ex parte corporis, qua corrupta, solvitur unio et necessario a corpore separatur. Ita quamvis operatio eius a corpore non dependeat, tamquam in intelligendo cooperetur, tamen exigit dispositionem ex parte corporis, qua impedita, impeditur eius operatio. Ergo actus inferiores non sunt necessarii ad actum intelligendi inferiora vel superiora, tamquam causa coagens sed sicut causa sine qua non.

⁷ *De cognitione*, Q. X, p. 399.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *De anima* VI, Q. III, p. 284. Sed nec anima vel spiritus intellectualis habet completum actum, quia naturaliter inclinatur ad corpus; . . . nec separata habet perfectum naturae suae modum quia semper manet inclinatio naturalis; . . .

¹⁰ *De anima* VI, Q. II, p. 257. . . . nec spiritus per se proprie nec corpus habet esse, sed esse est suppositi ex utroque principio compositi et ex utroque principio constituti.

The soul then is not a species but rather a part of a species, the specific form. The soul can be called a species only *per reductionem*.¹¹

Here is an important development in Matthew's doctrine. Man is an existential unity constituted by the act of the soul and the matter of the body which it informs. These two parts of the compositum exercise a mutual attraction upon each other so that the body and the soul need each other in this life. However, the soul remains a substance and thus can be said to enjoy a certain independence of the body; for example, the soul has activities which go beyond the capacities of the body. In Matthew's formulation, the soul as substance can be said to subsist; but as form it has being only when it is joined to the body.

Taking Matthew's thesis that only the compositum exists, a question arises about the existence of the soul after death. He answers by distinguishing two kinds of forms: in one case there is a form which is just that and which ceases to be when no longer united to the matter which it informs; on the other hand, there is a being which is not only a form but which is also *hoc aliquid et per se subsistens*.¹² Since the soul fits the latter description, it continues to exist even in separation from the body, retaining, however, its natural aptitude, appetite and inclination towards the body. In fact, the separation of the soul from the body, says Matthew the theologian, is not natural but a punishment for sin.¹³

Through his repeated insistence on the appetite of the soul for the body, Matthew succeeds in safeguarding the unicity of the compositum; but at the same time he maintains the substantial unity of both body and soul, granting to each a certain independence. Thus the soul, as substance, is intrinsically independent and transcendent, yet as form, it is existentially and operationally joined to the body in such a way that in this life it is the compositum which exists and acts. Matthew's theory of plurality of forms aids toward a better understanding of this subsistent independence of body and soul. Not only is the soul a complete substance in its own right, but, according to his theory, the body is likewise subsistent.

The whole question of the plurality of forms, one of the most debated doctrines of this period, was to have profound effects on the various formulas of body/soul union. On the one hand, there was the strong tradition for plurality of forms and the subsequent emphasis on the complete subsistence of both body and soul. On the other hand, the

¹¹ *De anima* VI, Q. V, p. 324.

¹² *De anima* VI, Q. III, p. 281.

¹³ *De anima* VI, Q. III, p. 260.

theory of unicity of form stressed the soul as form of the body and the substantial unity of the compositum.

Antedating Matthew's discussion, there is record of a public *disputatio* between Thomas Aquinas and John Peckham. Roger Marston witnesses: "I heard with my own bodily ears . . . when this opinion (the unicity of forms, taught by Thomas) was solemnly excommunicated as contrary to the teaching of the Saints, particularly of Augustine and Anselm . . ." ¹⁴ In the light of this sanction and in view of the fact that John Peckham was one of Matthew's teachers, it is not at all surprising to find Matthew holding a plurality of forms in the human compositum. In his *Quaestio de anima* XIII, Matthew first presents a very interesting review of some current theories and finally gives his own thesis more in harmony with the doctrine of Augustine. ¹⁵

As Matthew explains the pluralist theory, many substantial forms perfect the same individual, thus placing him in different genera. Each new form contributes a certain new degree of being to the matter, while the lower forms become "material dispositions" for still higher forms. ¹⁶

As an example of a form conferring an ascending degree of being, Matthew cites the fact that man is placed in the genus of substance by the form of substance; he is constituted a corporeal substance by the form of corporeity, But since man is not only a corporeal substance, but a superior type of body, endowed with vegetative and sensitive life, man must possess a still higher form, the so-called *forma mixti*. Finally, man is established in his own proper class of rational animal by the ultimate substantial form which is the intellectual soul. ¹⁷

For Matthew, then, the plurality of forms is both an ontological and a logical necessity, since a series of forms is required to perfect a being and to establish it in its proper genus. These forms are arranged in an hierarchical order in such a way that the totality becomes not just an accumulation of beings but the completion of one being; thus the specific form "informs" all the lower forms, perfecting them in such a way that the unity of the whole is maintained. ¹⁸ Applied to man, this

¹⁴ Roger Marston, *Quaestiones disputatae* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1932), pp. 116—117. For St. Thomas' doctrine of unicity of form see *Summa Theologica*, I, 76, 4.

¹⁵ *De anima* XIII, Q. VI, pp. 199—201. This question is given in a study by R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes* (Louvain: Instit. supér. de phil., 1951). In subsequent citations, this will be referred to simply as *De anima* XIII.

¹⁶ *De Christo*, Q. IX, p. 169.

¹⁷ *De fide*, Q. VI, p. 160. Ab alia enim forma est corpus, ab alia vivum, ab alia sensibile, ab alia rationale sive homo; . . .

¹⁸ *De anima* XIII, Q. IV, p. 328, in the footnotes.

means that the lower forms of corporeity, the *forma mixti*, all serve to perfect the matter of man's body, disposing it for the proper, complete and intellectual form which is the human soul.¹⁹

In support of this doctrine of plurality of forms, Matthew argues that the soul could not be the only form giving "to be" to all the parts of the compositum, since these parts are distinct from each other.²⁰ For example, the human body is capable of continued existence, even after the soul has departed in death; consequently, the body must receive its being from a form other than the rational soul. To further substantiate his thesis, Matthew appeals to the proportionality of form and matter. In this way, the soul which is the most perfect of forms, could not perfect the first matter; it should rather inform a body which has already been perfected by all the lower forms.²¹

It is in the light of this doctrine of plurality of forms that Matthew's doctrine of the hylomorphic composition of man must be interpreted. It should be remembered that for him the soul is a complete substance, possessing its own spiritual matter. The body too is a complete substance, having an independent being with its own form or forms. But in addition to this substantial independence, the body and soul are related to each other as matter to form. Only the substance of the compositum possesses the fullness of human existence. As a form of this totality, the soul actualizes the body and gives the compositum a type of being which exceeds the being of the body.²² Man can perform those activities which exceed the capacity of the body in virtue of this spiritual existence conferred by the soul.

What is this perfection of existence which the soul confers upon the matter of the body? Matthew answers that the soul, as form of the compositum, confers "to be living." He compares this vivifying role of the soul to the influence of God in bestowing grace; as grace gives to the soul a new type of supernatural life, so too the soul informs the

¹⁹ *De anima* VI, Q. V, p. 325. Quamvis enim in homine sit completus gradus essendi secundum quod sunt plures formae gradatim ordinatae, tamen omnes sunt materiales respectu ultimae quae est anima rationalis quae dat esse completum, ultimum et formale corpori adducens, et illud est intellectuale quod est proprie humanum.

²⁰ *De anima* XIII, Q. IV, p. 311, in the footnotes. . . . propter formalem differentiam inter membra corporis habendam, quam necessario oportet ponere. Quamvis enim sit una natura omnium membrorum, tamen quodlibet membrum differt specie ab alio membro et singulorum membrorum sunt diversae complexionones: ergo non potest esse una forma quae dat esse omnibus partibus, secundum quod partes ad invicem distincta sunt.

²¹ *De anima* XIII, Q. IV, p. 312, in the footnotes.

²² *De anima* VI, Q. II, p. 257.

body and gives it natural life.²³ The soul, then, does not give being to the body but gives the perfection of "being living," just as every form confers that type of being which falls in its own genus.²⁴ Granted that the body, as a substance, has being outside of the soul, but as matter of the compositum, it possesses life only when joined to the soul.

In summary on the role of soul as form, Matthew agrees with Aristotle that the soul is the efficient cause of the body in so far as it moves the body; the formal cause, since it perfects the body; its final cause, since it controls the body.²⁵ Thus he explains the naturalness of the soul's union with the body; even after death the soul retains an aptitude, an appetite for this body. Using the expression of Bonaventure and many of the scholastics, Matthew declares that body and soul, though distinct in so many ways, still remain "*unibilia*."²⁶ They are united as matter to form; as perfectible to perfector.

Powers of the Soul

Obviously Matthew presents the soul as a *per se subsistens* with a certain independence of the body, while still maintaining that the soul, as form, has a natural inclination towards the body which it informs and actualizes as a living being. In conformity with his doctrine on the substantial unity of the soul, Matthew says that the powers of the soul are consubstantial and connatural with it. By means of its powers, the soul exercises various sentient and intellectual activities.²⁷ Yet all the faculties of the soul are of the very substance of the soul; they are not simply properties or accidents. To prove this point, he explains that the soul cannot exist without its powers, nor can the powers exist without the soul.²⁸

But if the powers of the soul are consubstantial with it, how can they be distinguished? Matthew says that the soul, though simple in the sense that it lacks quantitative parts, still is multiple in virtue of its properties and operations. These varied properties and operations give rise to distinct species and in this way the powers of the soul are known by a distinct concept.²⁹

²³ *De gratia*, Q. VI, p. 163.

²⁴ *De gratia*, Q. X, p. 263.

²⁵ *De gratia*, Q. VIII, p. 219.

²⁶ *De anima* VI, Q. II, p. 259.

²⁷ *De anima* XIII, Q. VI, pp. 207—208.

²⁸ *De gratia*, Q. IV, pp. 231—232. . . . nec anima possit esse sine potentiis nec potentiae sine ipsa.

²⁹ *De cognitione*, Q. V, pp. 311—312.

Since the powers of the soul are said to be consubstantial with the soul itself, they can only be distinguished, then, by means of their activities. It is interesting to note that Matthew here speaks of a species formed by these acts. Such a species will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters; here it is sufficient to say that this need of a species is typical of Matthew's theory.

It seems possible that Matthew's distinction of the powers of the soul could be called "virtual," since he refuses to admit any real basis in the soul for these concepts of the distinct powers. However, in referring to intellect and will, Matthew claims that these faculties differ formally.³⁰ Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any other place in his published works, where Matthew uses this expression, consequently it is difficult to determine exactly what is meant by the term "formal," as he uses it. Though it would be interesting to see here some preview of the Scotistic distinction, it does not seem that Matthew's notion of the consubstantiality of the powers would permit them to be called formal entities.

Even though the powers of the soul are not really separable from it, nevertheless they can give rise to distinct concepts. As will be seen in a later chapter on the soul's knowledge of itself, such a cognition is intuitive, that is the soul knows its acts by a kind of direct vision without recourse to an elaborate reasoning process or a conversion to the phantasm. In such an exercise of self-knowledge, the soul is not dependent on the body, since its method and object are both spiritual.³¹

Naturally, the classification of the various kinds of powers is of less importance for Matthew than for those scholastics who postulate some kind of real distinction between the powers and the substance of the soul. As already indicated, Matthew gives a basic division into vegetative, sentient and intellectual faculties, the latter being subdivided into intellect and will.³² Unlike other Augustinians, Matthew is more modern in his approach; he does not speak of the memory as being distinct even in terms of giving rise to separate species. For Matthew, the intellect and memory are one power; or if they are two, they are so intimately joined and so dependent on each other, that both must concur in every act and therefore their habit, at least, must be common.³³

Without going into further detail on these distinctions of the powers it will be more important to analyze the terms Matthew uses for the

³⁰ *De gratia*, Q. X, p. 257. . . . quod enim est in voluntate in quantum huiusmodi, non est in intellectu in quantum intellectus: sic enim differunt formaliter . . .

³¹ *De gratia*, Q. II, p. 59.

³² *De gratia*, Q. X, p. 257.

³³ *De cognitione*, Q. V, p. 312.

various intellectual faculties. Though he speaks of both an inferior and a superior power, these terms are not to be taken in any strict Aristotelian sense. First of all, these faculties are not distinct in essence or in existence but only as different offices of the same power.³⁴ Secondly, though man can know all things through these faculties, such knowledge is incomplete;³⁵ in other words, illumination is still needed.

This doctrine of Matthew on the powers of the soul as consubstantial with it will be of importance to understand his thesis on the soul's knowledge of itself. It will also present a slightly different orientation to his theory of sense cognition. Both points will be developed in subsequent chapters.

St. Bonaventure

It is hoped that the following exposition on Bonaventure's treatment of the body/soul problem will be of special help in obtaining a more complete picture of Matthew's position, since the latter seems to have followed his teacher very closely on this point. Both philosophers solve the body/soul problem by a form of hylomorphism, carefully balancing the unity of the compositum against the complete subsistence of each substantial part. Both agree in teaching that the powers of the soul are consubstantial with it and are distinguishable only through their operations.

Nature of the Soul; Its Relation to the Body

In a typical formulation, Bonaventure characterizes the soul as a substance, a substantial form or something that has a substantial form.³⁶ Specifically, the human soul is both a substance and the *entelechia* or form of the human body.³⁷

Initially, the soul is characterized as a substance, *hoc aliquid* and consequently by definition it must be hylomorphically composed.³⁸ According to this theory, the soul is not only a form which exists *per se* and is joined to its own spiritual matter. Lest spiritual matter seem a contradiction in terms, it is necessary to explain that for Bonaventure all matter is one *secundum essentiam* and can only be distinguished in

³⁴ *De cognitione*, Q. VI, p. 334.

³⁵ *De cognitione*, Q. II, p. 241.

³⁶ II *Sent.*, I, 2, 3, I; II: 48 a. In all subsequent references to the works of Bonaventure the abbreviations will mean: Book II of the *Sentences*, distinction I, part 2, article 3, question I: Volume II of the *Quaracchi* edition, page 48, first column, a, or second column, b.

³⁷ II *Sent.*, 18, 2, I; II: 445 a.

³⁸ II *Sent.*, 17, 1, 2; II: 415 b. — Bonaventure held to the theory of universal hylomorphism.

being by the form to which it is joined.³⁹ It follows, then, that the matter of the soul is somehow spiritual, since it is informed by a spiritual act.

To substantiate this composition of matter and form in the human soul, Bonaventure argues that any creature which receives its being from some other must possess matter, which is the principle of all potentiality and receptivity.⁴⁰ Moreover, this union of matter and form individuates the soul.⁴¹ To these arguments, O'Leary's commentary adds that the soul can exist without the body and this is not possible for any pure form; moreover, the soul has accidents and these must adhere in matter.⁴²

For Bonaventure, as for Matthew, the soul is a complete substance composed of spiritual matter and a form. According to Pegis, this thesis is used by Bonaventure to ensure the validity of his proofs for the immortality of the soul. However, this same insistence on the subsistence of the soul makes it impossible for Bonaventure to give anything more than a nominal agreement to Aristotle's definition of the soul as form of the body.⁴³ Gilson disagrees with the interpretation of Pegis, saying that Bonaventure does accept the Aristotelian definition of the soul, but emphasizes that the soul is primarily "this something" and only secondarily a substantial form.⁴⁴ Perhaps this difference of interpretation can be harmonized by saying that the soul is a complete substance in its own right but as a form related to matter it becomes a substantial part of the compositum.

In its role of form, the soul is naturally inclined and ordained to the body in such a way that soul and body need each other. Although the soul does not depend on the body for its being, still it has an appetite for the body and in this sense can be said to depend on the body for its mode of being.⁴⁵ One observes here a very close similarity to Matthew's formula that the soul subsists but only the compositum can be said to

³⁹ II *Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, 3; II: 100 a. In this lengthy and important article, Bonaventure presents his arguments for the homogeneity of matter.

⁴⁰ II *Sent.*, 17, 1, 2; II: 415 b.

⁴¹ II *Sent.*, 18, 2, 1, 1; II: 447 a.

⁴² C. J. O'Leary, *The Substantial Composition of Man according to Saint Bonaventure* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1931), p. 94.

⁴³ A. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Toronto: St. Michael's, 1934), p. 75.

⁴⁴ E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), p. 338. Gilson here stresses the Platonic character of Bonaventure's psychology.

⁴⁵ II *Sent.*, 17, 1, 3; II: 418 b. Throughout, Bonaventure develops his doctrine on the human soul along with his discussions on the nature of angels.

have the totality of existence in this life. Allowing for slight differences in terminology, both Bonaventure and Matthew insist that the soul is substantially complete, though requiring the body for the integrity of its existence as form of the compositum.

Bonaventure underlines the naturalness of this union of body and soul, asserting that the human form differs from that of the angels on just this point. To be united to a body is not proper to a soul but to be united to a human body is proper to man's soul.⁴⁶ Bonaventure consistently develops his doctrine on the human soul by contrasting it with the angelic form, a technique not so pronounced in Matthew.

What is the reason for this essential inclination of the human soul towards a body? Bonaventure replies that it is the appetite of a form for its proper matter.⁴⁷ The soul is naturally inclined to the body by means of an intrinsic principle; together with the matter of the body, it forms another complete substance, the human compositum. Though the soul is complete in itself as a substance, yet it is incomplete in so far as it exists as the form of the body and depends on the body for its mode of being. Actually there are three substances: soul, body and the compositum. Though the first two principles each have an independent *esse*, the perfection of their being is achieved only in terms of their substantial union. Thus Bonaventure posits a metaphysical composition to explain the problem of the union of the body and soul.⁴⁸ Bonaventure and Matthew after him, carefully guard the unity of the compositum on the basis of an intrinsic mutual perfectibility of the two substantial parts.

This mutual need of body and soul can be illustrated by considering the soul as the perfection of the body, its mover and vivifier. Each of these roles will be discussed in detail.

In the first place, the soul perfects the body which it informs, since it establishes the body as complete suppositum.⁴⁹ Such a perfection is a movement from the superior form of the soul to the body which has only an inferior type of being; yet it is of the very essence of the soul to be so united with the body which it transcends in terms of activities and immortality.⁵⁰ In this sense Bonaventure can say that the soul and body are *unibilia*.⁵¹

⁴⁶ II *Sent.*, I, 2, 3, 2; II: 50 b.

⁴⁷ II *Sent.*, I, 2, 2; II: 42 b.

⁴⁸ C. O'Leary, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

⁴⁹ IV *Sent.*, 44, I, 2, 2; IV: 914 a.

⁵⁰ II *Sent.*, 29, I, 1; II: 459 b.

⁵¹ II *Sent.*, I, 2, 3, 2; II: 50 b.

This desire of the soul for the body can even be considered as some kind of an imperfection, since the soul without the body lacks the complete reason of its personality.⁵² In other words, the soul attains the perfection of its nature only in union with the body.⁵³ The soul perfects the body by completing its being, yet the union of the soul and body is an imperfection on the part of the soul, since it underlines the incompleteness of the soul's being, as a form of the body. It is perhaps clearer to speak of the mutual perfectibility of soul and body, though the being of the former is more perfect *in se*. Again, this thesis of perfection/imperfection in the relation of soul to body is a cardinal point in Matthew's development.

This perfection which the soul gives to the body is the communication of "to be living."⁵⁴ In its role of form the soul makes the matter of the body living; since the soul can exercise this vivifying function only when it is joined to the body, death is seen as a punishment for sin.⁵⁵ In this way both Bonaventure and Matthew stress the naturalness of the body/soul union. Even though the soul can exist without the body, yet it can exercise its act of communicating life only when joined to the body.

A third function of the soul—as form of the body, it gives movement to matter.⁵⁶ The body without the soul would not be actualized as living and hence would be incapable of self-movement. On the other hand, the soul without the body would not be able to realize the fullness of its activation. For example, in this life, the soul requires a certain movement on the part of the body to initiate the ideogenetic process. This point will be analyzed more fully in the next chapter.

The mutual attraction and consequent unification of body and soul Bonaventure explains in terms of a hylomorphic theory. It must be remembered, however, that Bonaventure's exposition of this matter/form thesis does not consider the soul as the only form found in the human compositum. Though Bonaventure never develops any *ex professo* question of the co-existence of a plurality of forms, such a theory would seem to follow from his other philosophical positions, for example from his theory that light is the first form of all beings.⁵⁷ According to this theory, man's body is constituted by a hierarchy of lower forms

⁵² III *Sent.*, 5, 2, 3; III: 137 b.

⁵³ E. Szdzuñ, "Bonaventure et le problème du rapport entre l'âme et le corps," *La France Franciscaine*, XV (1932), p. 290.

⁵⁴ II *Sent.*, 8, 1, 1, 1; II: 211 b.

⁵⁵ II *Sent.*, 1, 2, 3, 2; II: 51 ab.

⁵⁶ IV *Sent.*, 44, 1, 2, 2; IV: 914 a.

⁵⁷ E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 323—24.

but it is completed in being by the rational soul which gives the compositum its substantial unity.⁵⁸ Such a thesis of a plurality of forms is in harmony with the insistence in Bonaventure and in Matthew that the soul is the perfection of the body.

Such then is Bonaventure's well balanced doctrine of the soul in its dual character of *per se subsistens* and substantial form. The key thesis to his whole treatment of this question is his matter/form theory applied, not only to the compositum, but also to each of its substantial parts. The soul is an individual substance, composed of spiritual matter and a form; it is also united with the body as a form naturally inclined to this particular matter which it perfects, moves and vivifies. The body is likewise substantially complete, possessing its own form or forms. Even though body and soul are each complete in substance, still Bonaventure insists that as matter and form they have a mutual need for and attraction to each other. Applying this to the problem of cognition, one readily sees that the soul, as substance, is capable of intellection beyond the body; as form, it is both aided and impeded by the body.

In the judgment of Križoljvan, Bonaventure successfully unites the matter/form theory of Aristotle with the Platonic conception of the soul as an independent spiritual substance united to the matter of the body.⁵⁹ Both in Matthew and in the whole Augustinian tradition, primacy is given to the soul as spiritual substance, with the consequent emphasis on the transcendent nature of the soul's activities.⁶⁰

The most serious objections to Bonaventure's formulation of this problem arises from a fear that his stress on the substantiality of the soul will break down the unity of the compositum. O'Leary answers by pointing out that the only thing required for substantial unity is this: the constituent parts must be substantial parts; they may also be substances in their own right.⁶¹

Such an interpretation seems in accord with the reasoning found in both Bonaventure and Matthew, emphasizing as it does the naturalness of the body/soul union. There does not seem to be any real reason for accepting the unity of hylomorphism in the compositum and then rejecting this same type of composition in the soul itself, or in the body itself. Bonaventure, and Matthew after him, base the unity of the

⁵⁸ II *Sent.*, 18, 2, 1; II: 447 a.

⁵⁹ H. A. Križoljvan, *Philosophia S. Bonaventurae* (Rome: Collegium Internationale S. Laurentii a Brundisio, 1956), p. 256.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

⁶¹ C. O'Leary, *op. cit.*, p. 98. — A lengthy discussion and interpretation of a key passage in Bonaventure's psychology, II *Sent.*, 17, 1, 2; II: 415, are given here.

compositum on the fact that both body and soul, though complete substances, are still dependent on each other as matter and form. Together they constitute a third substance which is the human compositum and which alone possesses the perfection of being. Perhaps the difficulties of accepting this complete substantiality of body and soul arise from an attempt to interpret this Augustinian thesis in the light of a hylomorphic theory which is not held by its proponents.

Powers of the Soul

Having established that the soul is both a *per se subsistens* and also the substantial form of the compositum, Bonaventure further clarifies and underlines this unity of the soul in his identification of the powers with the soul itself.

In a lengthy discussion found in his commentary on the *Sentences*, Bonaventure first rejects several explanations which he considers faulty. He denies that the powers of the soul are only the substance in relation to its acts; in other words, he rejects the opinion that the soul and its powers are identical *per essentiam*; nor are the powers simply properties which inhere in the soul and belong to the genus of accidents. Rather they are intrinsic and essential principles in the genus of substance *per reductionem*.⁶²

This is Bonaventure's own formula for the relation of the powers of the soul to its substance. These powers are neither identical with the essence of the soul, nor are they really distinct from the soul as accidents. Rather, in harmony with Bonaventure's conception of the unity of the soul, these powers are identical with the substance of the soul and yet are distinguishable from it.⁶³ Expressing this in a formula which is later adopted by Matthew, the powers of the soul are "consubstantial" with the soul itself.⁶⁴

Bonaventure continues that the powers are in the same genus as substance *per reductionem*. According to Križovljan, this last phrase, which seems to have been a favorite with Bonaventure, means that the powers are not complete substances but are reduced to the genus of substance as substantial differences. Another example of this same kind of reduction would be matter and form, which can likewise be reduced to substance, since together they constitute every created

⁶² II *Sent.*, 24, 1, 2, 1; II: 560 ab. — An historical survey of the various formulations of the relation of the powers and the soul is given by E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 341—44.

⁶³ H. Križovljan, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

⁶⁴ I *Sent.*, 3, 2, 1, 3; I: 86 a.

substance.⁶⁵ Though the powers are not identical *per essentiam*, since, as activities, they go out from the soul, yet they can be predicated essentially about the substance of the soul.⁶⁶ Gilson seems to agree with such an interpretation of the phrase, *per reductionem*, even using the same example of matter and form. According to him, "reduce" is an indication that a being is grouped in the class of substance, even though it is not a substance in itself.⁶⁷

In this careful formulation, Bonaventure seems anxious to avoid both of the positions which he has initially criticized. The powers are not only consubstantial with the soul but they are also able to be distinguished from it, are even capable of distinct and essential predication, something which would imply that they are at least mentally distinct from the substance of the soul.

The question arises as to how the powers, one with the soul through reduction, can be distinguished. Bonaventure answers that this differentiation comes primarily and principally from their act;⁶⁸ but they are also distinguished by means of their operation.⁶⁹ In explanation of the need for some kind of distinction, Bonaventure points out that every operation must proceed from a substance by means of some power, otherwise the essence of the thing would always be in act.⁷⁰ Granted that the soul is always in act with regard to its first act, i. e. with regard to its existence, yet in terms of the second act, by means of which the soul moves itself as well as the body, the soul is not always in act. Therefore these faculties, which are sometimes acts and sometimes only potencies, must be distinguished from the actual essence of the soul. In the concrete, the powers of the soul are identified with it but in the abstract they differ from the soul and from each other as principles of operation.⁷¹

Bonaventure's whole theory seems based on his desire to uphold the substantiality of the soul and to safeguard its unity. The powers of the soul are not really distinct from its essence in such a way that they become accidents; nor are they identical with the substance of the soul, because then their transient activities would destroy the actual unity of its essence. Rather these powers, or faculties, are "redu-

⁶⁵ H. Križovljan, *op. cit.*, pp. 277—78.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 278—79.

⁶⁷ E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 345.

⁶⁸ II *Sent.*, 24, 1, 2, 1; II: 561 b.

⁶⁹ L. Veuthey, *S. Bonaventurae philosophia christiana* (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1943), p. 187.

⁷⁰ E. Szdzujski, *op. cit.*, pp. 301—302.

⁷¹ II *Sent.*, 24, 1, 2, 1; II: 560 b.

ced" to the category of substance as operative principles of the soul itself. In this formulation of the powers as substances *per reductionem*, Bonaventure seems to give them more reality and distinctness than did Matthew. Yet both agree that the powers are consubstantial with the soul itself.

Both Bonaventure and Matthew also agree that the soul of man perfects and motivates his vegetative, sensitive and rational activities.⁷² These operations are not accidents of the soul but diverse powers of the same substance.⁷³ By means of its vegetative power, the soul motivates growth, reproduction and nutrition; through its sentient faculty, the soul comes into contact with the external world via the five senses. Finally, the rational power of the soul is distinguished as intellect or will.⁷⁴ In another passage, Bonaventure gives a more unique and typical division. Here he distinguishes between the animal, intellectual and divine operations. In the first faculty he includes the senses, both common and particular, plus the imagination. The intellectual powers he subdivides into the rational, by means of which a man abstracts the universal, and the faculty of intellect, through which a man comes to know himself and other spiritual substances.⁷⁵ Finally, he speaks of divine powers enabling man's intelligence to contemplate God and to be united with Him.⁷⁶

These various powers are distinguishable only when the soul experiences its own activities as when a man knows intuitively that his reason and will are distinct faculties, by experiencing his intellectual and appetitive acts. Man knows his own powers as different instruments of the soul.⁷⁷ Each power has a proper operation in conjunction with the body and in independence from it.⁷⁸

This unification of the powers with the soul will be of importance later in explaining the subsequent development of Bonaventure's theory of ideogenesis. For example, it will be helpful to remember that whenever Bonaventure and Matthew speak of sensation they are not discussing anything really distinct from the soul itself nor from the intellectual faculty.

⁷² II *Sent.*, 8, 1, 3, 1; II: 222 a.

⁷³ II *Sent.*, 31, 1, 1; II: 742 a.

⁷⁴ B. A. Luyckx, "Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, XXIII (1932), pp. 11—12.

⁷⁵ In *hexaëmeron*, V, 24: V: 358 a.

⁷⁶ L. Veuthey, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

⁷⁷ E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 345.

⁷⁸ II *Sent.*, 29, 1, 1, 9; II: 459 b.

Obviously Matthew and Bonaventure show a fundamental agreement on the soul, not only in doctrine but even in terminology. Both hold the substantiality of the soul, plurality of forms, the consubstantiality of the powers with the soul itself. It remains to show how these doctrines are developed by Henry of Ghent and Scotus along more Aristotelian lines.

Henry of Ghent

Like his predecessors, Henry of Ghent repeats the time-honored formula that the soul is both a substance and the substantial form of the compositum. Like Bonaventure and Matthew before him, he holds a plurality of forms and agrees that the powers of the soul are not really distinct from its substance. Despite this surface agreement, however, Henry's doctrine marks a definite development on these points; here again common terminology cloaks very real differences.

Substantial Nature of the Soul

In Henry's theory both body and soul of man are called substances, but only *per reductionem*, so that neither soul nor body has substantial independence.⁷⁹ Immediately one is conscious of the Bonaventurian terminology but it is also evident that Henry's doctrine directly contradicts that of his predecessors.

In Bonaventure and Matthew, both body and soul are complete substances in their own right, though each is incomplete in mode of being since each is perfected only in the compositum. According to Matthew's formulation, the soul is a *per se subsistens*, on the basis of which it enjoys a certain independence of the body in being and activities; yet in this life the soul needs the dispositions of the body. Bonaventure concurs, maintaining that the soul is a complete substance, yet, as the form of the compositum, it has a certain inclination towards the matter of the body with which it constitutes a third substance. Both philosophers emphasize the subsistent independence of the soul while safeguarding the unicity of the compositum in terms of a hylomorphic composition.

⁷⁹ *Quodl.*, III, 15, f. 117 r b. Citation from the Venice edition, 1608. These abbreviations can be read as follows: *Quodlibet* III, question 15, folio 117, recto (v for verso), column a or b.

This question on the soul as substance and substantial form is of the greatest importance. Of historical interest is Henry's rejection of the Averroistic agent intellect, a position similar to that of St. Thomas in *Summa Theologica* I, 76, 1.

Henry agrees that the soul is both a substance and also the substantial form of man;⁸⁰ but he adds that the soul is an incomplete substance and an incomplete being. As form, the soul is only a substance *per reductionem*, i. e. it can be reduced to the category of substance, but it is not a substance *per se*, as in Bonaventure's use of the term. Furthermore, since Henry does not admit of any real distinction between essence and existence, if the soul is incomplete in substance, it is also incomplete in being. According to this, the soul has only a diminished being when it is separated from the body.⁸¹

Henry's position thus contradicts the substantial independence posited by Bonaventure and Matthew. It is also in opposition to the doctrine of Thomas who says that the soul is incomplete in substance but complete in being.⁸² For the Angelic Doctor the soul is complete without the body in the order of existence but not in the order of essence. Because Henry does not admit of any real distinction between these two orders, neither the Bonaventurian nor the Thomistic formula is acceptable to him.

Following Henry's thesis on the radical dependence of the soul, the union of body and soul becomes an ontological necessity. If the human soul cannot have complete being or substantiality without the body, then it must be united to it; as Henry asserts the soul is in potency to the complete being of the compositum.⁸³ He agrees with his predecessors that the soul is the natural form of the body, as well as its act.⁸⁴ Since the soul "loves" and needs the body, there seems little danger of an over-emphasis on the duality of spirit and matter.

The doctrine of Henry of Ghent occupies a medial position between the traditional Augustinianism of Bonaventure and Matthew, on the one hand, and the Aristotelian emphasis of St. Thomas on the other. In accord with the former, Henry says that the soul is naturally orientated towards the body so that only the compositum has completeness of being. On the other hand, he agrees with St. Thomas that the soul, in itself, is only an incomplete substance, stressing its role as form of the body. This compromise position of Henry is called "typical" by his historian, A. Maurer, and "an embarrassment" to his interpreters.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ *Quodl.*, III, 15, f. 116 v a.

⁸¹ *Quodl.*, III, 15, f. 117 r b.

⁸² *Summa Theologica*, I, 75, 2; I: 283 ab. See Thomas Aquinas, *Opera Omnia* (Parma edition, New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1948—1950).

⁸³ *Quodl.*, III, 16, f. 122 v b.

⁸⁴ *Quodl.*, III, 15, f. 121 v a.

⁸⁵ A. Maurer, "Henry of Ghent and the Unicity of Mediaeval Man," *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), p. 5. This is an excellent study, emphasizing the duality of Henry's inspiration.

Plurality of Forms

Similar to his position on the body/soul problem, Henry also presents a compromise theory on the question of the plurality of forms. On the one hand, he admits that the human body has a separate form, in addition to the soul; but he denies such plurality to animate beings lower than man, saying that in these cases there is no need for such duplication. Even in the case of man, he limits this to a duality of forms and not the real plurality of Bonaventure and Matthew.

According to Henry, the body of man is composed of pure matter and a *forma mixti*. Man, then, is composed of three essences: matter, the *forma mixti* and the rational soul; consequently, there are three corresponding existences.⁸⁶ Lest such a multiplicity destroy the unicity of the compositum, Henry explains that these three natures and existences constitute only one substantial being, *esse subsistentiae*, with only one complete existence.⁸⁷ Since all three essences are incomplete substances, they have only incomplete being; completeness of substance and being is reserved for the compositum.

This *forma mixti* of which Henry speaks is a real form, giving the matter of man's body its corporeity and disposing it for the soul.⁸⁸ Henry calls it a real form to distinguish it from the *forma corporeitatis* which he says is simply intentional and common to all bodies.⁸⁹ Here one sees a difference in terminology from that of Scotus, but the actual doctrine of both men seems quite similar.

Henry continues with his description of the *forma mixti*, as the ultimate in a hierarchy of forms, disposing the body for the infusion of the spiritual soul. In this progression of form, each lower form yields to a higher form until only the *forma mixti* remains. At the very same instant, when this ultimate bodily form is educed from the potencies of matter, the supernatural form of the rational soul is infused. Thus both forms are actually simultaneous, though Henry gives a certain priority to that form which is more natural, i. e. to the *forma mixti*.⁹⁰

This ultimate corporeal form remains when the soul is infused because it cannot be corrupted. In this negative proof for the existence of the *forma mixti*, Henry explains that neither the natural powers of the soul nor the ordinary workings of the supernatural order can destroy this form. If the natural powers of the soul are not in opposition to the

⁸⁶ *Quodl.*, IV, 13, f. 171 r b.

⁸⁷ *Quodl.*, III, 15, f. 118 r ab.

⁸⁸ *Quodl.*, IV, 13, f. 171 r a.

⁸⁹ *Quodl.*, IV, 4, f. 143 ab.

⁹⁰ *Quodl.*, IV, 13, f. 172 r a.

powers of the *forma mixti*, then they cannot destroy it. On the other hand, the supernatural intervenes in human generation only to create and infuse the soul. Since there is no power able to destroy this ultimate bodily form, the *forma mixti* remains along with the soul.⁹¹ However, only these two forms are found in man, since unnecessary forms should not be postulated in accord with the Aristotelian principle of economy.⁹²

In addition to this negative thesis, Henry also presents positive evidence for the continued existence of the *forma mixti* along with the rational soul. Here he appeals to both philosophy and theology. Philosophically, he enunciates the principle that different agents acting in different ways cannot have the same term or object for their action. Now the proper term of the divine agent is the human soul; consequently, the object of human generation must be some other form. Though these two products of the two agents of human generation coincide, still they are not identical.⁹³ Such is the strongest of Henry's arguments for the duality of forms in man. Following from this argument it can be seen that animate beings lower than man do not require such a plurality, since they do not possess a soul which would be the object of direct creation by God.

On theological grounds, Henry says that a separate form for the body is necessary to explain the identity of the risen body of Jesus with His crucified body.⁹⁴ It is also required to explain the existence of the human body after the departure of the soul⁹⁵ and the reunion at the general resurrection, when the same soul must be infused into the same body.⁹⁶ It is interesting to note that Henry's arguments for the *forma mixti* are similar to those which Scotus invokes to establish the existence of the *forma corporeitatis*.

The corporeal form which Henry calls the *forma mixti* is not to be identified with Scotus' form of the body, however, despite similarities of argumentation. The differences between the two will be made clearer in the following section on the doctrine of the Subtile Doctor; here it suffices to say that Scotus, as is usual with him, criticizes Henry's position that only man has this plurality of forms, saying that such a negation is "without reason."⁹⁷ According to Henry, beings lower than

⁹¹ *Quodl.*, II, 2, f. 48 r ab.

⁹² *Quodl.*, IV, 13, f. 170 v b.

⁹³ *Quodl.*, IV, 13, f. 170 v b.

⁹⁴ *Quodl.*, IV, 13, f. 168 r a.

⁹⁵ *Quodl.*, III, 8, f. 95 r ab.

⁹⁶ *Quodl.*, VII, 16, 407 v b—408 r a.

⁹⁷ *IV Op. Ox.*, II, 3, 54; XVII: 415 a. All citations from Scotus will be from the *Vives* edition. If the particular text appears in that part of the

man are produced by one natural agent and hence possess only one natural form. He likens this unicity in all animate beings to the unity in man when all lower forms are absorbed in the superiority of the *forma mixti*.⁹⁸ His position at least has the merit of being consistent within his principles.

One final point must be noted. Henry's doctrine on plurality of forms is his ultimate position as presented in his second and fourth *Quodlibet*. In his first *Quodlibet*, however, Henry holds a unicity of form in man, as well as in lower beings. According to the testimony of Roger Marston, Henry retracted this first theory of unicity in a solemn declaration at Paris.⁹⁹ Since his first *Quodlibet* was published in 1276, while the second dates from 1278,¹⁰⁰ it seems possible that Henry's retraction may have been connected with the controversies stirred up by the condemnations of Tempier.

At any rate, Henry's position, even his final doctrine on duality of forms in man, is an evolution from the real plurality described by Bonaventure and Matthew.

Powers of the Soul

More Augustinian and traditional in this thesis, Henry teaches that the powers of the soul are not distinct from its substance.¹⁰¹ Actually, these powers are simply distinct designations of the soul in reference to its acts.¹⁰² Since the essence of a being, as the principle of its activities, is not really distinct from the activities themselves, the powers of the soul can only be distinguished conceptually. This position, however, is one of those criticized by Bonaventure who gives a certain substantiality to the powers *per reductionem*.

According to Henry the powers of the soul are simply different "names" for the activities of one and the same being. Harris sees in

Ordinatio in print at the present writing, the volume and page of this critical edition will be added. The abbreviations should be interpreted: Book IV of the *Opus Oxoniensis*, distinction 11, question 3, article 54; Volume XVII of the *Vives* edition, page 415, first column, a, or second column, b.

⁹⁸ *Quodl.*, IV, 13, f. 177 r a.

⁹⁹ V. Doucet, "Introductio critica," *De gratia*, p. cxiv—cxv. In a valuable footnote, Fr. Doucet refers to the various opinions on Henry's change of doctrine on this point. Was it occasioned by the condemnations of Oxford or by those of Paris?

¹⁰⁰ J. G. Caffarena, "Cronología de la 'Summa' de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus 'Quodlibetes'," *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII (1957), p. 133. This revised chronology has been followed throughout. This study gives an excellent chart on the inter-relations of the *Summa* and the *Quodlibeta*.

¹⁰¹ *Quodl.*, III, 14, f. 112 v b.

¹⁰² *Quodl.*, IV, 10, f. 156 r b.

this formula of Henry a foreshadowing of the Scotistic distinction.¹⁰³ But it seems that the powers of the soul, in Henry's presentation, lack any formal entity, something already mentioned in connection with Matthew's express use of the word "formal." It would perhaps be more accurate to say that both Matthew and Henry teach a kind of virtual distinction, or in Henry's case, a distinction that is purely mental. Bonaventure with his formula of substances *per reductionem* seems closer to the Scotistic notion.

As Bourgeois points out, for Henry the powers of the soul differ only in their activity and their ordination to that activity.¹⁰⁴ Since these powers have no distinct existence, they are not considered as separate substances and here Henry agrees with Matthew's formulation.

In general, one may say that Henry's main concern is to safeguard the unity of the compositum, sacrificing for this end, the substantiality of the soul. Granted that the soul is both substance and substantial form, still it is only an incomplete substance and consequently incomplete in being. From this Henry concludes to a thesis directly opposed to the position held by Bonaventure and Matthew. Such a theory, while strengthening the unity of the compositum, can be criticized as endangering the independent existence of the soul.

In a similar compromise position, Henry accepts plurality of forms but limits them to a duality in man. Again such hesitation seems in harmony with his emphasis on the soul as form of the compositum.

Finally, Henry agrees with Bonaventure and Matthew in stating that the powers of the soul are not really distinct from its substance; actually, they are simply terms used to designate the varied activities of the spiritual principle. Since he thus identifies the powers of the soul with its substance, there is no need for making any prolonged division of the faculties. Following his main thesis, Henry says that the soul is called spirit when it contemplates; sensible, when it senses; intellect, when it understands; memory, when it remembers; and will, when it consents.¹⁰⁵ It will be helpful, in subsequently examining Henry's cognition theory, to remember that the terms he uses for the various faculties designate one and the same substance.

¹⁰³ C. R. S. Harris, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), II: 246. This early study must be used with some reservations, since it refers to works which are no longer considered authentic.

¹⁰⁴ R. Bourgeois, "La théorie de la connaissance intellectuelle chez Henri de Gand," *Revue de philosophie*, XXXVI (1936), p. 250.

¹⁰⁵ *Quodl.*, III, 14, f. 112 v a.

John Duns Scotus

So far this study on the nature of the soul has underlined the verbal agreement of Bonaventure, Matthew and Henry of Ghent, all of whom admit that the soul is both substance and substantial form of the compositum. Such uniformity in terminology, however, covers very real divergencies in doctrine. Is the soul a complete substance, incomplete only in mode of being, as Bonaventure and Matthew agree, or is it incomplete in both substance and being as Henry postulates? Scotus adopts still a third position, saying that the soul is incomplete in substance but complete in being.

On the distinction of the powers of the soul, Scotus agrees with the basic theory of his predecessors that the faculties are something more than mere accidents of the soul; according to his thesis, the powers are distinguishable from the substance as formalities and not simply in terms of their act or operation.

Scotus on Body/Soul Relation

In the Scotistic psychology, the emphasis is placed on the soul as the specific form of man, giving him life and capacity for spiritual operations.¹⁰⁶ Like his predecessors, Scotus postulates a plurality of forms, but for him the intellectual soul distinguishes man and places him in the species of rational animal. Consequently, it is the soul which informs man's body, making him "to be living" and enabling him to perform those activities which are proper to his nature.¹⁰⁷ Since intellection is man's proper operation, this form must be intellectual as well as animate.¹⁰⁸

The rational soul, then, as the specific and proper form of the human compositum, constitutes a man as a living, intellectual being. The soul, however, does not give being to the body. According to Scotus, soul and body each have their own "to be" as parts, while the compositum has the being of the whole. In other words, the whole has one being but each of the constitutive parts has its own separate being.¹⁰⁹

Objections to this thesis of separate being for body and soul might be raised on the basis that it destroys the unity of man. Scotus replies by saying that composition need not destroy unity.¹¹⁰ In proof of the

¹⁰⁶ IV *Op. Ox.*, 43, 2, 4; XX: 36 a. ¹⁰⁷ II *Op. Ox.*, 16, 1, 6; XIII: 26 a.

¹⁰⁸ IV *Op. Ox.*, 43, 2, 6; XX: 37 a.

¹⁰⁹ IV *Op. Ox.*, 11, 3, 46; XVII: 429 ab.

¹¹⁰ II *Op. Ox.*, 12, 1, 13; XII: 560 a. — Perhaps this insistence on the possibility of substantial and/or existential unity, along with composition, could be regarded as the hallmark of Franciscan psychology.

fact that the soul is a complete being, Scotus says that, if the being of the soul were identical with that of the whole, then the separated soul would not suffer any imperfection in being.¹¹¹

In this initial description of the Scotistic doctrine on the nature of the soul, one recognizes the repetition of formulas already familiar from the theories of Matthew and Bonaventure. Like them, Scotus says that the soul is the proper and intellectual form of man, which gives life to the body. But this form does not give being to the body; rather body and soul each have an independent and complete existence. Refuting objections that such an existential independence of the parts destroys the unity of the compositum, Scotus answers in the very same words which Bonaventure uses. So far, then, Scotus seems to be merely repeating the words and work of his predecessors.

Having admitted then that body and soul are independent in being, Scotus declares that these parts are only called substances *per reductionem*.¹¹² Here again is the phrase which Bonaventure uses to describe the powers of the soul and which Henry of Ghent applies to the soul itself. On this point, then, Henry and Scotus stand in unaccustomed agreement: both soul and body enjoy substantial integrity only when joined to each other in the compositum. Here Scotus seems more in conformity with the Thomistic position than with his Augustinian predecessors. He differs, however, from the Angelic Doctor on the exact meaning of the soul's "*esse*." For Thomas, *esse* is an act by which an essence has being; for Scotus, this same word signifies an essence taken in its actual, real existence.¹¹³ Though this study cannot go into any discussion of the exact meaning of the Thomistic distinction between essence and existence, yet the difference between the doctrine of Thomas on this point and the formal distinction posited by Scotus makes for differences in interpretation. Even if Thomas and Scotus agree in their formulation that the soul is incomplete in substance and complete in being, their understanding of this last phrase differs considerably.

For example, Scotus says that if the soul and the body each has its separate being, then the body must have an independent form.¹¹⁴ In further substantiation of the need for a plurality of forms, Scotus argues that even though many different agents may act to destroy the life of

¹¹¹ *Quodl.*, IX, 15—17; XXV: 389 b.

¹¹² *IV Op. Ox.*, II, 3, 54; XVII: 436 b.

¹¹³ E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), p. 486. In a footnote on this same page, Gilson goes into some detail on the Scotistic and Thomistic notion of *esse*.

¹¹⁴ *IV Op. Ox.*, II, 3, 54; XVII: 436 b.

a being, yet there is always a dead body remaining. Now the form of this corpse cannot be the product of diverse agents and therefore must be something independent of the infusion or separation of the soul.¹¹⁵ Here the Subtile Doctor appeals to the principle of Henry of Ghent that different agents cannot have the same *terminus* for their activities. Unlike Henry, however, Scotus says that this separate bodily form is found in all living things.¹¹⁶ Such a distinct *forma corporeitatis* is always needed to explain the continued existence of the being after the animating soul has left it.

Such are Scotus' philosophical arguments for a *forma corporeitatis*. Like Henry, he continues with a series of theological proofs, the chief of which is the nature of transsubstantiation,¹¹⁷ and the identity of Christ's body after the resurrection with His crucified body.¹¹⁸ Basic to all these proofs, is the argument that the *forma corporeitatis* preserves the identity of the body, placing it in potency to the intellectual soul.¹¹⁹ It is this form which constitutes a body as this particular body.

According to Scotus the *forma corporeitatis* found in all animate beings remain something distinct from their life principle. He further clarifies the function of this last form of the body by saying that it unifies the heterogeneity of the material elements in the body.¹²⁰ In other words, it is a substantial form but not the ultimate specific form.¹²¹ Though the body of man is established as a human body by this *forma corporeitatis*, the personality of man, i. e. man as a living, rational being, is the act of his proper and specific form which is the rational soul. Since this bodily form is natural, it is generated by the parents¹²² simultaneously with the infusion of the immortal soul.¹²³ The *forma corporeitatis* then is a natural form, organizing the body and thus preparing it for the infusion of the life-giving soul; it is logically prior to the soul but ontologically contemporary with it.

Applying this notion to the Scotistic formula of body/soul union, one observes that man is composed of a body and soul, each of which

¹¹⁵ IV *Op. Ox.*, II, 3, 54; XVII: 420 a.

¹¹⁶ IV *Op. Ox.*, II, 3, 37; XVII: 415 a.

¹¹⁷ IV *Op. Ox.*, II, 3, 31—32; XVII: 399—400. Actually, this whole question of the plurality of forms is presented in the course of a question on the Holy Eucharist.

¹¹⁸ *Op. Ox.*, II, 3, 57; XVII: 437—38.

¹¹⁹ IV *Rep. Par.*, II, 3, 22; XXIV: 125 b.

¹²⁰ IV *Op. Ox.*, 44, 1, 3; XX: 163 a.

¹²¹ IV *Op. Ox.*, II, 3, 46; XVII: 429 b.

¹²² IV *Op. Ox.*, II, 3, 39; XVII: 420 a.

¹²³ III *Op. Ox.*, 2, 3, 5; XIV: 152.

has a complete *esse*. As a complete being, the body of man is likewise dual—composed of a positive material element, which is divisible but undetermined, plus another element which is likewise material and divisible but a determining principle. The latter is the *forma corporeitatis*.¹²⁴ The conjunction of this bodily matter and form is informed by the ultimate and specific form of the rational soul to constitute the individual man. Thus the soul is the proper form, establishing man as a particular species; the *forma corporeitatis*, including matter and all the lower forms, is in potency to this ultimate form. Thus Scotus safeguards the unicity of man while still granting completeness of being to both body and soul, as well as a plurality of forms.¹²⁵

One final question on the Scotistic notion of plurality: does he hold a real plurality of forms or is he closer to the dualism of Henry of Ghent? There does not seem to be any authoritative text of this question but Campbell feels that Scotus postulates more than two forms in man.¹²⁶ In that case he would be closer to the pluralist position of Bonaventure and Matthew.

Since this question of the exact number of forms is not especially pertinent to the present problem it need not be discussed further. What is of importance is the Scotistic doctrine that unity of being does not require unicity of form. The soul is not individuated by its relation to a particular body; rather, the substance constituted by the union of these two parts is the individual.¹²⁷ On this question of individuation, Scotus again seems to depart from the doctrine of Bonaventure and of Matthew who say that the union of body and soul is the principle of individuation; Scotus postulates his theory of the *haecceitas*, a doctrine which will be given fuller treatment in the chapter on knowledge of individual things.

¹²⁴ Déodat De Basly, *Scotus docens* (Paris: Supplement to *La France Franciscaine*, 1934), p. 64.

¹²⁵ T. Barth, "Individualität und Allgemeinheit bei J. Duns Skotus," *Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, XVIII (1955), p. 199.

¹²⁶ B. J. Campbell, *The Problem of One or Plural Substantial Forms in Man as Found in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus* (Philadelphia, 1940). pp. 91—92.

The concluding sections of this dissertation present an evaluation and comparison of Thomas' unicity vs. Scotistic plurality. See pp. 95—106. In the light of modern science, Fr. Campbell is inclined to accept the Scotistic conception. See p. 119.

Another favorable judgment on the rapport of plurality of forms with the discoveries of modern biology and physics is given by Fr. E. Longpré, "The Psychology of Duns Scotus and its Modernity," *Franciscan Educational Conference*, XIII (1931), pp. 46—48.

¹²⁷ II *Op. Ox.*, 3, 7, 4; XII: 161 a.

Throughout his psychology, Scotus stresses the soul's independence in being while explaining the unicity of the compositum in terms of a hylomorphic composition. In agreement with the Augustinian school, he claims that body and soul each has completeness of being, the body even possessing its own form. He does not admit, however, the fundamental theses of Bonaventure and Matthew that the soul is an independent substance.

Scotus on the Powers of the Soul

The substantial agreement of Bonaventure, Matthew and Henry of Ghent is apparent in their theory that the powers of the soul are not simply accidents but are somehow identified with the soul itself. Scotus also maintains that the powers of the soul are not really distinct from its essence, since beings should not be multiplied without reason. Actually, these faculties are not so much parts as passions or operations of the soul. Though united to each other and contained in the essence of the soul, they differ "formally" from the substance of the soul and from each other. Scotus explains this formal distinction by comparing it to the differences posited between the divine attributes. For example, the qualities of mercy and justice differ *ad extra* in terms of their objects and activities, yet they do not imply any real composition in the divine essence. In the same way, the faculties of man are distinguished in regard to their activities but are not really distinct as separable from the substance of the soul. They are only formalities which can be conceived distinctively.¹²⁸

This formal distinction of Scotus between the powers and the essence of the soul seems very close to the theories of Matthew, Bonaventure and Henry. His expression, however, is more precise than that of his predecessors. Moreover, Scotus, like Bonaventure, grants a certain independent "reality" to these powers. While Bonaventure calls them substances *per reductionem*, Scotus says that they are formal entities.

This section on the nature of the soul and its relation to its powers has aimed at showing the common doctrine of Matthew, Bonaventure, Henry and Scotus, as well as their divergencies. All agree that the soul is both substance and form. All postulate some incompleteness in the body/soul principles: either dependence in mode of being, as Bonaventure and Matthew say, or incompleteness of substance, as Scotus postulates; or the total dependence of Henry of Ghent. All agree that the powers

¹²⁸ II *Op. Op.*, 16, 1, 17; XIII: 43 a.

of the soul are distinguishable activities distinct from the soul conceptually, nominally or formally.

Subsequent chapters on ideogenesis and the various objects of the intellect will make use of this psychological background in explaining the theories of Matthew, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus.

(To be continued)

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A NOTE ON WALTER BURLEY'S EXAGGERATED REALISM

The appearance in 1934 of L. Baudry's article, "Les rapports de Guillaume d'Occam et de Walter Burleigh,"¹ marked the turning point for scholarly estimates of Walter Burley's rôle in the history of mediaeval philosophy. Prior to the publication of this work by Baudry, it had been assumed that the key to Burley's thought lay in his bitter, if mediocre and ineffectual, opposition to the *moderni* in general, and William Ockham in particular.² After the circulation of Baudry's article, however, the scholarly consensus began to waver; and, to be brief, we may now observe that more recent research on Burley has done so much in the direction of establishing him as an independent thinker of the first rank,³ that

¹ In *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, IX (1934).

² The thesis that Burley's and Ockham's works constitute a continuous sequence of mutual attacks and counter-attacks is propounded — with no real evidence, as Baudry shows — by P. Doncoeur in his "La théorie de la matière et de la forme chez Guillaume Occam," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, Paris (1921), and K. Michalski, "La physique nouvelle et les différents courants philosophiques au XIV^e siècle," *Bulletin international de l'Académie polonaise des sciences*, Cracovie (1927). Among others, C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* (Leipzig, 1855—70); B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la Philosophie Scolastique* (Paris, 1872—80); and L. Michalski in *op. cit.*, all attest to the sterility and ultra-conservative character of Burley's writings. Hauréau, for example, (in *op. cit.*, II, 2, p. 444), writes: "... Ne proposant jamais rien de nouveau, il (Burley) n'éprouve pas le besoin de faire de long discours ...;" this note is echoed by K. Michalski (in: *op. cit.*, p. 120): "... dans ses (Burley's) oeuvres, on chercherait peut-être vainement une seule idée fondamentale qui ne l'oppose au parti des novateurs." Again, Michalski notes (*op. cit.*, p. 97): "(Burley) accablait le monde scientifique de son époque d'une masse d'opuscules sans importance." The fact that Burley does express himself as opposed to the views of the *moderni* cannot be taken as *prima facie* evidence of his philosophical conservatism. It should be noted that William Ockham too, whom Michalski and the others regard as a *progressive* thinker, quite often directs criticism against the *moderni*, and prefers to think of his own views as being in alignment with those of the *antiqui*. See E. A. Moody's *The Logic of William of Ockham* (London, 1935), esp. Chapter One.

³ Easily the most dramatic and startling of the works that are beginning to bring the "new" Burley to the fore, is Philotheus Boehner's *Medieval Logic* (Manchester University Press, 1952). In this work Boehner proves Burley to have been one of the most acute logicians of an age noteworthy for the

the pre-baudrian view of his philosophical worth is falling rapidly into decay.⁴

Despite the fact that scholarship has been thus pulled up short and forced to review its stand, at least one line connecting the "old" and the "new" Walter Burley stretches unbroken across Baudry's road-block. For whether of the pre or post-baudrian vintage, all observers see eye-to-eye on the fact of Burley's "extreme realism." It appears, however, that even this — possibly the last meaningful stronghold of scholarly consensus in respect of Burley's philosophy — may be open to question.⁵

excellence of its logic. For more on the "new" Burley, see also: S. H. Thompson, "Walter Burley's Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle," *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer* (1947); A. N. Prior, "One some *consequentiae* in Walter Burley," *New Scholasticism* XXVII (1953); and H. Shapiro, "Walter Burley and the Intension and Remission of Forms," *Speculum*, XXXIV (1959).

⁴ When we look to our standard histories of mediaeval philosophy, we find only M. DeWulf still adhering doggedly to the pre-baudrian line. See M. DeWulf, *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale*, III, 6th ed. (Paris, 1947) p. 164 ff. F. Überweg's *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*, II, 12th ed. (Basel, 1951), is content merely to note (p. 621) Burley as "(der) realistische Bekämpfer des Ockhamschen Nominalismus," and let it go at that. E. Gilson, whose 3rd (1947) edition of *La Philosophie au Moyen-Âge* (Paris, 1947), voiced a tentative pro-baudrianism in respect of Walter Burley's philosophy, chooses in a later text, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Random House, 1951), not to deal with Burley in the body of his work at all, but rather to note cautiously (pp. 769—70) that: "(Burley) is known to have opposed Ockham and the 'moderns' . . . but our only information concerning the precise nature of his opposition is still limited to the notes on Burley in Michalski . . . and to . . . L. Baudry."

⁵ It should be noted that the only evidence presented in support of the thesis that Burley was an extreme realist, consists in the following passage: "Apparent duo contraria dictis modernorum. Primum est, quod universalia de genere substantiae sunt extra animam . . . secundum contrarium est quod propositio componitur ex rebus extra animam." These lines are dutifully echoed (indeed, where any evidence is cited at all), by writer after writer. See, as example, E. Gilson, *La Philosophie au Moyen-Âge*, *op. cit.*, pp. 616-7, and M. DeWulf, *op. cit.*, p. 165. The cited passage is quoted by K. Michalski, *op. cit.*, p. 121. Michalski gives its source as Burley's *Vetus Ars* (Venice, 1585), fol. c—4r. When we put this quotation back in its proper setting, the case for Burley's exaggerated realism does not seem quite so assured. For the sake of brevity, we shall merely quote the context for the first of Burley's "duo contraria dictis modernorum." Note particularly that Burley is not here taking any positive philosophical stand at all, but seems rather to be exploring the consequences of an extreme nominalism. "Quodlibet aut est in subiecto aut non est in subiecto. Si sit in subiecto aut dicitur de subiecto, et sic est accidens universale; aut non dicitur de subiecto et est in subiecto, et sic est accidens singulare; si non est in subiecto et dicitur de subiecto, et sic est substantia communis; aut non dicitur de subiecto nec est in subiecto, et sic est substantia particularis vel singularis. Sciendum est quod in illa divisione, aliud in subiecto esse, aliud dici de subiecto, accipitur subiectum aequivoce. Nam subiectum, quantum spectat ad propositum, est duplex, scilicet de quo et in quo. In quo est quod substat accidentibus; subiectum vero de quo est illud quod subijcitur in propositione. Unde subiectum in quo dicitur respectu accidentis et subiectum de quo dicitur respectu praedicamenti. Item est sciendum quod ex hac divisione apparent

For if Burley *was* a realist of the naive twelfth-century variety as is generally assumed, then it is extremely curious to find him entering the philosophic lists brandishing a buckler inscribed with what reads suspiciously like the *nominalist* battle-motto — i. e.:

secundum actum existendi, nihil
est extra animam nisi singulare.⁶

Clearly, something is rotten in the state of Denmark.

duo contraria dictis modernorum. Primum est quod universalia de genere substantiae sunt extra animam, quia illud quod dicitur de subjecto et non est in subjecto est universale de genere substantiae; sed omne ens non existens in subjecto est extra animam, quia si esset in anima esset in subjecto. Cum secunda substantia non sit in subjecto, sequitur quod non est in animam, et per consequens extra animam. Unde, si nihil esset universale nisi vox vel conceptus, sequeretur quod omne universale esset in subjecto, et per consequens nihil esset illud quod dicitur de subjecto et non est in subjecto..." The relevant portions of this Burleyan text can be found in Prantl, *op. cit.*, vol. iii.

⁶ Walter Burley, *Tractatus de materia et forma* (Oxford, 1518), fol. 2r. This abbreviated text of Burley's will be our primary source. It is printed together with another short work of Burley's — *De relativis* — to make up the Oxford 1518 edition, the full title-page of which reads:

Tractatus perbrevis de materia et forma Magistri Walteri Burlei doctoris planissimi. Aliud perbreve compendium de relativis eiusdem doctoris, utile tamen admodum novelis logicis.

De materia et forma, (incipit: "Notandum quod cum sunt duo principia prima substantiae secundum rem"), commences on folio 2r and is completed, (explicit: "... sicut vult Aristoteles in veteri Metaphysica ubi disputat contra Platonem"), half-way through folio 2v. *De relativis*, (incipit: "Circa relativa est sciendum quod relativum est duplex in generibus") begins at the bottom of folio 3v and brings the short edition to a close, (explicit: "... secundum ponentes affirmatio eiusdem de se est necessaria, et vale lector candidissime"), half-way through folio 7r. The colophon, (folio 7v), reads as follows:

Impositus est finis tractatui doctoris planissimi de duobus principiis, scilicet, materia et forma, et de relativis, cum speciali privilegio per septennium ex edicto dignissimi cancellarii Oxoniae. Impressum est praesens opusculum in celeberrima universitate Oxoniensi per me Joannem Scolar in viculo divi Joannis baptiste, moram trahentem anno domini MCCCCC decimo octavo, mensis vero Junii, die septimo.

Now directly following on the conclusion of *De materia et forma*, and preceding the opening of *De relativis*, there appears to be a bridge which may very well constitute another tract of Burley's. It begins: "Intelligendum est quod in universo tria sunt agentia per se, scilicet, deus, natura et ars," (folio 2v); and ends: "adhuc forma domus esset artificialis quia causatur per operationem artis applicatis artificialiter partes domus ad invicem, ergo, etc.," (folio 3v). "This section, apparently a work complete in itself, bears no connection either to the preceding *De materia et forma*, or to the following *De relativis*. The suspicion that this is a complete tract, making the total printed in the 1518 edition *three*, rather than *two* of Burley's works, is strengthened by the fact that Michalski, (in *op. cit.*, p. 98), lists, (as appearing in Cod. Vat. lat. 2146, folios 247v to 248r), a short work of Burley's entitled, *De Deo natura et arte*, which bears the same incipit as the portion appearing between *De materia et forma*, and *De relativis* — i. e., our suspected third tract.

To put the case quite fairly, it appears that the evidence now at our disposal allows us to conclude but one thing with respect to the alleged "extremeness" of Burley's "realism": more studies are needed. In this paper we intend to inaugurate one such study. We can hold out no promise that our findings, based as they will be upon but one of the numerous writings⁷ of the *Doctor planus et perspicuus*, will provide students of the mediaeval period with a final solution of what promises to be a complex problem; but it is our hope that by making available more material treating of Burley's philosophical writings and decisions, we will help to broaden the rather narrow field of debate to which discussions of his philosophy have hitherto been restricted.

The sequel will be divided into two sections. In the first of these we will exposit Burley's approach to universals as it is given us to understand in his tract, *De materia et forma*. In our final section we will employ the previously exposit material in an attempt to answer the question of whether Burley was — as is generally claimed — or was not, an exaggerated realist. In addition, this final section will contain such remarks as appear to us to be of interest in respect of Burley's approach to the problem of universals.

Burley opens his tract with a simple affirmation of the doctrine of hylomorphism. The doctrine, that is, that matter and form are the dual constitutive principles of all primary substances. Matter, possessed of no form *de se*, is in potential to all forms. It is a sheer capacity to become — anything at all — under the activating and guiding impulsion of form. Now clearly, the material principle, which is thus passive and entirely neutral in respect of determination, cannot be regarded as the essence of a determinate composite. To be sure, matter is a *necessary* constituent in the existent individual; but since it is form that *determines* matter, and is thus logically prior both to matter and the concrete composite displaying the determination, it follows that form must be viewed as the entire essence of any primary substance.⁸

But we have here been viewing form as a something *in se*: a something enjoying a mode of being — *esse essentiale* — quite different from the

⁷ K. Michalski, *op. cit.*, p. 95 *et passim*, lists over thirty extant writings of Walter Burley; and L. Baudry, *op. cit.*, p. 155, adds to the list.

⁸ W. Burley, *op. cit.*, fol. 2r: "Notandum quod cum sunt duo principia prima substantiae secundum rem, scilicet: materia et forma. Materia est illud quod est in potentia, nullam habens formam de se. Sed ens in potentia ad omnes formas et subiectum omnium, nec proprie loquendo aliquid de essentia compositi. Sed subiectum essentiae sine quo essentia subsistere non potest; unde occasionalis est materia necessaria ad compositum. Forma, autem, est tota essentia composita, sicut vult Aristoteles septimo *Meta-physicae* . . ."

mode in which it is found actually to obtain in the natural sphere. Nature, that is, exhibits the formal principle's *esse essentiale* only by way of the materialized hylomorphic concrete; and it is thus, in its natural tie to matter that form may be said "to be" in another sense — *esse habituale*. Form as "quiddity," as "essence," as *esse essentiale*, may thus enjoy a demonstrable "nobility" and ontological "firstness" in respect of matter and the concrete; but as "informing" act of matter, as *perfection* of the composite, as *esse habituale*, it is clearly first in the order of nature.

Now nature is pluralistic: a manifold display of particular substances in energetic pursuit of their several careers. What then, we may ask, is the ontological basis for this observable particularity? Is it material or formal? Since it would be quite unreasonable to assume that that which is, in principle, both indeterminate and common to all hylomorphic concretes can ever provide the ground of distinction between them, it follows that form must be the principle of individuation. Form, then, according to Burley, does more than merely determine matter as a specific "such;" for as principle of individuation it also underwrites the "thisness" of each "such." But the analysis cannot end here. The substances with which we commonly traffic in nature are *numerically* singular as well as formally unique. Form, as Burley sees it, may be ontologically responsible for each "this such" displayed in nature, but only matter can guarantee that the career of a signal "this such" is the natural history of "one this such."⁹

Where then, in Burley's analysis of reality, is there room for the *universal*? Patently, one cannot maintain that it obtains, *qua* universal, in the natural order since, as we have seen, Burley views nature as consisting solely in a manifold of particular composites, the distinctive

⁹ *Ibid.*: "Individuum per naturam materiae habet non esse; per naturam autem formae habet esse; et ideo omnes formae separatae a materia prima incorruptibiles, quia esse earum non dependet a materia sunt. Haec forma quae solum in materia reperitur, duplex habet esse. Est enim formae essentia alia ab essentia materiae et prior naturaliter tam materia quam composito, sicut dicit Aristoteles in principio septimo Metaphysicae; et ita aliquod esse habet prius naturaliter in se praeter esse quod si(bi) derelinquitur inquantum est actus materiae et perfectio compositi. Prout, ergo, est aliquid in se, duplex habet esse. Unum, inquantum est una essentia in se, alia ab essentia materiae sine omni comparatione ad materiam. Et sic proprie vocatur 'essentia,' et hoc esse vocatur 'esse essentiale.' Aliud habet in comparatione ad materiam inquantum est multi(pli)cabilis per materiam. Primus enim, secundum naturam, est forma multibilis per naturam quam actu multiplicem, et hoc esse vocatur 'esse habituale,' quod debetur naturae, inquantum natura est multibilis per multa. Secundum, autem, quod forma est in materia alia, duo esse habet; est enim actus materiae, et sic proprie vocatur 'forma' — dicitur enim 'forma' ab informando."

traits and several careers of which are conjointly underwritten by real formal individuality and material singularity. In short, nothing, according to Burley, can exist extra-mentally save it be a particular.

The live options then, relative to the status of the universal, are as clear as they are exclusive: either the universal has no being whatsoever; or the universal has its being *in mente*. To affirm the first alternant would be, in effect, to yield that human science — i. e., knowledge of the universal — is an illusion. Burley elects the latter alternant: universals have psychological being.

But this is not to say that there obtains *nothing extra mentem* to which the universal species *in anima* is correspondent. For to endorse this view is to empty science of all real content and thus invite scepticism just as surely as if one were to reject all universality. As Burley sees it, the universal species in the soul relates to the particular form displayed habitually in nature; and to the degree that *this* is what one means when he speaks of real and subsistent universals — i. e., particular forms as *esse habituale* — the “universal” *does* have extra-mental being. But make no mistake: the extra-mental “universality” is neither an accident added to the particulars to provide a real, subsistent, universal ground for the intramental noetic construct; nor is the universal to be thought of as an ontological entity somehow made multiple and displayed in the particular composites exhibited in nature. Real, singular, individual, particular form as *esse habituale* is the only ground to which the mentally-inhering universal concept relates.¹⁰

In capsule, Burley's stand on universals may be stated thus: the universal, as such, has no extra-mental status. In reality, there simply is no such entity as a universal possessed of *esse habituale in se*. The only “being” attaching to the universal is psychological being. This “being” — *esse universale in actu* — is a “completed” being; i. e., the

¹⁰ *Ibid.*: “Aliud autem esse habet quod immediate consequitur ex isto. Per hoc, enim, quod est actus materiae, ex consequenti est perfectio totius compositi, et secundum hoc esse dicitur ‘quidditas,’ et utrumque istorum duorum esse vocatur ‘esse actuale,’ sive ‘actus essendi.’ Et secundum hoc esse est forma subiecta in actu et principium individui. Et sic patet quod principia rerum individuarum singularia sunt et non universalia; quia forma singularis et materia singularis sicut dicit Commentator septimo Metaphysicae, capituli ‘De Universalibus.’ Haec autem quattuor esse habet forma complete extra animam; et ita universale sub esse universalis extra animam est. Hoc, tamen, esse, non est accidentale, sed habituale solum. Unde, secundum actum existendi nihil est extra animam nisi singulare. Quia secundum actum existendi solum reperitur forma in materia. Secundum autem habitum, universale est extra animam. Huic autem universali correspondet species universalis in anima. Haec enim naturam universalem existentem extra animam representat intellectui — non prout actu mult(iple)catum est in singularibus, sed prout ipsa multiplicabilis est.”

universal is a psychological entity deriving its existence from the agent intellect's creative action on a manifold of remembered experiences of similar, ontologically singular forms abstracted from the particular material conditions in which alone form may be said to have *esse habituale*.¹¹

For all practical purposes Burley's theory of universals here stands completed. He draws the brief *De materia et forma* to a close by anticipating, and replying to, two objections that might be levelled against his view. These objections, together with their replies, are transcribed below in their entirety.

Si autem aliquis obiciat quod haec opinio ponit universale secundum rem esse aliquid praeter intellectum et extra singularia et ita ponit ydeas separatas sicut posuit Plato;

dicendum quod Plato posuit formas universales separatas extra singularia habent actum existendi, et esse hoc aliquid et entia actu, sicut entitas aliorum. Sed licet universalem habeat esse habituale in se praeter hoc quod est in singulari. Tamen secundum actum solum reperitur in singularibus, cum forma sive materia actualiter subsistere non potest.

Si aliquis obiciat adhuc quod haec est diffinitio universalis, quod sit unum in multis, et non praeter multa, sicut dicit Aristotelis primo Posteriorum;

dicendum quod illud esse non dat actu talem existentiam, sed habitualement. Ut sit sensus universale est unum natum esse in multis et de multis; unde secundum esse, universale habitualiter est in multis, et sub hoc esse non includit aliquam individua determinata, sed omnia praesentia, praeterita et futura indifferenter — et secundum hoc, est de universali scientia. Secundum autem quod est actualiter multiplicatum, includit individua praesentia determinate, et sub tali esse est corruptibile, et de eo est ymaginatio et unscia, sicut vult Aristotelis in veteri Metaphysica ubi disputat contra Platonem.¹²

Let us direct ourselves first of all to the question which is central to this paper: was Burley, as is generally assumed, an exaggerated realist,

¹¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 2r—2v: "Haec autem species quia abstracta est per intellectum a materia et a materialibus condicionibus habet esse universale in actu. Unde, universale actum existendi sub tali esse solum ab anima habet. Et hoc est quod dicit Commentator, quod intellectus agens subtrahendo facit universale secundum actum supple existendi et non secundum habitum. Et sic intelligendum est quod dicit Aristoteles in fine Posteriorum, et in fine Metaphysicae veteris, quod ex multis memoriis experimentatur unum universale quiescens in anima, quia illa anima facit universalis esse multa, scilicet, solum universalis esse in actu, scilicet, in anima. Cum enim intentio recepta in sensu sit individuale, et sub condicionibus materialibus sub quibus non potuit ab intellectu recepti, in materia necessarium fuit, ut per intellectum agentem abstraheretur ab huiusmodi condicionibus, et sic fieret universalis in actu et intelligibilis . . ."

¹² *Ibid.*, fol. 2v. It is at this point that our suspected third tract (see above, n. 6) commences.

or not? Since "extreme," "excessive," "naive" or "exaggerated" realism is characterized by the belief that there subsists an extra-mental universal to which our specific and generic concepts correspond in a one-one ratio, Burley was evidently not an exaggerated realist. As we have seen, nothing, for Burley, exists *extra mentem* save it be a particular. The view known as conceptualism, however, is characterized by the affirmation of universals *in mente*, and by the denial of any universality outside the mind. Burley's position on universals, then, as it is given us to understand in his *De materia et forma*, places him squarely within the conceptualist camp.

Now according to the tenets of traditional mediaeval conceptualism, general ideas are obtained by the agent intellect's abstraction of the formal principle obtaining in all the particular hylomorphic composites which make up the extra-mental universe. Next, by mentally comparing, for example, the abstracted green foliage, the green robe, and the green book, and focussing on the resemblances while neglecting the dissimilarities, we are enabled to construct the general idea "greenness." This concept is accordingly a mental product which stands in a one-many relation to all particular instances of greenness. We can now employ the general idea "greenness" without thinking of any particular green objects at all. The general idea is thus a universal: but a mentally "completed" universal — an intellectual device lending to human thought-processes precision, expedition, convenience and — perhaps most important of all from the Scholastic viewpoint — philosophic assurance of the reality of human knowledge.

Clearly, by his acceptance of a working compromise thus employing the best features of the two alternative approaches to the problem of universals — realism and nominalism¹³ — the mediaeval conceptualist enjoyed a philosophically invidious position. For thus, with one qualified "yea," he not only avoided the plagues afflicting both houses,¹⁴ but

¹³ By "realism," we mean "exaggerated realism," which has been defined above. By "nominalism," we mean the philosophical position which utterly repudiates the existence of any universality, either *in mente* or *in re*. This is not, of course, to say that the nominalist therefore rejects the possibility of any general knowledge, but rather that he will regard such knowledge as obtained by letting a particular stand as the representative of a class. Thus, for example, by discovering that the internal angles of a triangle — a *particular* triangle — sum up to 180°, the nominalist holds to the belief that the same will hold true for any other particular triangle. In this way, without postulating the "being" of any general concepts or entities at all, the nominalist feels that we can, and do, acquire our knowledge of all triangles.

¹⁴ By the "plague" afflicting realism, we mean the severe critique levelled by Abelard against the position, which made it forever thereafter

made philosophically available to himself all of the epistemological comfort deriving from realism's insistence on subsistent universality on the one hand, and all of the empirical benefits accruing from nominalism's emphasis on particularity, on the other. Thus equipped, one is hard put to understand why conceptualism, which appears to be holding all the cards in this contest, was ever forced to yield the palm to nominalism at all. Where, in this apparently masterful compromise position, is the tragic fault?

An answer to this question suggests itself immediately we focus on Burley's insistence that *form* is the principle of individuation. The orthodox conceptualism, that is, with which Burley's view was contemporary, based its epistemological stand on a metaphysic which saw extra-mental particularity as a function of the *material* principle, while form was seen as fulfilling the role of *specific* determinant. If we next realize that knowledge, for the mediaeval conceptualist, can arise only after the form has been abstracted from the "ignoble" material wrapping which guarantees particularity to each extra-mental composite, *it follows that the individual must remain forever unknown and unknowable in its particularity*. Since, that is, only form is adequated to intellection; and since form is specific in nature; the intellect is effectively and eternally cut off from any knowledge of the particular as such.

Now if we are correct in assuming that this was traditional conceptualism's "tragic flaw" — i. e., that its metaphysic necessarily rendered the individual opaque to reason¹⁵ — then we well understand the philosophical motives underlying Burley's insistence upon form as the individuating principle. For if the individual, as such, is seen on the ontological plane as owing its particularity to the formal principle; while form, on the epistemological level, is viewed as the intelligible aspect of things; then the individual becomes not only fully intelligible, but is at the same time the only possible reality capable of serving as

philosophically untenable. Nominalism, on the other hand, was "plagued" by the fact that it implied a scepticism that no one appeared to want. Without, that is, the guarantee of a subsistent universal, one could never have complete assurance that human knowledge actually conformed to reality.

¹⁵ We should not be taken as implying that this was mediaeval conceptualism's only shortcoming and one in itself sufficient to explain the steady gains made against it by 14th century nominalism. The fact, however, that the proposition "God does not know singulars" — a consequence which appears to follow from what we have called above the "traditional conceptualist" position — was one of the thirteen theses condemned by the Bishop of Paris in 1270, would certainly indicate that our "tragic flaw" was, at the very least, a thorn in the conceptualist's side.

the basis for the mentally "completed" universal. Thus, with one metaphysical stroke, Burley is enabled to overcome traditional conceptualism's most glaring incapacity, while, at one and the same time, preserving its positive contribution of the mentally subsistent universal as a philosophic guarantee for the reality of human knowledge.

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PETER JOHN OLIVI: HISTORICAL AND DOCTRINAL STUDY

The name of Olivi is familiar in the early history of our Order. It has always been difficult to arrive at a true picture of his character, involving as it does so many complex issues, not only in regard to him in particular but also in regard to early Franciscan history in general. It is our purpose here to summarize, as briefly as possible, the materials for a more accurate evaluation of his historical and doctrinal position, with special reference to the Council of Vienne.¹

EARLY LIFE

Petrus Iohannis Olivi,² or "Petrus Provenzalís," as he was sometimes called, was born at Sérignan in Languedoc, near Béziers, in the latter half of 1247 or the first half of 1248. This we learn from a contemporary Spiritual document:

Anno domini 1297, pridie idus martii, die veneris, hora 6. in civitate Narbone migravit a seculo. Vixit autem 50 annis in mundo, in religione 38, natus de castello Cirinhani dyocesis Biterrensis. Hic post sacram inunctionem susceptam, astante sibi conventu fratrum, dixit totam scientiam suam recepisse a deo, Parisius hora 3^a se fuisse illuminatum a domino Yhesu Christo.³

As the year then began at Easter in southern France, the date of death would in our reckoning read March 14, 1298, which places his birth date as indicated and his entrance into religion in 1259 or 1260.

¹ The chief sources are, of course, the documents and studies published by Ehrle, in *Archiv für Literatur- u. Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* (A.L.K.G.), II—III. Documents since published will be cited as they occur.

² This form signifies *Petrus*, son of *Iohannes Olivus*, a Latinized Languedocian name which was probably *Olieu*. Cf. Thomas, "Le vrai nom du Frère Mineur Petrus Iohannis Olivi," *Annales du Midi*, XCVII (1913), 68 *et seq.*; Jarraux, "Pierre Jean Olivi, sa vie, sa doctrine," *Études Franciscaines* (E.F.), XLV (1933), 133. The forms *Petrus Iohannes Olive*, *d'Olive*, *Oliva*, frequently met with, are incorrect.

³ Cf. Bernard Guidonis, *Practica Inquisitionis* (ed. Douais, Paris 1886), p. 287; Ehrle, A.L.K.G., III, 411; *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* (A.F.H.), XI (1918), 267.

Very early then, when around 12 years of age, Olivi entered the Franciscan Order at Béziers.⁴ Apparently he manifested the marks of good character and intellectual ability required of those to be sent to the university of Paris,⁵ for his superiors conferred that honor on him. This is attested by Bartholomew of Pisa, who writes (c. 1385):

Fr. Petri Iohannis: hic baccalarius formatus Parisius fuit, qui opera praeclara super Sententias ac super totam Scripturam faciendo et alia, mundo sui famam perennem dimisit.⁶

In his commentary on the Sentences⁷ Olivi mentions having heard at Paris St. Bonaventure's exegesis of the apocalyptic number 666, which occurs in the eighth of his *Collationes de Donis Sancti Spiritus*,⁸ given at Paris on April 1, 1268.⁹ Hence Olivi was in Paris as a student in 1268. Speaking of St. Bonaventure in another place, he writes: "Parisius in pleno capitulo me astante dixit . . ."¹⁰ This indicates that Olivi took part in the scholastic exercises at the General Chapter of 1266.¹¹ Finally, according to the document quoted above, he declared on his deathbed that he had received a special illumination at Paris.

Allowing about ten years for his stay in Paris, plus two or three years previously in a provincial house of studies after his novitiate,¹² we conjecture that he became *baccalarius formatus* around 1273. Subsequently, as was customary, he became a lector at various houses of his

⁴ Cf. Wadding, *Annales Minorum* (Quaracchi 1931), ad an. 1278, n. 29, V, 58.

⁵ Cf. *Constitutiones Narbonenses, S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia* (Quaracchi 1898), VIII, 456n; Felder, *Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Studien im Franziskanerorden bis um die Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Freiburg im B., 1904), pp. 362—364. Only a limited number were sent from each province.

⁶ *Liber de Conformitate Vitae S. Francisci ad Vitam Domini Iesu (Analecta Franciscana, IV)* (Quaracchi, 1906), pp. 339 *et seq.*, 540 *et seq.*

⁷ *Quaestiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum*, ed. B. Jansen, S. J. (*Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi*, IV—VI) (Quaracchi, 1922—1924), I, 98. (Cited hereafter by volume number of this edition.)

⁸ *Opera Omnia*, V (Quaracchi 1891), 497b; cf. Delorme, "Saint Bonaventure et le nombre apocalyptique 666," *La France Franciscaine*, VIII (1925), 519—525.

⁹ Not in 1273, as Jarraux asserts (*op. cit.*, p. 134); cf. Glorieux, "La date des 'Collationes' de S. Bonaventure," *A.F.H.*, XXII (1929), 257—272; E. Longpré, "Bonaventure (saint)," in *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, IX, 772—773.

¹⁰ *A.L.K.G.*, III, 517.

¹¹ Cf. Wadding, ad an. 1266, n. 4, IV, 289. This is the only chapter held by St. Bonaventure at Paris.

¹² Cf. Felder, *op. cit.*, pp. 211, 358 *et seq.*, 539; Kurtzschid, "De Lectorum Ordinis Min. formatione," *Acta Ordinis Minorum*, XLIX (1930), 360—374. Du Boulay wrongly places Olivi's entrance into the Order after his studies at Paris (*Historia Universitatis Parisiensis* [Parisiis 1666], III, 433). Cf. Daunou, art. on Olivi in *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XXI (Paris, 1847), 41; *A.F.H.*, X (1917), 339 n. 2.

province.¹³ Various authors, after Ehrle,¹⁴ have speculated as to why Olivi did not go beyond *baccalarius formatus* and become *magister*; but to no purpose, since it was not customary for all students at Paris to take the master's degree.

The Spiritual Movement

At this point Olivi's history immediately enters the current of the Spiritual movement, with which his name is inseparably connected. Though having its roots earlier in the history of the Order, the beginning of this movement can be placed in 1274, after the General Council of Lyons.¹⁵ Its chief centers were the Italian provinces of Ancona, Tuscany, and Umbria, and the province of Provence, to which Olivi belonged.¹⁶ Olivi, as we have seen, had returned from Paris around this time, and soon distinguished himself by attacking with word and pen the many abuses in regular observance. In this he won many adherents, but, as may be understood of anyone who opposes entrenched abuses, he also made many determined enemies.¹⁷ The Spirituals saw in him the angel of the Apocalypse, divinely sent to defend their cause, while the Community, as his adversaries styled themselves,¹⁸ called him Antichrist, the head and instigator of all vicious sects and errors.¹⁹

The controversy centered from the very first around the question of poverty — its theory and its observance. The Community had begun to uphold the theory that the Franciscan vow of poverty in no wise includes the poor use of things (*usus pauper*), but only expropriation, or *abdication dominii*. Those who refused to subscribe to this doctrine

¹³ Cf. Olivi, in *II. Sent.*, I, 633: "esto quod angelus existens in caelo velit me videre qui sum Narbone."

¹⁴ *A.L.K.G.*, III, 412; cf. René de Nantes, *E.F.*, XVI (1906), 477; Jarraux, *op. cit.*, p. 134; Koch, *Scholastik*, V (1930), 499. Olivi himself later wrote: "... quodam grandi erubescencia, quodam conscientiae stimulo, Parisienses ambitiones perhorrescens ... praedixeram ... quia ... me ad ambitiones humani magisterii sublevare Christus nullatenus pateretur." (*E.F.*, XXIX [1913], 416 *et seq.*) Concerning the *Parisienses ambitiones* referred to, cf. Ubertino of Casale, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 73 *et seq.*, 118; Felder, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

¹⁵ Cf. Angelo Clareno, *A.L.K.G.*, II, 301 *et seq.*; P. Gratien, O.F.M.Cap., *Histoire de la Fondation et de l'Évolution de l'Ordre des Frères Mineurs au XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1928), pp. 379—381.

¹⁶ Thus according to P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 378—379, and Holzapfel, *Handbuch der Geschichte des Franziskanerordens* (Freiburg im B., 1909), p. 41; but cf. Ubertino of Casale, *A.L.K.G.*, II, 380—381; III, 56, 68, 173, 184, 189.

¹⁷ Cf. Angelo Clareno, *A.L.K.G.*, II, 124, 289—299; Wadding, *ad an.* 1278, n. 29, V, 58; *ad an.* 1282, n. 2, V, 120.

¹⁸ *Communitas Ordinis*, i. e., the generality of the Order.

¹⁹ Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, III, 10 *et seq.*

and the abuses which accompanied it they treated with the greatest severity, proclaiming them indiscriminately heretical, superstitious, and destroyers of the Order.²⁰ The trenchancy with which Olivi opposed this doctrine and the prevalent abuses was the cause, as Ubertino of Casale and Angelo Clareno repeatedly insist, of the constant enmity and persecution which he incurred.²¹ But for this, his speculative opinions would hardly have attracted much attention. One of the ablest scholastics of his age, Olivi's writings are not without much of the forceful eloquence and relentless clarity which Clareno attributes to them in this matter, so that his adversaries were no match for him in direct argument, and could not proceed against him by the ordinary means.²² In order to incriminate him and his doctrines, they searched in his extensive writings for any propositions suggestive of heresy and susceptible of condemnation, and instituted a series of processes against him.

Processes against Olivi

The first action against Olivi occurs under the Minister General Jerome of Ascoli.²³ Accused before the latter of sinister teachings, he was summoned and examined by him at Montpellier.²⁴ The Community accounts tell us only that the Minister General burned a work of Olivi

²⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, I, 14; II, 384, 388.

²¹ Clareno, *A.L.K.G.*, II, 293—294; *Expositio Regulae* (ed. Oligier, Quaracchi 1912), pp. 231—236; Ubertino, *A.L.K.G.*, II, 381—382, 388; III, 71, 88, 193; Raymond Gaufredi, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 143; Wadding, as above (n. 17). Among modern authors, Jeiler writes: "Man darf behaupten, daß seine theoretischen Mißgriffe, ebenso wie die mancher anderen Schriftsteller wohl wenig Staub würden aufgewirbelt haben, wenn sein Reformeifer ihm bittere Feindschaft und übermäßig scharfe Kritiken verursacht hätte" (art. "Olivi," *Wetzer und Welte's Kirchenlexikon*, 2. Aufl., IX [Freiburg im B., 1895], 829). Cf. also Ehrle, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 416; Jarraux, *op. cit.*, p. 137; R. de Nantes, *E. F.*, XVI (1906), 480. Holzapfel advanced the strange theory that there was really no difference between the doctrine of Olivi and the Spirituals on the *usus pauper* and that of the Community, and that Ubertino probably misrepresented the Community doctrine out of malice; hence the controversy must have had a different basis (*op. cit.*, pp. 49, 54—55; cf. also de Sessevalle, *Histoire Générale de l'Ordre de S. François*, I [Paris, 1935], 123—124). But the point appears as bitterly controverted in the documents of both sides, from the very earliest. Most of the important documents, it is true, were unknown to Holzapfel. Clareno outlines the points of controversy in some detail (*A.L.K.G.*, II, 296—299).

²² Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, II, 291. Some such explanation seems necessary to explain why Olivi did not suffer the fate of many other Spirituals (cf. *infra*, note 95, 99). Cf. Leon Veuthey, O.F.M.Conv., *Alexandre d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1932, p. 8.

²³ Minister General 1274—1279; elected Pope (Nicholas IV) in 1288.

²⁴ Wadding (V, 57—58) and du Boulay (*loc. cit.*) place this event in 1278, though the primary sources give no date. This date, however, fits well with the chronology of Jerome (cf. P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 325—326).

"in detestation of the errors" contained therein.²⁵ According to Clarenò, it was a treatise on the Blessed Virgin which was burned.²⁶ Later, at the Council of Vienne, in their accusations against Olivi, the Community asserted in reference to this event that Pope Nicholas IV had condemned Olivi's heresies long before, as Minister General, and burned his works,²⁷ while Clarenò claims that according to the explanation Jerome himself gave later when Pope, he had burned the work for Olivi's spiritual good, to try the humility of a young and talented writer; it had contained no heresy, but *multa laude digna*.²⁸

P. Victorin Doucet, O.F.M., has pointed out, on the basis of some newly discovered *Mss.*, that Olivi had declared the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception to be "heretical, impious, and blasphemous;"²⁹ but it is difficult to see how this could have occasioned the condemnation of Olivi's treatise, as P. Doucet suggests, since this was the common opinion on the Immaculate Conception at that time.³⁰ It is interesting to note that St. Bernardine of Siena used material from Olivi in his sermons on the Blessed Virgin, but from what work of Olivi we cannot say.³¹ The accusations made against Olivi in this instance, however, were not restricted to his teachings on the Blessed Virgin, as we may infer from a passage in a later document.³² More detailed knowledge of this first process is not possible, since there are no firsthand documents such as we find in the following processes.

²⁵ Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, III, 13, 16; *A.F.H.*, XXIV (1931), 502.

²⁶ *A.L.K.G.*, II, 288—289. He also relates how Olivi was completely unperturbed by the event, so that he celebrated Mass immediately after.

²⁷ *A.L.K.G.*, II, 381—382; III 156—157.

²⁸ *Loc. cit.* "So klingt das wenig glaubhaft," remarks Koch (*op. cit.*, p. 493); but it seems quite plausible, considering the circumstances themselves and the later relations of Pope Nicholas IV with Olivi (cf. *infra*, note 73).

²⁹ *A.F.H.*, XXVI (1933), 560—563.

³⁰ Cf. *Fr. Gulielmi Guarrae, Fr. Ioannis Duns Scoti, Fr. Petri Aureoli Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione* (*Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica*, III) (Quaracchi, 1904), pp. vi—xii. Olivi's reasons are the usual ones; the fact that he uses the above epithets does not render his treatment particularly different or novel. Baluze (*loc. cit.*) also connects the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception with this event, but it is doubtful if he had any authentic source for this. Olivi also indicates in his *Qq. in II. Sent.* that he rejected the doctrine (III, 278, 285).

³¹ Cf. *A.F.H.*, XXIX (1936), 235, 518; cf. also Daunou, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

³² In reference to a proposition on the sacrament of matrimony, Olivi writes: "de hoc domino Hieronymo satisfeci, et postea nihil horum dixi quod sciam." (*Apologia* of 1285, *A.F.H.*, XXVIII [1935], 127) In the letter to Gaufredi the following phrases occur: "Dixi ante tempora fratris Hieronymi;" "Ante tempora fratris Hieronymi aliquid de hoc dixi . . . a tempore illo et citra nolui me intromittere de materia ista." (Cf. *E.F.*, XXIX [1913], 417, 418; *A.L.K.G.*, III, 414; *Quodlibeta Petri Ioannis Provenzalis* [ed. Lazarus Soardus, Venetiis, 1509; cited hereafter as *Quodlibeta*], fol. 51vb, 52rb.) Possibly these propositions were also concerned.

In 1278 Jerome of Ascoli was raised to the cardinalate, and in the General Chapter held at Assisi the following year, Bonagrazia di S. Giovanni in Persiceto was elected as his successor. After the Chapter Bonagrazia joined the papal curia at Soriano, in order to transact affairs of the Order with Pope Nicholas III. Chief among these was the preparation of the bull *Exiit qui seminat*, published on August 14, 1279. During the deliberations which preceded the appearance of this declaration of the Rule, Olivi was at Rome, and while there wrote, at the request of his Provincial, a treatise on the expropriation required by the nature of the Franciscan rule.³³ This and two treatises on the *usus pauper*, one written before the declaration and one after, are included in Olivi's *Qq. in IV. Sent.*³⁴ In the latter two treatises, the Community doctrine on the *usus pauper*, combatted by Ubertino of Casale at the Council of Vienne, is sharply attacked.³⁵

The declaration of Nicholas III returned to a stricter interpretation of the Rule.³⁶ It was quite in accord with Olivi's own contentions on the subject, and he made use of it to support his subsequent writings. Bonagrazia also issued an encyclical letter concerning the new declaration,³⁷ and Olivi cites this also in his favor, as well as St. Bonaventure and other older authorities.³⁸

The new declaration did not greatly please Olivi's opponents, and his continued vindication of Franciscan ideals still less. But since they could not overthrow him on this ground, they accused him to Bona-

³³ "... vias quas Rome a sancte memorie fratre Bertrando ministro meo super hoc requisitus conscripsi, tempore quo ministri cum discretis aliis ibidem convenerant ad deliberandum super declaratione tunc temporis a domino Nicolao fienda et paullo post facta." (*Expositio super Regulam*, in *Firmamentum trium ordinum* [Venetiis, 1513], fol. 107; cf. *A.L.K.G.*, III, 415, 506—507.) Whether he had any direct part in the preparation of the declaration is not entirely clear.

³⁴ Cf. *infra*, note 186; *A.L.K.G.*, III, 507—517.

³⁵ "Novissime vero diebus istis... audent publice astruere et dogmatizare et in scholis suis solempniter determinare, quod usus pauper... nullo modo cadit sub voto... iam antea, quam perniciosus sit predictus error quantum ad omnes partes suas, habundantius et diffusius pro posse tractaverim in questionibus contra tales pestiferos de hoc primitus factis." (*A.L.K.G.*, III, 515) "Unde valde mirabile est quod aliqui in me impingerent tanquam novitatis inventorem propter articulum de paupere usu, quem contra ipsius fortissimos impugnatores et negatores quasi impulsus asserui et defendi." (*Expositio Regulæ*; cf. Wadding, ad an. 1297, n. 38, V, 430.)

³⁶ Cf. R. de Nantes, *E.F.*, XIV (1904), 477 *et seq.*; Holzapfel, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

³⁷ Dated October 8, 1279; edited by Wadding, ad an. 1279, n. 11, V, 83—85; also in *Chronologia historico-legalis Seraphici Ordinis*, I (Napoli, 1650), 31—32.

³⁸ Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, III, 507, 516, 531; *A.F.H.*, XXVIII (1935), 117, 382—384.

grazia of continuing to spread the errors and innovations he had introduced under Jerome of Ascoli.³⁹ This second process can be pieced together only with difficulty from certain obscure documents. First there is a letter of Olivi to Raymond Gaufredi and other confreres at Paris, in which he explains his teaching on 19 propositions concerning which he had been accused;⁴⁰ in another writing, he attacks the doctrines of a certain "fr. Ar." on 37 points;⁴¹ finally, we have Fronciacho's record of two letters of Bonagrazia against the errors of Olivi, *tunc noviter pullulantes*.⁴² From the tenor of the first two documents, we gather that some propositions of Olivi had been denounced to Bonagrazia around 1280, a step in which "fr. Ar." played a leading part, Olivi having written previously against him. After Bonagrazia had written for an account of the accused propositions of Olivi (the first letter), Olivi wrote a further explanation of what he had written against fr. Ar. (the second document mentioned above). But Bonagrazia condemned 19 propositions of Olivi (the second letter), and deprived Olivi of his writings.⁴³ The letter to his friends at Paris was written after this

³⁹ "Item notorium esse . . . postquam frater Jeronimus generalis minister combussit predictos libros fratris Petri Johannis, quod adhuc frater Petrus Johannis eosdem errores et novitates contrarias dictis doctorum sacre theologie scriptitavit et in voluminibus multiplicavit . . ." (Fronciacho, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 16, c. 44).

⁴⁰ As yet unedited save in the rare edition of 1509 (*Quodlibeta*, fol. 51va—53rb); extracts are given by P. Gratien, *E.F.*, XXIX (1913), 414—422, and du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio iudiciorum de novis erroribus* (Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1728), I, 231—233. The MS. used by P. Gratien bears the rubric: "Littera quam misit Parisius rescribendo Raymundo Gaufredi et sociis eius nondum generali ministro," whereas in *Quodlibeta* it is "fratri R. de Camliaco et sociis." The reading of P. Gratien is doubtless correct. The two have other variants.

⁴¹ Also unedited save in the *Quodlibeta* (fol. 42ra—53vb). Ehrle conjectured "fr. Ar." to be Arnaldus de Roccafolio (*A.L.K.G.*, III, 468—469; cf. Jarraux, *op. cit.*, pp. 139—140), which P. Gratien (p. 419, n. 1) rejects because *Cod. Par.* says "*bone memorie fratris A.*" and Arnaldus de Roccafolio was Provincial of Provence as late as 1300 (Cf. *A.F.H.*, XVII [1924], 196). *Quodlibeta* omits "*bone memorie*" (fol. 52rb); but it seems likely that the "fr. Ar." was Arnaldus Galhardi (cf. *A.L.K.G.*, III, 16; Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 499, n. 43). It is to be noted that this treatise against fr. Ar. begins with the question of the poor use.

⁴² "In XXVII. capitulo ponuntur due littere fratris Bonagratie ministri, per quas mandat arceri errores fratris P. J. et suorum sequacium tunc noviter pullulantes. Prima post salutationem incipit: Frater quidam, secunda vero: Quam sit periculosum." (*A.L.K.G.*, III, 13.) These two letters are not extant. According to the otherwise chronological order of Fronciacho, they would come before 1282.

⁴³ The letter to Gaufredi ends with the words: ". . . omnibus denudatus, etiam scriptitationibus meis." (*E.F.*, XXIX [1913], 422; *Quodlibeta*, fol. 53rb.) The reconstruction of this process as given above was first proposed by Koch, "Die Verurteilung Olivis auf dem Konzil von Vienne und ihre Vorgeschichte," *Scholastik*, V (1930), 489—522. The documents referred to

(c. 1281), in order to explain to them his position on the accused propositions. He refers to himself as universally defamed, and assures them of his desire to embrace persecution as a special grace of God.⁴⁴ He also refers to accusations of Joachimistic tendencies, of which we shall speak later.

The question of the poor use also occupied the attention of the following General Chapter at Strassburg in 1282, and Bonagrazia issued another encyclical letter, determining what was to be held in the matter. His solution agreed with Olivi's opinions, as we are told not only by Ubertino of Casale but also by Fronciacho, his opponent.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, says Ubertino, the letter was directed against Olivi, and contained many inconsistencies in this regard.⁴⁶

Letter of the Seven Seals

The renewed accusations of the anti-Olivi party at this Chapter resulted in a more serious process than those which he had previously experienced. An ordinance was passed that all Provincials should report to the Minister General if there were anyone in their respective provinces teaching doctrines.⁴⁷ When Bonagrazia's general visitation brought

were previously interpreted as referring to the later process of 1282 (cf. Ehrle, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 426—427). The main point of his hypothesis at least seems well established. He is, however, very prejudiced against Olivi (cf. e. g. pp. 489, 509, 513, n. 94; *supra*, n. 28; *infra*, n. 56, 58, 73).

⁴⁴ "Queso igitur, fratres mei, quid feci ordini meo ut fratres mei et patres sic me ubique terrarum dilacerent ut ante sim omnibus per infamiam notus quam natus . . . Timeo ne scelera mea hoc tam ineffabile bonum impediunt . . . ut abiectum et humiliatum Deus ad suum familiare consorcium . . . traheret et elevarer." (*Loc. cit.*, pp. 422, 417.)

⁴⁵ "In XXVIII. capitulo ponitur littera eiusdem generalis ministri, per quam determinat quid sit tenendum de questione usus pauperis; et incipit post salutationem: Pervenit ad me; et in ea fratris Petri Johannis opinio de usu paupere." (*A.L.K.G.*, III, 13—14.) This letter is also not extant. At the Council of Vienne, Ubertino capitalized on the fact that his opponents solemnly declared before the Pope their acceptance of this letter, in direct contradiction to all their other statements and actions.

⁴⁶ "... tamen in illa littera multa inconvenientia continentur, sicut et in aliis, quas fecit frater Bonagratia contra fratrem Petrum Johannis, que fuerunt per fratrem Arlottum, per fratrem Matheum de Aquasparta, per fratrem Raimundum Gaufridi, preclaros scientie theologie doctores et successores dicti fratris Bonagratie in generali ministerio, revocata." (*A.L.K.G.*, II, 387.) The reference to the three Ministers General will become clear as we proceed.

⁴⁷ Cf. *Acta Capituli Argentinensis*, *A.F.H.* XXVI (1933), 137, no. 16. Considering all that has been related so far, there seems to be no reason to doubt that this ordinance applies directly to Olivi and his "sectatores," though he is not named (cf. Laberge, *A.F.H.* XXVIII [1935], 119). — "Accusatus est in his comitiis frater Petrus Johannes (*sic*) Olivi, quod plurima libere nimis contra Communitatem Ordinis frequenter proferret, et gravius adhuc dixerunt aemuli, quaedam eius scripta circumferri a multis,

him to Paris (in 1282), he charged seven theologians of the Order there with the task of examining Olivi's writings.⁴⁸ These censors drew up a *rotulus*, or long parchment roll, containing a list of propositions quoted from Olivi's commentaries on the Sentences, each marked with what they considered the proper censure.⁴⁹ To this they added a letter fortified with their personal seals — whence the name "letter of the seven seals" — containing a list of propositions supposedly corrective of Olivi's propositions in the *rotulus*.⁵⁰ They ordained that this *rotulus* and the accompanying letter should be read publicly in all the convents of the province of Provence, that Olivi's writings should be confiscated from all who might possess them, and that Olivi should be compelled to subscribe to the propositions of the letter of seven seals.

With these documents, Bonagrazia went from Paris to Avignon, there to carry out the decisions of the censors, and to "repress the sect" of Olivi. But having fallen ill after his arrival, he commanded his companion, Gerard of Prato, to fulfill the business in his name.⁵¹ Bonagrazia

haeresi et erroribus plena . . . Hinc exortus contra eum tumultus et concitata conspiratio ne cessurum ab accusatione donec decretum est ut Minister Generalis omnino visitaret Provinciam Franciae [correctly, Provinciae], hominem examinaret, scripta discuteret, et doctrinae, dummodo malae, sectatores cohiberet." (Wadding, *Annales*, ad an. 1282, n. 2, V, 120.) Wadding draws much from Angelo Clareno in all this.

⁴⁸ Among them were Arlotto da Prato and Joannes de Murro (Giovanni Minio da Morovalle), later Ministers General, and Richard de Mediavilla. Cf. *A.L.K.G.* III, 14, 416 ff.; Wadding, ad an. 1283, n. 1, V, 134; *A.F.H.* XXIV (1931), 503; *Chronica XXIV Generalium* (*Analecta Franciscana* III, Quaracchi 1897), pp. 374 ff.; *Chronica Nicolai Glassberger* (*Analecta Franciscana* II, Quaracchi 1887), pp. 100 ff.; Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton* (Paris, 1925), pp. 79 ff., 443 ff.

⁴⁹ After replying to 34, Olivi says: ". . . de omnibus praedictis et quibusdam similibus eis annexis . . ." (*A.F.H.* XXVIII [1935], 405). Koch (*Scholastik* V [1930], 508) thinks that the *rotulus* contained about 50 propositions, but his reasons are not clear. Some of the propositions were marked as heretical, contrary to Daunou (*op. cit.*, p. 42). Olivi adds: "et sicut apparet . . . ipse auctor est sententialiter laesus seu reprehensus" (*A.F.H.* XXVIII [1935], 132).

⁵⁰ Koch (*l. c.* pp. 507 ff.) mentions 25 propositions, but without any explanation. We know these two documents only from Olivi's reply. This reply is also found in the *Quodlibeta*, fol. 50vb—51rb; extracts are given in du Plessis d'Argentré, *op. cit.*, pp. 230a—231b.

⁵¹ ". . . in infirmitate precepit quod frater Gerardus de Prato eius socius colligeret libros fratris Petri Johannis et sectam coherceret. Qui adhuc eo vivente [contrary to Jarraux, *l. c.* p. 138, and R. de Nantes, *E.F.* XVI (1906), p. 492] et iubente, ne commissio spiraret per mortem committentis, processit et precepit libros predictos sibi tradi" (*A.L.K.G.* III, 14). Bonagrazia died at Avignon on the date indicated (whether before or after Olivi's arrival is uncertain; cf. *A.F.H.* XXVIII [1935], p. 121, not in 1284, as Wadding states (ad an. 1284, n. 1, V, 141); cf. Salimbene, *Chronica* (ed. Holder-Egger, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores*, XXXII, Hannoverae et Lipsiae, 1905—1913), pp. 298, 321, 402, 520.

died at Avignon soon after (October 3, 1283). In the meantime, Gerard proceeded to confiscate Olivi's works and to receive his subscription to the articles drawn up by the censors. The precise order of events cannot be determined, nor is it clear how certain other details fit into the picture. Clarenó narrates in some detail how Olivi came unbidden to Avignon and delivered so powerful an address on conditions within the Order that Bonagrazia became sick with grief (*merore tabescens elanguit*); the two main instigators of the process also died soon after, and the rest of those gathered there were so confounded that they dismissed Olivi without reprisal.⁵² Raymond Gaufredi also stated at the Council of Vienne that Olivi had satisfied Gerard and the others on this occasion.⁵³ The details given by Olivi, in the letter to be presently described, and the text of his subscription offer no clues for the interpretation of these two sources.

Olivi's *Defensio*

After about a year and a half, Olivi by some chance obtained copies of his writings and the two documents issued against him,⁵⁴ whereupon he proceeded to draw up a complete reply to the seven censors. This is his famous *Defensio*, mentioned so often at the Council of Vienne.⁵⁵ It was written from Nîmes, in 1285, some time before the General Chapter of that year. He begins by expressing his astonishment at the unusually severe defamatory measures that had been taken against him in so

⁵² "... nemo poterat respondere sapientie et resistere spiritui qui loquebatur, ipse enim erat tanquam lux in lucem reducens dubia, ideo eum emuli insequabantur acerbe; nam verum est illud: Summa petit livor, perflant altissima venti" (*A.L.K.G.* II, 291 ff.). Clarenó's account is regarded as fantastic by Ehrle (*l. c.* p. 424), Jarraux (*l. c.* p. 138), and de Nantes (*E.F.* XVI [1906], p. 492). Perhaps if more details were available to us, Clarenó's description might be construed somewhat more favorably. The above quotation is repeated by the later Conventual historian, Petrus Rodolphus Tossinianensis, in his *Historiarum Seraphicæ Religionis libri III* (Venetiis, 1586), fol. 331r (cf. *A.F.H.* X [1917], p. 332). Daunou (*op. cit.*, p. 45) mentions a MS. of a sermon attributed to Olivi on this occasion by Clarenó (*Incipit: Spiritu oris eius interficiet impium*); but it seems to be mentioned nowhere else.

⁵³ "... exceptis forte paucis emulis." *A.L.K.G.* III, p. 143.

⁵⁴ "... nullam viam excusandi me penitus habuissim, nisi pridie ex quodam contingenti casu et incidenti occursu fuisset a Deo mihi aliquantula opportunitas ministrata" (*A.F.H.* XXVIII [1935], p. 135).

⁵⁵ Published in *A.F.H.*, XXVIII [1935], 130—135, 374—407; XXIX [1936], 98—141, 365—387; also in *Quodlibeta*, fol. 54r—50v (pagination confused), 53v—61v; cf. also du Plessis d'Argentré, *op. cit.*, pp. 226b—230a. *Incipit: "Reverendis in Christo fratribus... homuncio peccatorum vilissimus, dictus frater Petrus Ioannis Olivi, eam reverentie plenitudinem quam decet magistros et patres tantos ac tales."* Articles 12—16 concern the observance of the Rule.

unprecedented and arbitrary a manner. For, he said, the censors had condemned his doctrines without giving the least proof that they were erroneous or properly interpreted, and had issued a solemn condemnation throughout the Province, all without first giving him a hearing to defend himself and explain his teachings.⁵⁶ Then at Avignon he was ordered to accept the letter of seven seals as though it contained articles of faith or papal definitions, scarcely being given time to read it or to deliberate. This placed him in a dilemma, for if he refused to accept the propositions, he would seem to be heretical; but if he accepted them unconditionally, he would seem to admit that he had really contradicted them in his writings, so that he suspected that he had purposely been asked about the letter of seven seals and not about the *rotulus*.⁵⁷ Finally, neither his judge at Avignon (Gerard da Prato) nor his Provincial would give him permission to go to Paris to defend himself, so he had to do so by writing, having obtained the necessary materials. After these few introductory remarks, he gives a lengthy and acute refutation of the

⁵⁶ "... ad improbationem dictorum meorum nulla ratio aut auctoritas inducitur sed absolute mea dicta vel mihi imposita improbantur, praecise dicendo: hoc est haeticum vel falsum... nec ibi etiam ex dictis meis contra me probatur, quod ego sensum illum qui mihi ibidem imponi videtur, semper habuerim, sed tanquam sit hoc certum et ratum, sine mora damnatur." (*A.F.H.*, XXVIII 1935, 134) — According to Koch, this marks a new departure in medieval *Irrtumslisten*. He would have us believe (*op. cit.*, pp. 505 *et seq.*) that the *rotulus* was a severely scientific and objective document; but in fact the trivial character and subjectivity of its criticisms belie this, and merit the critique of Ubertino which we shall quote later. Most of the propositions are subtle philosophical questions, arbitrarily interpreted (cf. de Nantes, *E.F.*, XVI [1906], 481). At the Council of Vienne, as we shall see, the Community dropped most of them, while the papal examiners dealt only with two. — In one place Olivi remarks: "Certe in quaestionibus meis plura possunt esse incorrecta, quia me nolente per aliquos communicatae fuerunt antequam eas diligentius correxissem" (*ibid.*, p. 378; cf. pp. 129, 13; 132; Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 494). This is the only place where Olivi admits error.

⁵⁷ Hence he took a middle course, stating in what sense he understood the 22 propositions, and that he had never taught otherwise, adding that if he had ("quod non credo"), he now revoked it. As Laberge points out (*A.F.H.*, XXVIII [1935], 121), this contradicts the statements of Pronciacho (*A.L.K.G.*, III, 14), Wadding (V, 135), and *Chronica XXIV Generalium* (p. 376), that Olivi revoked his propositions unconditionally. — Olivi writes: "... ubi et aliquantulum suspicatus sum quod aliqua subtili excogitatione, ne dicam astutia, ordinatum fuerit a quocumque quod ego non requirerem de his quae erant in rotulo directe contra me fabricato, sed solum de dictis litterae vestrae praefatae..." (*A.F.H.*, XXVIII, 134). Cf. also the following: "Si vero dicatur ab aliquo mihi malevolo quod ego dolose talibus verbis usus sum, quasi voluerim per hoc disseminare errorem... iniquissime hoc in me impingeretur..." (*ibid.*, p. 146 *et seq.*) — "Hoc dictum est nimis truncate excerptum, et Deus velit quod de hoc et de quibusdam aliis scienter et astute non fuerit factum" (*ibid.*, p. 154; cf. also 389, I. 23; 135, I. 22). That there was some reason behind these remarks Olivi indicates elsewhere (cf. *ibid.*, p. 134; *E.F.* XXIX [1913], 421; *A.F.H.* XI [1918], 372 *et seq.*).

censors' criticisms, and asks them to send a written reply, so that if his teachings were really erroneous, they might prove it for his enlightenment and correction.⁵⁸ But if they cannot repair his reputation in the matter, he expresses his willingness, as in the letter to Gaufredi, to die to all things for Christ's sake.⁵⁹

Favorable Developments

Olivi's request received perhaps a better answer than he had anticipated. The General Chapter at Milan (May, 1285) proved to be a turning

⁵⁸ "Si autem . . . iudicor errasse, ostendatur mihi hoc, et libenter volo corrigi et edoceri; sed meo iudicio sola cruce signatio vel solum dicere: falsum et erroneum est, non sufficiunt eruditioni meae" (*ut supra*, p. 397; cf. 155, 390). — "Hinc est, carissimi patres, mihi valde venerabiles, et merito reverendi ac metuendi, quod quamvis ego abominandus homuncio, ne dicam quam respectu Dei, sed etiam respectu vestri sim nihil, et si dici queat minus quam nihil, ex hoc tamen a me obedientiam talem exigere aut exigendam consulere non debetis, ut dictis vestris, quamvis solemnibus, quamvis reverendis, tanquam catholicae fidei . . . omnino debeam subdi, nisi enodatione luce clariori primitus innotescat vestrum dictum esse verum dictum catholicae fidei" (*ibid.*, p. 132). — "Supplicio igitur ac peto, reverendi Patres ac Magistri Ordinis nostri, ut si quid in praedictis minus sane dictum sit, mihi pauperculo per rationem validam et auctoritatem solidam clare ac dilucide explicetis" (*ibid.*, p. 387). De Nantes asserts: "Malheureusement . . . l'attitude humble et soumise qu'il (Olivi) manifesta en cette circonstance ne se tarda pas de se transformer en irritation violente, en face des accusations injustes et passionnées dont il se vit bientôt accablé. Au lieu de se montrer indépendant et digne dans une humble soumission, et de défendre avec une liberté respectueuse les idées qui lui étaient si chères, il ne sut garder aucune mesure dans la lutte, et se répandit en invectives amères contre ceux-là mêmes qui étaient revêtus de la suprême autorité" (*E.F.*, XXVI [1911], 478). This indictment is truly astonishing, inasmuch as nowhere in Olivi do we find anything corresponding to this description; unless perhaps with Koch (*op. cit.*, p. 509) we regard the protestations of Olivi quoted above as mere sarcasm and bitter scorn. But even this is hardly tenable, as Olivi speaks in a similar strain in other letters where there can be no question of insincerity, and if he had intended such a meaning he would have defeated his purpose. His general attitude towards philosophy, which we shall touch upon later, is also to the point.

⁵⁹ "Obsecro igitur vos, tanquam fratres et patres meos venerabiles, ut tantae diffamationi meae, contra communem modum et, ut arbitror, contra rectum ordinem iuris processu hactenus valde inusitato super me factae, compatiamini, et pie, prout poteritis, eam dignemini sublevare . . . Si autem zelum veritatis incitat vos contra istum vilem et abiectum vermiculum, odoretur Christi sacrificium (I Reg. 26, 19). Ecce enim ego omni opinioni, praeterquam soli fidei Romanae ecclesiae, paratus sum mortificari, quibus et iam mortuus sincera mente et fideli confessione clamo: 'non iudicavi me scire aliquid inter vos nisi Iesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum,' pro cuius paupertate et ignominia, ex immensa caritate pro me suscepta, totis visceribus ac medullis internorum affectuum desidero immolari" (*A.F.H.*, XXVIII [1935], 407). — "Verumptamen licet hoc in desiderio habeam," he says in the letter to Gaufredi, yet he must defend himself, "quia occasionem dare non debeat ut contra veritatem credar falsarius veritatis et precipue ubi agitur de catholice fidei veritate" (*E.F.*, XXIX [1913], 417. "... viderer concedere, et hoc mendose et contra conscientiam meam, quod ego in illo erroneo vel haeretico sensu qui michi erat impositus, ea dixissem" (*A.F.H.*, XXVIII [1935], 133).

point in his favor. At this Chapter, as at the last, Olivi's adversaries brought the usual accusations against him. Arnaud de Roquefeuil (Arnaldus de Roccafolio), probably as Provincial of Provence, presented a petition, signed by 35 other friars of Provence, that measures should be taken against Olivi, whom they designated as the head of a superstitious, seditious sect and of many errors in his province.⁶⁰ So far, no "coercive measures" had been taken against Olivi, nor had his writings been officially and generally proscribed. In spite of all that had hitherto taken place, however, the Chapter merely ordained that Olivi's writings should be collected until the new Minister General should decide concerning them.⁶¹

After a vacancy of nearly two years since the death of Bonagrazia, the office of Minister General was conferred by this Chapter upon Arlotto da Prato.⁶² Whereas Olivi had asked only for a written reply from the seven censors,⁶³ Arlotto called him to Paris to answer his censors personally. Angelo Clareno relates an incident in which Olivi silenced his adversaries (Richard de Mediavilla and John de Murro) by the force of his arguments, and Arlotto turned to them smiling and said: "Frater

⁶⁰ "...caput superstitiose secte et divisionis et plurium errorum in eadem provincia Provinciae. Et incipit [petitio]: anno domini MCCLXXXV." (A.L.K.G., III, 14; cf. A.F.H., XXVIII [1935], 122). According to de Sessevalle (*op. cit.*, p. 85), "c'est à ce chapitre que furent discutés pour la première fois les écrits de Pierre Jean Olieu."! It is perhaps doubtful, however, if this notice of Fronciacho really pertains to the Chapter of Milan (cf. Ubertino, A.L.K.G., II, 388).

⁶¹ "Item mandat capitulum generale ministris, quod diligenter inquirent in suis provinciis si quis frater habeat quaestiones aut aliquid de scriptis fratris Petri Iohannis de provincia Provinciae, et omnia inventa auferant, nec aliquem eis uti permittant, quousque per generalem ministrum alius fuerit ordinatum" (A.F.H., XXII [1929], 289, 3; cf. also 287, 14).

⁶² Brother of the Gerardo da Prato mentioned above. At the time of his election he was *magister regens* at Paris (cf. A.F.H., XXII [1929], 274 *et seq.*; P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 369, 374). Authors point out that the rapid succession of superiors was a factor in the decline of discipline in the Order (cf. P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 361—366; de Nantes, E.F., XV [1906], pp. 588 *et seq.*).

⁶³ "Quia igitur presentia ac viva voce me vobis excusare non valeo, idcirco more epistolari seu litterario, qui prolixitatem necessariam tantae rei non patitur, me vobis excusandum decrevi, obsecrans vestram celsitudinem magistralem ut, si qua vere excusata fuerint, benigne recipiat et receptionem ipsam mihi per litteras pia condescensione rescribat, si qua vero inexcusata vel inexcusabilia iudicaverit, hoc ipsum mihi ad meae ignorantiae sublevationem et reformationem per vobis solidae rationis et divinae auctoritatis exponat" (A.F.H., XXVIII [1935], 134). There is no evidence that Olivi's plea made any impression on the other six censors; certainly not on John de Murro, as subsequent events will show. Cf. the *Series Condemnationum* on Olivi's *apologia*: "liber satis prolixus, in quo nisus est se excusare... colorando et paliando ac excusando que dixit."! (A.F.H., XXIV [1931], 503.)

Richarde et frater Ioannes, respondete ei;" but they could not.⁶⁴ But within a year after his election, Arlotto died, without having brought the affair to any definite conclusion.⁶⁵

However, Olivi's rehabilitation was completed within another year, namely at the General Chapter of Montpellier in 1287, at which the famous theologian Matthew of Aquasparta was elected Minister General. Olivi was perhaps accused at this Chapter as at the two preceding;⁶⁶ but this time he was called before the Chapter and given a chance to defend himself.⁶⁷ His explanation of the poor use was accepted by the Minister General and the whole Chapter,⁶⁸ and Aquasparta appointed Olivi to the office of lector in the important *studium* of Santa Croce at Florence. Here Olivi became familiar with Ubertino da Casale, Angelo Clareno, and Bl. Conrad of Offida Spiritual leaders of the Italian provinces.⁶⁹ It was probably here also that he came into contact with Petrus de Trabibus, his later disciple in the chair of philosophy.

Already the following year (1288) Aquasparta was made Cardinal by the new Pope, Nicholas IV (Jerome of Ascoli), and the following year gave up his charge to Raymund Gaufredi, who was elected Minister General on May 28, 1289, at the Chapter of Rieti. The new Minister appointed Olivi, his old friend of Parisian days, to the still more important *studium* of Montpellier, and Olivi acted as lector in various places till his death — a point which Ubertino tellingly emphasized at the Council of Vienne, as we shall see.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, II, 295 *et seq.*; *A.F.H.*, XXVIII (1935), 123.

⁶⁵ Cf. *Chronica XXIV Generalium*, p. 382; Wadding, *ad an.* 1285, n. 5, V, 156.

⁶⁶ P. Gratien (*op. cit.*, p. 382) puts the *consilium* of Arnaldus de Roccafolio at this Chapter (cf. *supra*, note 60).

⁶⁷ Olivi may then have been stationed at Montpellier again (the letter to Gaufredi was written from there). At any rate, Montpellier, Nîmes, Narbonne, and Béziers are all close together, hence Olivi was undoubtedly near at hand. This development was no doubt influenced by the previous action of Arlotto, and also by Pope Nicholas IV (cf. *infra*, note 73).

⁶⁸ "Quod etiam dicunt iuxta hoc, quod frater Petrus erravit dicens usum pauperem esse de substantia voti evangelice paupertatis . . . de hoc ponimus hic sententiam fratris Petri predicti et explicationem quam fecit in generali capitulo apud Montem Pessulanum celebrato presente fratre Mattheo de Aquasparta generali ministro, a quo et a toto generali capitulo fuit acceptata" (Ubertino da Casale, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 400).

⁶⁹ Cf. Felder, *op. cit.*, p. 154; Sarri, "Pier di Giovanni Olivi e Ubertino da Casale," *Studi Francescani*, XI (1925), 88—125. According to Tocco (*Studii francescani* [Napoli, 1909], pp. 370 *et seq.*), Aquasparta sent Olivi to Florence to remove him from his "followers" in Provence, which Jarraux rejects (*op. cit.*, 150 *et seq.*). P. Gratien suggests that it was to remove him from his accusers (*op. cit.*, p. 382).

⁷⁰ According to Felder (*op. cit.*, p. 367), it was customary then to change lectors every year.

Olivi's return to Provence was followed by a widespread recrudescence of Spiritual and Joachimistic ideas among the people of Provence and Aragon, due largely, no doubt, to the fact that the new Minister General was himself a Spiritual, which was calculated to encourage the Spiritual party and the Joachimistic sects. At any rate, the Community approached Nicholas IV in 1290 with the request that he proceed against the heresies and enormities of Olivi and his "followers." The Pope sent a letter to Gaufredi commanding him to institute a process against these disturbers of the peace, which Gaufredi entrusted to the Franciscan inquisitor Bertrand de Sigottier, whose report he brought before the General Chapter at Paris in 1292.⁷¹ At the Council of Vienne, the Community claimed that the letter of Nicholas was aimed against Olivi and his heresies;⁷² but Ubertino dissipated this pretense, asserting that the Pope himself, on being requested to proceed against Olivi, had refused,⁷³ and had aimed the letter against certain vicious and fanatical sects who were the guilty parties.⁷⁴ These latter were punished,⁷⁵ but no action was taken against Olivi, who was present at the Chapter of Paris and gave the same explanation of his doctrine on the poor use that he had given at the Chapter of Montpellier, and again the Chapter accepted

⁷¹ "Eodem anno (1290) dominus Papa misit litteras dicto Generali fratri Raymundo, ut contra quosdam fratres ageret, qui in Provincia Provinciae schisma videbantur inducere, statum aliorum fratrum damnantes et se spiritualiores ceteris reputantes, quorum nonnulli reperti sunt malae famae et scandala in Provinciis suscitantes et doctrinam quandam non consonam veritati tenentes. Examinationem diligenter fiendam fratri Bertrando de Cigotorio commisit ad sibi referendam. Facta vero relatione, dictus Generalis omnia ad examen et definitionem deduxit capituli generalis Parisius proximo celebrandi" (*Chronica XXIV Generalium*, p. 420). Cf. also Wadding, V, 264, 336; P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, p. 426; Clareno, *A.L.K.G.*, II, 295 *et seq.*

⁷² "... quamvis generalibus verbis!" Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, II, 381 *et seq.*; III, 15, 156 *et seq.*

⁷³ "Nulla mentio fit de eo in litteris Papae, nulla de eius doctrina, nec fuit eius intentio contra eum, sicut ipse Pontifex dixit nobis expressis verbis" (*A.L.K.G.*, II, 389). This is probably the incident to which Clareno refers and Koch calls "wenig glaubhaft" (Cf. *supra*, note 28). Ubertino adds that it was Nicholas IV who had recommended to Aquasparta the appointment of Olivi to the lectorate at Florence.

⁷⁴ "... cuius verba et doctrinae superstitiosae provocaverunt litteram... contra quos illa littera loquebatur" (*ibid.*).

⁷⁵ "Fuerunt etiam puniti fratres culpabiles ex informatione facta per dictum fratrem Bertrandum de Cigotorio in Provincia Provinciae iuxta praecceptum datum Generali per dictum dominum Papam, brigas et schismata in dicta Provincia occasione doctrinae fratris Petri praedicti suscitantes. Quamvis ut ex dictis apparet, idem Petrus Ordini satisfecerit nec repertus fuerit schismaticus vel rebellis, tamen multos sequaces in doctrina habuit nescio quem zelum sine discretione habentes, sub devotionis colore non modicum capitosos, quibus multa scandala sunt secuta" (*Chronica XXIV Generalium*, p. 422).

it.⁷⁶ What is more striking, the Chapter permitted once more the free circulation of Olivi's writings.⁷⁷ The remaining few years of his life were spent, we are told, amid the universal veneration of clergy and people.⁷⁸

Remainder of his Life

Pope Nicholas IV died in 1292. After a vacancy of two years, the hermit Pietro Morrone ascended the throne of Peter (August 19, 1294) as Celestine V. The Spirituals had reason to hope — they now had both a favorable General and a Pope who had long been a friend of theirs. Celestine indeed granted long-desired favors to Angelo Clareno and other Spirituals, but, unfortunately for them, abdicated after only four months (December 13). Benito Gaetano, who succeeded him (December 24) as Boniface VIII, did not prove favorable to the Spirituals. The troublous times of neo-Caesarism, which was to cause Boniface so much grief, were just beginning; the Spirituals, in the controversy over the validity of Peter Celestine's abdication and the consequent legitimacy of Boniface, sided with the powerful Colonna, their patrons, in opposing Boniface, while Raymund Gaufredi enjoyed the favor of Philip the Fair and was himself a Spiritual. Among the first acts of Boniface were the abrogation of all that his predecessor had enacted and the unceremonious deposition of Gaufredi (October 29, 1295).⁷⁹ Clareno and the other Spirituals who had been separated from the Order by Celestine now fled to Greece, and Gaufredi was succeeded at the General Chapter of Anagni by John de Murro, friend of the Pope and bitter enemy of the

⁷⁶ "Et similiter postea a fratre Raymundo Gaufredi generali ministro et a generali capitulo sub eo Parisius celebrato fuit repetita et acceptata eius explicatio et a predictis duobus magistris solemnibus et generalibus ministris multipliciter per ordinem predicata . . . Verba autem fratris Petri de usu paupere a predictis duobus ministris generalibus et generalibus capitulis acceptata et etiam a fratre Arloto predecessore amborum et a catholicis omnibus ut credimus acceptanda, salva semper determinatione sanctissimi domini nostri summi pontificis, sunt hec: . . ." (Ubertino da Casale, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 400). Cf. also *Chronica XXIV Generalium* (Conventual source): "Quae omnia admisit et acceptavit capitulum generale . . . quae prius etiam acceptata fuerat per capitulum generale Montispessulani sub fratre Athloto tunc Generali (*sic*)" (p. 421 *et seq.*). The declaration of Olivi at these two Chapters, given by Ubertino after the above quotation, is also edited in Wadding, *ad an.* 1297, n. 33, V, 425 *et seq.*; Jarraux, *op. cit.*, pp. 142—144; *A.F.H.*, I (1908), 621; de Sessevalle, *op. cit.*, pp. 121—123. *Explicit*: "Predictorum autem contrarium nunquam sensi nec dixi; et si, quod non credo, contrarium huius in aliquo tractatu meo posset inveniri, ego illud abhorrerem et pro viribus exterminarem."

⁷⁷ "... remansit capitulum paccatum et contentum, et libri illius libere dimissi communicari volentibus" (Ubertino da Casale, *A.L.K.G.*, III, 191, 426). This is confirmed by the subsequent action of John de Murro in 1299.

⁷⁸ Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, II, 388; III, 144.

⁷⁹ Cf. *Chronica XXIV Generalium*, pp. 430 *et seq.*; P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 364 *et seq.*

Spirituals. Olivi, however, was no more molested during his lifetime, and the Spirituals also seem to have enjoyed a sort of lull from 1292 till after his death.

The lack of discipline in the Church, the abuses prevalent among the clergy, the evils threatening the Church from without, and numerous grave circumstances of this kind affecting the times of which we speak, made it a fertile ground for the spread of various sects of Joachimistic, apocalyptic aberrations and immoralities, such as the *Apostoli*, the *Beguini*, the "sect of the free spirit," etc. Many Spirituals within the Order became infiltrated with such excesses, thus, so Wadding remarks, causing serious harm to all Spirituals and in particular to Olivi.⁸⁰ Fanatics of various types, with whom Olivi had nothing to do, proclaimed him their leader and prophet, and attached a superstitious value to his writings, which they often used to support their own ideas.⁸¹ The Community only too readily made use of these facts to incriminate and discredit Olivi and the Spirituals for their own ends.⁸²

⁸⁰ "Nocuit horum miseria et infamia (inventi enim vere sunt aliqui a veritatis et pietatis tramite deviantes) aliis piis viris, dum enim quiddam agebant aut proponebant ad restituendam regularem observantiam, supersticiosorum et erroneum ex tempore socii proclamabantur (*sic*)" (ad an. 1290, n. II, V, 264). — "Hi valde nocuerunt praedicto Petro, cuius se profitebantur sequaces; quamvis enim ille liber dimissus sit ex comitiis, neque judicatus sit in doctrina sua pecasse; tamen hi in universa illa Provincia tot excitarunt turbas et schismata ut tamquam cervicosi nimis et tumultuarii fuerint plectendi, et doctrinam illius quem suum praedicabant Magistrum odiosam valde reddiderunt Ordinis communitati. Zelum quemdam indiscretum, ut communiter in huiusmodi rebus fit, sub devotionis colore praeferebant, nec poterant a suis opinionibus revocari, atque hinc secuta quaedam scandala et prohibita fuit doctrina Petri ob aliorum periculum" (*ibid.*, p. 336; note dependence on *Chronica XXIV Generalium*).

⁸¹ Thus the Community writes: "Et aliqui dixerunt quod doctrina fratris Petri erat defendenda sicut articulus fidei. Et aliqui dixerunt quod ipse frater Petrus erat ille angelus de quo dicitur in apocalipsi, qui veniebat post illum angelum qui habebat signum Dei vivi. Et eius sequaces . . . nituntur exhibere eidem fratri Petro mortuo reverentiam sicut sancto contra canonum interdicta" (*A. L. K. G.*, II, 371). — Raynaldus records the following incident: "Tunc tempore (c. 1300) Frater de Bodicis de Provincia Provinciae fugit cum libris Petri Ioannis de Biterris, et in Ecclesia S. Petri Romae per quinque Beguinos et tredecim mulieres in Papam electus est!" (*Annales Ecclesiastici*, ad an. 1297, n. 55).

⁸² Jarraux writes: "L'histoire d'Olivi est une chose et l'histoire du mouvement des Spirituels en est une autre!" (*op. cit.*, p. 136, n. 1). On the other hand, the history of the Spirituals in general and that of the sects mentioned is not entirely the same either, save by the imposition of the Community. Cf. also Daunou: "Ces opinions et son zèle ardent à les soutenir l'ont font passer, après sa mort, (speaking of Olivi) pour le chef ou le précurseur d'une secte d'illuminés . . . Il est certain qu'ils rêvaient la mémoire de Pierre Jean, qu'ils traduisaient ses livres en langue vulgaire; mais rien n'autorise à le déclarer leur instituteur, ni à lui reprocher leurs déplorables égarements . . . qui tenaient de lui ni leur institution, ni leurs croyances, ni leurs pratiques" (*op. cit.*, p. 47; p. 54, quoting Ubertino). — Cf. *infra*, n. 108.

Olivi indicates in several places that he does not consider himself guilty of the excesses of those who thus traduced him. Of interest in this connection is his letter, dated from Narbonne, May 18, 1295, to the hostage sons of King Charles II of Naples (one of whom became St. Louis of Toulouse), in answer to their earnest appeal to visit them. He gives several reasons for hesitating to come, remarking that, despite his disinterestedness concerning the quarrels of some, yet even the most innocent things are often evilly interpreted.⁸³ He adds that if they insist, he is ready to come, having obtained permission from the Minister General (John de Murro!). But they were released before any further developments. This incident is an indication of the reputation which Olivi enjoyed.

More important is his letter to Bl. Conrad of Offida, dated from Narbonne, September 14, 1295. In it he severely castigates the fanatical Spirituals who denied the legitimacy of Boniface VIII and the papal declarations of the Rule, and who separated themselves from the Order in consequence of their doctrines,⁸⁴ asking his friend to use his influence with these miscreants.⁸⁵ According to Oliger, he is the only one at that time who solved the question of Celestine's abdication successfully in every respect.⁸⁶

⁸³ "Tercia causa [non veniendi] fuit, quia licet pro nullo vivente contra aliquem aliquid suaderem et precipue contra dominos et principes mundi huius, nichilominus veritus sum per scripturam quamcumque etiam communia indicare; sepe enim sinistre interpretantur, que simplici animo digeruntur. Nam et michi a fide digno aliquo dictum fuit, quod etiam dominus pater vester timuerat vos inbeguinari seu ut proprius loquar in divinis infatuari per eloquia oris mei. Quod si de illo modo credidit, de quo Apostolus ait: 'Nos stulti per Christum,' et: 'Qui voluerit esse sapiens in hoc seculo, stultus fiat, ut sit sapiens;' et: 'Quod stultum est dei, sapiencius est hominibus,' id est quam humana sapiencia mundi — non sum tante sapiencie et virtutis, ut hac sapientissima stulticia replere vos possem. Si vero de huic contrario fuit dictum, absit a me, quod meas vel non meas stulticias in vos vel alios per stultiloquia vel stulta consilia refundere velim. Si enim aliquid sincerum a deo meo accepi, hoc scio esse precipuum, ut veritati sue fidei et sanis consiliis proximi sim fidelis. Unde et sepiissime eligo et elegi meam vitam miseram privatim et publice reprobare, ne vite Christi radiositas per mee vite tenebras obfuscetur" (*A.L.K.G.*, III, 539; compare Wadding, V, 58, 120).

⁸⁴ Perhaps Angelo Clareno's group is meant; cf. *A.F.H.*, X (1917), 355.

⁸⁵ "Secundum [detrimentum quod ex istorum dementia patitur regula] est, quod spirituales huius regule professores et observatores propter istos blasfemantur ab aliis extrema immoderate tenere. Tertium est, quod idem ex hoc reputantur instar illorum erroribus et heresibus comisceri. Et ideo huiusmodi pestiferi sunt a viris spiritualibus incessanter et implacabiliter expugnandi . . . Quamvis autem pertinaces et protervos in hac parte detestor, compatiatur tamen pluribus simplicibus, qui per ignorantiam sub ymagine paupertatis et specie pietatis miserabiliter, attamen damnabiliter, deluduntur" (*A.F.H.*, XI [1918], 372 et seq.).

⁸⁶ *A.F.H.*, XI (1918), 338. He also edits a question on the same subject from Olivi's *Quaestiones de perfectione evangelica*. Cf. also *La France Franciscaine*, IX (1926), 295, n. 2; XII (1928), 364. Oliger says of this letter: "Quis

Olivi died at Narbonne on March 14, 1298, in his fiftieth year. The *MS* cited in the beginning of this study tells us that after receiving the last sacraments, he declared that he had received all his knowledge at Paris by a divine illumination, and also gives a declaration of Olivi's position on the observance of the Rule and his submission to the teachings of the Church which he pronounced at the same time.⁸⁷ After his death an altar was erected in his honor in the friars' church at Narbonne, and Clarenco tells us that never in the memory of man was such a celebration seen as on the anniversary of Olivi's death, the crowds surpassing those seen every year at the Portiuncula.⁸⁸ We read that every year a solemn Mass of the Blessed Virgin was celebrated at his tomb, which was surrounded with votive offerings and testimonials of the favors obtained through the intercession of the new thaumaturgus; bishops and cardinals took part in the celebrations, and Olivi was venerated by

non mirabitur Olivi sic loquentem et Spirituales durioribus verbis increpantem? Nonne ipse similia et etiam peiora suis scriptis disseminavit? Transeo (!) quod Nicolai III decretalem defendit, cum ipse in ea praeparanda . . . collaboravit (cf. *supra*, note 26). Sed alii in quaestionibus, ut in paupertate minoritica ultra modum celebrata et Ioachimismi somniis receptis, quoad eorum fundamentum et primum velut principium, immunis dici nequit. Non potest igitur, iudicante etiam P. Ehrle, negari Olivi pro variis temporum circumstantiis sibi consuluisse, ea, quae a doctrina eius inopportune scaturire videbantur, dextere a se avertendo . . . Quae cum omnium testimonio ita sint, mirum sane est hominem tanti ingenii, tantae perspicacitatis in errores apocalypticos Joachimi Florentis incidisse . . . Olivi autem, quod hucusque ab omnibus praetermissum est, forsan a iuventute Ioachimismi doctrina imbutus est . . . Inerant profecto veluti duae mentes in Olivi, quarum una positiva, ieiune ac logice rem considerans atque simul perspicax, profunde omnia penetrans; altera mystica, abstrusa, Ioachimismo irreparabiliter dedita atque irretita. Eum non assecuta esse, ut duas illas mentes harmonice componeret, fatum est auctoris et origo crebrarum vexationum quas vivens et post mortem perpeusus est" (*A.F.H.*, XI [1918], 322 *et seq.*, 335). — Cf. also Ehrle: "Es zeigt uns eben dieser Brief noch einmal die Geschmeidigkeit, mit welcher Olivi, wo es die Zeitverhältnisse verlangten, zur Beschwichtigung eines losbrechenden Sturmes, ohne eigentlich von seinen Grundsätzen abzulassen, doch plötzlich an den von ihm bisher eifrigst bekämpften Verhältnissen und Schriftstücken eine neue Seite hervorkehrt und in anscheinend nur dem feindlichen Standpunkt dienenden Ausdrücken seine wahre Herzensmeinung zu verbergen weiß" (*op. cit.*, p. 439). These conclusions seem to be arrived at entirely too hastily. Is there really anything in Olivi's writings or life to warrant such assertions? Is this not to interpret the clear by the obscure, instead of using a clear and explicit passage like the above as a key to interpret more dubious utterances of Olivi, and thus to end in assumptions and extravagant speculations? Also, it must be remembered, we are here concerned with a private letter, which could hardly have the intentions attributed to it by Ehrle. Other authors are willing to judge the letter at its face value (cf. P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, p. 427; de Sessevalle, *op. cit.*, pp. 121, 123; Jarraux, *op. cit.*, p. 145); Holzapfel, p. 52.

⁸⁷ Cf. *A.F.H.*, XI (1918), 267—269. The question posed here by Heysse (pp. 263 *et seq.*) can perhaps be solved by assuming Wadding's source, with *Bonifacius*, as the correct version.

⁸⁸ Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, I, 544.

the people and clergy as a saint.⁸⁹ But the Community did not share this veneration, and all this came to a rude end, as we shall see further on.

Further Developments

Only a year later, at the General Chapter of Lyons in 1299, John de Murro ordered that the works of Olivi should be gathered up again and burned,⁹⁰ and sentence of excommunication was pronounced on anyone who should presume to keep or use them.⁹¹ The Provincials of Provence and Aragon with Vital du Four, then lector at Toulouse, were charged with the task of collecting them, and of demanding in each case the retraction of Olivi's teaching on the poor use. All who resisted were proceeded against with full rigor.⁹²

The Spirituals and *Beguini* of Provence wrote to Boniface VIII protesting against the injustice of this renewed condemnation and the punishment of many friars. But Boniface, advised apparently by John de Murro, ordered a process against them similar to that under Nicholas IV, and also excommunicated Angelo Clareno and those who had fled with him.⁹³ These persecutions were continued under Gonsalvus Hispanus, the successor of John de Murro,⁹⁴ so that, according to Ubertino da Casale,⁹⁵ more than 300 religious were despoiled of their habit, expelled from their province, or committed to perpetual imprisonment (which usually implied the deprivation of the sacraments, ecclesiastical burial, and all books, including the breviary, as well as inhuman treatment). But the hour of the Spirituals — if but short-lived — was approaching. As the division between the Community and the Spirituals became ever more sharp and critical after the turn of the century, so

⁸⁹ Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, III, 442 *et seq.*

⁹⁰ This measure was repeated later, which explains the present paucity of Olivian MSS. The few extant are probably those kept in the archives of the Order and used at Avignon, where Fronciacho after the Council asked the Pope what should be done with them (cf. *A.L.K.G.*, III, 25, 88; *A.F.H.*, XXVII [1934], 418). Cf. Ehrle, *op. cit.*, pp. 552 *et seq.*

⁹¹ Cf. P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 427 *et seq.*; *A.F.H.*, XXIV (1931), 504; Wadding, *ad an.* 1297, n. 35, V, 427; *A.L.K.G.* II, 311, 366.

⁹² Ubertino mentions that John de Murro made an official pronouncement imposing on all an opinion concerning the poor use contrary to that accepted at Montpellier and Paris (also cites it; *A.L.K.G.*, II, 126, 366, 386; III, 15 *et seq.*, 88, 144, 157).

⁹³ Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, II, 129; *A.F.H.*, XXIV (1931), 504. According to the latter source, "De hoc processu . . . documenta hucusque edita omnino silent" (505, n. 2). But the letter of Boniface is given by Raynaldus, *op. cit.*, *ad an.* 1297, n. 57.

⁹⁴ The latter was made Cardinal-Bishop in 1302; Gonsalvus was elected at Assisi in 1304. Compare Wadding, *ad an.* 1302, nn. 1—3, VI, 8—11, and P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 375—377.

⁹⁵ *A.L.K.G.*, III, 144.

also the demands of the latter for justice became stronger and more insistent. Hitherto their attempts to gain a hearing had been in vain, and the Community had had its way in oppressing them and repressing even their just complaints; but in 1309 complaints were heard from all sides, not only from the citizens of Narbonne and Siena, but also from ecclesiastics and royal patrons of the Spirituals, demanding the investigation of the matter and a necessary reform. This powerful agitation was organized and brought to bear by Arnaldo de Villanova, an influential Catalan physician and ardent leader of the *Beguini*, who, after personal interviews with Pope Clement V, finally moved the latter to institute a thorough investigation.⁹⁶ Thus began that *longa et iniucunda disceptatio* between the Spirituals and the Community, of which we here present a brief outline.⁹⁷

Around the end of 1309, Pope Clement summoned the Minister General, Gonsalvus, and some outstanding Spirituals, among whom were Raymund Gaufredi and Ubertino da Casale, to Malaucène, where he was then residing, in order to settle the question concerning the state of the Order.⁹⁸ Four questions were put to the Spirituals: concerning their relations with the Sect of the Free Spirit, the persecutions inflicted upon them by the Community,⁹⁹ the observance of the Rule, and the

⁹⁶ Cf. Pou y Marti, *Visionarios, beguinos, y fraticellos catalanos (siglos XIII—XV)* (Vich, 1930), pp. 34—110; P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 432 *et seq.*; A.L.K.G., II, 129; III, 18, 36.

⁹⁷ Only the original documents are completely reliable sources. P. Gratien (*op. cit.*, pp. 432—475) gives a quite complete account, but one may sometimes differ from his interpretations.

⁹⁸ Cf. the bull *Dudum ad apostolatus*, in Wadding, *ad an.* 1310, n. 3, VI, 188—191; P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 439 *et seq.*

⁹⁹ It may be apropos here to quote at least a passage from Ubertino on this point: "Nec quod nos intendamus ordinem et bonos fratres de hiis malitiis inculpare, sed quosdam prelatos et eisdem adherentes, laxationum amatores et nutritores, qui super bonos fratres ordinis et regularis observantie amatores in diversis mundi partibus cum multo dolo et malitia tyrannizant, ut patet in provincia Provincie, Tuscie et beati Francisci et Januensis et Marchie Trivisine et Marchie Ancone et in aliis multis locis. Et fautores suos indignos exaltant et super emulos bellum sanctificant et docent et dogmatizant falsa et erronea de paupertate et contra evangelicam et sue regule veritatem. Et ab hiis quasi omnia scandala et infamie ordinis oriuntur et communitas fratrum pauperum et innocentum gemit sub eis, sicut multi boni fratres et valentes et integre fame de diversis provinciis, si vocentur vel si ibi per viros idoneos auctoritate apostolica inquirantur, ostendere plura ex predictis et probare legitime sunt parati. Et predicti non tam prelati quam tyranni ubicumque vident bonos fratres gementes et dolentes super relaxationibus et ruinis regularibus et iuditiis perversis, que vident, nituntur tales opprimere, infamare et infames reddere, crimina falsa eis imponere et ubi possunt et incarceratione et aliis penis affligere, humana verecundia et dei timore postposito non verentur. Hii vero et eorum sequaces sunt nostri detractores et diffamatores et eorum hic vices gerentes." (A.L.K.G., II, 380 *et seq.*) Cf. the similar words of Angelo Clareno, *ibid.*, p. 149.

doctrines and writings of Olivi. In April, 1310, on account of other pressing affairs, Pope Clement (by the bull *Dudum ad apostolatus*) handed the matter over to a commission of three Cardinals, and removed the representatives of the Spirituals from the jurisdiction of the superiors of the Order, placing them directly under the three Cardinals, and strictly commanding the Community, under pain of excommunication, not to molest them or their adherents in any way. About the same time, however, Raymund Gaufredi and two other Spiritual representatives died — violently, the Spirituals said¹⁰⁰ — leaving Ubertino to sustain the conflict alone. In the same year, the papal court returned to Avignon, where the conflict was continued.

The two poles, as Ehrle says,¹⁰¹ around which the controversy gravitated, were the two questions of the observance of the Rule and of Olivi. The Community, represented by Gonsalvus and four theologians of the Order (Alexander of Alexandria,¹⁰² Vital du Four, Gilles, Provincial of France, and Martin Alnwick, Provincial of England), attempted to discredit their adversaries from the very start by painting Olivi as a heretic and insisting that the Spirituals ought consequently to be condemned without further ado as adherents of such heresies, since professed heretics had no right to stand in court. Ubertino, on the other hand, concentrated his attention on the abuses prevalent in the Order, pointing out that the Community was attacking Olivi only to evade the point and to gain time.¹⁰³

Council of Vienne

So far Ubertino had the upper hand, and the question seemed about to be decided in his favor. The Pope was interested in the state of the Order, not the doctrines of Olivi. Then, at the advice of John de Murro, now Cardinal Protector, Gonsalvus gave the defense of the Community

Both give an abundance of details. That their words are substantially true can hardly be doubted by one who studies the documents of both sides carefully, as well as other sources. Many authors like to dismiss Ubertino and Clareno as entirely unreliable witnesses; but this historical prejudice is not entirely warranted.

¹⁰⁰ The Community, however, called it a mark of divine vengeance. Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, II, 133, 354.

¹⁰¹ *A.L.K.G.*, II, 363.

¹⁰² Veuthey (*op. cit.*, p. 10) attributes the main part of the defense to Alexander, but on the basis of inaccurate sources (cf. *Chronica XXIV Generalium*, p. 458; Glassberger, pp. 114—116).

¹⁰³ Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, II, 362, 380; III, 193. He also remarks: "Ipsique, per quos diffamamur, nobis et quasi singulis nostrum suas derisivas promotiones promitterent, si vellemus desistere a prosecutione reformationis regule" (*A.L.K.G.*, II, 378; cf. 384). An interesting sidelight!

over to Raymund Fronciacho, Procurator of the Order, and Bonagrazia da Bergamo, a lawyer recently received into the Order. The latter was no match for Ubertino, but Fronciacho was a more dangerous adversary. This pair renewed the protestation against Olivi's doctrines and the consequent illegal status of Ubertino; but the Pope paid no attention. Renewed attempts, however, proved successful, and the Pope decided to submit Olivi's doctrines to the examination of three theologians (a Dominican, a Carmelite, and an Augustinian).¹⁰⁴ This was the first victory of the Community; the controversy was thus protracted until the approaching Council of Vienne, to which it was then referred for consideration, reform in the Church being one of the chief purposes of the Council.¹⁰⁵

At the first session of this ecumenical council, Fronciacho was reinforced by fourteen Franciscan theologians and Provincials who had been called to take part in the Council (among whom were again Gonsalvus and Vital du Four, and Richard Conington). They produced about eleven counterstatements against Ubertino. Fronciacho and his allies did not limit themselves now to accusing Olivi, but attacked Ubertino directly on his own grounds, striving to refute all his accusations and assertions. Ubertino ably countered these documents with fresh declarations. To the claim of the Community that he should be ruled out of court as an adherent of the heretical doctrines of Olivi, he replied that the teachings of Olivi were not his concern — let the Pope correct them if he saw fit; if they were really heretical, he was not responsible for them, but the Community was, for they had caused Olivi to teach publicly in many places from the Chapter of Montpellier till his death, and had permitted free circulation of his writings after the Chapter of Paris! Furthermore, Gonsalvus himself had followed Olivi's teachings as lector at Paris.¹⁰⁶ Then Ubertino enters into an energetic defense of Olivi's teachings, merely, he says, to show the falsity of the Community's accusations. He remarks in several places that in such trivial and disputed matters no one would ever be thus condemned except for ulterior motives.¹⁰⁷ He also refutes the claim that Olivi was responsible

¹⁰⁴ Cf. P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 454 *et seq.*

¹⁰⁵ The authoritative work on the Council in general is Müller, *Das Konzil von Vienne 1311—1312. Seine Quellen und Geschichte* (Münster in W., 1934), but we have not been able to consult this. Cf. also Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte nach den Quellen bearbeitet* (2. Aufl., Freiburg im B., 1890), pp. 552—554.

¹⁰⁶ "... quasi omnes vel plures opinioniones fratris Petri ... tenuit in legendo" (A.L.K.G., II, 383; 388 ff.).

¹⁰⁷ "Et est multum notandum, quoad omnia predicta, quodsi in libris alicuius devoti christiani et in quo appareat zelus fidei et morum et qui communiter doceat catholice et intentione catholica scribat, qualis utique

for the errors of various sects.¹⁰⁸ He points out that from the extensive writings of Olivi the Community had censured only eight points, while the three examiners appointed by the Pope had found only three of any importance, were uncertain even concerning these, and always absolved Olivi from any heretical intention.¹⁰⁹

The greater part of the literature, however, was exchanged on the subject of the obligations of the Rule and their observance.¹¹⁰ Here also Fronciacho uses various artifices and underhand tactics to overthrow

fuisse noscitur frater Petrus, si contingat talem etiam aliquam falsa scribere, pia mater ecclesia et doctores eius fraterna caritate prediti, non imponunt sibi errores, qui ex dictis ipsorum possent resolutoria argumentatione deduci. . . Si igitur frater Petrus, de quo est sermo, aliqua minus vera dixisset, ex quibus detractores sui vellent impingere in eum, argumentatione illa ad errorem reducentes, cum ex dictis suis clare pateat, quod intellectus illos errores non intendit, videat sapientia apostolica, quid de libris alias multum utilibus, sacram scripturam multum catholice et excellenter exponentibus expediat in hac parte" (*A.L.K.G.*, II, 406). — "Non tamen in omnibus eius opinionem sequor, licet ipsum propter hoc non credam errare. Nam vix est aliquis doctor sanctorum extra libros canonicos bible, qui recipitur in toto quoad omnia dicta sua; multo minus est aliquis magistrorum moderatorum, qui non dicat multa, que non ab omnibus recipiuntur" (*ibid.*, III, 88). — "Hec autem philosophica opinative recitata non imponuntur communiter ad errorem in fide, nisi a viris malevolis, qui in detractationibus proximi delectantur" (II, 397). — Cf. also Olivi's words: "Quod autem, in correctione dicti mei, dicitur quod confuse loquor, fateor quod tam defectu naturae quam industriae et experientiae imperitus sum sermone. . . Nihilominus advertendum est quod dicit Augustinus, *I. de Trinitate*, c. 3: 'quisquis ergo cum legit dicit: non bene hoc dictum est, quoniam non intelligo, locutionem meam reprehendit, non fidem. Et forte vere dici potuit planius, verumtamen nullus hominum ita locutus est ut in omnibus ab omnibus intelligeretur.' Et paulo post: 'qui vero hoc legens dicit: intelligo quidem quid dictum sit, sed non vere dictum est, asserat ut placet sententiam suam, et redarguat meam si potest. Quod si cum caritate et veritate fecerit, mihi que cognoscendum facere curaverit, uberrimum fructum laboris huius cepero.' Et iterum infra: 'arbitror sane nonnullos tardiores in quibusdam locis librorum meorum opinaturos me sensisse quod non sensi, aut non sensisse quod sensi. Quorum errorem mihi attribui non debere quis nesciat, si velut me sequentes nec comprehendentes, deviauerunt in aliquam falsitatem, dum per quaedam densa et opaca cogor viam carpere, quandoquidem nec ipsis sanctis divinatorum librorum auctoribus ullo modo quisquam recte tribuerit tam multos et varios errores haereticorum, cum omnes ex eisdem scripturis falsas atque fallaces opiniones suas conentur defendere.'" (*A.F.H.*, XXVIII [1935], 403 *et seq.*)

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, II, 410 *et seq.*; P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, p. 441, n. 25.

¹⁰⁹ "Nam illa quae imponunt sibi, non inveniuntur ponderis notabilis per Magistros visis suis dictis nisi in tribus articulis, scilicet de essentia divina, de anima rationali, et de vulnere laterali; in quibus et in omnibus aliis positionibus et intentionem persone purgant ab omni heretica pravitate et in ipsismet tribus articulis varii et dubii conceptus ipsis magistris occurrunt. Esto ergo quod in illis tribus articulis minus bene dixisset, non propter hoc fuit tanta librorum utilitas condemnanda et maxime per iudices temerarios et non suos, nec propter hoc deberet in aliis librorum copia fidelibus denegari" (*A.L.K.G.*, III, 191).

¹¹⁰ Besides the documents in *A.L.K.G.*, II—III, cf. those published later in *A.F.H.*, VII, VIII, X, XXIII, XXIV, XXVII.

Ubertino's case, which the latter effectively exposes. Ubertino also makes many startling revelations which support his severe accusations against the Community and corroborate those of Angelo Clareno. By this time, the scope of the discussion had been considerably broadened and the issues perhaps confused somewhat. The final decision, published at the third and final session of the Council (May 6, 1312), corresponded to the two main points of controversy; the doctrines imputed to Olivi were defined by the decretal *Fidei catholicae fundamentum*, and the disputes concerning the Rule by the bull *Exivi de paradiso*. The latter was so worded that both sides claimed the victory, at least on the theoretical side, for on the practical side no effective measures were taken, and the Spirituals did not receive the separation they had sought.¹¹¹

The Pope sent the Spirituals back to the obedience of their regular superiors, with admonitions to the Community not to molest them in any way; but, as Ubertino had foreboded,¹¹² these recommendations went for nought. Clement's successor, John XXII, finally fulfilled the desires of the Community by a definitive condemnation of the Spirituals, whose history became in large part that of the unorthodox *Fraticelli*. Their better tendencies were carried on later by the Observants, who did not accomplish their reform, as Ubertino had foretold,¹¹³ without a division of the Order.

In 1318 the Community, angered by the cult paid to Olivi by the Spirituals and people of Provence, destroyed his tomb under cover of night and did away with his remains.¹¹⁴ At the General Chapter of

¹¹¹ Oliger remarks that the skill of Fronciacho deferred the reform for nearly 100 years, and in that sense the Community was victorious (cf. *A.F.H.*, IX [1916], 25). We are inclined to think that the declaration of the Rule was rather favorable to the Spirituals, though it designedly maintains a middle path. Others claim that it definitely favors the Community (cf. P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 459, n. 3, 473). Heyse claims that it practically reproduces the words of the Community, and that Ubertino was guilty of sophisms and distortion of his adversaries' words (*A.F.H.*, X [1917], 109, 113 *et seq.*); but the documents do not bear out his statements, and his own grasp of the problem seems lacking in some respects.

¹¹² Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, II, 415 *et seq.* The oppression of the Community drove the Spirituals to desperate measures, which were in turn used to condemn them as rebels. Cf. P. Gratien, *op. cit.*, pp. 487 *et seq.*; *A.F.H.*, VII (1914), 654; XVI (1923), 323 *et seq.*; 336 *et seq.*; *E.F.*, XXVII (1912), pp. 422—426; *A.L.K.G.*, II, 159—164.

¹¹³ Cf. *A.L.K.G.*, III, 85—87. The Observants of France based their petition for separation on one of the documents written by Ubertino at the Council of Vienne (cf. *A.F.H.*, IX [1916], 1—41).

¹¹⁴ Cf. Clareno, *Expositio Regulae*, p. 233; *A.L.K.G.*, II, 129, 149, 293; III, 457. "Fuit autem corpus inde extractum et alibi portatum et absconditum sub anno domini M^oCCC^oXVIII^o, sed ubi sit a pluribus dubitatur et

Marseilles in 1319, the Minister General Michael of Cesena and a large group of theologians again solemnly condemned the works of Olivi, and pronounced excommunication on any friars who should retain or read them.¹¹⁵ In the same year, a process was instituted against Olivi's *Postilla in Apocalypsim*, to which many who had been tried and burned for heresy appealed in support of their tenets.¹¹⁶ Pope John XXII had it examined by theologians, who produced first a list of 84 erroneous propositions, which was then reduced to 60.¹¹⁷ But it was only in 1326 that the Pope formally condemned the work, apparently because of proposition 22.¹¹⁸ Subsequent Chapters renewed the prohibition of Olivi's works, but in spite of this they were much in use among the Observants, especially by St. Bernardine of Siena,¹¹⁹ and Pope Sixtus IV (O.F.M.) is said to have examined the condemned treatise and given it his approval.¹²⁰

diversi diversa super hoc locuntur et dicunt" (Guidonis, *op. cit.*, p. 287; cf. *A.L.K.G.*, III, 412). Some said the remains were burned, others that they were thrown into the Rhone.

¹¹⁵ Cf. *A.F.H.*, XXIV (1931), 509, Octavo.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Baluze-Mansi, *Miscellanea Sacra* (Lucae, 1761), II, 248 *et seq.* Olivi, as we have seen, protested against such a use of his works (cf. *supra*, note 107). His treatise on the Apocalypse was used in the Sachsenhausen declaration of Louis the Bavarian, against John XXII (cf. *A.L.K.G.*, III, 540—552).

¹¹⁷ Cf. *A.F.H.*, XXIV (1931), 509 *et seq.*, Nono. The 60 propositions are given in Baluze-Mansi, *op. cit.*, pp. 258—271.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Baluze-Mansi, *Vitae paparum avenionensium*, ed. Mollat (Paris, 1914), I, 166, 142; *Bullarium Franciscanum* (Romae, 1898), V, 297, n. 601; Alvarus Pelagius, *De Planctu Ecclesiae* (Venetiis, 1560), 144 va; Glassberger, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

¹¹⁹ Cf. *A.F.H.*, XI (1918), 321; XXVIII (1935), 159; the studies of Pacetti on the MSS. of St. Bernardine, *ibid.*, XXVII (1934)—XXIX (1936)

¹²⁰ "Doctrina eadem, a Praelatis quidem Ordinis prohibita ob fratrum dissensionem, restituta sit a Sixto IV tanquam bona, sana, catholica, quia defectus a legentibus oriebatur, non ex doctrina; illi enim vel aversi, vel nimium affecti suo appetitui magis quam sensui auctoris inhaerebant, non libero accedentes animo propriumque somnium ingerentes magis quam veritatem captantes sententiae, tantum inter se altercabantur, quantum studio et voluntate alieni dissidebant. Nemo ergo dicat haereticum doctrinam, quae a Pontifice restituta atque in Concilio generali praetermissa est" (Anthony Hickey, O.F.M., *Nitela franciscanae Religionis* [Lugduni, 1627], 334; cf. Wadding, ad an. 1297, n. 35, V, 427). Alexander Natalis objects that the reputed approbation of Sixtus cannot prevail against the certain condemnation of John XXII (*Historia Ecclesiastica*, ed. Roncaglia, Lucae, 1752, VIII, 81 *et seq.*; Venetiis 1771, XV, 163 *et seq.*). But if the sources quoted above (note 118) are correct as to the sense in which John XXII condemned proposition 22, it is certain that Olivi understood at least that proposition in an orthodox sense. Ubertino claimed that the other propositions, taken in their context, were also orthodox (cf. Baluze-Mansi, *Miscellanea Sacra*, II, 276 *et seq.*). A definitive judgment cannot be made in this matter as long as the treatise in question remains unedited. Cf. also *A.L.K.G.*, II, 407 *et seq.*

Interpretation of the Dogmatic Decree

From the data outlined above it seems clear that current concepts of Olivi are based on a picture, which is biased and lacks real objective foundation; such evidence as we have is in general favorable to Olivi. It remains to examine whether the dogmatic decree *Fidei catholicae fundamentum* is, as is usually asserted, a formal condemnation of Olivi's doctrines. Hefele writes concerning this:

Daß durch dieses Dekret dem Ansehen Olivis nicht im geringsten nahe getreten wurde, wie denn auch nirgends auf ihn Bezug genommen ist, erhellt aus obiger Darstellung von selbst.¹²¹

P. Gratien, O.F.M. Cap., writes:

On se souvient que des dix erreurs reprochées au docteur provençal, les théologiens chargés de les examiner n'en avaient retenu que trois. Finalement, après la vigoureuse apologie écrite par Ubertain de Casale, Clément V ne condamna aucun des ouvrages incriminés. Il se borna à définir, dans le décret *Fidei catholicae fundamentum*, la doctrine de l'Église sur quatre points où l'on avait accusé Olive d'avoir un enseignement hérétique. On se souvient encore que les avocats de la *vie commune* avaient cherché de toutes leurs forces à obtenir contre les ouvrages d'Olivi, qu'ils regardaient comme la cause de tous les troubles et le germe de divisions futures, une condamnation officielle et définitive. Le décret *Fidei catholicae fundamentum* était loin de répondre à leurs désirs. Son nom n'y était même pas prononcé, et ainsi son prestige, aux yeux de ses disciples, restait intact.¹²²

Jarraux, after citing the above, continues:

Telle est la très objective conclusion du R. P. Gratien, conclusion que corrobore — non moins forte et explicite — celle de Hefele . . . La nôtre est identique, à la suite du double examen, doctrinal et historique, auquel nous nous sommes livré: C'EST À L'OCCASION DES LUTTES AUXQUELLES DONNÈRENT LIEUX LES DOCTRINES OLIVIENNES QUE LA DÉCISION CONCILIAIRE FUT PORTÉE, MAIS LA DOCTRINE ELLE-MÊME, ET NOTAMMENT LA PLUS IMPORTANTE, CELLE DU MODE D'INFORMATION DU CORPS HUMAIN PAR L'ÂME RATIONNELLE, TELLE QUELLE EST PROPOSÉE PAR OLIVI DANS SES ÉCRITS AUTHENTIQUES, N'EST AUCUNEMENT VISÉE, ENCORE MOINS CONDAMNÉE . . . Il nous reste cependant à formuler un vœu: nous demandons qu'il en soit désormais fini avec la

¹²¹ *Op. cit.*; p. 540. The French translation used by P. Gratien (*op. cit.*, p. 470, n. 35) and Jarraux (*op. cit.*, p. 528) does not at all correspond to the German text given above.

¹²² *Op. cit.*, p. 470 *et seq.* Fronciacho says that the original decree contained a fourth article (*de divina essentia*) (cf. *A.L.K.G.*, III, 24 *et seq.*), but there seems to be no way of verifying this. The present text has only three, no mention being made of the divine essence. Other contemporary documents refer to three or even two (cf. *A.F.H.*, XXIV [1931], 507; XXVII [1934], 416, 418).

légende de la condamnation conciliaire d'Olivi, et de sa prétendue "hérésie." Nous pensons que le vocabulaire théologique est assez riche, l'ingéniosité des auteurs assez grande, et l'exigence de la vérité historique et doctrinale assez rigoureuse pour que, dans *l'Enchiridion Symbolorum* par exemple de Denzinger-Bannwart, — et autres ouvrages similaires — l'on puisse trouver d'autres titres que celui-ci: *Errores Petri Johannis Olivi*.¹²³

Referring to Hocédez (*Richard de Middleton*, p. 208), Delorme writes:

Le R. P. évidemment ne s'est pas donné la peine de comprendre Olivi ni même de le lire dans son texte. C'est trop peu. Attribuer à un auteur les pires doctrines, amorcer sur son compte un pitoyable chapitre intitulé "les erreurs d'Olivi," puis redire la chanson qu'il fut condamné au concile de Vienne, et tout cela sans l'avoir ouvert, rien n'est plus commode. On aimerait autre chose, surtout après l'édition des *Quaestiones in II librum sententiarum* par le R. P. B. Jansen.¹²⁴

E. Müller, O.F.M., agrees with Jarraux.¹²⁵ Other authors, however, are quite unwilling to admit this opinion. Amorós, O.F.M., asserts:

B. Jansen suis discussionibus circa doctrinam P. I. Olivi in Concilio Viennensi condemnatam, modo speculativo magis quam historico procedit. Eius tamen conclusiones evolutionem historicam totius processus plene confirmant. L. Jarraux (eumque secutus Ew. Müller) asserit doctrinam P. I. Olivi, prout in eius scriptis invenitur, nullo modo esse a Concilio in consideratione habitam, eoque minus condemnatum. Ast, vellemus videre hanc assertionem solidis argumentis, ex authenticis fontibus depromptis, corroboratam.¹²⁶

Bihl, O.F.M., likewise writes:

Attamen quia Concilium nomen opinantis istud [de anima] — immo ista tria — nullibi expressit, P. E. Müller tandem in hanc ultimam conclusionem (384) devenit: "Concilium doctrinam Olivi positive et explicite non condemnavit. Synodus probabiliter falsas quasdam interpretationes quae forte contra hanc doctrinam catholicam dogmaticum e scriptis Olivi inferri potuissent, definitione sua excludere voluit." — Ad quae haec animadvertimus. Liqueat tale intentum Concilii gratis supponi, neque ulla ratione evinci posse. Cuilibet apparet etiam harmonizationem variorum nec clariorum opinamentorum Olivi, viri speculationis subtilissimae, hic violentiore, ibi benigniore arte interpretandi non carere. Quodsi vero Patres Concilii opinionem quam Olivi non tenuisset condemnarunt, hinc quaestio dogmatica

¹²³ *Op. cit.*, 528; capitals his.

¹²⁴ *La France Franciscaine*, IX (1926), 449, n. i.

¹²⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 357—385. Oliger contents himself with saying: "Utrum Concilium . . . quasdam magni Spiritualium ducis doctrinas condemnaverit, an solum, occasione accusationum contra eum factarum, doctrinam catholicam stabilire voluerit (nam Olivi nomen in decretali non invenitur), inter doctos controvertitur" (*Antonianum*, IX [1934], 414). Cf. also *Franziskanische Studien*, XXI (193), 300 et seq.; Gerz, *Collectanea Franciscana Neerlandica*, II (1931), 307—320; Ehrle, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

¹²⁶ *A.F.H.*, XXVII (1934), 409.

exagitaretur, quae illis solvenda est, qui illi opinioni negativae favent. Sin autem Olivi in causa non erat, apologetae huius alium quempiam e documentis eruant, in cuius opinionem Patres Conciliares animadvertere voluerint; isti vero alterius nominis, sive parvi sive magni, ne umbram quidem ostendere aut suscitare possunt. Porro error primus et tertius certo ab Olivi docebatur, unde etiam circa errorem medium praesumptio valida exstabat. Quod Concilium nomen errantis non expressit, neque alios errores Petro I. Olivi obiectos proscripsit, Spirituales merito suam victoriam, etsi tenuem, canere poterant.¹²⁷

But the arguments of these authors are entirely irrelevant. Amorós quotes many contemporary documents which speak of the decretal as a formal condemnation of Olivi; but the quotations from Community writers avail nothing, since they are not disinterested witnesses, and the same must be said of Aegidius Romanus and Augustinus Triumphus. The quotations from Ubertino da Casale are given a forced interpretation outside their context, and the author seems to forget that Ubertino wrote a forceful defense of Olivi's doctrines, and held at least the one *de vulnere laterali* himself. In short, this part of his study is so inconsequential that one is surprised at its serious presentation. As a matter of fact, the precise aim of the decree was as obscure in this regard then as it is now, and each, as now, interpreted it according to his general attitude.¹²⁸

The other argument used by Amorós and Bihl, that there is no one else known to have held the condemned doctrines and against whom the decree may have been aimed, is likewise beside the point. Certainly it was the discussions over Olivi's doctrines which gave rise to the definition; but the Council could have intended only to define the correct doctrine on the disputed points, in order to satisfy the Community or to make the correct doctrine beyond dispute, without deciding whether or how far Olivi was in error. That the Council had any further intention is what must be proven, not conversely, as Bihl insists. Ubertino's defense of Olivi was certainly powerful and calculated to make an impression,¹²⁹ and the Pope and the three theological examiners were

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 596.

¹²⁸ Outside of Olivi's immediate adversaries or partisans, indeed, few authors seem to have mentioned the decree at all. Ockham, remarkably enough, said that he could not make a judgment in the matter unless he had the writings of Olivi and the pertinent acts of the Order (cf. *A.F.H.*, XI [1918], 325—327). — As his only direct evidence, Amorós cites a tale recorded by Fronciacho *A.L.K.G.*, III, 25); but, besides the uncertainty of the text, its very triviality makes it significant that Fronciacho should think it necessary to use such an argument. The Spirituals made a similar claim on their side (*A.L.K.G.*, III, 449 *et seq.*).

¹²⁹ According to Jansen: "Gegen das Urteil der Kommunität kommt das des Ubertino von Casale nicht auf" (*Scholastik*, X [1935], 243). This

given Olivi's own defense of his doctrines in answer to the seven censors;¹³⁰ from which, Ubertino tells us, the examiners found little of any weight and had doubts about even this.¹³¹ All this creates a strong presumption in the direction we have indicated, and contrary to Bihl's thesis.

This conclusion will be corroborated if we examine whether Olivi can be said to have held the condemned doctrines. The first doctrine condemned was that the piercing of our Lord's side on the cross took place before His death.¹³² Olivi develops this theory in his *Postilla in Ioannem*; but we find the expressions:

Si vera esset ista revelatio . . . si tamen revelatio dici potest . . . Haec igitur dicta sunt absque alicuius assertionis temeritate, quia nullatenus est nostrum hic aliquid definire; unde relinquenda sunt illi secreto, quod "nisi qui accipit nemo novit."¹³³

He refers here to a private revelation. Since he neither originated the doctrine nor gave unqualified adherence thereto, he cannot strictly be said to have been condemned. On the other hand, there were others who defended the doctrine very strongly, including Ubertino himself,¹³⁴ and this was doubtless known to the Council; hence there is no reason to suppose that the condemnation was aimed solely against Olivi. Doucet thinks that the condemnation touches Olivi because the latter held that the condemned doctrine was not contrary to the text of

certainly indicates a rather ingenuous and unrealistic assumption. Pope Clement V himself was not so prejudiced against the Spirituals (cf. the bull *Dudum ad apostolatus*; *A.F.H.*, XVI [1923], 352).

¹³⁰ Cf. *A.F.H.*, XXIV (1931), 505; *A.L.K.G.*, II, 416. In spite of the whole tenor of Ubertino's documents, Bonagrazia, in a later writing, makes the brazen assertion that neither the Pope nor his representatives knew anything about them! (Baluze-Mansi, *Miscellanea Sacra*, II, 276 *et seq.*)

¹³¹ Cf. *supra*, note 109: ". . . et in ipsismet tribus articulis varii et dubii conceptus ipsis magistris occurrunt." One wonders why Amorós omits this clause in quoting the passage. In the passage he quotes from Ubertino's *Arbor vite*, Ubertino later added the clause: "licet ipsum propter hoc non credam errare" (cf. *supra*, note 107). It is interesting to note P. Gratien's interpretation of this passage (*op. cit.*, p. 388, n. 28).

¹³² "Nos igitur, . . . sacro approbante Concilio, declaramus, praedictum Apostolum et Evangelistam Ioannem rectum in praemissis factae rei ordinem tenuisse, narrando, quod Christo iam mortuo, unus militum lancea latus eius aperuit" (Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, ed. 18—20 [Friburgi Brigoviae, 1932], n. 480, p. 222). Note that this point is not among those mentioned by Ubertino (*supra*, note 109).

¹³³ *A.F.H.*, XXVIII (1935), 436, 439, 441.

¹³⁴ Cf. Wadding, ad an. 1297, n. 44, V, 433—435; *A.F.H.*, XXVIII (1935), 428 *et seq.* Yet Bihl asserts: "alterius nominis . . . ne umbram quidem suscitare possunt." Having found such here, we might, following his own argument, make a strong presumption concerning the other two! On the other hand, there is no need to presume concerning the second doctrine defined, if one takes the trouble to read Olivi's text.

St. John, which, he says, is precisely what was condemned.¹³⁵ This distinction is perhaps unwarranted, as Olivi's exegesis of the text is merely hypothetical, like the hypothesis on which it is based; and the decree also really defines both simultaneously. However, this is a minor issue, as is also the third point defined, which we shall treat immediately. The definition is as follows:

Verum quia quantum ad effectum baptismi in parvulis reperiuntur doctores quidam theologi opiniones contrarias habuisse . . . nos attendentes generalem efficaciam mortis Christi . . . opinionem secundam, quae dicit, tam parvulis quam adultis conferri in baptismo informantem gratiam et virtutes, tanquam probabiliorem, et dictis Sanctorum et doctorum modernorum theologiae magis consonam et concordem, sacro approbante Concilio duximus eligendam.¹³⁶

This was a disputed question at the time, as is remarked in the decree itself; hence again there is no reason for supposing that Olivi alone is intended.¹³⁷ The final words are rather strange; one hardly knows whether the meaning is *tanquam probabiliorem* "eligendam," or *eligendam tanquam* "probabiliorem." Wadding takes it in the second sense, and says it was still disputed in his day.¹³⁸ As to Olivi's position, he merely replies to his censors:

Quod virtutes non dentur parvulis in baptismo . . . scripsi et docui contrarium . . . non me tangunt, quia semper contrarium docui, sequens communes opiniones. Et semper credidi quod gratia ponat in anima aliquid absolutum . . .¹³⁹

We take it for granted that Olivi knew what he taught. Since no texts of his on this point have been edited, no more can be said.¹⁴⁰

The second point defined, which is also by far the most famous, we are in a position to treat more fully, since Olivi's texts on this subject have been edited (*Quaestiones in II. Sent.*). The definition is as follows:

Confitemur [Christum] . . . partes nostrae naturae simul unitas . . . humanum videlicet corpus et animam intellectivam seu rationalem, ipsum corpus

¹³⁵ Cf. *A.F.H.*, XXVIII (1935), 428 *et seq.* Writing before this text was published, Amorós says: "Nullum vestigium huius articuli habetur in Responsione Olivi ad VII Magistros . . . Tenuitne revera Olivi hanc sententiam? . . . Solutio tamen huius quaestionis ex serio examine dictorum Olivi pendet" (*op. cit.*, p. 414, n. 5). After he has striven to prove that Olivi must have been the object of condemnation, this remark seems rather inexplicable.

¹³⁶ *Enchiridion, ibid.*

¹³⁷ Cf. Ubertino, *A.L.K.G.*, II, 397 *et seq.*; Wadding, ad an. 1297, n. 45, V, 435 *et seq.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.* Cf. Fronciacho: "... dicit tanquam minus rationabilem iudicandum" (*A.L.K.G.*, III, 25).

¹³⁹ *A.F.H.*, XXVIII (1935), 130; *E.F.*, XXIX (1913), 417.

¹⁴⁰ We are not unaware of the second part of Koch's study, but there is no way to check it as to whether it merits credence.

vere per se et essentialiter informantem, assumpsisse . . . Porro doctrinam omnem seu positionem temere asserentem, aut vertentem in dubium, quod substantia animae rationalis seu intellectivae vere ac per se humani corporis non sit forma, velut erroneam ac veritati catholicae inimicam fidei, praedicto sacro approbante Concilio reprobamus; definientes, ut cunctis nota sit fidei sinceræ veritas ac praecludatur universis erroribus aditus, ne subintrent, quod quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tanquam haereticus sit censendus.¹⁴¹

Fr. Jansen's View

Bernard Jansen, S.J., the editor of Olivi's *Quaestiones in II. Sent.*, has written a series of articles attempting to prove that Olivi's doctrine corresponds to that condemned.¹⁴² What is the basis of his position? Nothing but an assumption, it must be admitted. To quote his own words:

Per haec mentem Concilii Viennensis perfecte assequemur, cum apud omnes plane in confesso sit et quasi ut principium non amplius probandum assumatur Concilium Viennense voluisse damnare errorem Olivi eumque solum. Unde . . . certe ex stabilita doctrina Olivi immediate stabilitus erit sensus definitionis Concilii Viennensis.¹⁴³

With such a starting point, of course, his conclusion was foregone; but it is to be wondered at that he experienced no difficulty in making Olivi's doctrine fit the Procrustean bed. He does so only by contradicting the clearest statements and fullest explanations of Olivi (and Olivi wrote very extensively on this point). Olivi's doctrine may be summarized as follows:

1. Only God has absolute simplicity. Every created substance, including such as the angel and the human soul, must be composed of matter and form, which are distinct substantial principles.¹⁴⁴

2. As a simple spiritual substance may be thus composed of matter (primary, simple, spiritual) and form, so also it may include several

¹⁴¹ *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, nn. 480, 481.

¹⁴² Cf. the following articles: *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, XXXII (1908), 289—307, 471—488; *Franziskanische Studien*, V (1918), 153—175; XXI (1934), 297—314; *Gregorianum*, I (1920), 78—90; *Scholastik*, X (1935), 241—244, 406—408.

¹⁴³ *Gregorianum*, I (1920), 80. Jarraux remarks: "... si le R. P. Bernard Jansen fut un parfait éditeur, il s'est montré commentateur défaillant . . . il est parti de ce *postulat* — c'en est un — qui a tout vicié: puisque c'est Olivi qui a été condamné . . . pour savoir ce qu'a voulu définir l'Église, nous n'avons qu'à savoir ce qu'a enseigné Olivi" (*op. cit.*, p. 529).

¹⁴⁴ Cf. *Qq. in II. Sent.*, q. 16, I, 291—355. This question is essential to a correct understanding of Olivi's position. Cf. also *ibid.*, II, 41 *et seq.*, 245 *et seq.*, 302; pp. 17, 20, 21, 49.

formal perfections or partial forms (*partes formales, naturae formales*) determining the same primary matter; thus the *potentiae animae* are consubstantial perfections of the soul.¹⁴⁵

3. There are primary formal parts informing one primary matter as in the soul or angel, and formal parts comprising such a composite of primary matter and form further united into a secondary composite, as in the total human composite, between the soul and the lower forms. Thus one may take *form* as abstracted from all matter, or not. In the first sense, as in the formal parts of the soul, it is essentially incomplete, and cannot exist alone *saltem naturaliter*, requiring matter *ad sui substantificationem*. In the second sense, as in the soul and the lower corporeal forms, it is essentially complete, having its primary matter which also enters into any further substantial composition. The formal parts of the soul are only partially distinct, i. e., *se ipsis sed non materia sua*; taken as essentially complete substances they include their matter which is common to all.¹⁴⁶

4. In either case, one form never acts as the *materia* of the next higher form, strictly speaking,¹⁴⁷ but matter alone receives the various formal determinations directly, the formal being substantially — not formally — united to each other by thus informing the same matter *modo ordinato*.¹⁴⁸

5. The intellective perfection or form cannot inform corporeal matter (is not a corporeal form), because of their essential incompatibilities, or contradictory notes; hence the intellective and sensitive perfections can be united together only in the simple matter of the soul, as described in n. 2. The sensitive can inform both, the intellective only the one.¹⁴⁹

6. The sensitive and intellective perfections are thus separate forms, or formal parts, in relation to their common primary matter, but constitute one simple substantial form in relation to the body (corporeal matter) and lower forms, which is *formally* united to the body not as intellectual but as sensitive. Thus corporeal and spiritual matter form

¹⁴⁵ I. e., intellect, will, *sensitiva, vegetativa*. Concerning the distinction of the latter two, cf. q. 71, II, 637—644.

¹⁴⁶ "Illa non esse distincta, verum est de distinctione faciente diversa tota, sed falsum est de distinctione partialiter distinguente partes a se invicem et a suo toto, iuxta quod et membra corporis nostri sunt in eo partialiter distincta, non tamen sic quod faciunt diversa supposita vel tota" (II, 190; cf. 184). The nature of this distinction will be discussed further on.

¹⁴⁷ Only in the sense that it is sometimes necessary (not in the case of the spiritual matter of the soul, as Jansen asserts, contrary to Olivi's express statement) for the matter to be informed by one form before it is susceptible of a higher form. Cf. II, 39 *et seq.*, 142, 193; III, 12 *et seq.*, 34, 83.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. I, 312 *et seq.*; II, 39 *et seq.*, 110.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. II, 104, *et seq.*

one integral matter of the sensitive form, as all the formal parts make *one* integral *forma corporis* or *forma hominis*. The *PARS intellectiva* is neither immediately nor mediately *forma corporis* (cf. n. 5); but it is substantially united to the body,¹⁵⁰ which could not be unless it were a formal perfection of a soul which has another formal perfection according to which it is *forma corporis*. But the *ANIMA intellectiva*, since the *pars sensitiva* is part of its substance or essence as explained, is thereby united to the body *formaliter* (as form), *substantialiter*, *immediate*, *per se*, *essentialiter*, or any other way one might put it. Taken in its entirety, this brilliant elaboration of plurality of forms and substantial union — of which I have given but the briefest outline — may be considered an outstanding achievement on Olivi's part, which has not received the due place and attention which it merits.

It is obvious at a glance that the doctrine outlined is in perfect accord with the definition. The essential point — *anima est forma per se et essentialiter* (i. e., *per substantiam suam, immediate*) — is abundantly safeguarded by Olivi. Indeed, he puts forth his theory as the only possible explanation of how the *anima intellectiva* may be substantially united as form to the body.¹⁵¹ We think he is correct; certainly it is at least a logical and valid explanation.

One labors in vain to find any definite or intelligible argument to the contrary on Jansen's part. At first he claimed that the union of formal parts in Olivi's sense is merely dynamic or mechanical (Platonic), a *funesta haeresis*, but later retracted this.¹⁵² He still holds, apparently,

¹⁵⁰ Cf. II, 134, 538 *et seq.*

¹⁵¹ "Secundum autem quod ex hac positione [sensitivam esse a generante] sequitur est quod sensitiva non sit radicata in substantia seu in spirituali materia partis intellectivae. Quod, ut credo, non solum est falsum, sed etiam in fide periculosum, sicut et primum. Si enim pars intellectiva non potest esse per se forma corporis, sicut ex praehabitis satis patet, et non est dare viam quomodo possit uniri corpori substantialiter et cum eo constituere unum ens, nisi habeat intra se aliquam naturam formalem per quam informet corpus, et aliam non est dare nisi sensitivam et vegetativam: ponere quod sensitiva non sit radicata in natura partis intellectivae est manifeste ponere quod pars intellectiva non uniatur corpori nisi ut motor mobili. Hoc autem ultimum non solum est haeticum, sed etiam totius fidei enervativum." (II, 121 *et seq.*; cf. 110 *et seq.*) — "Si autem pars intellectiva cum sensitiva non ponantur ad se invicem unitae in una materia spirituali vel in uno, ut ita dicam, supposito rationalis animae: non video quomodo pars intellectiva possit dici substantialiter unita cum corpore nec cum sensitiva ipsius" (II, 540).

¹⁵² Cf. *Franziskanische Studien*, XXI (1934), 301 *et seq.*, 310; Olivi's *Qq. in II. Sent.*, III, 603, note. Alexander of Hales (as cited below) also speaks of the *intellectiva* as *regens et movens* in relation to the lower forms; all scholastics speak of the will as *regens et movens intellectum*. Needless to point out that this does not exclude substantial or formal union; indeed, according to Olivi, it flows from this very union!

that the *anima intellectiva* as such, without including any other substantial perfections, can and must inform the corporeal matter and lower forms, and that each formal part of an ordered series in a composite must form part of the *materia totalis* of the next higher form; that for a real substantial unity or *unio essendi* the formal parts must be united to each other formally and not only consubstantially, and that making a distinction between *anima intellectiva* and *pars intellectiva* is a mere subterfuge (!).¹⁵³ Aside from the tenability of such statements, it is clear that the decree says nothing about the mode of union between formal parts or the composition of the *anima intellectiva*, and no amount of mere assertion will prove that it does; nor does it say that the *anima intellectiva* is united to the body *as such*. Jansen insists that the decree says three times: "*anima intellectiva seu rationalis*;" but what does this signify? Certainly Olivi would admit that *anima intellectiva* and *anima rationalis* are synonymous, and uses them as such.

In reading the decree it may be tempting to see in it, as Jansen does, the condemnation of some definite doctrine, which naturally would be Olivi's; but in fact it merely repeats the thesis formulated against Olivi in 1283 by the Community, who in turn denied that he had ever taught otherwise.¹⁵⁴ The Community did not prove their case to the papal consultors, as we have seen, and there is no evidence that the decree was anything but a confirmation, as has been said, of the doctrine asserted by the Community and also claimed by Olivi as his own, without deciding between them. Jansen says that his high opinion of the teaching office of the Church prevents him from accepting the probability of such an interpretation;¹⁵⁵ but such persuasions do not change evidence to the contrary. His statements on the history of dogma — that a definition is always aimed at a definite person and against a serious error for the

¹⁵³ It is by exchanging these term that he is able to make a contradiction between the decree and Olivi's doctrine; but then we no longer have Olivi's doctrine. For example, he writes: "*Olivi conceptis verbis docuerat animam intellectivam non per se ipsam nec per suam ipsius essentiam, sed per partem sensitivam esse formam*" (*Gregorianum*, I [1920], 89). There is, of course, no contradiction between the two statements. Again he says: „Es ist aber eine leicht irreführende, höchst gezwungene Redeweise, deshalb zu sagen [weil die pars sensitiva ein Teil der vernünftigen Seele ist], die anima rationalis sei per se forma corporis . . . ob er ein Recht hat, es zu sagen . . . bestreiten wir aufs entschiedenste. Das ist nur dazu angetan, das Problem selbst und das Sachliche der Irrlehre und der Konzilsentscheidung zu verhüllen" (*Franziskanische Studien*, V [1918], 245). What comment could one make on such a gratuitous statement? — Thomists make a similar charge against Scotus's plurality of forms, as destroying the essential unity of man. The accusation is no more justified for Olivi than for Scotus.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. *A.F.H.*, XXVIII (1935), 128, 155.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. *Franziskanische Studien*, XXI (1934), 310, 314.

good of the Church — could be questioned, at least as *a priori* principles; on the other hand, from the interpretation given above it does not necessarily follow that the decree was useless or trivial. The subject was one of much controversy at the time, and many errors were rife.¹⁵⁶

There are other serious flaws in Jansen's arguments. He refers to Olivi's concept of the communication of form to matter as his "basic error,"¹⁵⁷ though it seems to be merely the commonplace Aristotelian doctrine of the actualization of matter by form. Again, arguing against Jarraux and Müller, he admits a formal distinction in q. 54 (relation of intellect and will), and denies it of q. 51 (relation of *intellectiva* and *sensitiva*).¹⁵⁸ But that Olivi is speaking of the same distinction in both places could not be clearer; in both he is speaking of the same entities, bases himself on the same composition of formal parts in a simple substance, and argues *per longum et latum* that there is no real distinction between an entity viewed as *potentia* and as *essentia* or *substantia*; and in both places he explicitly rejects the distinction of *rationes reales* alone. In q. 51 Olivi is proving that the *sensitiva* is a formal part of the soul, not a form separate from it, and in q. 54 he discusses how the *potentiae* in general (*sensitiva*, *intellectiva*, *volitiva*, etc.) are distinct from each other and from the substance of the soul (i. e., as formal parts with matter making up the substance of the soul), one of the conventional questions of the scholastics. It is therefore incorrect to say, as Jansen

¹⁵⁶ Cf. the expressions: "... ut cunctis nota sit fidei sincerae veritas, ac praecludatur universis erroribus aditus, ne subintrent," which fits in with the interpretation given by Müller and repeated here.

¹⁵⁷ „Es ist hier in der Theorie und Spekulation Olivis dieselbe Überspannung und Übertreibung wie in seiner Praxis mit seinem stürmischen Reformeifer" (*Franziskanische Studien*, V [1918], 246). Cf. also *ibid.*, XXI (1934), 304 *et seq.*; *Gregorianum*, I (1920), 86; prolegomena to Olivi's *Qq. in II. Sent.*, II, viii. — Quite true, one might reply, inasmuch as the exaggeration is equally imaginary in both cases.

¹⁵⁸ It is interesting to note such expressions of Olivi's as the following: "... supponendo... quod pars sensitiva sit essentialiter radicata in substantia seu materia animae intellectivae, et quod formae substantiales *potentiarum animae sunt partes formales et substantiales ipsius animae*" (*A.F.H.*, XXVIII [1935], 155) — "... per intellectivam disponitur [materia spirituales] ad susceptionem *formae volitivae*" (in *II. Sent.*, II, 193). — "Omnes per nomen animae communiter sumunt totam substantiam spiritus vivi qui est in uno animali vel homine, et ideo nullam partium eius, quandiu habet rationem partis et non totius spiritus seu animae vocant animam, sed solum *partem vel potentiam* animae; denominant tamen totam animam a quolibet istorum, ut cum dicunt quod homo habet animam sensitivam vel animam vegetativam vel animam intellectivam... formam dicunt tam de forma totali quam de partibus eius" (*ibid.*, II, 182). — In the face of all this, Jansen's objection from q. 7 against the "Gleichstellung der tres partes, vegetativa, sensitiva, intellectiva mit den Seelenkräften" (*Franziskanische Studien* XXI [1934], 229), is quite irrelevant.

does, that the formal parts according to Olivi are substantial entities and not *potentiae*, as Olivi would not admit any real distinction between formal parts viewed as substance or *potentia*.¹⁵⁹

Nature of Olivi's Distinction

Does Olivi, however, posit a formal distinction in both the above questions, or in neither? If in neither, how is the distinction of formal parts to be explained? Against Thomistic unity of form and Vital du Four, Olivi denies that the faculties of the soul can all be one "omnino eadem simplex essentia," distinct only *secundum rationes reales*, in treating the plurality of forms (q. 50), the composition of the soul (q. 51), and the consubstantiality of the faculties (q. 54).¹⁶⁰ On the other hand, they are not distinct as the soul is from the lower forms, in relation to which it is but one simple form; this is a more complete distinction, in which each part has its own matter and form (*quasi suppositum*), whereas the formal parts of the soul have only one common matter. Their distinction is therefore intermediate between the complete unity and complete diversity. This will be clearer if we consider the nature of the *distinctio solius rationis realis*, which corresponds to Scotus's formal distinction. Concerning the latter, Barth has reached some conclusions the criticism of which will serve to elucidate our point. He says, for example:

Statim surgit quaestio, num possibile sit ens tantum determinabile et differentias ultimas tantum determinantes reddere. Hoc negandum est; nam et ens et differentiae ultimae insimul sunt determinabilia et determinantia. Differentiae ultimae determinant ens ad prima entia possibilia (ens infinitum et finitum) et determinantur ab ente ad ens (quid est et si est); aliter essent nihil neque ullam functionem determinationis exercere possent. Ens e contra determinat differentias ultimas ad campum extra nihilum versantem et determinatur a differentiis ultimis ad primas specificationes. Unde ens et differentiae non sunt conceptus unilaterales, sed bilaterales, se invicem suppletentes, inquantum unus ab alio accipit et unus alteri de suo communicat.¹⁶¹

But this is surely a lamentable hypostatizing of concepts. In the real order neither concept modifies the other, since they suppose for one sole reality, one simple essence. The author argues that the ultimate differences must contain *ens in quid*, because "sine ente nihil sunt," i. e., have no reality, cannot exist without *ens*. But in this sense *ens* is

¹⁵⁹ Cf. esp. II, 163 *et seq.*, 264 *et seq.*

¹⁶⁰ Cf. esp. II, 31, 34 *et seq.*, 191 *et seq.*, 243 *et seq.*

¹⁶¹ *Antonianum*, XIV (1939), 388.

also *nihil*, since it cannot exist without an intrinsic mode; it should then also contain the mode *in quid*, and thus *actum esset de univocatione*, as he says. This seems to be a misapprehension of the nature of the distinction. No real entity is so simple, according to Scotus, that it cannot be resolved into two simpler concepts, by which it is *primo conveniens cum aliis et primo diversum*, i. e., the concept of *ens* and its intrinsic mode, or ultimate difference. These concepts correspond to one and the same essence *a parte rei*, and make no real composition or diversity. Hence they cannot be said to be related as *actus* and *potentia* except metaphorically; there is *tantum unum principium*, as our author says, but it is the real *ens una cum modo*, not *ens* alone (*ens logicum*). The simplicity of these concepts is a logical simplicity (*ulterius non resolubilis*), hence can be greater than that required in the existent thing. The author's "unilateral" distinction will not hold, as an ultimate difference containing *ens in quid* must be further resolvable to one that does not; this conclusion is unavoidable. These concepts will then be distinct, not as representing separate realities *cum proprio esse*, but as incomplete or imperfect aspects of one reality. Olivi expresses this in the oft-used principle: "Non oportet quod omnis diversitas rationum realium faciat compositionem realem seu diversitatem essentialem."¹⁶² A "diversitas rationum realium" alone, according to him, is not a mere mental distinction, yet supposes no real diversity *a parte rei*. When different *rationes reales* do suppose a real distinction, he uses the terms: *dicunt diversas essentias*, or *diversitatem essentialem*, as in the case of the plural forms in man and the faculties of the soul, with the difference explained above.

Clearly the soul cannot be an "essentia undequaque simplex," to use Jansen's words,¹⁶³ in the sense described above, in which the faculties would be merely different aspects, distinguished by the mode of operation proper to abstractive cognition. This complete identity of the three *potentiae animae* (*vegetativa, sensitiva, intellectiva*) seems to have been taught by Alexander of Hales,¹⁶⁴ St. Bonaventure,¹⁶⁵ and Duns Scotus,¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² II, 280. One must read not only q. 7, which professedly treats *rationes reales*, but the numerous applications and occasional digressions; cf. esp. I, 227 *et seq.*, 134 *et seq.*, 143, 247 *et seq.*, 262 *et seq.*, 280—284, 310, 333, 335 *et seq.*, 376; II, 34, 45 *et seq.*, 243 *et seq.*, 260 *et seq.*; III, 117.

¹⁶³ Cf. Olivi's *in II. Sent.*, II, 185, n. 3.

¹⁶⁴ *Summa Theologica* (Quaracchi, 1928), II, 403 *et seq.*, 420—427, 682 *et seq.*; cf. prolegomena, xlii—xlvi.

¹⁶⁵ *Opera Omnia*, I, 86 *et seq.*; II, 463, ad 3, 560—563, 741—743.

¹⁶⁶ Ox. I, d. 19, q. 2, n. 10; II, d. 1, q. 4, n. 25; q. 5, n. 5; d. 16, n. 17; IV, d. 44, q. 1, n. 4.

as well as Vital du Four¹⁶⁷ though we do not believe any of them says with Jansen, that the *anima intellectiva* informs the body as intellective. Vital holds a sort of real distinction between a faculty taken as *essentia* and as *potentia*, so that it can inform something as *essentia* and not as *potentia*, which Olivi ridicules.¹⁶⁸ In Vital's hypothesis of a purely relative distinction of the faculties, he might just as logically hold that the soul could inform the body as sensitive and not as intellective, which, indeed, he seems to do in places, as Olivi points out; and this is all that Olivi's teaching amounts to, except that he denies the possibility of the faculties being thus completely identified, so as to constitute one simple essence of which they are but different intentions or relations. If each *potentia* is identified with its essence or substance, and is essentially different from the others, then they cannot be consubstantial except as formal parts of a composite substance, as Olivi teaches. The arguments for plurality of forms in general hold here also: the intellective and sensitive perfections cannot be communicated to the body by one and the same principle any more than the intellective and corporeal forms (*dicunt diversitatem essentialem seu realem compositionem*). Thus Olivi rejects a formal distinction in this instance, and if he is right, Scotus erred in applying it to the *potentiae animae*.

At any rate, in Olivi's hypothesis the substantial unity of the various elements and the immediate, essential, and formal union of the body and intellective soul are preserved complete and perfect in every respect. He so explicitly emphasizes this essential and formal unity that Böhner could write:

As far as I can see, it is hardly possible on the basis of the pluralistic theory to emphasize the substantial unity of a human being more than Olivi did . . . How Jansen, then, can speak of a "mechanical unity" and of even worse things, is hardly understandable . . . In our opinion, Jansen perpetuates a confusion.¹⁶⁹

OLIVI AS A PHILOSOPHER; HIS WORKS

By way of appendix we may say a few words about Olivi as a philosopher and give a list of his works. An extensive perusal of his works, we think, will lead to the conclusion that Olivi ranks with the first of the

¹⁶⁷ *Quaestiones selectae* ("De Rerum Principio"), ed. García (Quaracchi, 1910), pp. 297—309.

¹⁶⁸ The arguments of Vital to which Olivi replies in the long appendix to q. 51 may be found, in a somewhat different recension, in Vital's *Quaestiones*, ed. cit., pp. 198—248, 283—290.

¹⁶⁹ Mimeographed lecture on Olivi (St. Bonaventure's College, 1941), pp. 6, 13, 14.

scholastics.¹⁷⁰ Olivi's attitude towards philosophy, however, is more or less peculiar to him. His viewpoint is primarily theological; he regards philosophical inquiry merely as a means of explaining or defending the faith, in so far as to profess the greatest distrust and contempt for mere philosophical opinions as such, strongly adhered to and made the occasion of party conflicts. As a result, in discussing such speculative and controvertible matters, he is often very impersonal and noncommittal, which has given rise to the theory that he does this for diplomatic reasons, namely, to avoid any pretext of attack by his vigilant adversaries.¹⁷¹ He himself, however, gives a different explanation for his conduct, and it will not be inappropriate to quote the few digressions he has made in his writings on this point:

Ad maiorem reverentiam dictis vestris [i. e., the seven censors] exhibendam, de his quae erant philosophica, fidem nostram non contingentia, nullam vim feci, sed ea simpliciter et absolute subieci iudicio vestro, pro eo quod eorum assertiones, et praecipue pertinentes, ego in parte detestor, et in parte, plus quam a plerisque credatur, negligo et parvipendo, sicut satis potest patere ex modo tenui in huiusmodi philosophica recitando.¹⁷²

De ista autem opinione ego non multum curo, nisi solum de quibusdam periculis fidei quae videntur ad alteram opinionem sequi . . . Satisfiat igitur praedictis periculis et inconvenientibus et sufficit mihi; mihi enim non est cura nisi solum de his quae directe tanguit catholicam fidem.¹⁷³

De omnibus enim praedictis . . . recitavi opiniones varias . . . quia videbantur in se habere difficultates merito dubitabiles et quas ego nescirem dissolvere, et videbantur mihi ad fidem nostram explicandam et defendendam non minus accomodatae quam ceterae; et e contrario, in quibusdam opinionibus philosophicis usitatis occultos laqueos, et quaedam perplexa et nodosa pericula fidei catholicae timui, et vehementer suspicatus sum, et adhuc suspisor illa in posterum ab errorum seminatoribus propalanda . . . zelus fidei catholicae et Romanae ecclesiae me movit ad ista et ad alia plura non minora istis . . . Certus autem sum quod in talibus philosophicis aut in quibuscumque opinionibus humanis non inhaereo, nec pertinaciter illis insisto, nec eas secundum se velut res altas et magnas aestimo, quin potius vehementer detestor, quod Aristoteles paganus, et Averroes saracenus, et quidam alii infideles philosophi a quibusdam in tanta aestimatione et veneratione et in tanta auctoritate habentur, et praecipue in dictis et scriptis sacrae theologiae. Scio quidem quod Agar tractanda et domanda fuerat ut ancilla, non veneranda et excolenda ut domina; sed quia nunc apud plerosque

¹⁷⁰ Even Bihl makes a somewhat similar admission: "forte non immerito praedicatur: 'le plus puissant philosophe français du XIII^e siècle.'" (*A.F.H.*, XXVIII [1935], citing de Sessevalle, *op. cit.*, p. 453.)

¹⁷¹ Cf. Jansen, prolegomena to Olivi's in *II. Sent.*, III, xxvii; de Wulf, *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale* (Louvain-Paris, 1936), II, p. 233.

¹⁷² *A.F.H.*, XXVIII (1935), 134.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 154 *et seq.*; cf. also 130.

res aliter se habet, non dubito quod suo tempore spiritus Christi clamabit: "eicite ancillam et filium eius," et Isaac patriarcha molestatus dicet: "taedet me vitae meae propter filias Heth. Si acceperit Iacob de stirpe huius terrae, nolo vivere." Et tunc Paulus viva voce intonabit: "perdam sapientiam sapientum et prudentiam prudentium reprobabo. Ubi sapiens, ubi scriba, ubi conquisitor huius saeculi? Nonne stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi? . . ." Absit igitur a nobis, ut propter traditiones hominum quorumcumque relinquamus aut transgrediamur mandata Domini Dei nostri, aut propter fabulas portarum a veritate Iesu Christi avertamus auditum.¹⁷⁴

Humanas autem opiniones, humana excogitatas ratione, si magnorum et fide dignorum eas humili et disciplinabili corde revereor, sed pro universo orbe non adhererem eis tanquam fidei catholicae aut traditioni divinae cui contradicere licet nunquam, non ab ea aliquatenus dissentire, nec de ea saltem leviter disputarem, quin potius temerarium et in fide periculosum et quasi hereticum primus censeo, sic quibuscumque humanis adinventionibus adherere, quod non solum per rationes sed etiam per plures auctoritates sanctorum et praecipue Augustini probare possem. Hoc est enim dicta hominum quasi idola venerari, ex quo pericula sectarum et schismata oriuntur ita ut quidam: "Ego sum Pauli, ego autem Aristotelis, ego vero Thomae." Si vero hoc omnino urgentes a me requirant an de diversis opinionibus a me non affirmatis sed recitatis alteram earum amplius credam, si de credulitate simplicis opinionis quaeritur, fateor quod sic; si vero de credulitate fidei nihil penitus credo nisi quae supra dixi et modo quo dixi. Contra vero ea quae fidei sunt nulli hominum scienter obedirem. In aliis autem quantum salva conscientiae puritate potero propter obedientiam, sed contra veritatem conscientiae nullo modo. Quamvis enim illa non spectant ad fidem, tamen pro nullo homine mentiri debeo et praecipue in doctrina. Si quis vero humanam opinionem me compellat tenere ut fidem, ita cito me posset ad idololatriam inclinare nisi prius mihi ostenderetur vere et infallibiliter quod ipsa esset de fide.¹⁷⁵

Haec sunt quae pro parte ista ad praesens occurrunt, de eius approbatione non aliter curans; nisi quod nollem in alteram me vel alium leviter praecipitare. De his quae directe non spectent ad intrinseca fidei nostrae vellem quod nunquam tractarentur aut tenerentur tanquam dicta fidei, sed solum tanquam ancillaria eius; hoc est causa quare in talibus aliquando opiniones et excogitationes diversas recito, ne alteri partium tanquam fidei insistatur, nam nisi simplicis fidei zelus me nimium decipiat, quod non credo, permaxima pericula mihi videntur latere in tanta assertione et authenticatione humanarum opinionum, sive sunt Aristotelis sive Averrois, sive quorumcumque aliorum praeter doctores sacros a romana ecclesia authentice receptos et solemnizatos.¹⁷⁶

Diabolicum autem esse dico opinioni humanae tanquam ex fide immobiliter adhaerere. Confiteor enim quod nulli determinanti hoc vel illud esse de substantia fidei nostrae tencor necessario assentire, nisi soli Romano Pontifici . . . Non abinde tamen diffiteor theologorum et doctorum sententias

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 405 et seq.

¹⁷⁵ *E.F.*, XXIX (1913), 420 et seq.; cf. *supra*, note 56.

¹⁷⁶ *Quodlibeta*, fol. 53ra.

esse reverendas, et magni faciendas, dummodo contra fidem . . . nihil contineant. Dico etiam utile esse, contrarias conscribi et defendi opiniones, dum id fiat absque pertinacia; ita enim exactius veritas examinatur, disputantium ingenia magis exercentur, et ad elucidationem mysteriorum fidei securius pervenimus. Id autem intelligendum velim de illis opinionibus, quae fidei nostrae subancillari dicuntur, vel ad eiusdem mysteria percipienda vel defendenda conducunt.¹⁷⁷

Thus throughout his writings Olivi almost always examines the theological bearings of a question. This severe objectivity and detachment of judgment which he describes could, no doubt, appear to unfriendly adversaries, or be made to appear, as undue freedom of thought or scepticism. When an adversary, however, violated this objective attitude insisted on by Olivi, he could become quite pointed in his language, as in the following picturesque expressions written against Vital du Four:

Patet igitur quod hoc non est monstrare contradictionem in dicto nostro, sed potius fatuizationem in verbo et cogitatu suo.¹⁷⁸

Videtur mihi quod iste non intelligit mea dicta nec sua.¹⁷⁹

Quantum capio, iste plenus est contradictionibus nec intelligit quae dicit.¹⁸⁰

Videsne quomodo fatuizat et errat! . . . Haec est nova philosophia istius . . . Attende miram caecitatem istius . . .¹⁸¹

Concerning Olivi's writings, Ehrle remarks that Olivi has not yet been given his rightful place, being one of the most productive writers of the thirteenth century.¹⁸² Ubertino da Casale calculated that Olivi's works amounted to more than seventeen times the Sentences of Peter Lombard.¹⁸³ Their extent may be seen by the following list:

Theological and Philosophical Writings

Quaestiones ordinatae (or Summa quaestionum) super Sententias;¹⁸⁴
Commentarius in Sententias; Five *Quodlibeta*;¹⁸⁵ *Quaestiones de perfectione*

¹⁷⁷ *A.F.H.*, XI (1918), 269; Wadding, ad. an. 1297, n. 34, V, 426 *et seq.*

¹⁷⁸ *In II. Sent.*, II, 151.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 173.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 175.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 177, 191, 195.

¹⁸² *Op. cit.*, p. 410.

¹⁸³ *A.L.K.G.*, II, 406.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Doucet, *A.F.H.*, XXVIII (1935), 156 *et seq.*, 408 *et seq.*; Koch, *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale*, II (1930), 290—310.

¹⁸⁵ Ed. Lazarus Soardus, Venetiis, 1509. New questions discovered by Doucet (*op. cit.*, pp. 193—197); cf. Glorieux, *La Littérature Quodlibétique* (Paris, 1935), pp. 205—211; Paulus, "Die gedruckten Quodlibeta des Petrus Johannis Olivi," *Der Katholik*, LXXIX—II (1899), 478—480.

evangelica;¹⁸⁶ *Expositio super Regulam fratrum minorum*;¹⁸⁷ *Expositio super Dionysii de angelica hierarchia*;¹⁸⁸ *Quaestio seu tractatus de signis voluntariis*;¹⁸⁸ *Tractatus de emptione et venditione et de usura*;¹⁸⁹ *Tractatus de sacramentis*; *Tractatus de virtutibus et vitiis*; *Opus de dictis Seneca*; *Miles armatus*; *Tractatus de septem spiritibus malignis*; *Tractatus quod vocatur Exercens*;¹⁹⁰ *Informatio Petri Ioannis*; *Tractatus de 14 gradibus amoris gratiosi*;¹⁹¹ *Tractatus de 7 sentimentis Christi Ihesu*; *Tractatus de 7 tentationibus*; *Remedia contra spirituales temptationes Angelici viri Petri Ioannis*; *Monitio ad divinum amorem obtinendum*; *12 perfectiones seu proprietates cuilibet summo pastori vel cuilibet pontifici adaptabiles*; *Tractatus de Beata Virgine*;¹⁹² *Tractatus de contractibus*;¹⁹³ *Censure of fr. Ar.*;¹⁹⁴ Two responses to the seven censors;¹⁹⁵ Letter to Raymond Gaufredi,¹⁹⁶ to Bl. Conrad of Offida,¹⁹⁷ to the sons of King Charles II;¹⁹⁸ *Quaestio de Indulgentia Portiunculae*.¹⁹⁹

Scriptural Writings²⁰⁰

Principia generalia in sacram scripturam;²⁰¹ *Tractatus de distinctione veteris et novi testamenti*; *Tractatus de fabrica templi Salomonis*; *Postilla*

¹⁸⁶ According to Doucet (*op. cit.*, p. 413), this is probably part of the commentary on *IV. Sent.* It is being edited at Quaracchi, and according to Jarraux will equal the three volumes edited by Jansen (*op. cit.*, p. 515).

¹⁸⁷ Edited in *Firmamentum trium ordinum beatissimi Patris nostri Francisci* (Parisii, 1512).

¹⁸⁸ Prologue edited by Delorme; see list of Editions.

^{188a} Edited by Ferd. Delorme, in *Miscellanea historica Oliger, Antonianum*, XX (1945), 309—330.

¹⁸⁹ Perhaps the same as the *Tractatus de Contractibus* below.

¹⁹⁰ This and the following may be the same; cf. Doucet, *op. cit.* p. 157, n. 3.

¹⁹¹ The following eight, taken from St. Bernardine's MSS may be extracts from other works; but as the Saint elsewhere gives source-references, I have copied these (cf. Pacetti, *op. cit.*). Other treatises may also have been taken from larger works.

¹⁹² Cf. *supra*, note 23.

¹⁹³ Cf. *A.F.H.*, XXIX (1936), 526.

¹⁹⁴ Edited in *Quodlibeta* (Venetiis, 1509).

¹⁹⁵ Edited by Laberge, *A.F.H.*, XXVIII (1935), 115—155, 374—407; XXIX (1936), 98—141, 365—395; also in *Quodlibeta*.

¹⁹⁶ Edited in *Quodlibeta*; partially in *E.F.*, XXIX (1913), 414—422, and in du Plessis d'Argentré, *op. cit.*, 231—233.

¹⁹⁷ Edited by Jeiler, *Historisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft*, III (1882), 648—659; also by Oliger, *A.F.H.*, XI (1918), 366—373.

¹⁹⁸ Edited by Ehrle, *op. cit.*, pp. 534—540.

¹⁹⁹ Edited at Quaracchi, as below.

²⁰⁰ "Leur masse est impressionnante et certains d'entre eux sont des plus beaux qui aient jamais été composés" (Jarraux, *op. cit.*, p. 514). Cf. Kleinhans, "De Studio Sacrae Scripturae in Ordine Fratrum Minorum saeculo XIII," *Antonianum*, VII (1914), 417 *et seq.*, *passim*.

²⁰¹ Edited by Bonelli, as below.

*super Genesim; Postilla super Iob; Postilla super Psalterium; Postilla super Proverbia; Postilla super Ecclesiasten; Postilla super Cantica Canticorum;*²⁰² *Postilla super Lamentationes Ieremiae; Postilla in Ezechielem; Postilla super libros Regum; Postilla super Exodum (?)*; *Postilla super Prophetas minores; Postilla in Matthaeum; Postilla in Lucam et Marcum; Postilla in Ioannem;*²⁰³ *Postilla in Actus Apostolorum; Postilla in Epistolam ad Romanos;*²⁰⁴ *Postilla in Ep. ad Corinthios;*²⁰⁵ *Postilla in epistolas canonicas; Postilla in Apocalypsim.*

Editions

Quodlibeta Petri Ioannis Provenzalis doctoris solemnissimi Ordinis Minorum, ed. Lazarus Soardus (Venetiis, 1509). Also contains the treatise against fr. Ar. and the two replies to the seven censors. (See also note 195.)

Expositio super Regulam, in *Firmamentum trium ordinum* (Venetiis, 1513).

Quaestio de indulgentia Portiunculae (incomplete), in *Acta Ordinis Minorum*, XXIV (1895), 139—145. Also printed separately.

Quaestiones ordinatae seu Summa quaestionum super II. librum Sententiarum, ed. Jansen (*Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi*, IV—VI) (Quaracchi, 1922—1926).

Quaestiones de Deo: three edited by Jansen in above, one by Schmaus, in *Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus* (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, XXVIII—XXIX), I, 143*—228*.

Quaestio de angelicis influentiis (prologue to the *Expositio super angelicam hierarchiam*), ed. Delorme, *Collationes S. Bonaventurae* (*Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica*, VIII) (Quaracchi, 1934), appendix.

Quaestio "Quid ponat ius vel dominium" seu tractatus de signis voluntariis. Ed. Delorme, *Antonianum* XX (1945), pp. 309—330.

²⁰² "Il commento al Cantico dei Cantici di Giovanni Olivi, non credo di errare asserendo che è una delle più belle opere mistiche del medio evo" (Sarri, *op. cit.*, p. 104). Edited by Bonelli.

²⁰³ According to Jarraux (*op. cit.*, p. 514, n. 3), the commentary edited in the Roman edition of St. Bonaventure (1589) and attributed by Ehrle to Olivi, may belong to John of Wales.

²⁰⁴ This is, according to Denifle, "inter meliores quae Medio Aevo scriptae fuere" (cf. *A.F.H.*, XI [1918], 315).

²⁰⁵ Probably the treatise "De perlegendis philosophorum libris" mentioned below is taken from this commentary.

Postilla in Cantica Canticorum, ed. Bonelli, *Supplementum operum omnium S. Bonaventurae* (Tridenti, 1772).

Principia generalia in sacram scripturam, ed. *idem, ibid.*

Quaestio de renuntiatione Papae Coelestini V (part of *Qq. de perfectione evangelica*), ed. Olier, *A.F.H.* XI (1918), pp. 340—373.

Letter to Bl. Conrad of Offida (cf. note 197).

Letter to sons of King Charles (cf. note 198).

Letter to Raymond Gaufredi (cf. note 196).

Quaestio de voto regulam aliquam profitentis (from *Qq. de perfectione evangelica*), ed. Delorme, *Antonianum* XXVI (1941), pp. 143—164.

Tractatus de perlegendis philosophorum libris, ed. *idem, ibid.*, pp. 37—44.

Extracts from *Qq. de perfectione evangelica*, in Ehrle, *op. cit.*; from the Commentaries on the Sentences, in Schmaus, *op. cit.*, Doucet, *op. cit.*, and Koch, *op. cit.*; from the Commentary on Romans, in Denifle, *Luther und Luthertum, Quellenbelege* (Mainz, 1904), pp. 156—161.

APPENDIX

The following passages from Ubertino of Casale's defense of Olivi at the Council of Vienne may be of interest:

"Et probabiliter credo quia fuit malum motivum et modus peior destructionis eorum [librorum Olivi], quia ipse singulariter exprimebat in suis scriptis transgressionem in observancia paupertatis, quas summe, qui hec fecerunt, timuerunt ad communem noticiam pervenire, quia non videntur habere animum corrigendi." (A.L.K.G. III, 88) — "Ex hac cecitate provenit furia, quam ostendunt contra libros illius, qui fuit melior clericus et subtilior, quem unquam habuerunt in hac vita, sicut ex eius scriptis evidenter apparet, solum quia transgressionem evangelice regule et sanum eum intellectum clare descripsit, que ne possent legi et sciri, voluerunt eius exterminare de mundo." (*Ibid.*, p. 193; cf. II, pp. 381 ff.) — "Et quia vir zelotes evangelii paupertatis et nostre regule frater Petrus hanc doctrinam pestilentem in suis libris quasi ubique irrefragabiliter arguit; idcirco hec principalis est et precipua causa, quia ipsum et eius doctrinam sunt atrociter persecuti; sicut patet in multis eorum sententiis contra bonos fratres, et sicut etiam plures eis manifeste dicunt et sicut est notorium per ordinem universum et in rotulis, quos legit frater Bonagratia [de Bergamo] coram vobis de hiis, que fecit frater Arnoldus de Rocafolio in conventu Montispestulano, continentur. Quod vocant fratrem Petrum Johannis capud superstitionis, propter hoc, quod detestabatur errorem dicentium, abusus rerum non frangere substantiam voti evangelice paupertatis; et quia detestabatur

modum causicum, quo per privilegium procuratorum replemus litigiis omnes curias tam saecularium quam etiam prelatorum." (*Ibid.*, II, p. 388.) — "Non est mirum, si tales lectores et magistri et prelati odiunt doctrinam de usu paupere, quia nimis ab eorum vita discrepat." (*Ibid.*, III, p. 71.) — Cf. also Claren, *ibid.*, II, pp. 293 ff.; *Expositio Regulae* (ed. Oliger, Quaracchi, 1912), pp. 231—236; Raymond Gaufredi, A. L. K. G. III, p. 143; Wadding, V, p. 58, 120.

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THE POSITION AND FUNCTION OF MAN IN THE CREATED WORLD ACCORDING TO SAINT BONAVENTURE¹

INTRODUCTION

One of the great achievements of Medieval Scholasticism is to have formed and developed doctrinal systems that comprise the entire wealth of human knowledge and bring everything into one harmonious synthesis. An outstanding master of theological synthesis is the "Seraphic Doctor" Saint Bonaventure.² In his doctrine the various parts are not only harmoniously connected with one another, but form together such a unity and totality that they cannot be understood in their real meaning when considered separately; for "each part reaches out into all the rest of the system and is affected by the ramifications leading to it from the system as a whole."³ Every individual question must thus be considered in connection with the general structure and the leading

¹ This article was composed for the fulfillment of the publication requirement for the degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology in the School of Sacred Theology of the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. — List of abbreviations used: Ant. = Antonianum / BACH-PT = Bibliotheca Academiae Catholicae Hungaricae — Sectio philosophico-theologica / BFSMA = Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi / BGPM = Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters / BKV = Bibliothek der Kirchenväter / BSF = Biblioteca di Studi Francescani / CF = Collectanea Franciscana / CUA-PS = Catholic University of America — Philosophical Studies / DTC = Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique / EF = Études Franciscaines / EncF = Enciclopedia Filosofica / EPM = Études de Philosophie Médiévale / ETL = Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses / FCh = The Fathers of the Church / FF = Franziskanische Forschungen / FIP-ThS = Franciscan Institute Publications — Theology Series / FIP-TS = Franciscan Institute Publications — Text Series / FrF = La France Franciscaine / FS = Franciscan Studies / LCC = The Library of Christian Classics / LCL = The Loeb Classical Library / MG = Migne — Patrologia Graeca / ML = Migne — Patrologia Latina / PJ = Philosophisches Jahrbuch / RUO = Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa / SM = Studia Mariana / SST = Studies in Sacred Theology / WSB = Works of Saint Bonaventure / WW = Wissenschaft und Weisheit.

² See J. Fr. Bonnefoy, "De synthesis operum Dei ad extra ad mentem sancti Bonaventurae," *Ant.* 18 (1943) 17—28.

³ E. Gilson, *La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure*, EPM 4 (2. ed., Paris 1943) 385—6 (translation by I. Trethowan [London 1940]).

ideas of the entire doctrine. This is particularly true with regard to the subject of the present study, which touches so many different points and is in fact an important part of the system as such.] In order to provide the necessary framework within which the subject matter itself can be properly placed and treated, we therefore begin with a general outline of the main elements in the Bonaventurian synthesis. Although only a brief introductory sketch, this outline will show the wonderful inner coherence, continuity, and correspondence that exists in this system both between the various created things and between each of these things and God, their common center.

§ I

The General Structure of the Bonaventurian Synthesis

In the great drama of creation St. Bonaventure distinguishes three main parts or phases: the *emanatio*, the *exemplaritas*, and the *consummatio*,⁴ which is also called *reductio*. The meaning of these three basic terms is that the created world as a whole and all creatures in this world have their origin in God *from* whom they *proceed*; having been created, they *reflect* God, their divine model or exemplar, *according* to which they were made; they finally *return* to God *for* whom they were created and who is their ultimate end. This division comprises the great themes of St. Bonaventure and is a guiding principle not only for his philosophy, but for his theology as well. Its influence is visible in many ways through-

⁴ Explicitly enumerated in this way in the *Collationes in Hexaemeron* I. 17 (V. 332b). — Unless indicated otherwise, the works of St. Bonaventure will be quoted according to the edition of Quaracchi, *S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, Quaracchi 1882—1902. The figures that are added in parentheses also refer to this edition, the Roman numeral indicating the volume, the Arabic numeral the page, and the final letter *a* or *b* the first or second column on that page. — In the frequent references to the Commentary on the *Sentences*, the three consecutive Arabic numbers signify the *distinction*, *article*, and *question*, e. g. II *Sent.* 15. 1. 2. ad 5 (II. 378b). If there is only one single article, the letter *u.* (*articulus unicus*) is used instead of the number 1, e. g. I. *Sent.* 2. *u.* 4. *fund.* 4 (I. 57a). In those cases where a distinction is first subdivided into several *parts*, the reference contains four Arabic numbers, the second one indicating the part in question, e. g. II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. *arg.* 3 (II. 41a). — The main part or body of a question is indicated by the letter *c.* (*conclusio*); *fund.* (*fundamentum*) signifies the arguments adduced in favor of the author's solution, *arg.* (*argumentum*) the objections against it, and *ad* (*responsio ad argumentum*) the answers to these objections; *dub.* refers to the so-called *Dubia circa litteram Magistri*, which St. Bonaventure adds at the end of every distinction, and which are a last remainder of the old litteral commentaries before the time of St. Bonaventure. — *Italics* are used in the quotations according to the point to be emphasized in that particular connection and do not always coincide with the italics in the Quaracchi-edition.

out his works.⁵ To know these three aspects was for him of fundamental importance; he himself assures us that "unless a man is able to consider how things are brought into being, how they are led back to their end, and how God shines forth in them, he cannot have a real understanding."⁶

These three phases in the drama of creation are closely connected with one another and constitute one continuous line or process. The fact that this line finally returns to the same point from which it started has led St. Bonaventure to consider the entire process as a great *circular movement*.⁷ Together with those three phases the idea of the circle, therefore, has also become a significant element in his system.⁸ The

⁵ E. g. Holy Scripture is considered in its source, procedure, and final result (ortum, progressum et statum). *Brevil. Prol.* (V. 201a). Its truth "is [1] from God, [2] about God, in accordance with God, and [3] because of God." *Ibid.* § 6 (V. 208b). Sanctifying grace is likewise "from God, according to God, and for God." *Brevil.* 5. 1 (V. 252b and again 253a). Charity is called "the root, form, and end" of the virtues. *III Sent.* 27. dub. 1 (III. 617a). In the *Itinerarium* (1. 12) the believer considers this world in its origin, development, and end (originem, decursum et terminum) (V. 298b). Also *In Hexaem.* 8. 13 (V. 371b). In accordance with the three phases of creation, *Collatio* 10. 12—14 of the same work (V. 378b) develops three proofs for the existence of God and concludes: "Therefore, according to the order of causality, dignity, and finality all things manifest that there is a *First, Highest, and Ultimate Being*." In one of St. Bonaventure's sermons we read: "Everything is then well and perfectly known, when it is known with regard to its initial, intermediate, and final state (principium, medium et ultimum)." *Dom. 5. p. Epiph.*, sermo 1. 1 (IX. 193a).

⁶ *In Hexaem.* 3. 2 (V. 343a).

⁷ The circular movement is regularly mentioned in connection with the third phase, the return: "Illuminatio refertur in Deum, unde habuit ortum. Et ideo ibi completus est circulus." *De reduct. art.* 7 (V. 322a). See also *Brevil.* 5. 1 (V. 253a) and the passages quoted later in the present paragraph. — B. Rosenmöller expresses the same idea when he says: "Der Ausgang aus Gott verläuft in der geraden Linie, aber das Zurückkehren biegt die Linie zum Kreise zurück" (*Religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, BGPM 25. 3—4 [Münster 1925] 133). — In *I Sent.* 45. 2. 1. c. (I. 804b—805a) St. Bonaventure mentions as source of this idea of a circular movement Denis the Areopagite and quotes from his work *On the Divine Names* (4. 14): "Divinus amor est quidam cyclus aeternus, ex optimo, per optimum, et in optimum." The original text of Denis reads in the translation of John Scotus Eriugena: "Divinus amor ostenditur differenter, sicut quidam aeternus cyclus, per optimum, ex optimo, et in optimo, et in optimum, inenarrabili conversione circuiens" (MG 3. 712D; ML 122. 1136D—1137A). If we compare the two texts we see that St. Bonaventure is actually more definite than the source he quotes. For he states as simple fact (est) what Denis has mentioned only as a comparison (sicut), and he selects and rearranges the other three expressions in such a way that they now correspond to his three phases of creation.

⁸ See E. T. Healy, *Saint Bonaventure's De reductione artium ad theologiam: A Commentary with an Introduction and Translation*, WSB 1 (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1955) 119. — The more detailed study of J. Ratzinger, *Die Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura* (Munich 1959) 145—7, shows how the Seraphic Doctor applied the idea of the circle and the circular movement in the first place to God and His inner life, but then also to the individual man, and finally to the entire history of mankind.

whole created world "returns, as if in the manner of an intelligible circle, to its beginning in which it is perfected and beatified."⁹ The same circular movement is also present and more perfectly fulfilled in man; for the eternal life to which he is called "consists solely in this, that the rational spirit, which *proceeds* from the Most Blessed Trinity and is the *image* of the Trinity, *returns* in the manner of an *intelligible circle* into the Most Blessed Trinity."¹⁰

This notion of a circular movement explains why St. Bonaventure sometimes speaks of only two aspects in creation: the *origin* from God, and the *return* to God.¹¹ These two phases are the dynamic elements in the drama of creation; they account for the formation of the circle and are, therefore, more directly connected with the idea of a circle. But the other, intermediate phase of exemplarity, which possesses a more static character, is thereby not completely excluded. Some of those passages that mention only two phases describe creation as proceeding from the Divine Exemplar,¹² according to which each being is created in its particular form. The exemplarity is, therefore, linked with the first phase,¹³ remains present throughout the circle, and determines the manner of the return.

⁹ "Quasi ad modum circuli intelligibilis reducat ad suum principium." *Brevil.* 2. 4 (V. 221b). See also part 5. 1 (V. 253a). — The closed circle as an expression of final perfection and completion is mentioned in III *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. c.: "[Incarnatio] congruum etiam fuit propter divinorum operum excellentem consummationem, quae quidem facta est, cum *ultimum* coniunctum est *primo*. Ibi enim est *perfectionis consummatio*, sicut apparet in *circulo*, qui est perfectissima figurarum, qui etiam ad idem punctum terminatur, a quo incepit" (III. 20a—b).

¹⁰ *De myst. Trinit.* 8. ad 7 (V. 115b).

¹¹ "Iste circuitus est in consideratione quod omnia a Deo et ad Deum." *Comment. in Eccl.* 1. 7 (V. 13b). "Exire — redire" is another familiar set of terms for the same division, e. g. I *Sent.* 37. 1. 3. 2. c. (I. 648b) and II *Sent.* 4. dub. 3 (II. 143b). — The idea of a downward and upward movement in creation is a fundamental idea of Denis the Areopagite, who in turn took over from the Neo-Platonics, particularly from Proclus, as we shall see later in the second chapter. A striking example is the beginning of the work *On the Celestial Hierarchy* (1. 1), where Denis writes: "*Omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum, desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum*. Sed et omnis Patre moto manifestationis luminum processio, in nos optime ac large *proveniens*, iterum ut unifica virtus restituens nos replet et *convertit* ad congregantis Patris unitatem et deificam simplicitatem" (MG 3. 120B—121A; ML 122. 1037C). The opening words from St. James 1. 17 are particularly dear to St. Bonaventure, and several of his own works begin with the same text. Among them are the *Itinerarium* (V. 295a) and *De reductione art. ad theol.* (V. 319a), which both deal with the question of the return or the upward movement.

¹² "Liber vitae est liber redeuntium, ars est exeuntium." IV *Sent.* 43. 2. 3. c. (IV. 898b). Also the preceding question (898a—b).

¹³ "Initio ille est invocandus, a quo omne bonum originaliter progreditur, per quem omne bonum *exemplariter* producit, et ad quem omne bonum finaliter reducit." *Soliloqu.* Prol. no. 1 (VIII. 28b).

Another symbol of this drama of creation, which St. Bonaventure himself does not mention in this connection, but which expresses his idea of the three phases in creation very well, is the *triangle*. Its first side, drawn from the top to the lower left corner, represents the *emanation* of all things from God, the first and highest principle. The second side, which forms the base of the triangle and runs in a horizontal direction from the lower left to the lower right corner, symbolizes the *exemplarity* of the created world. Since this side is opposite the top corner of the triangle, it is like a mirror in which the first principle is reflected. Its horizontal position expresses the static character of this phase. The third side, leading from the lower right corner of the triangle back to its top and thus completing the figure, represents the *return* of all things to God, the all-dominating principle.

This triangular figure makes the whole drama of creation resemble an imitation and reflection of the Blessed Trinity, of which the triangle is an ancient, traditional symbol.¹⁴ That such a correspondence between creation and the Triune Creator is actually present in the doctrine of St. Bonaventure, is evident from many passages in the writings of the Saint. The immediate reason why creation consists of these three phases lies in the fact that the first principle, which exists before and independently of anything else, "must act *from* itself, *according* to itself, and *because* of itself."¹⁵ It therefore assumes, "with regard to any given creature, the role of a threefold cause" from which the three phases in creation follow; "every creature is *constituted* in being by the *efficient cause*, is made to *conform* to the *exemplary cause*, and is *ordained* to an end" which is the work of the *final cause*.¹⁶

But this is only the first step in the process of tracing the three phases of creation back to their origin. The deeper source and basis for such a threefold causality is seen in God's *power*, *wisdom*, and *goodness*.¹⁷ These three divine attributes are then further related to the three Divine Persons.¹⁸ The connection which is thus established between the three

¹⁴ St. Bonaventure uses the triangle as a symbol both for the Blessed Trinity (*In Hexaem.* 4. 16 [V. 352a]) and for the image of the Trinity in the human soul (*II Sent.* 16. 1. 1. ad 4 [II. 395b] and 16. 2. 3. c. [405a]).

¹⁵ *Brevil.* 2. 1 (V. 219b). Also *Serm. de rebus theol.*, sermo 2. 43 (V. 551b), and *Brevil.* 7. 1 (V. 281a).

¹⁶ *Brevil.* 2. 1 (V. 219b), also 7. 1 (281a). — About this threefold causality see J. J. Hartnett, *Doctrina Sancti Bonaventurae de deiformitate* (Diss. Mundelein, Ill., 1936) 9.

¹⁷ *In Hexaem.* 16. 9 (V. 404b).

¹⁸ The three causes, attributes, and Divine Persons are formally placed together and shown in their relationship in *III Sent.* 37. 2. 1. c. (III. 822a—b); *De decem praeceptis* 2. 4 (V. 511b); *Brevil.* 1. 6 (V. 215b). — See also

phases of creation and the three Persons in God, shows the created world as a result and reflection of the Blessed Trinity. The first phase corresponds to the *Father*, who is the originating principle for the other two Divine Persons; the second phase has its parallel in the *Son*, who is the perfect image of the Father; the third phase is comparable to the *Holy Ghost*, who, as the bond of divine love, completes and terminates the inner life of God, so that the ring of divine processions is closed and perfect.¹⁹

This parallel between the created world and God receives a further confirmation and deeper explanation if we take a closer look at the question of the first origin. In the inner life of the Triune God as well as in the drama of creation St. Bonaventure knows a *first principle*, which he considers not only in its negative aspect of being in no way derived from another, but also and even more in its positive aspect of highest nobility, power, activity, and fecundity.²⁰ Comparing such a first principle with a spring or fountain that virtually contains all the riches of the river proceeding from it, he calls this positive aspect or quality of a first principle the *fontalis plenitudo*, and makes it a fundamental notion for his entire system.

This "fountain-fullness," as we might perhaps translate, is in the deepest sense proper to the *first Person* in God, to the Father, who possesses the absolute primacy or innascibility, and who is thus the root and fountain for the two processions in God²¹ and for the relations that are constituted by them.²² But the entire Divine Essence, which

A. Dempf, *Metaphysik des Mittelalters* (separate edition from *Handbuch der Philosophie*, Munich 1930) 115, where these parallels are mentioned as an example of the universal analogy in St. Bonaventure's system. See also p. III of the same work.

¹⁹ *In Hexaem.* 1. 12 (V. 331a—b). Likewise I *Sent.* 36. dub. 4 (I. 632b) and *Dom.* 3. *Adv.*, sermo 2. 1 (IX. 60a). — A brief summary of all this is found at the beginning of the *Sermo de Trinitate* (IX. 352a): "Est autem haec Trinitas beata principium effectivum, exemplativum et terminativum omnium sive completivum, iuxta illud ad Romanos undecimo (v. 36): "Ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia'." This verse is frequently quoted with reference to the three Divine Persons, e. g. *Comment. in Sap.* 11. 21 (VI. 182b).

²⁰ "Primitas summa in summo et altissimo principio ponit summam actualitatem, summam fontalitatem et summam fecunditatem." *De myst. Trinit.* 8. c. (V. 114a). Also I *Sent.* 13. dub. 4 (I. 240a—b), 27. 1 u. 2. ad 3 (470a), and 28. u. 1. c. (498a).

²¹ "Ratione *primitatis* persona nata est ex se aliam producere; et voco hic primitatem *innascibilitatem*, ratione cuius, ut dicit antiqua opinio, est *fontalis plenitudo* in Patre ad omnem emanationem." I *Sent.* 2. u. 2. c. (I. 54a). The same is expressed in similar ways in I *Sent.* 27. 1. u. 2. ad 3 (I. 470b), *Brevil.* 1. 3 (V. 212a), and *De myst. Trinit.* 8. ad 7 (V. 115b).

²² St. Bonaventure sees the real source of the two divine processions in this primacy or innascibility of the first Person and not in the paternity; the latter is rather the result of the first procession and constitutes the full

equally includes all three Persons, is then in a similar way the *first Essence* and Principle with regard to all created things, and possesses this same "fountain-fullness," from which now the vast multitude of creatures proceeds.²³ It is in both cases an overflowing and outpouring of the same divine perfection and goodness, which is necessary and eternal in the Triune God Himself, but free and temporal with regard to the production of creatures.²⁴

This shows that the parallel between the inner life of God and creation is not merely exterior and accidental, but has a deep reason. The first "fountain-fullness" is the basis for the second one,²⁵ and St. Bonaventure sees in the eternal processions in God the last source of all temporal creation.²⁶ The notion of the *fontalis plenitudo*, which is in this way applied both to the life in God and to the creation outside of Him, is a new and striking proof of the unity, harmony, and continuity in the system of the Seraphic Doctor.

The final important point to be mentioned in our outline is the *intermediate position* which the *Second Divine Person* has throughout this Bonaventurian synthesis. Already within the Blessed Trinity we see the Son as the Person in the middle; for He alone is both brought forth by the Father and bringing forth the Holy Spirit, whereas the two other Persons constitute the extremes in this divine order: the Father only brings forth, the Holy Spirit is only brought forth.²⁷

The second Person also holds an intermediate position with regard to anything created. This is not to be understood in the sense that the

personality of the Father. See I *Sent.* 27. 1. u. 2. c. (I. 469b) and esp. ad 3 (470—2). See also A. Stohr, *Die Trinitätslehre des heiligen Bonaventura; I. Teil: Die wissenschaftliche Trinitätslehre*, Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie 3 (Münster 1923) 117—9.

²³ *De myst. Trinit.* 8. ad 7 (V. 115b) and I *Sent.* 27. 1. u. 2. ad 3 (I. 471a). The parallel between these two kinds of "fountain-fullness" is also emphasized in I *Sent.* 2. u. 2. fund. 4 (I. 53b).

²⁴ *Itiner.* 6. 2 (V. 310b). — The basic principle for this twofold "fountain-fullness" is the axiom: "Bonum est diffusivum sui." — See B. Rosenmöller, *op. cit.*, 35, and E. Sauer, *Die religiöse Wertung der Welt in Bonaventuras Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, FF 4 (Werl 1937) 64.

²⁵ "Haec autem fontalitas quodam modo origo est alterius fontalitatis." *De myst. Trinit.* 8. ad 7 (V. 115b).

²⁶ E. Sauer points to this relationship, when he writes: "Der enge Zusammenhang zwischen innertrinitarischem Leben und schöpferischer Wirklichkeit beruht auf der Idee der 'Plenitudo fontalis,' von der die ganze Trinitätsspekulation Bonaventuras getragen ist" (*loc. cit.*).

²⁷ In *Hexaem.* 1. 14 (V. 331b—332a) and 8. 12 (371a). Concerning the two extremes and their medium in God see *ibid.* 11. 7 (381a), 1. 12 (331a—b), I *Sent.* 36. dub. 4 (I. 632b), and *Dom.* 3. *Adv.*, sermo 2. 1 (IX. 60a). About the "order according to origin" in God see I *Sent.* 20. 2. 1—2 (I. 372—5).

Son is in any way a third being between God and creatures; for His principal relationship remains that to the Father,²⁸ with whom He possesses the one divine nature. But He nevertheless has a relationship to either side, and is for this reason most fittingly called the Divine Word, because a word has such a twofold relationship, namely to the one who speaks it, and to the object that is signified by it.²⁹ As the perfect image of the Father the Divine Word expresses the Father and also everything the Father plans to do, and thus the entire work of creation.³⁰

In correspondence to the different phases in this creation St. Bonaventure mentions three specific mediating functions of the Divine Word.³¹ The *production* of the entire world is accomplished through the *Verbum Increatum*. According to Holy Scripture, God has created all things by a word of His divine omnipotence: *He spoke, and they were made*.³² Following the interpretation of St. Augustine,³³ the Seraphic Doctor brings this creation through a spoken word in connection with the eternal generation of the second Divine Person. The one who speaks is the Father, and the word that is being spoken is the Son. In this Divine Word the Father pronounces from all eternity not only Himself but also all His ideas and plans. "In Him He has disposed everything,

²⁸ I *Sent.* 27. 2. u. 2. ad 5 (I. 486b) and 27. 2. u. 1. ad 6 (483b). Notice the more careful expression of *quasi medium* in I *Sent.* 27. 2. u. 2. c. (I. 485b) and ad 5 (486b). — See also II *Sent.* 13. dub. 4, where the expression *Deus operatur in Filio* is shown as expressing both the idea of identity and of causality (II. 332b—333b). — The twofold intermediate position of the Divine Word is placed side by side in *De reduct. art.* 23 (V. 325a). See to this text the explanation of R. Guardini, *Die Lehre des heil. Bonaventura von der Erlösung* (Düsseldorf 1921) 50—51.

²⁹ *Comment. in Ioan.* c. 1, no. 1 and 6 (VI. 246a, 247b). — I *Sent.* 27. 2. u. 3. c.: "Verbum autem non est aliud quam similitudo expressa et expressiva" (I. 488a); similar expressions occur in I *Sent.* 18. u. 5. ad 4 (I. 331b); *Brevil.* 1. 3 (V. 212a).

³⁰ In *Hexaem.* 1. 13 (V. 331b), 16, 17 (332a), and I *Sent.* 27. 2. u. 2. c. (I. 485b). See F. Imle — J. Kaup, *Die Theologie des heiligen Bonaventura* (Werl 1931) 50—67, esp. 52.

³¹ "Clavis ergo contemplationis est intellectus triplex, scilicet intellectus Verbi increati, per quod omnia producuntur; intellectus Verbi incarnati, per quod omnia reparantur; intellectus Verbi inspirati, per quod omnia revelantur. Nisi enim quis possit considerare de rebus, qualiter originantur, qualiter in finem reducuntur, et qualiter in eis refulget Deus; intelligentiam habere non potest." In *Hexaem.* 3. 2 (V. 343a). About this threefold function of the Divine Word as a medium see W. Dettloff, "'Christus tenens medium in omnibus': Sinn und Funktion der Theologie bei Bonaventura," *WW* 20 (1957) 122—8.

³² "Deus dicendo facit omnia; Psalmus [148:5]: 'Dixit, et facta sunt.'" In *Nativ. Dom.*, sermo 2. 1. 5 (IX. 107b). See also *Comment. in Sap.* 9. 1 (VI. 166b—167a).

³³ *Conf.* 11. 7 (no. 9) is one of the texts frequently quoted.

and through Him He has produced all things" by letting the temporal fulfillment of the plan of creation follow according to the eternal disposition.³⁴

Because of this eternal disposition the second Person in the Blessed Trinity is also the Eternal Art, the Divine Exemplar, Model or Archetype, *according* to which everything is made.³⁵ Since the Divine Word is the proper place of all the ideas in God, It is the absolute truth, whence flows the truth of all things, and by which the truth of things is known. With regard to this function as fountain of all truth and knowledge, the Second Person is called the *Verbum Inspiratum*. The same eternal Word through which everything has been made, is thus also the principle by which this creation is truly understood.³⁶ Illumined and assisted by the rays of the spiritual light that descends from this Word, the created spirit is able to obtain certain knowledge both in the natural and in the supernatural order.³⁷

Moreover, this illumination from above is also connected with an upward movement; for it points and leads back to its origin, and thus reaches over into the third phase of creation, the *return* to God. The illumined created spirit is able not only to see things in themselves, but also to discover the deeper reasons behind them, and comes in this way to a knowledge of God. St. Bonaventure has this in mind when he says that "this ray of light leads us, by way of a resolving process, back to the contemplation of heavenly things."³⁸ The same Divine Word, which is the source of all truth and light, is also the medium for

³⁴ "Dixit, id est Filium genuit, in quo omnia disposuit et per quem omnia produxit; . . . Et ad illud *dicere* sequitur creaturam fieri, sicut ad dispositionem sequitur opus." II *Sent.* 13. dub. 3 (II. 332a). See also I *Sent.* 6. u. 3. c. (I. 129b—130a) and 27. 2. u. 1. c. (482b—483a); II *Sent.* 37. 1. 2. ad 1 (II. 865b—866a); *Comment. in Ioan.* 1. 3 (no. 9) (VI. 248b); *In Hexaem.* 3. 4 (V. 344a); *De reduct. art.* 12 (V. 323a).

³⁵ I *Sent.* 27. 2. u. 4. c. (I. 490a). Also II *Sent.* 1. 1. dub. 2 (II. 36b). See B. Rosenmöller, *op. cit.*, 4.

³⁶ "Idem est principium essendi et cognoscendi." *In Hexaem.* 1. 13 (V. 331b); also 1. 10 (331a) and 3. 4. (344a).

³⁷ The six visions, which the *Hexaemeron* discusses and attributes to the *Verbum Inspiratum*, comprise every form of intellectual activity. For the natural realm in particular see *De scientia Christi* 4. c. (V. 22b—24b), and *Comment. in Ioan.* 1. 4 (no. 12) (VI. 249a).

³⁸ "Deinde ordine resolutorio ille radius nos reducit in contemplationem caelestium et deinde supercaelestium." *In Hexaem.* 3. 32 (V. 348b). *Resolutio* is a technical term in St. Bonaventure's teaching, and is explained by E. Gilson in this way: "To reduce or resolve the truth of any judgment is to follow the series of its conditions down to the eternal principles on which they are based." (*op. cit.*, 319). See also *Itiner.* 3. 4 (V. 305a), and I *Sent.* 28. dub. 1 (I. 504a—b). For further details see A. Engemann, "Erleuchtungslehre als Resolutio und Reductio nach Bonaventura," *WW* 1 (1934) 211—42.

the return to God.³⁹ The illumination is a part of this return which finds its full realization and completion through grace. But since after Adam's fall into sin the created spirit is no longer able to return on this way, and cannot even see the things above because its eye of contemplation has been darkened,⁴⁰ the Divine Word Itself descended as Redeemer,⁴¹ and it is now the *Verbum Incarnatum* from which all graces flow⁴² and through which the final return to God is actually accomplished. Here the great circle closes: for the same Word, through which everything proceeds from the Father as the ultimate source, is also leading back to unity with the Father.⁴³

The Second Person in the Blessed Trinity thus holds a key position with regard to each one of the three phases in creation, and "holds the middle in all things."⁴⁴ This does not mean that the equal and harmonious participation of all three Divine Persons in the work of creation is in any way impaired. Only the second phase, the exemplarity of all creatures, is attributed to the Son alone; in the production of things it is the Father who speaks the Word of creation, and the return to God is actually accomplished through the gift of grace which is in a particular way connected with the Holy Spirit.⁴⁵ But it remains true that the Divine Word plays a decisive role in each phase of creation, and for this reason St. Bonaventure sees in the threefold function of the Word also the necessary and indispensable key to a correct understanding of the entire drama of creation and to the solution of the problems that the searching human mind will encounter.⁴⁶ The fact that we know and possess this key only by faith, proves the basically theological character of the Bonaventurian synthesis.

³⁹ *In Hexaem.* I. 17 (V. 332a—b). In this function the Word is called the Tree of Life (*ibid.*) and the Book of Life. (IV *Sent.* 43. 2. 2—3 [IV. 897—9]). — About this illumination as a way for the return to God see *De reduct. art.*, esp. 7 (V. 322a).

⁴⁰ *Brevil.* 2. 12 (V. 230b).

⁴¹ *De reduct. art.* 8, 12, and 23 (V. 322a, 323a, and 325a).

⁴² "[Verbum incarnatum] est origo et fons omnis doni gratuiti." *Brevil.* 5. 1 (V. 252a). — "Descendit igitur gratia Dei ad nos per Verbum incarnatum, per Verbum crucifixum et per Verbum inspiratum." *De donis Spir. S.* I. 8 (V. 459a).

⁴³ "Verbum ergo exprimit Patrem et res, quae per ipsum factae sunt, et principaliter ducit nos ad Patris congregantis unitatem." *In Hexaem.* I. 17 (V. 332a). See also I *Sent.* 27. 2. u. 2. ad 5 (I. 486b), 31. 2. dub. 7 (552a), *Dom. 3. Adv.*, sermo I. 1 (IX. 57a), and the remark in I *Sent.* Proem.: "Et ita fecit circulum" (I. 2b).

⁴⁴ "[Christus] tenens medium in omnibus." *In Hexaem.* I. 10 (V. 330b).

⁴⁵ See I *Sent.* 18. u. 1 (I. 323—4) and 27. 2. u. 2. ad 5 (486b).

⁴⁶ *In Hexaem.* 3 (V. 343—8). — "Non contingit intelligere nisi per Verbum. Et haec est clavis nobilissima animae purgatae per fidem, quae est necessaria." *Ibid.* 3. 9 (345a).

The result of our outline may be summarized in this way: The great drama of creation, as St. Bonaventure sees it, consists of three phases, and can be compared to a triangle that contains a continuous movement, reflects the Blessed Trinity, and is accomplished through a threefold mediating function of the Divine Word. This triangular structure of the world is the general framework within which we can now place our study, namely the position and function of man in this Bonaventurian drama of creation.

§ 2

Our Topic and its Place in the Bonaventurian Synthesis

The best way to find and to explain the proper place of our topic within the general outline is to consider the entire work of creation from the viewpoint of *final causality*; for it is the end which determines the ways and means that lead to this particular end.⁴⁷ In the case of creation this end or motive cannot be anything outside of God,⁴⁸ but must be in God. *The Lord has made all things for Himself*,⁴⁹ not because of profit or need, but for the sake of His "glory or goodness."⁵⁰ This general end, however, is realized in two particular ways: things are created in order to *manifest* this glory or goodness, and to *participate* in it.⁵¹ This twofold aim is contained in the three phases of creation, and is also closely connected with man's position and function in this creation.

Although God and His divine attributes are reflected in the entire course of creation,⁵² the *manifestation* of God's glory belongs in a particular way to the first two phases which, as we have seen, are identical with the first half of the circular movement, namely the egression of all things from God. But while this manifestation begins with the first phase, the production of creatures, it becomes fully realized only after the work of creation has been unfolded completely and laid out, as it

⁴⁷ "Finis imponit necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem" is an axiom which St. Bonaventure quotes and invokes frequently, e.g. II *Sent.* 2. 2. 1. 1. c. (II. 71 b), 19. 1. 1. c. (460a), and IV *Sent.* 23. 2. 3. c. (IV. 599 b). It goes back to Aristotle, *Phys.* 2. 9.

⁴⁸ I *Sent.* 45. dub. 3 (I. 812 b).

⁴⁹ Prov. 16: 4, frequently quoted by St. Bonaventure.

⁵⁰ II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. 1. c. (II. 44 b). The two expressions are used interchangeably.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, and ad 3 (45a); also II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. ad 1 (II. 42a).

⁵² "Sicut in productione rerum manifestatur *potentia*, . . . sic ordo rerum in universo in se ostendit *sapientiam*, et ordo ad finem *bonitatem*." I *Sent.* 44. 1. 3. c. (I. 786 b).

were, so that its artistic structure is seen and the Creator reflected in it. This makes the second phase the most important place for this manifestation. The egression from God is for all creatures the same, in as far as they proceed from one source; but the variety of forms in which they are created and continue to exist, constitutes a world with different levels of perfection.

In order to explain this in terms of the same triangle that we used as a symbol of creation, we may say that, while only one line comes down from the top to the lower left corner, the horizontal line along the base, which stands for the second phase of creation, is actually a number of parallel lines, one above the other, representing the various levels of perfection in creation. Some creatures are higher and nearer to God, others are lower and at a greater distance from Him; they reflect God with greater or less clarity and are thus either a mere vestige, or an image, or finally a similitude. These different levels of perfection in the created world constitute a definite *order* in which each being has its proper *position*. As in every perfect order,⁵³ there are also in this case some creatures that represent the extremes, and certain others that stand somewhere in the *middle*. We see that the three terms of order, position, and medium are closely related to one another and to this second phase of creation.⁵⁴ With the help of these three terms we can now formulate the basic theme of the first part of the present dissertation; this part will deal with the *position* of man in this *order* of the created world as he stands in the *middle* between the corporeal and the spiritual realm.

The second purpose of creation, the *participation* in God's glory, is accomplished in the third phase which is the return to God, whereby the drama of creation comes to a conclusion and everything in it to a final rest. This part, which is identical with the second half of the great circular movement, again includes all created beings; but the participation takes place in different ways according to the different levels that

⁵³ "Omnis autem ordo habet de necessitate infimum et summum et medium." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. fund. 2 (II. 41b). This principle will play an important role in the first part of the dissertation, where it will be examined both with regard to its meaning in the writings of St. Bonaventure (chapter 1, sect. B, § 2, b) and with regard to its historical background and development (chapter 2).

⁵⁴ Order in creation is often considered as a sign of the Divine Wisdom: "Ordo et gradus est in effectibus divinis propter sapientiam, cuius est ordinare." IV *Sent.* 46. 1. 3. fund. 2 (IV. 960a). — "Sapientia connotat ordinem." *Ibid.* ad 3 (961b). See also I *Sent.* 44. 1. 2. ad 3 (I. 785b), II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. fund. 2 (II. 41b), 9. u. 8. fund. 3 (255b), 17. 2. 1. c. (419b) and *Brevil.* 2. 3 (V. 220b), 2. 5 (223b). This wisdom, in turn, corresponds to the second phase of creation.

we have noted before in the order of creation. The spiritual beings are able to participate directly, whereas corporeal things share in a more indirect manner, by serving those who participate directly,⁵⁵ and are thus lifted up with them. The creatures of the various levels are linked together in a continuous chain and move together towards the one ultimate end of all things. Our interest is again concentrated on man. In the same way as we have seen him in a special *position* within the existing *order* of creation, so we see him now exercising a special *function* within the general *movement* back to God, and this will be the main theme of the second part of this study, namely the *function* of man in this *return* of the created world as a *mediator* between the corporeal world and God.

When St. Bonaventure speaks about this relationship of the creatures to their final end, he often uses the same term "*order*", but now in a different sense. He himself clearly distinguishes "a twofold order of things, one within the universe, and another with regard to their end."⁵⁶ The first kind of order concerns the relation of the creatures to one another⁵⁷ and consists in the proper location, arrangement, and disposition⁵⁸ of things within this world. Along with it goes a gradation of beings; different levels of perfection and dignity⁵⁹ are formed, as we have seen before in the second phase of creation. The other kind of order is quite different from this and consists in an orientation and direction⁶⁰ of all the individual parts in this world towards their common final end.⁶¹ It is related to the final cause⁶² and implies the idea of move-

⁵⁵ See II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. ad 1 (II. 42a).

⁵⁶ "Duplex enim est ordo rerum: unus *in universo*, alter *in finem*." I *Sent.* 47. u. 3. c. (I. 844a—b). The same division is made in I *Sent.* 3. 1. dub. 4 (I. 80b) and 40. 1. 2. ad 1 (705b). Pointing to the twofold meaning of the term *ordo*, St. Bonaventure says: "Aequivocatio est in ordine; ipse enim loquitur ibi de ordine, quo creatura dicitur ordinata per comparationem ipsius *ad finem*; ordo vero Angelorum attenditur secundum prae excellentiam ipsorum ordinabilium *inter se*." II *Sent.* 9. u. 2. ad 3 (II. 244b). — See also E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 144—5, and B. Rosenmöller, *op. cit.*, 36.

⁵⁷ "Ordo rerum *ad invicem* — *ad finem*" is another set of expressions for the same division, e. g. I *Sent.* 43. u. 3. c. (I. 772b), II *Sent.* 1. 2. art. 2. introd. (II. 43a—b) and 30. 1. 1. introd. (714a).

⁵⁸ See the definition of "order," taken from St. Augustine, in *De perfectione evangelica* 4. 1. c. (V. 181a); also I *Sent.* 40. 1. 2. ad 1 (I. 705b).

⁵⁹ II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. 2. c. (II. 46a) speaks of two orders: "quantum *ad finem* — quantum *ad naturae dignitatem*." Likewise *ibid.* ad 1 (II. 46b).

⁶⁰ "Directio in finem." I *Sent.* 40. 1. 2. ad 1 (I. 705b).

⁶¹ The twofold order is also expressed in the terms "*ordo partium in toto* — *ordo partium in finem*." I *Sent.* 44. 1. 3. c. (I. 786a). A further subdivision is given in IV *Sent.* 44. 1. 3. 2. ad 4 (IV. 917a).

⁶² *Ordo* has this meaning e. g. in connection with the two other terms *modus* and *species*, as in II *Sent.* 9. u. 2. ad 3 (II. 244b), 35. 2. 1. c. (829b), and 38. 1. 2. ad 6 (885b); also III *Sent.* 27. 2. 5. fund. 4 (III. 611a).

ment. While the first kind of order is more of a static nature, this one contains a strong dynamic element.

St. Bonaventure not only explains the difference between these two types of order, he also emphasizes their harmonious connection. They are "joined together in such a way that one is made to conform to the other, and the order of the parts in the universe exists because of the ordering towards the final end."⁶³ Both are present together without any conflict, and the universe is said to be "like a very beautiful song that flows along in most excellent harmonies."⁶⁴ Each one of these two orders is in itself a manifestation of a divine attribute: the order within the world is an indication of wisdom, and the ordering towards an end a sign of goodness;⁶⁵ but it is in the relation and comparison of one order to the other and in their harmony that the highest wisdom and goodness is manifested.⁶⁶ This shows that the points we have considered separately are in reality integral parts of one continuous and coherent synthesis.

These two different kinds of order, which correspond to the twofold end of creation and which are also in harmony with the three phases in creation and with the two aspects of the circular movement, constitute the immediate framework for the present study. The order *within* the universe includes the *position* of man in this world, which will be the subject of our study in the first part. The order of all things *towards their final end* involves the *function* of man in the general return, of which the second part will speak.

The *main and unifying idea* that runs through each of these two principal parts is the central place of man in the created world.⁶⁷ How much St. Bonaventure actually considers man as the center of creation is clear from his prologue to the Second Book of the *Sentences*. There he formulates and explains the principal theme and purpose which, in his opinion, underlies and governs this part of Peter Lombard's work. The Second Book deals with the large and manifold world

⁶³ I *Sent.* 44. 1. 3. c. (I. 786a). — "Res a fine et secundum illum respectum accipiunt distinctionem formarum." II *Sent.* 1. 2. div. text. (II. 38a—b).

⁶⁴ "Optime ordinatae sunt res in finem, salvo ordine universi, quia universum est tamquam pulcherrimum carmen, quod *decurrit* secundum optimas consonantias." *Ibid.* (I. 786b). The analogy is found in St. Augustine, *De civit. Dei* 11. 18 (ML 41. 332); also *De vera relig.* 22 (no. 42) (ML 34. 140), *Epist.* 138. 1 (no. 5) (ML 33. 527) and 166. 5 (no. 13) (ML 33. 726).

⁶⁵ I *Sent.* 44. 1. 3. c. (I. 786b). The same attributions are made in I *Sent.* 3. 1. dub. 4 (I. 80b), 40. 1. 2. ad 1 (705b), and II *Sent.* 30. 1. 1. introd. (II. 714a).

⁶⁶ I *Sent.* 44. 1. 3. c. (I. 786b).
⁶⁷ "Homo enim in medio constitutus," says St. Bonaventure in his *Prooemium* to the Second Book of the *Sentences* (II. 5a).

of created things. In commenting on it, the Seraphic Doctor discusses the various questions that arise with regard to the nature of this created world and its constituents. In the first fifteen distinctions he speaks in sometimes considerable length and detail about the act of creation, the angels, the notion of matter, the form of light, the heavens with their luminous bodies, and the world of sense-endowed life. It is only after all this that he begins the discussion on man in particular. And yet, he considers man, and not any of the other subjects, as the real and principal topic.

In the beginning of his prologue to this Second Book St. Bonaventure makes the surprising statement that "he who carefully reflects upon the principal purpose and the entire content of the present book" is reminded of the conclusion to which the wise man in the Book Ecclesiastes finally came after all his attempts to investigate the things and events in this world: *Only this I have found, that God made man right, and he has entangled himself with an infinity of questions.*⁶⁸ For the contemplative mind of St. Bonaventure this verse implies two basic facts: the first part indicates that "the right formation and righteousness of man is from God"; the second part insinuates that "the miserable distortion of man is from himself."⁶⁹ Then follows the explicit statement, that "these two facts comprise the entire purpose of the composition of the present book which is concerned with two things, namely the creation of man and his deviation."⁷⁰ By reducing the vast material of this book to the one principal topic of man, St. Bonaventure clearly places man in a central position with regard to the entire created world and subordinates all other things under this main subject; they are treated "because man shares with all creatures, and all the rest is made on account of man."⁷¹ It will be our task in the present study to confirm and elaborate what these words indicate.

⁶⁸ "Sollicite consideranti praesentis libri, scilicet secundi Sententiarum *principalem* intentionem et *totalem* continentiam, illud occurrit, ad quod suam inquisitionem dicit Sapiens esse perductam, Ecclesiastis septimo [V. 30], in verbo proposito." II *Sent.* Proem. (II. 3a).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* (II. 3b).

⁷⁰ "In his etiam clauditur *tota* intentio tractatus libri praesentis, qui circa duo versatur, scilicet circa *hominis conditionem* et *eius deviationem*." *Ibid.* — When St. Bonaventure later divides the text of Peter Lombard, he distinguishes the same principal parts: "In prima [parte] agit de hominis conditione; in secunda de lapsu eius et tentatione." II *Sent.* I. I. div. text. (II. 13a—b).

⁷¹ "Quia enim homo communicat *cum* omnibus creaturis, et cetera facta sunt *propter* hominem, ideo primo agit de conditione rerum in generali, secundo vero in speciali." II *Sent.* I. I. div. text. (II. 13b—14a). These words again insinuate the two principal parts of the dissertation, which correspond to the two kinds of order.

§ 3

Sources and Purpose of our Study

A faithful and genuine presentation of this point in the doctrine of St. Bonaventure requires that the question be approached and the material be arranged according to the mind of the Seraphic Doctor. This means that the outline of the study should follow as much as possible the questions and divisions which he himself mentions and discusses in his works. Since the topic has not been treated by St. Bonaventure in this particular form, the present study is to some extent a combination of his ideas found at various places throughout his writings. It is therefore important to have at least certain fundamental texts which can assure conformity with the thoughts and intentions of the author.

The fundamental and most comprehensive section with regard to the main points, as well as to many of the subdivisions, is the second part of the first distinction in the Commentary on the Second Book of the *Sentences*. This *first distinction* deals with the created world in general.⁷² While the first part concentrates on questions concerning the *efficient* principle of creation,⁷³ the second and, for this study, most important part considers the work of creation with regard to its *final end*.⁷⁴ This *second part* contains two clearly distinct ideas which are in perfect accordance with the twofold purpose and the two kinds of order in creation. One of them centers around the *distinction* of created beings,⁷⁵ their order of dignity,⁷⁶ and the connection between them;⁷⁷ the other has to do with the *ordering* and actual return of all things to their final end.⁷⁸ The position and function of man with regard to these points is mentioned and discussed throughout the entire section. Since this second part of the first distinction contains all the principal ideas of our study and many of them in the same order, it can rightly be considered as a basic source and guide. It provides the essential outline,

⁷² II *Sent.* I. I. div. text. (II. 14a).

⁷³ *Ibid.*; the following *tractatio quaestionum* describes this part with the words "De exitu rerum in esse" (*ibid.*).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* and I. 2. div. text. (II. 38a). The *tractatio quaestionum* repeats and elaborates: "Agitur de rebus productis in comparatione ad finem, secundum ordinem et distinctionem" (39a). Order and distinction are subordinated under the main idea of the final end.

⁷⁵ Art. 1 (De rerum distinctione). Art. 3 again returns to the same idea by discussing the particular problem of the distinction between the angel and the human soul.

⁷⁶ Art. 2, q. 2 (De ordine rerum ad invicem).

⁷⁷ Art. 1, q. 2, ad 2—3, § 1.

⁷⁸ Art. 2, q. 1 (De ordine rerum ad finem), and also parts of art. 1, q. 2, esp. ad 2—3, § 2.

which then remains to be filled in and enlarged by further material taken from the various writings of our author.

One question in this second part is of particular importance, and this is the *second question* in the *first article*. In it St. Bonaventure explains why there are and ought to be three principal kinds of substances in the created world, namely a spiritual substance, a corporeal one, and a third substance which is composed of the two others.⁷⁹ Since the composite substance is nothing else but man, we possess in this question the Seraphic Doctor's most explicit and comprehensive explanation with regard to our topic. Not only is the position of man between the two other levels of creation described and explained,⁸⁰ but the return of all things through man is also expressed in various ways.⁸¹ It is significant also that the present question is not explicitly treated by the other Scholastics;⁸² it indicates that the subject is one which St. Bonaventure considered important, and which is, at least with this particular emphasis, proper to him.

For a study that intends to examine the position of man in the created world and to draw an adequate picture of it, it is not enough to concentrate merely on man himself. Such a study must also take into consideration all those created things to which man is related; for it is only through these various *relations* that the position of man can be really shown and understood. Since man stands in the center of creation and is related to every level in creation, our study will have to touch a great number of subjects. Most of these individual points have been studied and presented in various publications, either in general works about St. Bonaventure's theology⁸³ and philosophy,⁸⁴ or in special treatises about his doctrine on creation itself,⁸⁵ the order in the created world,⁸⁶

⁷⁹ "Secundo quaeritur circa hoc de differentiis, secundum quas res multiplicatae sunt, quas Magister ponit in littera, scilicet substantiam spirituales et corporales et ex utraque compositam. Quaeritur ergo, utrum haec distinctio debeat esse in universo." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. introd. (II. 41a).

⁸⁰ Since the question is part of the first article, which deals with the distinction of creatures, the greater portion of it refers to this position of man.

⁸¹ Ad 1 (II. 42a) and ad 2—3, § 2 (42b).

⁸² See the remark in the Scholion to this question in the Quarracchi-edition (II. 43b).

⁸³ F. Imle — J. Kaup, *Die Theologie des heiligen Bonaventura*, Werl 1931.

⁸⁴ E. Gilson, *op. cit.* — L. Venthey, *S. Bonaventurae philosophia christiana*, Rome 1943.

⁸⁵ S. Belmond, "L'idée de création d'après S. Bonaventure et Duns Scot," *EF* 29 (1913) 561—9; 30 (1913) 5—16, 113—23, 449—62. — Pius M. a Mondreganes, "De mundi creatione ad mentem Seraphici Doctoris Sancti Bonaventurae," *CF* 1 (1931) 3—27.

⁸⁶ T. Szabó, *De SS. Trinitate in creaturis refulgente: Doctrina S. Bonaventurae*, BACH-PT 1, Rome 1955.

the natural constitution of things,⁸⁷ and the composition of man⁸⁸ with the special problems of soul and body in their mutual relationship.⁸⁹

A similar situation exists with regard to the second main point, the mediative function of man in the return of the created world to God. Here, too, for a complete presentation it is necessary to bring in certain related topics that are an integral part of this return, such as the natural faculties of the rational human soul, and their supernatural elevation through grace. Most of these individual subjects have been examined and treated.⁹⁰ The return itself has also been studied and presented in various works of Bonaventurian literature, at least as far as the return of the human mind to God is concerned, which St. Bonaventure describes in his *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*.⁹¹ The real objective of the present study is not the spiritual ascent of man in itself but the more general return of the entire creation, of which man's return is only a part, although the most important and decisive part upon which all the rest depends. What has to be shown is this relationship between man and the created world in the general return, and the unbroken, harmonious connection, in virtue of which all creatures share in some way in the return to God and the final glorification.⁹² The fact that also this third phase of creation includes every created being, makes the great circular movement and the Bonaventurian synthesis truly complete and perfect.

⁸⁷ K. Ziesché, "Die Lehre von Materie und Form bei Bonaventura," *PJ* 13 (1900) 1—21; "Die Naturlehre Bonaventuras: Nach den Quellen dargestellt," *PJ* 21 (1908) 56—89, 156—89. — P. Robert, *Hylémorphisme et devenir chez Saint Bonaventure*, Montréal 1936.

⁸⁸ C. J. O'Leary, *The Substantial Composition of Man according to Saint Bonaventure*, CUA-PS 22, Diss. Washington 1931.

⁸⁹ E. Szdzujs, "Saint Bonaventure et le problème du rapport entre l'âme et le corps," *FrF* 15 (1932) 283—310. — E. Lutz, *Die Psychologie Bonaventuras*, BGPM 6. 4—5, Münster 1909. — C. M. O'Donnell, *The Psychology of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas*, CUA-PS 36, Diss. Washington 1937.

⁹⁰ J. J. Hartnett, *op. cit.* — T. Szabó, *op. cit.* — J. Fr. Bonnefoy, *Le Saint-Esprit et ses dons selon Saint Bonaventure*, EPM 10, Paris 1929. — J. P. Rézette, "Grâce et similitude de Dieu chez saint Bonaventure," *ETL* 32 (1956) 46—64.

⁹¹ A comprehensive work, which has many points of contact with the present dissertation, is that of E. Sauer, *Die religiöse Wertung der Welt in Bonaventuras Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, FF 4, Werl 1937. — See also Phil. Boehner, *Saint Bonaventure's Itinerarium mentis in Deum with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary*, WSB 2, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1956.

⁹² The fact that St. Bonaventure includes in this great circular movement from God and back to God not only the spiritual beings, but in some way also the rest of creation, is mentioned by R. Šilić, *Christus und die Kirche: Ihr Verhältnis nach der Lehre des heiligen Bonaventura*, Breslauer Studien zur historischen Theologie (new series) 3 (Breslau 1938) 41.

PART I

THE POSITION OF MAN BETWEEN THE SPIRITUAL
AND THE CORPOREAL WORLD

The Introduction indicated the central idea of the present study, which finds its best and shortest expression in the formula *homo in medio constitutus* — man is placed at the center. This leading thought is ever present, but varies in its precise meaning and connotation according to the particular content of each part. With regard to the *position* of man in the created world, this formula means that man is placed between the two principal realms of creation, namely between the corporeal and the spiritual world. Man holds this position because he consists of a corporeal and a spiritual part, of body and soul, which are united to one new, composite substance. The explanation of this principal point will be given in two different steps. Our first aim will be to present St. Bonaventure's *doctrine* on the intermediate position of man as a third, uniting substance, with a particular emphasis on the reasons why such an order exists and must exist in creation. Among the reasons which St. Bonaventure gives for the necessity of man's position in creation, there is one axiom or principle that deserves special attention because it is fundamental to the present question. The general presentation of St. Bonaventure's doctrine and arguments will, therefore, be followed by a more detailed study of the *genesis* of this basic principle, in order to show the historical background.

CHAPTER I

PRESENTATION OF THE DOCTRINE

A study of man's position in the created world has to deal particularly with the *order* of creation in which man has his definite place among the other creatures. But since any order in the realm of creation presupposes a plurality of things to be ordered,¹ the *multitude* of creatures also appears as a fundamental fact out of which this created order is formed and in which it continues to exist. Hence, before turning our attention to the order of creation and to man's key position in it, we shall begin with some important aspects of the multitude of creatures.²

¹ "[In Deo] est summa pulcritudo per omnimodam unitatem; hic autem [scil. in sensibili mundo], si esset unitas, non esset pulcritudo, quia non esset ordo nec perfectio." II *Sent.* I. 2. I. 1. ad 3 (II. 40b).

² In that second part of the first distinction of the Second Book, St. Bonaventure uses the same method of approach. He begins with the *distinction*

This preliminary discussion serves a threefold purpose: it establishes the connection between the created order and the first source of all creation; it explains those three attributes of God which are fundamental to the entire work of creation and which play an important role throughout this study; it will finally lead us directly into the order of creation, providing a fuller understanding as each step is unfolded before our eyes.

Both multitude and order in creation belong to the first part of the great circular movement in which the first purpose of creation, the manifestation of God's glory, is being fulfilled. We shall meet this idea of manifestation in both sections; but while the *multitude* in itself mainly shows the power of God, the completely unfolded and developed *order*, with man in the center, manifests the full glory of God by being a testimony not only to His power but also to His wisdom and goodness.

Section A

The Multitude of Created Beings Proceeding from One Principle

In perfect correspondence to his fundamental idea of God as the inexhaustible "fountain-fullness" for all created reality, St. Bonaventure compares the entire creation to a river³ that proceeds from one single source, but widens and becomes a broad stream. The vast expansion and extension of this river from one bank to the other is called *spatiositas* and is taken as a symbol of the great dimensions and varieties in the created world.⁴ In order to emphasize this extensiveness still more, St. Bonaventure adds that, because of this quality, the world is compared not only to a river, but also to the sea; and he illustrates this by quoting one of his favorite verses from the Psalm of creation, *Hoc mare magnum et spatiosum* — *This great sea, which stretches wide its arms*.⁵ The mention of the sea leads to the closely connected symbol of creatures (art. 1); and here again his first step is to explain the *multitude* of things in creation (q. 1).

³ I *Sent.* Proœmium (I. 1—6a).

⁴ *Ibid.* (1a and 2a). — See also the Prologue to the *Breviloquium*, where the *latitudo* of Sacred Scripture and Theology is seen in the multitude and variety of its subjects: "Progressus autem sacrae Scripturae . . . describit totius universi *continentiam* quasi in quadam summa, in quo attenditur *latitudo*" (V. 201b). — "Consistit autem ipsius *latitudo* in multitudine suarum partium." *Ibid.* (202b).

⁵ "Non tantum fluvius, sed mare a Propheta dicitur in Psalmo [103:25] iste mundus." I *Sent.* Proœm. (I. 2a). — Other texts that quote this Psalm verse (e. g. IV *Sent.* 22. 3. 2. c. [IV. 584b], *Dom. 18. p. Pent.*, sermo 3 [IX. 426a], and *Comment. in Sap.* 14. 5 [VI. 197a—b]) take the sea more as a symbol of our earthly life with its dangers, but the idea of vastness is always present.

of the sand, which points more specifically to the immense number of created things. "Just as the whole of creation is compared to the sea because of its extensiveness, so to the sand on account of its great numerosity."⁶ The two symbols are then joined together in a concluding quotation from the Book Ecclesiasticus, *Who has numbered the sand of the sea, and the drops of rain?*⁷ There is every indication that St. Bonaventure considers this multitude with regard to variety and number as one of the characteristic features in creation.

§ 1

God as the One Source of All Creation

How such a multitude can proceed from a principle that is perfectly one⁸ and without any real plurality except that of the three Divine Persons,⁹ is well explained by the Seraphic Doctor; and, since this problem concerns the critical starting point for the multitude of creatures and for the order we are about to discuss, it deserves our attention. In sharp contrast to those erroneous opinions which, in order to have a starting point for the multitude in creation, try to find some initial element of plurality either in a multitude of ideas and self-reflections within God¹⁰ or in a number of intermediate beings between God and this world,¹¹ St. Bonaventure goes back to some properties in God which, at first sight, seem to show little connection or harmony with real multitude. The reason why many things can proceed from this one principle lies for St. Bonaventure in two facts, namely that God is the *first* principle, and that He is in a singular way *one*.¹²

With regard to the first point St. Bonaventure briefly states: "Because the one principle from which the multitude among things originates is the *absolutely first* principle, it is therefore *productive* and capable of an infinite and immense *fecundity*."¹³ This is then further explained

⁶ I. *Sent.* Proœm. (I. 3a).

⁷ *Ibid.* — Ecclus. 1 : 2.

⁸ "*Qualiter* potest venire multitudo a principio summe et perfectissime uno," is the precise problem, as St. Bonaventure formulates it in II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 1. c. (II. 40a). At the beginning of the question the topic is expressed in the more general way: "Utrum a primo efficiente debuerit, vel potuerit esse rerum multitudo" (39a).

⁹ *Ibid.* c. ad opin. 1 (40a).

¹⁰ *Ibid.* opin. 1 and 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.* opin. 2.

¹² "Et ideo est positio recta, quod multitudo in rebus est a principio uno, quia est *primum* principium et *unice unum*." *Ibid.* c. (40a). — The historical background of these two attributes is Neo-Platonic. The First (ἄρχή, πρῶτον) and the One (ἓν) are two of the outstanding attributes in the highest being of Plotinus and Proclus.

¹³ *Ibid.*

by two examples¹⁴ which are taken from Dionysius the Areopagite¹⁵ and are given here in order to show that the notion of a first principle includes an unlimited fertility. The *number one* is the basic unit and first principle for all numbers, and it is precisely because of this fact that it virtually contains all numbers and becomes the starting point from which an unlimited multitude of numbers can proceed. The other example of such a first principle is the *geometrical point*, which is the basis and origin of an unlimited number of possible lines.¹⁶ The two principles possess this infinite fecundity because of the primacy they have within that particular class of beings. But their capability is, at the same time, limited to this one class; they are therefore principles only in a *relative* sense.¹⁷ St. Bonaventure draws the conclusion from these two examples by saying: "That which is *absolutely* first is so powerful as to be altogether immense."¹⁸ This absolute primacy is the deeper reason why God can be and actually is the one source of an unlimited multitude of creatures. Although the term itself is not mentioned here, it is clear that this combination of primacy and fecundity is nothing else but an application of that same notion of "fountain-fullness" which is so fundamental and typical for the Seraphic Doctor.

In this connection it is interesting and instructive to see how St. Bonaventure, when taking up the same problem later in his *Collationes in Hexaemeron*,¹⁹ uses the same two examples, but now with a more specific reference to the intellectual activity of this first principle. "If the number one were able to perceive its entire potentiality, it would see and know all numbers; and if the point were to perceive all its potentialities, it would recognize all lines in the center."²⁰ The one center in which God, the absolutely first and most intelligent Principle,

¹⁴ These same examples are mentioned in I *Sent.* 27. 1. u. 2. ad 3 (I. 471a) and II *Sent.* 1. 1. 2. 2. ad 4 (II. 29b—30a). The first example alone is used in *De myst. Trinit.* 2. 1. ad 10 (V. 63a—b).

¹⁵ *De scientia Christi* 3. fund. 4 (V. 12b) explicitly mentions Dionysius as source of both examples. See *De Divinis Nominibus* 5. 6 (MG 3. 819—22).

¹⁶ In what sense the point possesses this infinite potentiality, is explained in I *Sent.* 17. 2. u. 2. ad 2: "[Punctus] non habet potentiam activam infinitam, sed passivam, quia non proprie dicitur punctus posse lineas producere, sed potest statui terminus lineae" (I. 312a).

¹⁷ "Unitas, quae est prima in genere numeri." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 1. c. (II. 40a). See also I *Sent.* 17. 2. u. 2. ad 2 (I. 312a).

¹⁸ The entire sentence containing both the two examples and their application reads as follows: "Si enim unitas, quae est prima in genere numeri, est principium a quo possunt infiniti numeri egredi, et punctus a quo infinitae lineae; quod est simpliciter primum est ita potens, quod omnino immensum." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 1. c. (II. 40a).

¹⁹ *Coll.* 3. 4—5 (V. 343b—344a).

²⁰ *Ibid.* 3. 5 (344b).

"disposes all things and expresses all things,"²¹ is the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity or the Divine Word, in whom all the divine ideas are thus present and united. But although these divine ideas constitute in no way a real plurality in God,²² they do form a certain connection in as far as they are related both to the one divine intellect which thinks and to the multitude of actually distinct objects of which the divine intellect is thinking.²³ Since the Divine Word is the one expression of all these ideas, It is truly the medium in which absolute unity and unlimited multitude meet and are joined together;²⁴ It is a first starting point and, in this regard, a *fontale principium*²⁵ or original fountain for all the countless creatures; It is, because of all this, also the key to a deeper understanding of the present question.

This primacy and "fountain-fullness" in God is the first and fundamental reason which St. Bonaventure gives in order to explain the origin of a multitude in creation, but it is not yet his entire answer. Side by side with the fact that God is the absolutely first principle, he mentions another important divine attribute, namely the fact that God is "in a singular way one,"²⁶ possessing absolute and perfect unity. Although this attribute is closely connected with the preceding notion of primacy and at times deduced from it,²⁷ the second part of the answer, which starts from this unity, represents a different approach. The first point has led to the original and infinitely rich fountain of all things; the second point will show with new arguments and in greater detail that fullness of perfection which the original fountain contains.

Like the idea of primacy in the first part, so also the present notion of unity or oneness has *two aspects*.²⁸ In the mind of St. Bonaventure

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *De scientia Christi* 3. ad 21 (V. 16b).

²³ "Idea enim est similitudo rei cognitae, quae quamvis in Deo sit absolutum, tamen secundum modum intelligendi dicit respectum medium inter cognoscens et cognitum." I *Sent.* 35. u. 3. c. (I. 608a). — See also F. Imle — J. Kaup, *Die Theologie des heiligen Bonaventura* (Werl 1931) 57.

²⁴ About the entire question see J.-M. Bissen, *L'Exemplarisme Divin selon St. Bonaventure*, EPM 9 (Paris 1929) 44—61.

²⁵ See *Serm. de reb. theol.*, sermo 4. 1 (V. 567a). — With regard to the supernatural order of grace St. Bonaventure considers Christ in a similar way as the original fountain (*Brevil.* 4. 5 [V. 245b—246a]).

²⁶ "Multitudo in rebus est a principio uno, quia est *primum principium et unice unum*." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 1. c. (II. 40a). The expression *unice unum* is translated by B. Rosenmöller with „das einzig Eine“ (*Religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, BGPM 25. 3—4 [Münster 1925] 33); F. Imle calls it „die einzigartige Einheitlichkeit“, the unique uniformity (*op. cit.*, 62).

²⁷ E. g. *De myst. Trinit.* 3. 1. c. (V. 70a—b). For the text of this passage see footnote 38 of the present chapter.

²⁸ The two aspects of primacy have been mentioned in the Introduction on page 266.

this oneness means not only the absence of any plurality or a negation of division,²⁹ but includes also a positive element, which is considered to be the greater the more perfectly a being is one.³⁰ Since God possesses this oneness in a far higher degree than any creature, it must have in Him an eminently more positive meaning,³¹ so much so that it is now taken in a positive sense only.³²

The Seraphic Doctor admits that the human intellect arrives at the notion of oneness in a negative manner, namely by way of denying a division or multitude; for this oneness is a first reality which we know only through posterior facts.³³ "Hence, since in God is the most perfect oneness, it is understood there as an absence of multitude in every form," be it actual or potential, by division or aggregation.³⁴ But St. Bonaventure then immediately emphasizes the positive side by saying that "this oneness is most perfect, most supreme, and infinite."³⁵ It exists in this highest degree only in God and is therefore truly singular. Although expressed in the form of a privation, it assumes the character of a very positive perfection and contains, like the other notion of primacy with its accompanying "fountain-fullness," an intrinsic dynamic element³⁶ which makes the being that possesses it an all-perfect and all-powerful principle.

St. Bonaventure now begins to unfold this positive fullness of the divine unity by deriving a series of attributes from it. Because God "is in a singular way one, He is therefore most *simple*, most *spiritual*, and most *perfect*."³⁷ This first conclusion is not explained by any further

²⁹ This position is taken by St. Thomas Aquinas: "Unum non addit supra ens rem aliquam, sed tantum negationem divisionis." *Summa theol.* I. II. I. c. (*Op. omnia* [ed. Leon.] 4. 107a).

³⁰ "Unum dicit *privationem* multitudinis secundum generalem nominis rationem; sed illa privatio, etsi nomine tenus sit privatio, tamen realiter est *positio*; quia quanto magis est privatio diversionis in aliquo, tanto illud est completius et perfectius." I *Sent.* 24. I. I. ad 3 (I. 422a).

³¹ *Ibid.* c. (421a).

³² "Unum . . . in Deo solum positive, in creaturis aliquando accipitur positive, aliquando privative." *Ibid.* (421b).

³³ "Si loquamur *quantum ad rationem intelligendi*, sic dico, quod dicitur privative; unde et ratio eius assignatur per *privationem* divisionis sive multitudinis. Et hoc est, quia unum est primum, et prima non habent intelligi a nobis neque notificari nisi per posteriora; et inde est, quod privative dicitur." *Ibid.* (421a—b).

³⁴ *Ibid.* ad 3 (422a).

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ For further details about this notion of transcendental unity in St. Bonaventure see the special study of A. Zigrossi, *Saggio sul Neoplatonismo di S. Bonaventura: Il concetto di unità e la struttura del reale come problema teologico*, BSF 4 (Florence 1954) Part I, and the review of this work by Servus a St. Anthonis in *CF* 26 (1956) 86—8.

³⁷ II *Sent.* I. 2. I. I. c. (II. 40b).

remarks, nor does it, in its present form, find a parallel in other works of our author.³⁸ The reason why these three attributes are chosen and why they are placed in this particular order seems to lie in three other divine attributes to which these first three are now leading in the immediately following second conclusion. Because God is most simple, He has the greatest *power*,³⁹ as the most spiritual Being, He possesses the greatest *wisdom*; and finally, since He is most perfect, He is the highest *goodness*.⁴⁰

Here we meet those three divine attributes which play a fundamental role in any question that concerns the relationship between God and creatures; for they are, as the Introduction has pointed out, the basis for the threefold causality in God with regard to everything He creates.⁴¹ They represent a special nobility in God⁴² and are quite often applied to the three Divine Persons.⁴³ All creatures, on the other hand, bear some traces of these characteristic qualities of their Creator;⁴⁴ the three attributes are reflected in every created being and are, as it were, "the basic form under which the activity of the Triune God becomes manifest to us."⁴⁵ A striking example of this is the first chapter of the *Itinerarium*, where St. Bonaventure describes how the human mind considers the visible outer world as a mirror which directs us to God, the Supreme

³⁸ The text that seems to come nearest to this and the following conclusion is a passage in *De myst. Trinit.* 3. 1. c.: "[Divinum esse] quia *primum*, in quo nulla diversitas, necesse est, quod omnes [conditiones nobilitatis] sint in ipso *unum* et sic *simplicissimum* per exclusionem omnis compositionis et inclusionem omnis *perfectionis*. Sunt ergo in Deo omnes conditiones nobilitatis, scilicet *potentia* et *sapientia* et *voluntas*" (V. 70b). — See also *Itiner.* 5. 7, 8 (V. 310a—b).

³⁹ As a proof of this particular aspect of the positive perfection in unity, St. Bonaventure invokes the often-quoted proposition 17 of the *Liber de Causis*: "Virtus quanto magis unita, tanto magis infinita." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 1. fund. 3 (II. 39b).

⁴⁰ "Quia simplicissimum, maximae potentiae; quia spiritualissimum, maximae sapientiae; quia perfectissimum est, bonitatis summae." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 1 (II. 40b).

⁴¹ Introduction, page 265. — See also *In Hexaem.* 21. 5 (V. 432a) and I *Sent.* 35. dub. 1: "[Potentia, scientia, voluntas] dicunt respectum ad creaturam, et secundum has conditiones attenditur ratio causae in divina natura . . . Praeexistit in causa posse, scire et velle, quae faciunt causam esse perfectam" (I. 614a).

⁴² *Brevil.* 2. 2 (V. 220a). Also I *Sent.* Proem. (I. 3b).

⁴³ See the Introduction, page 265 with footnote 18. Also *Serm. de reb. theol.*, sermo 1. 4 (V. 535b), *In Hexaem.* 21. 5 (V. 432a), and *De decem praeceptis* 1. 22: "Patri attribuitur maiestas, Filio veritas et Spiritui sancto bonitas" (V. 510a).

⁴⁴ See e. g. *Brevil.* 2. 10 (V. 228a) and *Serm. de reb. theol.*, sermo 1. 7 (V. 536b).

⁴⁵ "Bei dieser Dreieinheit von appropriierten Vollkommenheiten handelt es sich sozusagen um die Grundform, unter der uns das Wirken des Dreieinigen offenbar wird." F. Imle—J. Kaup, *op. cit.*, 33.

Creative Artist. So manifold as these considerations are in their content and way of approach, they all end in the same result: what shines forth in all created things is the supreme power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator.⁴⁶ These three attributes are for St. Bonaventure the predominant factors in the entire work of creation, and we shall meet them frequently during the course of this study.

After deriving these three attributes from the perfect unity in God, St. Bonaventure uses them to explain the multitude and variety of things in creation. Since God has greatest and absolute power, He is *able* to produce an unlimited number of creatures.⁴⁷ Because God possesses greatest wisdom, He *knows* many things, and this divine knowledge is not a knowledge of something that precedes God or exists independently of Him, but is the knowledge of an unlimited number of things that can be created by Him.⁴⁸ As the highest goodness, God *tends* to pour forth and diffuse His perfection; He wants to produce many things and to communicate Himself to others. Because this divine goodness is infinite, the number of beings to which it can be communicated has no limit.⁴⁹

In this way, all three divine attributes participate in the work of creation and find their expression in it, although we must add that St. Bonaventure does not attribute to all of them exactly the same function. The divine power and wisdom are considered as a necessary and always present *disposition* in God for a creation, whereas the divine goodness is more directly related to the actual *realization* of this creation.⁵⁰ This divine goodness is the all-dominating center; it is both the original *fountain* and the final *end* of all creatures.⁵¹ Here again it is true, and St. Bonaventure points it out, that neither of these two

⁴⁶ "Relucet autem Creatoris summa potentia et sapientia et benevolentia in rebus creatis secundum quod hoc tripliciter nuntiat sensus carnis sensui interiori." *Itiner.* 1. 10 (V. 298b). — "Haec autem consideratio dilatatur secundum septiformem conditionem creaturarum, quae est divinae potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis testimonium septiforme." *Ibid.* 14 (299a).

⁴⁷ "Quia maximae potentiae, multa potest." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 1. c. (II. 40b). Also fund. 3 (39b).

⁴⁸ "Quia maximae sapientiae, multa novit." *Ibid.* c. (40b) and fund. 2 (39b).

⁴⁹ "Quia summae bonitatis, multa vult producere et se communicare." *Ibid.* c. (40b) and fund. 1 (39a). The underlying principle in this argument is, as in the case of the "fontalis plenitudo" (Introduction, footnote 24), the axiom: "Bonum est diffusivum sui."

⁵⁰ "Quamvis actualis productio creaturae sit voluntaria, tamen potentia producendi et scientia est necessaria." I *Sent.* 27. 2. u. 2. ad 2 (I. 486a). See also I *Sent.* 40. 1. 2. c. (I. 705a).

⁵¹ "Ratio causandi est *bonitas* et in ratione *effectivi* et in ratione *finis*." I *Sent.* 45. 2. 1. c. (I. 804b).

sides or elements in the divine goodness would by itself ever become effective.⁵² But he then goes on to explain how the Will of God makes the Divine Goodness turn back upon Itself, concentrates on this Goodness both as effective source and as desirable end, and thereby establishes a connection between these two elements.⁵³ This gives the productive fountain the reason or motive for passing over into action and thus causes creation to proceed from the source of Divine Goodness and back towards this same Goodness as its goal and end in a circular movement.

§ 2

Creation as a Manifestation of the Power of the Creator

Having considered some of the important and fundamental attributes in God with regard to any creature, we are now ready to turn our full attention towards creation itself which, as we saw, proceeds from this first and unitary principle in a great multitude like a large river. Its first purpose is the manifestation of God's glory, goodness, and perfection; and the multitude in which it appears is already in itself a first fulfillment of this purpose. The particular attributes which shine forth in the vast number and variety of created things are the power and greatness of the Creator.⁵⁴ St. Bonaventure confirms this by saying that, "in order to manifest His immensity, God brings forth out of His treasures many things."

But there is an important addition to this statement. St. Bonaventure immediately remarks that God does not bring forth all of these truly infinite treasures, "because the effect cannot become equal to the power of its first cause."⁵⁵ These final words indicate an important limitation with regard to created beings in general and to their multitude in particular. God, although possessing a truly infinite power, does not and cannot create something that is actually infinite,⁵⁶ whether this

⁵² "Effectivum autem non fit efficiens in effectu nisi propter finem." *Ibid.*

⁵³ "Voluntas est actus, secundum quem bonum reflectitur supra bonum sive bonitatem: ergo voluntas unit effectivum cum fine." *Ibid.* — See E. Gilson, *La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure*, EPM 4 (2. ed., Paris 1943) 147—8.

⁵⁴ In II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 1. fund. 1—3 (II. 39a—b), the three divine attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness are mentioned as the basis for a multitude of creatures; but only in connection with the *power* of God is the purpose of *manifestation* mentioned.

⁵⁵ "Propter ergo immensitatem infinita potest, sed propter immensitatis manifestationem multa de suis thesauris profert, non omnia, quia effectus non potest aequari virtuti ipsius primae causae." *Ibid.* c. (II. 40a—b).

⁵⁶ "Infinitum in actu non potest facere nec facit. Non potest, inquam, facere, quia nec convenit sibi, nec convenit creaturae." I *Sent.* 43. u. 3. c. (I. 772a). See E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 141.

infinity be understood in being and perfection or merely in number. The fundamental argument which St. Bonaventure advances against the possibility of such an infinity in the realm of created things is his idea of order with the same twofold meaning that we have noted earlier in the Introduction.

An *infinite creature* would be incompatible with the necessary ordination of things *towards God*, which is so essential for any creature that St. Bonaventure equates the goodness of a created thing with this ordination.⁵⁷ God as the highest and absolute good can create only beings that are good and therefore ordained towards Him. But this relationship of order essentially implies on the side of the ordained creatures two additional qualities, all three together forming one of the fundamental ternaries in St. Bonaventure's system,⁵⁸ and being related to one another in a particular way.⁵⁹ This *order* of the creatures presupposes a certain *number*, and the number, in turn, presupposes a certain *measure*; for things are not being ordered in the required manner unless they are numbered, and in order to be numbered, these things must also be distinct and limited. It is for this reason that God had to create *all things in number, and weight, and measure*.⁶⁰

However, an actually infinite creature is not only contrary to the very notion of God, the Supreme Goodness to whom everything must be ordained; it also contradicts the very notion of *creature*, as St. Bonaventure shows in the following section of the same question.⁶¹ A creature

⁵⁷ "Cum enim summe bonus sit, non potest aliquid facere nisi bonum, et ita non potest facere nisi rem ad se ordinatam." I *Sent.* 43. u. 3. c. (I. 772a). See also II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. 1. ad 1: "Si ergo effectum non ordinaret ad se vel non faceret propter se, cum ipse sit bonum, a quo omne bonum, iam effectus non esset bonus" (II. 44 b).

⁵⁸ Instead of the term *order* we usually find the other term *weight* as third member besides *measure* and *number*, and this combination actually appears in the concluding quotation from Wisd. 11: 21. But this change is not surprising, since *weight* signifies precisely this *ordo in finem*, of which the present text is speaking. For an illustration of these three terms see *Itiner.* 1. 11 (V. 298b) and the explanation by Phil. Bochner, *Saint Bonaventure's Itinerarium mentis in Deum* . . . , WSB 2 (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1956) 114, no. 16.

⁵⁹ About the basic ternary *unum — verum — bonum*, to which the other groups are related (*Brevil.* 2. 1 [V. 219b]), St. Bonaventure says explicitly: "Verum praesupponit unum, et bonum praesupponit unum et verum" (*Brevil.* 1. 6 [V. 215a]).

⁶⁰ The complete argument from the fact of order is presented in this way: "Quoniam igitur *ordo* praesupponit *numerum*, et *numerus* praesupponit *mensuram*, quia non ordinantur ad aliud nisi numerata, et non numerantur nisi limitata; ideo necesse fuit, Deum facere omnia in numero, pondere et mensura [Sap. 11: 21]." I *Sent.* 43 u. 3. c. (I. 772a). See also *Brevil.* 2. 1 (V. 219a).

⁶¹ I *Sent.* 43. u. 3. c. (I. 772a—b).

is essentially and by definition a being that receives its existence from another and is made out of nothing.⁶² But an infinite being, if it is to be truly without limitation, must be pure actuality and entirely independent. Such a being could not receive its existence from another and could, therefore, never be created. The fundamental truth is that there can be only one infinite Being, and everything outside of God, which is both created by and ordained towards Him, must be finite.

But could the infinity of God's power and His immensity not, perhaps, be manifested in creation through the production of an *infinite number* of such finite creatures? Against this second and only remaining alternative St. Bonaventure points out that an infinite number of creatures would prevent the necessary *order of things to one another* within creation itself. A definite order among created beings needs certain points of reference within the multitude of things, and these must finally lead to one center.⁶³ An infinite number of creatures could never be reduced to such a single center⁶⁴ and would therefore make a definite order among things impossible.

This fact that any creation must, in its actual existence, be finite and limited in every respect, raises a question with regard to the above-mentioned manifestation, namely whether the actual infinity of the divine power can really and sufficiently be shown and recognized in such a creation. St. Bonaventure himself takes up this problem and gives a twofold answer.⁶⁵ God manifests the infinity of His power first

⁶² "Si igitur creatura, eo ipso quod creatura, *aliunde est et ex nihilo*, nullo modo potest esse actus purus, nullo modo potest esse infinita." *Ibid.* (772 b). — The two points which here characterize a created being, are the essential elements in St. Bonaventure's definition of creature, and they occur in some variations on numerous occasions, e. g. I *Sent.* 8. 1. 2. 2. ad 7—8 (I. 161a—b) and 37. 1. 1. 1. c. (639a); II *Sent.* 1. 1. 3. 2. c. (II. 34a—b) and 37. 1. 2. c. (865b); *Brevil.* 2. 1 (V. 219a).

⁶³ "Necesse est, illas plures ad aliquam unam creaturam reduci... Quod ad aliquod finitum necessario reducuntur, patet: quia necesse est ponere ordinationem in creaturis, non tantum ad Deum, sed etiam ad se invicem." I *Sent.* 43. u. 3. c. (I. 772b). See also I *Sent.* 2. u. 3. c.: "Infinitas numeralis repugnat perfectioni et ordini" (I. 55b), and II *Sent.* 1. 1. 1. 2. fund. 2: "Impossibile est infinita ordinari" (II. 21a). See E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 141.

⁶⁴ "Infinita ad finitum reduci est impossibile." I *Sent.* 43. u. 3. c. (I. 772b).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* ad 3 (773a). — The same problem of manifesting an infinite power in a finite world is mentioned in connection with the Incarnation: "Infinita potentia, sapientia et bonitas debet se perfecte manifestare; sed non potest se perfecte manifestare nisi per *effectum aliquo modo infinitum*; nihil autem est infinitum actu nisi solus Deus: ergo ad hoc, quod divinae potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis infinitas manifestetur, congruum fuit, aliquem effectum fieri, cui attribueretur esse Deum, quod est bonum infinitum. Sed hoc fuit, cum Deus unitus est carni." III *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. fund. 1 (III. 19a).

by creating something that is *potentially* infinite, in duration as well as in number. The ever possible continuation of created existence reflects God's infinite power in its eternal duration; and the ever possible further increase in the number of creatures reveals the divine power as being infinite in effects. Since the actual sum total at any given moment is always finite, such a potential infinity is compatible with the status of a creature.⁶⁶ But it is, at the same time, a sign of the actually infinite power of the Creator, because God is pure actuality and possesses, as the first cause, in Himself the totality of all the effects which He can produce.⁶⁷

Besides this possible infinity St. Bonaventure also knows of and points out a certain element of *actual* infinity, which appears in the work of creation, and through which the infinity of God's power is manifested in a more positive manner. This element of actual infinity can, of course, not be found in the creatures themselves, but lies in a certain relation or proportion.⁶⁸ In producing things out of nothing, God actually bridges over the "infinite distance" that exists between nothing and being due to the complete lack of proportion⁶⁹ and the absence of any common element⁷⁰ between the two terms or extremes. The power which is able to do this must be truly infinite.⁷¹ Such an act is proper to God alone, and reveals His omnipotence and immensity.⁷² Hence, although the river of creation is limited in size and content, it is in its emanation, amplitude, and continued flow a definite manifestation of the infinite power of the Creator.

⁶⁶ See e. g. I *Sent.* 37. 1. 2. 1. ad 4 (I. 643b), II *Sent.* 37. 1. 2. c. (II. 865b), and III *Sent.* 32. u. 5. ad 2 (III. 706a).

⁶⁷ "[Divina potentia] habet effectum infinitum *duratione* et infinitos *appositione*, ad quos comparatur ut actus purus et ut tota causa." I *Sent.* 43. u. 1. c. (I. 765b). See also *ibid.* fund. 2—3 (764a—765a) and E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 140. — To those who doubt the validity of this conclusion St. Bonaventure concedes that this does not necessarily follow for every efficient agent, but only with regard to the *first* cause (I *Sent.* 3. dub. 2 [I. 78a—b]).

⁶⁸ "In infinito autem *secundum actum* non potest manifestari simpliciter, quia non decet, sed *proportionaliter*, quia ens in infinitum excedit non-ens; et tamen Deus ex nihilo facit ens, inter quae est distantia infinita." I *Sent.* 43. u. 3. ad 3 (I. 773a).

⁶⁹ "[Manifestatur] per creationem de nihilo, ubi est distantia infinita propter omnimodam improportionem." *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ See I *Sent.* 43. u. 1. ad 4 (I. 767a); also II *Sent.* 1. 1. 1. ad 6 (II. 18b) and IV *Sent.* 10. 2. 1. 1. c. (IV. 228b).

⁷¹ I *Sent.* 43. u. 1. fund. 4 (I. 765a), and 44. 1. 3. c. (786b); II *Sent.* 1. 1. 2. 2. fund. 4 (II. 28b—29a).

⁷² "Et ita ex hoc actu [productionis rerum de nihilo] tanquam ex proprio cognoscitur Deus omnipotens, immensus." I *Sent.* 3. dub. 1 (I. 78a). Likewise II *Sent.* 1. 1. 1. 1. ad 6 (II. 18b).

Section B

The Order in the Multitude of Creatures with Man Placed Centrally as Final Complement

§ 1

Order and Perfection in Creation

The important factor that keeps the vast stream of creation within definite limits and forms is, as we have seen, the idea of *order*. The multitude and variety of created things does not mean a diversity of any kind, but is, as St. Bonaventure points out, "a diversity with order and connection and an inclination towards unity."⁷³ This order, which is now understood in the sense of relations among creatures, brings the second fundamental attribute of God into the foreground. Side by side with the divine power there now appears the divine wisdom; for it is the proper function of wisdom to bring things into an order,⁷⁴ so that a meaningful arrangement and a real cosmos is created. God in His infinite and eternal wisdom has laid out and designed a definite *plan*; and the work of creation, which has been and still is carried out according to this divine plan, becomes, on account of its order, a manifestation of the wisdom of the Creator.

This factor of divine wisdom and order influences the rule and norm for the perfection of creation. More perfect is, now, not simply that which is greater in size, number, or power, but that which corresponds better to the order that God has laid down for His creation. God's power is without limit, but He creates only what is fitting and appropriate in regard to His wise plan.⁷⁵ He was certainly able to produce a better world with more perfect beings; but in the order of this particular world, which His divine and inscrutable will has chosen to create,⁷⁶ all things are made in the most perfect condition, so that, at least with regard

⁷³ "[Effectus causati] non probant quamcumque diversitatem in creaturis, sed diversitatem cum ordine et connexione et inclinatione ad unitatem, et ita diversitatem in unitate." *De myst. Trinit.* 2. 1. ad 10 (V. 63a).

⁷⁴ "Sapientia ordinat in natura." *IV Sent.* 44. 2. 3. 2. fund. 3 (IV. 931b). — "Ordo et gradus est in effectibus divinis propter sapientiam, cuius est ordinare." *Ibid.* 46. 1. 3. fund. 2 (960a). See also *I Sent.* 44. 1. 2. ad 3 (I. 785b) and 39. 1. 1. fund. 3 (685a).

⁷⁵ "Non enim facit Deus quidquid potest, sed quod decet et quod congruit." *IV Sent.* 17. 1. 1. 2. ad 3 (IV. 421b). Also *II Sent.* 32. 1. 2. ad 2 (II. 764a) and *I Sent.* 44. 1. 2. ad 3: "Qui agit secundum artem et sapientiam agit quantum vult et quantum congruit, salvo ordine" (I. 785a—b).

⁷⁶ As regards the reason for this choice St. Bonaventure says: "Solutio non potest dari nisi haec, quia voluit, et rationem ipse novit." *I Sent.* 44. 1. 1. ad 4 (I. 783b).

to their substance and nature, they could not be made better without destroying the order and beauty of this present universe.⁷⁷ The power that created this world is truly divine and infinite, but it acts in perfect harmony with the divine wisdom and, thus, becomes a *potentia ordinata*, a power that is guided by the definite plan of a wise order.⁷⁸

The realization of this order, which is also the source of beauty in creation, requires, as a necessary condition, that things be created in a certain *gradation*. Only within the divine and supreme hierarchy of the Blessed Trinity is possible "order and perfect beauty in highest unity and equality."⁷⁹ The reason for this possibility is that "the highest perfection of every kind is present in each one of the equal Persons,"⁸⁰ who possess one and the same Divine Essence. But all creatures are by their very nature limited and do not possess this highest perfection.⁸¹ Their order and beauty cannot be realized in the same unity and equality,⁸² but is to be achieved by the only remaining alternative, and that is by way of "a harmonious gradation of dissimilar beings."⁸³ There must be different kinds of things and various degrees of perfection in the created world so that, "out of some congruous diversity and in some proportionate gradation, a certain orderly harmony can arise and a beauty that is perfect within the realm of creatures."⁸⁴

⁷⁷ For the details of this question see I *Sent.* 44. 1. 1—3 (I. 781—7) and E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 143—5.

⁷⁸ "Potest de potentia absoluta; sed de potentia ordinata, quae operatur secundum ordinem sapientiae . . . non debet esse nec potest esse." II *Sent.* 7. 1. 1. 1. ad 1 (II. 177a).

⁷⁹ "Cum in illa suprema hierarchia sit ordo et perfecta pulcritudo in summa unitate et aequalitate." II *Sent.* 9. u. 8. ad 4 (II. 256b).

⁸⁰ "In suprema hierarchia ex sola similitudine et aequalitate potest esse perfectissima pulcritudo, quia in qualibet personarum aequalium est omnimoda et summa perfectio." *Ibid.* c. (255b).

⁸¹ "Illi spiritus [scil. angeli], qui coordinantur, non habent singillatim summam perfectionem." *Ibid.* and also ad 4 (256b).

⁸² The fundamental fact behind the present argumentation is that everything external to God necessarily exists in number, limitation, and measure (see also *De myst. Trinit.* 4. 2. ad 7 [V. 86b]), and therefore in some diversity which can be ordered only by gradation and proportion. Involved in this reasoning is also the other idea that the imperfection of the individual created being is, in some way, compensated by the multitude of creatures and their orderly arrangement, so that creation now better reflects the perfection and beauty of the Creator (concerning this point see II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 1. ad 3—4 [II. 40b]). Arg. 4 in the present question (255a) and the answer to it (256b) center around this idea of representation.

⁸³ "Convenientia non tantum surgit ex aequalitate, sed etiam ex disparium congruenti gradatione." II *Sent.* 9. u. 8. ad 2 (II. 256b). — "In his enim duobus modis consistit pulcritudo et convenientia, sicut dicit Augustinus de Vera Religione [30. 55]." *Ibid.* c. (255b).

⁸⁴ "Necesse est, quod ex quadam convenienti diversitate, in quadam proportionali gradatione consurgat quaedam convenientia ordinata et pulcritudo in genere creaturae perfecta." *Ibid.* (255b—256a).

What St. Bonaventure wishes to prove in this passage is the necessity of a gradation among Angels, even within the same principal order of the angelic hierarchy. But what is stated and explained here is equally true for the other, less perfect levels of created beings, and for the work of creation as a whole. Order among creatures necessarily implies gradation, which means a "superposition either in place or in dignity."⁸⁵ For this reason God creates beings of truly different nature; some of them are good, others are better, and some exist in a most perfect condition.⁸⁶ A gradation is present even among creatures of the same kind, as St. Bonaventure points out in the case of the human souls, which by nature do not all possess the same perfection but show variations and different degrees, some excelling others in their faculties and talents.⁸⁷

By creating such different beings, and by bestowing His gifts upon them according to the nature and capacity in which He has made them, God is not acting against His goodness and generosity; for as much as this divine goodness is inclined to pour itself out and to give to all, yet it is, like the divine power, acting in harmony with the divine wisdom and according to the plan that is to be accomplished.⁸⁸ The most perfect form of creation is not a world in which every being is equally perfect; it is the present order with its harmonious gradation,⁸⁹ because it is in this condition the best manifestation of the divine power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator.⁹⁰

⁸⁵ "Gradus dicit superpositionem vel loci, vel dignitatis." I *Sent.* 25. dub. 4 (I. 447b). Also *ibid.* 20. 2. 1. c. (372b).

⁸⁶ "Sapientis est ordinare. Ideo quaedam facit bona, quaedam meliora, quaedam optima." I *Sent.* 44. 1. 2. ad 3 (I. 785b). About the difference in nature as a basis for gradation see II *Sent.* 1. 2. 3. 2. c. (II. 50a—b).

⁸⁷ "Ista praeellentia [in animabus] ex parte animae venit. In hac autem praeellit una anima alteram, non ratione principii ex quo, cum sit ex nihilo, sed ratione sapientiae Conditoris, qui producit omnia secundum debitum ordinem." II *Sent.* 32. dub. 6 (II. 777b).

⁸⁸ "Amor divinus non operatur secundum impetum, sed secundum dispositionem et regulam sapientiae." III *Sent.* 1. 2. 4. ad 2 (III. 32b). — "Dilectio Dei non excludit ordinem." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. ad 5 (II. 43b). — "Deus non manifestat bonitatem, nisi salvo ordine sapientiae ordinantis mundum." *Ibid.* 9. u. 1. ad 1 (243a). — "Sic dona sua distribuit largiter, ut tamen non excludatur sapientiae recta ordinatio." *Ibid.* 23. 1. 1. ad 2 (533b). — "Bonitas non praeiudicat sapientiae." *Ibid.* 30. 1. 1. ad 3 (716b).

⁸⁹ "Deus non dat unicuique quod simpliciter melius, quia tunc non faceret res ordinatas, sed aequaliter perfectas; et hoc repugnaret perfectioni, 'quia, si essent aequalia, non essent omnia,' ut dicit Augustinus." *Ibid.* 1. 2. 1. 2. ad 5 (43b). The same quotation from St. Augustine (*De div. quaest.* 83 41 [PL 40. 27]) occurs in I *Sent.* 44. 1. 1. c. (I. 782b).

⁹⁰ "Decet divinam potentiam et sapientiam non solum producere ad esse creaturas *magis* nobilis, sed etiam *minus* nobilis; et ideo tam in his quam in illis commendatur, et *magis manifestatur in omnibus simul* quam in aliqua earum per se." III *Sent.* 2. 1. 1. ad 5 (III. 39a—b). — "Summe laudabilis est divina sapientia in operibus, non quia omnia sunt optima, quae facit in se, sed in ordine." IV *Sent.* 2. 1. 2. ad 1 (IV. 51b).

§ 2

The Threefold Order in Creation as a Perfect Manifestation of the Three Fundamental Attributes of the Creator

These considerations lead us now directly to the structure and source of the actually existing order in creation, and to the particular position of man within this order. It is precisely the idea of the best possible manifestation of the Creator's fundamental attributes which St. Bonaventure considers as the basic reason for the fact that there are three principal kinds of substances in creation: a world of *spirits*, a world of *material beings*, and the union of these two in the *composite substance of man*.⁹¹ The fact of this threefold division is generally accepted, and is indicated also in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.⁹² But among the many great Commentators of this work it is St. Bonaventure who devotes a special question to the deeper problem as to whether this distinction *has to be* in the universe."⁹³ The answer to this problem involves also man, who appears in these explanations as an essential and even central factor. We now reach the basic text for the present study. With regard to the force of the arguments adduced it is important to note that they are not intended to be a strict demonstration; they do not prove the real necessity of this threefold order, but only a high degree of convenience and fittingness.⁹⁴

The Seraphic Doctor begins his own solution with the general statement that the three kinds of substances are required "for the *perfection of the universe*."⁹⁵ What this "perfection" of the created world means to the mind and system of St. Bonaventure, is now clear from our previous considerations; this perfection consists in the capacity to manifest and represent God and His three divine attributes. The degree of clarity in which a creature reflects the Creator determines the degree of its perfection, and this principle applies not only to individual crea-

⁹¹ "Secundo quaeritur circa hoc de differentiis, secundum quas res multiplicatae sunt, quas Magister ponit in littera (see the following note), scilicet substantiam spirituales et corporalem et ex utraque compositam." II *Sent.* I. 2. I. 2. introd. (II. 41a).

⁹² *Lib II Sent.* I. 4 (ed. Quaracchi 1916: I. 309—10). The text speaks of the two kinds of rational spirits (angel and human soul) and of the corporeal world serving man, but does not have St. Bonaventure's precise formulation.

⁹³ "Quaeritur ergo, utrum haec distinctio *debeat* esse in universo." II *Sent.* I. 2. I. 2. introd. (II. 41a) — The *Scholion* of the Quaracchi-edition remarks: "Hanc quaestionem ab aliis non invenimus explicite tractatam" (43b).

⁹⁴ See particularly the word *decurt* at the beginning of fund. 1—3 (41b), and also the remark in the *Scholion* (43b).

⁹⁵ "Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad perfectionem universi hoc triplex genus substantiae requiritur." II *Sent.* I. 2. I. 2. c. (II. 42a).

tures, but also to creation as a whole. To understand this notion of perfection is of great importance, for it is the basic thought that goes through every one of the arguments that follow; and St. Bonaventure continues his answer by showing what particular aspects this perfection implies.

Creation, in order to possess this perfection and to be a manifestation of its Creator, must have *three specific perfections* or characteristics, namely "greatness of extension, a sufficient order, and the influence of goodness"; for these point back to a threefold fundamental perfection in the original cause: they express God's power, wisdom, and goodness.⁹⁶ And what gives creation these necessary characteristics? It is nothing else but the *threefold structure* of spirit, matter, and the union of these two in man. How this threefold structure constitutes those three characteristics is not explained in the main part of the question, because it has been shown before in the first three affirmative arguments to which St. Bonaventure now briefly refers, thus making them a part of his own solution.⁹⁷ That these three arguments are not merely common, traditional texts taken over from previous authors, but are composed and formulated by St. Bonaventure, is indicated and confirmed by Denis the Carthusian who, in his Commentary on the *Sentences*, quotes these arguments in close connection with his conclusion as doctrine of St. Bonaventure.⁹⁸ Each one of these arguments deserves special attention with regard to our topic; for it is here that we find the reasons for the position of man between the two principal levels of creation most explicitly presented.

a) The Manifestation of the Divine Power through the Creation of Greatest Extremes and the Connection of these in Man

The first attribute to be manifested in the work of creation is the power of the Creator, and the particular quality through which this

⁹⁶ The complete text of the conclusio is as follows: "Ad perfectionem universi hoc triplex genus substantiae requiritur; et hoc propter triplicem perfectionem universi, quae attenditur in amplitudine ambitus, sufficientia ordinis, influentia bonitatis, in quibus tribus exprimit in causa triplicem perfectionem, videlicet potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. c. (II. 42a).

⁹⁷ See the concluding sentence in the preceding footnote. The reference is made to fund. 1—3 (41b—42a).

⁹⁸ "Denique circa haec scribit Bonaventura: Decuit Deum hunc facere ordinem in rebus creatis, ut quaedam essent substantiae penitus corporales, quaedam omnino spirituales, quaedam mediae, ut homines ex corporali et spirituali natura compositi." Denis the Carthusian, *In libr. II Sent.* 1. 9. c. (*Op. omnia* [ed. Tournai] 21. 110aC—110bD).

purpose is accomplished, is the "greatness of extension." This expression means not merely a great number and variety of creatures; it also and particularly implies that this variety consists of beings with very different and seemingly opposed natures.⁹⁹ The greater the distance between such extremes, the greater must be the capability of the agent that has brought these opposite beings into existence, and the degree of this distance therefore reveals how great that power is which has created such objects. If creation is to manifest the *infinite* power of God, it must possess within its limits the *greatest distance possible*.

We have met the idea of distance as a means of manifesting the Creator's power earlier in this chapter. The act of creation was considered there as a sign of infinite power, because it bridged over the infinite distance between nothing and being. There is, however, an important difference between this kind of distance and our present case, in so far as the term 'distance' here refers to something within the limits of creation itself, where everything is and must be finite.¹⁰⁰ The notion of an *infinite* distance has no real place in this connection, and St. Bonaventure now carefully avoids this term by speaking only of a *highest* or *maximum* distance,¹⁰¹ which does not imply the notion of infinity.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ The first part of the argument says: "Decuit Deum ita res facere, ut essent in manifestationem suae potentiae; sed potentia manifestatur in productione rerum multum distantium et in earum coniunctione — nam potentia tanto virtuosior ostenditur, quanto potest super magis distantia —." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. fund. 1 (II. 41 b).

¹⁰⁰ See also I *Sent.* 8. 1. dub. 4: "In comparatione Creatoris ad creaturam est excessus improporcionabilis et infinitus; respectu creaturarum ad invicem est proporcionabilis" (I. 163a).

¹⁰¹ In II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. fund. 1, St. Bonaventure speaks of a "*summa distantia*;" in his *Breviloquium* (2. 10) he twice characterizes this distance by the term *maxime*. For the complete texts see footnote 103 in this paragraph. In II *Sent.* 17. 2. 2. arg. 6 (II. 421 b) we read: "Substantia spiritualis *maxima distantia* distat a natura corporea et opaca." — Alexander of Hales, using the same terminology, says about the distance between body and soul: "Cum corpus et anima rationalis *maxime distent*, maxime indigent medio." *Summa theol.* II—I. 4. 1. 1. 3. 2. 1. 2 (no. 345) fund. 1 (ed. Quaracchi 2. 420a). The following argument speaks of a *maxima dissimilitudo* between body and soul (*ibid.* fund. 2).

¹⁰² An interpretation of this term *maxime* in the sense of *infinite* is given by H. Spettmann in his work on the psychology of John Peckham, where we read: "Mit Cassiodor, Wilhelm von Auvergne und Bonaventura [reference is made to Brevil. 2. 10] behauptet er, daß zwischen Leib und Seele ein *unendlicher Abstand* sei." (*Die Psychologie des Johannes Peckham*, BGPM 20. 6 [Münster 1919] p. 9 [italics mine]). That Peckham actually called the distance between body and spirit "infinite," is attested by the quotation in footnote no. 9 of the same page, and in the use of this term he thus went further than his master and teacher St. Bonaventure. But another text, which is quoted in the following footnote no. 10 and apparently also taken from Peckham, describes this distance more carefully as *quasi-infinite*. This is an indication that Peckham did not understand the word in the

This greatest possible distance in creation exists between the corporeal and the incorporeal or spiritual, because these constitute, as the Seraphic Doctor explains, the primary difference and are the supreme species in the highest genus of substance.¹⁰³ They represent the basic and radical distinction among created beings, and are so different as to exclude one another completely.¹⁰⁴ A creation that comprises these two extremes is therefore the best manifestation of God's divine power,¹⁰⁵ and to exclude one of these extremes from God's creative activity, as the Manichees did in regard to the material world, means for St. Bonaventure a limitation of this divine power.¹⁰⁶

However, the creation of these extremely different and opposite natures is, in itself, not yet the full manifestation of God's power, but is only the first step. What really proves the complete and absolute power over these extremes and all they include is the establishment of a connection and *union* between them.¹⁰⁷ Now, the creature in which these extreme natures are actually joined together as one new, composite substance, is man.¹⁰⁸ Man consists of a material body and a spiritual soul; of flesh and mind,¹⁰⁹ of earthly clay and spirit with intellect and will.¹¹⁰ These components in man are so radically different that only

strict sense, but merely wanted to emphasize the greatness of the distance. The other sources that are mentioned as parallel examples do not have the term "infinite," but only stress the extreme distance of the two realities and their opposite character.

¹⁰³ The second part of the argument reads: "Sed prima et summa distantia substantiarum est inter corporeum et incorporeum, quia *primae differentiae generis sunt*." II *Sent.* I. 2. I. 2. fund. I (II. 41b). — This first argument from the manifestation of God's power has a close parallel in the *Breviloquium*, where this distance is likewise mentioned and explained: "Ut igitur in homine manifestaretur Dei potentia, ideo fecit eum ex naturis *maxime distantibus*, coniunctis in unam personam et naturam, cuiusmodi sunt corpus et anima, quorum unum est substantia corporea, alterum vero, scilicet anima, est substantia spiritualis et incorporea, quae *in genere substantiae maxime distant*" (2. 10 [V. 228a]).

¹⁰⁴ See e. g. I *Sent.* 36. 2. I. ad 4 (I. 624b) and IV *Sent.* I. I. ¹⁰⁵dub. 3 (IV. 29b).

¹⁰⁵ The third and concluding part of the argument says: "Ergo ad hoc, quod divina potentia manifestetur *plene*, necesse fuit substantiam spiritua-lem et corporalem producere, rursus productas unire." II *Sent.* I. 2. I. 2. fund. I (II. 41b).

¹⁰⁶ II *Sent.* I. I. 2. I. c. (II. 26b).

¹⁰⁷ The conjunction and union of the two extremes as a necessary complement for a full manifestation of the divine power is mentioned twice in the argument. See the texts quoted above in footnotes 99 and 105.

¹⁰⁸ "Fecit eum [scil. hominem] ex naturis maxime distantibus, coniunctis in unam personam et naturam." *Brevil.* 2. 10 (V. 228a).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* 2. 9 (226b).

¹¹⁰ "Ex partibus valde diversis composuisti, scilicet ex spiritu rationali et luto terrestri, hominem." *Comment. in Sap.* c. 9, v. 2 (VI. 167a).

God himself, who created both of them, is able to unite them.¹¹¹ This union of two extremely distant natures shows the power of the Creator most clearly, and the manifestation of this power therefore culminates in the creation of man.

As a confirmation of this and, at the same time, as a summary of all that has been said in this chapter about the different ways in which God's power is manifested in the created world, we can quote St. Bonaventure's own words, as we find them in his *Breviloquium*. There he writes: "In order that His *power* might be manifested, He produced all things *from nothing* for His praise, glory, and honor; some He made close to nothing, namely the *corporeal* matter, and some close to Himself, namely the *spiritual* substance, and He joined these simultaneously in *one man* in a unity of nature and person."¹¹² It is man in whom the manifestation of God's infinite power reaches its highest degree of perfection and its final completion.

b) The Manifestation of the Divine Wisdom through the Creation of a Perfect Order with Two Extremes and Man as an Intermediate Member

The same central position of man in the created world appears if we now turn to Divine Wisdom, the second fundamental attribute of the Creator, which, according to St. Bonaventure, is manifested in creation through the particular characteristic of a "sufficient order." The entire argumentation now centers around the notion of order, to which the first part of the argument leads, and from which the remaining part draws the conclusion. The Seraphic Doctor presents this important proof for our topic in the following words:

Furthermore, [1] it was fitting for God to produce things in such a way that His *wisdom* would be manifested. But the wisdom of an artist is manifested in the perfection of *order*, and every order necessarily has a *lowest* level, a *highest* level, and an *intermediate* level. [2] If, therefore, the lowest level is the *purely corporeal* nature, the highest level the *spiritual* nature, and the intermediate level that which is *composed of both*, [3] then the wisdom of God would not be shown *perfectly* unless He had made *all these levels*. It was therefore fitting that they all came into being. [4] Hence, Augustine writes in the Twelfth Book of the *Confessions*: "Thou didst make two things, O Lord, one near to Thee, the other near to nothing."¹¹³

¹¹¹ II *Sent.* I. 1. 2. I. fund. 5 (II. 26a).

¹¹² *Brevil.* 7. 7 (V. 289a).

¹¹³ "Item, decuit Deum sic res producere, ut manifestaretur eius sapientia; sed sapientia artificis manifestatur in ordinis perfectione, omnis autem ordo habet de necessitate infimum et summum et medium. Si ergo infimum

We can, as the numbers in our translation indicate, divide this passage, according to its logical structure and content, into four parts. The proof begins with the development of a general principle about order, and this first section constitutes the major premise (1). The second part applies this general principle to the particular case of creation, and functions as a minor premise (2). The conclusion (3) which is then drawn from these premises constitutes the third part. The argument closes with a quotation from St. Augustine (4).

This *final quotation* does not really belong to the main proof, but is added as a further confirmation. It seems strange in this reference to St. Augustine that St. Bonaventure, in order to prove *three* basic kinds of substances in creation, appeals to a text which speaks of only *two* kinds, without making any mention of a third, composite substance in the middle. And yet, to show the need of this third, intermediate being in creation is the ultimate aim of the present argument as well as of the other two. Denis the Carthusian probably felt this difficulty. While he otherwise quotes the three arguments of St. Bonaventure faithfully and entirely, he leaves out this additional quotation from St. Augustine.¹¹⁴

But although man's intermediate position is not mentioned, the quotation still has a positive meaning in the present argument. It does state the existence of two extreme levels, and the establishment of this fact is at least an important part of the entire proof. It is the first step in it, and we shall see later, at the end of the following chapter, that this kind of approach is characteristic of the particular attitude and viewpoint of St. Bonaventure with regard to man's position in the created world.

Besides this, there is also a more general connection between the quotation from St. Augustine and the present argument. The entire proof centers around the notion of order as a manifestation of God's wisdom. But we saw at the beginning of the present section that order among created things implies and presupposes a gradation of beings; and a perfect order requires a perfect gradation, which St. Bonaventure himself explains, on another occasion, by a reference to the same passage of St. Augustine: "In order that the grades may be perfect, it is necessary to place something near to God which is most similar to Him,

est natura pure corporalis, summum natura spiritualis, medium composita ex utraque; nisi haec omnia fecisset, non ostenderetur perfecte Dei sapientia; oportuit igitur haec omnia fieri. Unde Augustinus duodecimo Confessionum [7. 7]: 'Duo fecisti Domine, unum prope te et aliud prope nihil'." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. fund. 2 (II. 41b).

¹¹⁴ Denis the Carthusian, *In Libr. II Sent.* 1. 9. c. (*Op. omnia* 21. 110bB).

and something else close to nothing which is similar only in a certain way."¹¹⁵ The perfect gradation therefore consists in the greatest possible distance between different levels; in this case between pure spirit at the upper limit, and matter in its most primitive form at the lower limit.¹¹⁶ The idea of greatest possible distance occurred already in the first argument, and the final quotation from the *Breviloquium*,¹¹⁷ which summarized this point, refers to the same text of St. Augustine. But there is a certain difference. While the first argument stressed merely the idea of extreme distance, this second argument has to do more specifically with extreme difference in quality and dignity. This again corresponds to the central notion of order among created things.

The quotation from St. Augustine is, in this sense, a confirmation of what has been said in the argument. It refers to the immediate basis from which St. Bonaventure proceeds to prove the position of man. In order to find his doctrine on this particular point, we must now return to the three main parts of the argument, namely to the two premises and the conclusion.

The way in which the *minor premise* finds and verifies the three principal levels in creation does not raise any further question; for the spiritual world and the material world are indeed the two extremes, while man is that third and intermediate being which is composed of the two others. The *conclusion* that all these three levels, and particularly the third one, are required for a full manifestation of God's wisdom in a created order, is also clear and evident if each one of these three elements is really necessary for a true order. This necessity is stated in the *major premise*, and the crucial point of the entire argument lies, therefore, in this first part. But here again, what attracts our attention is not so much the assertion that God's wisdom has to be manifested in creation, and that this is accomplished through order; for these two Bonaventurian ideas have appeared earlier in our study. They do not present any difficulty now; they only prepare the way for the next and final sentence of this major premise, where St. Bo-

¹¹⁵ "Et ideo ad hoc, quod gradus sint perfecti, necesse est ponere aliquid prope Deum, et hoc simillimum; et aliquid prope nihil, et hoc aliquo modo simile, licet non omnino nec perfecte." II *Sent.* 1. 1. 1. 1. ad 2 (II. 17b).

¹¹⁶ The complete phrase of St. Augustine expresses the idea of extreme limits with even greater clarity. There we read: "Tu eras, et aliud nihil unde fecisti *caelum* et *terram*, duo quaedam; unum prope te, alterum prope nihil: unum, quo superior *tu* esses; alterum, quo inferius *nihil* esset." *Conf.* 12. 7. 7 (ML 32. 828-9).

¹¹⁷ *Brevil.* 7. 7 (V. 289a). See above, page 298. Another reference to the same text of St. Augustine is found in *Brevil.* 2. 6 (V. 224a).

naventure states that "every order necessarily has a lowest level, a highest level, and an intermediate level."

This principle is the real basis for St. Bonaventure's doctrine that man not only actually is, but has to be in creation, and that he has to hold this peculiar intermediate position, if creation is to be well-ordered and thus a manifestation of God's wisdom. Since "man's place in creation" is the central theme of our study, this principle is of fundamental importance. In view of this fact, it is the more surprising and somewhat disappointing to see that St. Bonaventure gives no further explanation of this principle, neither in this place nor on other occasions where the same axiom is used.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, neither St. Bonaventure himself nor the Quaracchi-edition mentions any source from which the principle is taken or derived. To know such a source would surely be a help in determining what the Seraphic Doctor had in mind when writing these words.

This lack of any direct information is all the more to be regretted because there is a real need for further explanation. This principle is, at least in the present concise form, not fully evident in every respect. The difficulty lies not so much in the necessity of a highest and lowest member. For this is in accordance with the fact that every system of created things must be finite, and the two extreme terms are merely an expression of this limitation.¹¹⁹ But is the necessity of an intermediate member between these two evident in the same way? Why cannot two levels constitute a true and complete order? What is the basis for the necessity of a third term in between? We shall seek the solution in two different ways: first, by analyzing parallel texts in St. Bonaventure's own works, and then by reviewing possible sources. The first point will be examined now, and the study of the historical background will be reserved for the next chapter.

With regard to this first point we are in the fortunate situation of possessing some other texts, where St. Bonaventure states this principle in a similar form. The manner in which it is applied there and explained

¹¹⁸ In the case of *De myst. Trinit.* 4. 2. fund. 2 (V. 84b), where the same principle is stated, the Quaracchi-edition refers in footnote 7 to another text in *De scientia Christi* 1. ad 6 (V. 6a). But since in this latter text both the objection and the answer speak only about a first and a last member (see the texts in the following footnote) and do not mention the crucial intermediate element, this parallel does not clarify our present main question.

¹¹⁹ "Ubi cumque est ordo, ibi est ratio *primi* et *ultimi*, quae est ratio *finiti*." *De scientia Christi* 1. arg. 6 (V. 4a). The answer confirms this principle with regard to any actually existing order: "Quod omnis ordo habet *primum* et *ultimum*; verum est de ordine actuali, non de ordine potentiali." *Ibid.* ad 6 (V. 6a).

gives at least some indication as to its fuller meaning. These parallel texts show at once that the world of created beings is not the only and not even the main realm to which our author applies this principle.¹²⁰ The passages that are most explicit and come, at the same time, nearest to the principle as it is stated in the argument under discussion, are those in which St. Bonaventure shows that there are three and only three Persons in God. The fact that the principle is applied to matters so different indicates its fundamental character and far-reaching influence in the Bonaventurian system.¹²¹ It is also interesting to note that this principle, in its present form, does not appear in the Commentary on the First Book of the *Sentences*, where according to later use it could be expected in the question about the number of Divine Persons, and where some of its basic ideas are discernible.¹²² Our text in the Commentary on the Second Book is actually the first place where this axiom is clearly stated. We then find it again in the *Quaestiones disputatae* on the Blessed Trinity,¹²³ which originated soon after the Commentary on the *Sentences*, and especially in St. Bonaventure's last work, the *Collationes in Hexaemeron*.¹²⁴ This seems to indicate some development and clarification of the present principle in the mind of the Seraphic Doctor.

In the *Quaestiones disputatae* on the Blessed Trinity the principle appears in the same place in which we have seen it in our main text, namely in one of the introductory arguments that are adduced in favor of the author's own solution. What St. Bonaventure now wants to prove is the compatibility of God's infinity with the finite number of Divine Persons. He states as major premise that "the infinity in God does not destroy the *perfection of order*; for it does not follow that God,

¹²⁰ Among the nine texts, which we were able to find, and which contain the principle either explicitly or implicitly, *seven* deal with the number of Divine Persons, and only *two*, including the present text, speak about the created order.

¹²¹ Another example of such a wide application, which we have seen previously, is the notion of "fountain-fullness." See page 266—7 of the Introduction.

¹²² I *Sent.* 2. u. 4 (I. 56—8). This question speaks about *extreme* and *intermediate* terms (fund. 1), presents in several examples the middle term as having the qualities of *both* extremes (concl.), discusses the perfection of the *number three* (concl.), and mentions a *first, middle, and last* term as elements in every continuous body (concl.). But no relationship to order appears, and the word *ordo* is not even used in this question. Nor is there any stress on a general necessity of three such terms. — Some perhaps stronger indications of our principle appear in the preceding question, fund. 2: "Ubi est *ordo*, ibi est *terminatio*, quia ubi deficit *terminatio*, deficit et *mediatio* et per consequens *ordo*" (I. 55a).

¹²³ *De myst. Trinit.* 4. 2. fund. 2 (V. 84b).

¹²⁴ *In Hexaem.* I. 14 (V. 331b—332a), 8. 12 (371a), and II. 7 (381a).

being infinite, should for this reason be disordered." The minor premise, which then follows, concentrates on this notion of order and simply states our principle: "But the *order of perfection* necessarily establishes a *first, middle, and last* member." From this follows the conclusion that where these are, there is not an infinite number but only a triad.¹²⁵ If we compare this form of the principle with the one in our main text, we notice an important difference. St. Bonaventure does not speak any more of every order in general, but restricts the necessity of three members more precisely to a *perfect* order. This more exact formulation provides a first basis for our interpretation and is a further sign of a certain development.

The same ideas appear with still greater clarity and emphasis in the *Collationes in Hexaemeron*. It is true that we possess this work only in the form of *Reportationes*, which means that St. Bonaventure is "the author, but not the writer and editor."¹²⁶ The fact that there exist two versions, which differ considerably both in length and form,¹²⁷ seems to make the situation even more difficult. But fortunately, in the case of the following quotations the two versions are surprisingly close and, at times, in complete conformity, so that the Bonaventurian origin of the texts in this particular form is well assured. Here again, we find the notion of *highest perfection* taken as the starting point from which the human mind, elevated by faith, is able to derive the existence of the Triune God.¹²⁸ This divine perfection is further specified as a perfection of origin, *order*, and undividedness. In order to come from this perfect order to the three Persons in God, St. Bonaventure simply employs our principle and argues: "Where there is perfect order, there are the essential elements of a *first, middle, and last* member; otherwise disorder would occur in the Divine, as has been mentioned before. It is, therefore, by reason of order that there must be three Persons."¹²⁹

¹²⁵ "Item, infinitas in Deo non tollit perfectionem ordinis — non enim sequitur, quodsi Deus est infinitus, quod propter hoc sit inordinatus — sed ordo perfectionis necessario ponit primum, medium et ultimum; ubi autem haec sunt, non est innumerabilitas, sed tantum trinitas: ergo etc." *De myst. Trinit.* 4. 2. fund. 2 (V. 84b).

¹²⁶ F. Delorme, *S. Bonaventurae Collationes in Hexaemeron et Bonaventuriana quaedam selecta*, BFSMA 8 (Quaracchi 1934) p. X, note 1.

¹²⁷ The longer version (B) is found in the greater number of manuscripts and is printed in the Quaracchi-edition. The shorter text (A) has been edited later by F. Delorme, *op. cit.*, 1—275.

¹²⁸ "Prima speculatio est, quod intelligentia per fidem elevata dicit, Deum esse trinum et unum, propter quatuor, quae sunt in divino esse, scilicet propter conditionem *perfectionis*, propter . . ." *In Hexaem.* 11. 5 (V. 381a).

¹²⁹ "Item, a parte ordinis sic: ubi est *perfectus ordo*, ibi est ratio *principii, medii et ultimi*; alioquin inordinatio accideret in divinis, sicut supra dictum

To justify our principle, this passage again mentions a disorder that would result if these three members were not present. But this time the text itself refers to a previous place in the same work, where a further explanation is given. There again, the subject under discussion is the number of the Divine Persons; and St. Bonaventure now develops the necessity of each member in this divine order. He first establishes the extremes. There must be one first member which *only produces*, without being itself produced; and there must be one last member which is *only produced*, without producing on its own.¹³⁰ These two extreme terms are necessary to avoid an infinity of members in either direction, which would prevent order, as we have already seen. But this is not all. Having established these extremes, St. Bonaventure now concludes: "It is therefore necessary to assume a member that is at the same time *producing and produced*, in order that they *adhere to one another*. Otherwise there would be a distinction without order in the Divine, and a distinction without order is confusion."¹³¹

The first sentence in this quotation contains the Seraphic Doctor's most explicit answer to the problem of the deeper reason for the necessity of an intermediate term. This important phrase is still clearer in the shorter version of the *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, where the same conclusion reads: "Hence there must be a *middle* term, namely something that is producing and produced, in order that there can be a coherence of the *extremes*."¹³² The underlying idea is that two extremes, whatever they may be in a particular case, are too different and too far apart from one another to be joined together immediately. They need a link, which has something in common with either side and is, because of this

est: oportet ergo per rationem ordinis, ut sint ibi tres personae." *Ibid.* — The text of the shorter *Reportatio* (A) reads: "Origo autem necessario habet secum discretionem et ordinem; ideo est ibi discretio et *ordinatio perfecta*, habens rationem *principii, medii, ultimi*, alioquin inordinatio accideret in divinis." F. Delorme, *op. cit.*, 135.

¹³⁰ "Nec potest addi nec minui ad emanationem, ut scilicet sit *producens tantum* et non productum, quia sic esset infinitas; si esset *tantum productum*, et non producens tantum, sic esset infinitas ex parte ante." *In Hexaem.* 8. 12 (V. 371a).

¹³¹ The text quoted in the preceding footnote continues: "Ergo necesse est ponere *producens et productum simul*, ut *ad invicem cohaereant*. Aliter in divinis esset distinctio sine ordine; distinctio autem sine ordine confusio est." *Ibid.* — The shorter *Reportatio* (A) brings the second part of this quotation together with the discussion of the first extreme, thus relating the idea of confusion exclusively to the lack of limitation in number and not to the lack of a middle term: "Quia si ponitur *producens tantum* et non productus, esset infinitas et inordinatio; discretio enim sine ordine est confusio, quod in divinis non potest esse." F. Delorme, *op. cit.*, 114.

¹³² "Oportet ergo quod sit medius, scilicet producens et productus, ut posset esse cohaerentia extremorum." F. Delorme, *op. cit.*, 114.

common element, able to join both extremes in a continuous and harmonious transition. This is why the middle term always appears as a combination of the two extremes. St. Bonaventure frequently mentions such a middle term,¹³³ and if, in our main text about the three levels of creation, he argues that man had to be created in the form of such an intermediate and composite being (*composita ex utraque*) between the spiritual and the corporeal world, it is on the basis of this same principle of harmonious transition and connection.¹³⁴

This also leads us to a deeper and fuller understanding of St. Bonaventure's notion of *order*. It means not merely a simple juxtaposition and arrangement of distinct beings or parts, as could perhaps be gathered from an often-quoted definition by St. Augustine, which describes

¹³³ E. g. *In Hexaem.* I. 14: "Si persona est, quae producit et non producit, et persona, quae producit et non producit, *necessario est media*, quae *producitur et producit*" (V. 331b—332a). — In a similar way *I Sent.* 2. u. 4. c.: "Tantum erunt tres personae: una, quae tantum dat, in qua est amor gratuitus; alia, quae tantum accipit, in qua est amor debitus; et *media*, quae *dat et accipit*, in qua est amor *permixtus ex utroque*" (I. 57b). — On various occasions, especially in his discussions on Christ as Mediator, St. Bonaventure describes the composite nature and the connecting function of such a necessary intermediate term: "Medium debet esse *inter extrema*." *III Sent.* 19. 2. 2. fund. 3 (III. 409b). — "Medium debet habere *differentiam cum extremis*." *Ibid.* fund. 4. — "Medium *sapit naturam extremorum*." *I Sent.* 23. 2. 1. arg. 4 (I. 411a), also *Comment. in Ioan.* c. 1 (v. 2, q. 2) n. 7 (VI. 248a). — "Cum medium *suscipiat naturam extremorum*." *III Sent.* 23. 1. 3. fund. 3 (III. 514b); in a similar way *Brevil.* 4. 5 (V. 245b). — "Necesse est, quod habeat *convenientiam cum utroque extremorum*." *Brevil.* 4. 8 (V. 248b). — "Medium namque dicit *communicantiam cum extremis*." *III Sent.* 19. 2. 2. c. (III. 410b), also I. 2. 1. fund. 5 (19b) and *I Sent.* 3. 1. u. 2. arg. 3 (I. 71a—b). — "Si est recta ordinatio medi ad extrema, necesse est, medium *participare quodam modo naturam utriusque extremi*." *II Sent.* 14. 2. 1. 3. fund. 3 (II. 355a). See also *III Sent.* 19. 2. 2. arg. 2 (III. 410a), ad 2 (411a), and 23. 1. 1. arg. 1 (470b), ad 1 (471b). — "Tria considerant medium: medium inspicit ratio, virtus et natura. . . Medium rationis *extrema ordinat*; medium moris *extrema moderat*; medium naturae *extrema contemperat*." *Coll. in Ioan.* c. 1, coll. 4, n. 6 (VI. 541a). — "Medium locus est unitatis; extrema enim per medium *uniuntur*." *Ibid.* n. 8 (541b); also *Comment. in Ioan.* c. 1 (v. 26, q. 2) n. 59 (VI. 259a—b). — One text about the function of the middle term mentions the three members of our principle: "Primo Christus est *medium congruum mirabilis colligantiae in incarnatione*, quia in ipso mirabiliter duo *coniunguntur extrema*, videlicet *primum Divinitatis et ultimum humanitatis*." *Dom. 3. Adv.*, sermo 1. 1 (IX. 57b). — About this notion of medium see R. Guardini, *Die Lehre des heil. Bonaventura von der Erlösung* (Düsseldorf 1921) 48—55, and V. Plessner, "Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura über die Mittlerschaft Mariens," *Franziskanische Studien* 23 (1936) 355—8.

¹³⁴ The same idea is expressed later by Peter of Tarantasia, who in one of his arguments follows St. Bonaventure closely: "Decuit quoque esse creaturam ita compositam ex corporali et intellectuali substantia, propter complementum connexionemque universi. Est namque creatura aliqua pure corporalis, et est creatura pure spiritualis: ergo condecuit esse aliquam ex utraque compositam, quia extrema in tantum distantia nequeunt coniungi nisi per medium." Quoted by Denys the Carthusian, *II Sent.* 1. 9. c. (*Op. omnia* 21. 109bD—110aA).

order as "an arrangement of like and unlike things, whereby each of them is disposed in its proper place."¹³⁵ For St. Bonaventure, the notion of order also includes a true relationship among things and a mutual connection, so that all members form a harmonious and unified whole.¹³⁶ This is true for any order, be it the order of causality, of perfection and dignity, or merely that of temporal succession.

Only with this notion in mind can we understand and appreciate St. Bonaventure's argument from order against the possibility of a creation without beginning.¹³⁷ For him, the moments that follow one after the other in the course of time are not in a merely accidental arrangement, but each one has its definite place and plays its proper role in one great harmonious series or drama which is formed by all these parts, and which is in every respect under Divine Providence.¹³⁸ If all this is included in the notion of a true order in general, it applies all the more to a perfect order, of which St. Bonaventure often speaks when invoking the principle of three terms. A creation that is to manifest the Creator's wisdom in the best way possible, must possess an order of special perfection and needs, for this reason, not only extreme members but also a connecting, harmonizing, and unifying intermediate member, which is realized in man.

c) The Manifestation of the Divine Goodness through an Actual Communication of the Spiritual to the Corporeal World in Man

Besides the Divine Power and Wisdom there is still a third fundamental attribute of the Creator, which must likewise be reflected and manifested in creation. This third attribute is the Divine Goodness. The need of its manifestation is all the more evident, if we remember that

¹³⁵ "Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio." *De civitate Dei*, 19. 13. no. 1 (ML 41. 640 [tr. by Walsh and Honan in *The Fathers of the Church*]). — St. Bonaventure quotes this text e. g. I *Sent.* 20. 2. 1. arg. 2 (I. 372a); *De perfectione Evangelica* 4. 1. fund. 4 (V. 179b) and c. (181a). — See also the explanation of this Augustinian definition in Alexander of Hales, *Summa theol.* II—1. 1. 2. 4. 1. (no. 86) (2. 109).

¹³⁶ "Ordo importat *habitudinem*, et quia habitudo in creaturis ratione imperfectionis dicit *dependentiam*, ideo in creaturis importat *dependentiam*; in divinis autem habitudo solum ponit *comparationem et connexionem*." I *Sent.* 20. 2. 1. ad 5 (I. 373a—b). See also the text in footnote 73 of this chapter.

¹³⁷ "Impossibile est infinita ordinari. Omnis enim ordo fluit a *principio* in *medium*, si ergo non est primum, non est ordo." II *Sent.* 1. 1. 1. 2. fund. 2 (II. 21a).

¹³⁸ See on this point the explanation of E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 155—6, and J. Ratzinger, *Die Geschichtstheologie des hl. Bonaventura* (Munich 1959) 141—3.

St. Bonaventure sees in this attribute the decisive factor which has brought the created world into its actual existence.¹³⁹ The particular feature by which creation manifests this perfection of its Creator has been characterized by St. Bonaventure as "the influence of goodness."¹⁴⁰

St. Bonaventure's first step is now to establish a definite sign by which goodness can be manifested and recognized. He therefore inquires into the nature of the good and states that "goodness consists in the diffusion and communication of itself to another."¹⁴¹ What these words express is nothing else but the famous axiom *Bonum est diffusivum sui*. This principle plays a fundamental role in the doctrine of St. Bonaventure. Even his central notion of a twofold fountain-fullness in God¹⁴² is really based upon this axiom, and if we look for a first principle from which all propositions of theology follow in the system of the Seraphic Doctor, we can find it very well in this axiom.¹⁴³ It is the basis and starting point also for the present argument concerning man's necessary middle position in creation.

This principle, which is usually attributed to Denis the Areopagite, has its real source in the Neo-Platonic doctrine of which it is an essential part.¹⁴⁴ Plotinus and Proclus, on whom Denis largely depends in his whole system, explain the existence of the universe as an overflowing and outpouring of the fullness of perfection in the First Being and Absolute Good.¹⁴⁵ The Scholastics received this idea through Denis, with the only difference that this diffusion of the Divine Goodness in creation is not considered a necessary process, as the Neo-Platonists

¹³⁹ See above, p. 286—7 of the present chapter.

¹⁴⁰ "Influentia bonitatis." II *Sent.* I. 2. I. 2. c. (II. 42a). For the complete text see above, note 96.

¹⁴¹ "Item, Deum decuit sic res producere, ut manifestaretur eius bonitas; sed bonitas consistit in diffusionem et communicationem sui in alterum." II *Sent.* I. 2. I. 2. fund. 3 (II. 41b).

¹⁴² See p. 266—7 of the Introduction.

¹⁴³ This point is brought out by J. Fr. Bonnefoy, who says about St. Bonaventure: "Initia sumens ex notione boni non solum SS. Trinitatis mysterium illustravit, sed etiam creationem et ordinem universi, adhaerens sic illi traditioni, quae originem vult ducere a Pseudo-Areopagita, cui tribuebatur principium in Schola famosum: 'Bonum est diffusivum sui'." ("De synthesis operum Dei ad extra ad mentem sancti Bonaventurae," *Ant.* 18 [1943] 24—5). See also Th. Soiron, "Das Weltbild des mittelalterlichen Augustinismus," *Fünfte Lektorenkonferenz der deutschen Franziskaner für Philosophie und Theologie* (Wien 1930) 77.

¹⁴⁴ Unlike the principle of the three terms in the preceding argument, this axiom has been studied in its meaning and background. See esp. the article of J. Peghaire, "L'axiome 'Bonum est diffusivum sui' dans le néoplatonisme et le thomisme," *RUO* 2 (1932) 5*—30* (sect. spéciale, vol. 1).

¹⁴⁵ See A. E. Taylor, *Philosophical Studies*; 4.: *The Philosophy of Proclus* (London 1934) 166, 175. Ὑπερπλήρης is the expression which Proclus uses more than once to express this overfullness.

understood it, but depends in its activation entirely on the free will of God. While the Neo-Platonists thus developed the notion of the good as a self-diffusion and communication into a definite system, they found the basic idea already in Plato, who answers the question as to why God made the universe with the few, but significant words: "He was good, and in him that is good no envy arises."¹⁴⁶

But although we know where the idea of the principle originated and developed, we do not find its later traditional form in any one of these sources. Even Denis seems to be the author of this axiom only in the sense that certain passages of his writings, particularly one in his treatise *On the Divine Names* and another in his work *On the Celestial Hierarchy*,¹⁴⁷ have provided the basis for the classical formulation by some subsequent authors. The Scholastics were aware of this fact, as we can see in some of their carefully expressed references to Denis in connection with this principle.¹⁴⁸ St. Bonaventure also uses it with a certain variation and freedom of expression. He speaks in the present argument not only about a diffusion of the good, but also about a communication; and he has a definite reason for adding this second term, since this notion of communication is to be the central idea of his argument and the specific sign that manifests God's goodness in creation.

St. Bonaventure's next step is now to show what the Divine Goodness actually communicates. This act of self-diffusion to which goodness is inclined comprises all aspects of its own being, and is complete and *perfect* if the *highest* qualities are communicated. Since God is above all the absolute Spirit and the fullness of Life, St. Bonaventure can state that "His goodness consists in the communication of the most noble act, which is to live and to know." In order to manifest this goodness in creation, there must be some actual communication of these

¹⁴⁶ *Timaeus* 29. E (ed. Zurich), transl. by R. G. Bury, *Plato* 7, LCL (Cambridge, Mass., 1942) 55.

¹⁴⁷ In *De divinis nominibus* (4. 1) we read about the goodness of God: "[Theologi] ipsam, ut arbitror, divinam subsistentiam bonitatem dicentes, et quia existendo optimum, ut essenziale optimum, in omnia, quae sunt, extendit (διαιρεί) bonitatem" (MG 3. 693B; ML 122. 1128D—1129A). — *De caelesti hierarchia* (4. 1) states about God and His relationship to creatures: "Est enim hoc omnium causae et super omnia bonitatis proprium, ad communionem (κοινωνίαν) suam ea, quae sunt, vocare" (MG 3. 177C; ML 122. 1046B).

¹⁴⁸ The *Summa theol.* of Alexander of Hales refers to Denis by saying: "Ut extrahitur a B. Dionysio: 'Bonum [est] diffusivum vel communicativum sui esse'." (I. 1. 3. 1. 1. 3. [no. 104] arg. 3 [1. 163b]). Note the same two expressions which St. Bonaventure mentions in His formulation of the axiom in the present argument! — St. Thomas Aquinas writes: "Bonum est diffusivum sui esse, ut ex verbis Dionysii accipitur" (*S. theol.* I. 5. 4. arg. 2 [*Op. omnia* (ed. Leon.) 4. 61a]).

highest qualities. "It was therefore fitting," the Seraphic Doctor concludes, "that He gave to another being not only the power of life and intelligence, but also the power to communicate to another."¹⁴⁹

These last words bring us to the central idea of the present argument. It is true that the creation of living and rational beings constitutes in itself such a communication of the most noble Divine faculties and shows therefore the self-diffusing goodness of God. But St. Bonaventure knows of a more immediate way in which the Creator manifests His self-communicating goodness; and, on this point, his argument receives a special note of originality.¹⁵⁰ This more immediate and perfect manifestation consists in a reproduction and *dramatic presentation of the act of communication itself* somewhere in creation. In order to achieve this, God had to create a being which not only possesses these most noble faculties, but is also able to communicate them to another being. The full elaboration of this idea is carried out in the final part of the argument and leads to the necessity of the same three principal kinds of substances in creation which we have seen before in the two preceding arguments.

Every communication includes *three elements*: a giver, a receiver, and the act of communication. A creation that is to represent such a communication must contain these three elements. With this basic thought in mind St. Bonaventure now begins his application: "If, therefore, the living and understanding being is the *spiritual* substance, and that which is vivified and perfected by the intellect is the *body*,

¹⁴⁹ The entire second part of the argument reads in this way: "Si ergo sua bonitas consistit in communicatione actus nobilissimi, qui est vivere et intelligere, decuit, ut non tantum daret alii potentiam vivendi et intelligendi, sed etiam potentiam alii communicandi." *II Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. fund. 3 (II. 41b). — With regard to the faculty of the intellect as *actus nobilissimus* see also *II Sent.* 16. 1. 1. fund. 4: "Homo vere representat Deum secundum eius nobilissimum actum, qui est intelligere" (II. 394a).

¹⁵⁰ The idea of considering the union of soul and body as an exemplification of some other truth is well known among the Scholastics. But this union is usually seen as a symbol and proof of the possibility of the intimate union that will exist between God and the human soul in the final glorification. This thought is mentioned in considerable length by Peter Lombard as one of three reasons why God joined soul and body together: "Secundo autem dici potest, quod ideo Deus voluit eam corpori uniri, ut in humana conditione ostenderet novum exemplum beatae unionis, quae est inter Deum et spiritum, in qua diligitur ex toto corde, et videtur facie ad faciem" (*Lib. II Sent.* 1. 6 [2. ed. Quaracchi 1916: 1. 311]). Most of the later Commentators of this work take the idea over, see e. g. Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in II Sent. Petri Lomb.* 1. 28, BFSMA 13 (Quaracchi 1952) 13, and St. Thomas Aquinas, *II Sent.* 1. 2. 4. c. (*Op. omnia* [ed. Vivès] 8. 28b). However, the explanation St. Bonaventure gives in the present argument is quite different from this traditional thought.

then it was necessary for a perfect manifestation of goodness that a spiritual and a corporeal substance come into being."¹⁵¹

But this is only the first step. As in the preceding arguments, these two extremes of creation are merely the condition and prerequisite for the perfect manifestation; they are, as it were, the setting of the stage for the full presentation. St. Bonaventure now continues and concludes his argument by stating that these two kinds of substances "would not manifest the goodness perfectly, unless *one communicates to the other*, and this cannot be except through a *union*. It was therefore necessary to create a substance that is composed of both."¹⁵² This composite being is man, whose spiritual soul communicates its life and activities to a material body in such an intimate way that, together, they form a substantial union. Man thus stands in the center of creation as that creature in which the self-diffusing goodness of the Creator is most clearly and perfectly manifested.

With this result ends our review of St. Bonaventure's three basic arguments in favor of man's necessary intermediate position in creation. Because of their many parallels and their connection with one of the divine attributes these arguments form a closely related group. Their detailed elaboration and their use as part of the conclusion are strong indications that they are of St. Bonaventure's own composition. It now remains to show, by a few other examples, that what these three arguments explain is not something taught only on this one occasion, but is a fundamental point in St. Bonaventure's doctrine manifesting itself in various forms and applications.

§ 3

Further Confirmation of Man's Intermediate Position and his Role as Final Complement of the Entire Creation

A first text, which reflects St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the intermediate position of man in creation, deals with the question of why Eve was made from a rib of Adam. Among the four reasons given for this particular origin, are two that proceed from the notion of order. The

¹⁵¹ The third part of the argument begins: "Si ergo vivens et intelligens est substantia spiritualis, quod autem vivificatur et per intellectum perficitur est corpus: ergo ad perfectam bonitatis manifestationem necesse fuit, fieri substantiam spiritualem et corporalem." II *Sent.* I. 2. I. 2. fund. 3 (II. 41 b—42 a).

¹⁵² The argument closes: "Sed hoc non perfecte manifestarent, nisi una alteri communicaret, et hoc non potest esse nisi per unionem: ergo necesse fuit facere compositam ex utraque." *Ibid.* (42 a).

first reason is the order or rather *ordination* of the body towards the soul. Just as all rational souls proceed from one principle, so should all human bodies.¹⁵³ The emphasis lies in this point on the correspondence of body and soul in man, which is an idea that will play an important role in the final chapter. Our present interest lies more in the second reason, where man is mentioned in his *intermediate position*. St. Bonaventure sees this reason in the order or relationship of man in his entire, composite nature towards the other creatures, and he formulates his argument in the following way:

Man holds the middle place between the angelic and the irrational nature. Since the angels are created by God *one by one*, and the irrational creatures in *two sexes*, namely as male and female, it was fitting that man be produced in an *intermediate manner*, and thus the woman out of the man.¹⁵⁴

The first part of this argument has a parallel (probably its source) in St. Augustine, who mentions in his work *De civitate Dei* the same idea of man's position between the angels and the beasts.¹⁵⁵ He considers it as a more perfect work of God "to multiply the human race from one man whom he created, rather than to develop it from many."¹⁵⁶ From man's intermediate position he draws the conclusion that man is destined either to ascend into the company of the angels, by obedience to God's commandments, or to descend to the beasts and to eternal punishment, through disobedience.

¹⁵³ "Primo, ex ordine corporis ad animam, ut sicut omnes animae rationales immediate procedunt ab uno principio, sic omnia corpora humana immediate exirent ab uno." II *Sent.* 18. dub. 1 (II. 454 b). — The idea of one principle for all *men* is something traditional and mentioned by Peter Lombard: "Ideo scilicet, ut unum esset generis humani principium" (*Lib. II Sent.* 18. 1 [1. 388]). It is taken over from St. Augustine, *De civit. Dei* 12. 27 (ML 41. 376). But there is no mentioning of soul and body separately or of their correspondence.

¹⁵⁴ "Secundo vero, ex ordine totius coniuncti ad alias creaturas: quia enim homo medium tenet inter naturam angelicam et brutalem, cum angeli singillatim a Deo producti sint, et creaturae brutales in duplici sexu, in masculino scilicet et feminino: homo debuit produci medio modo, et sic femina ex viro." *Loc. cit.*

¹⁵⁵ "Hominem vero, cuius naturam quodammodo mediam inter Angelos bestiasque condebat, ut, si Creatori suo tanquam vero Domino subditus praeceptum eius pia obedientia custodiret, in consortium transiret angelicum . . . ; si autem Dominum Deum suum libera voluntate superbe atque inobedienter usus offenderet, morti addictus bestialiter viveret, libidinis servus aeternoque post mortem supplicio destinatus." *De civit. Dei* 12. 21 (ML 41. 372).

¹⁵⁶ "Non est arduum videre multo fuisse melius quod factum est, ut ex uno homine quem primum condidit, multiplicaret genus humanum, quam si id inchoasset a pluribus." *Ibid.* (transl. by G. Walsh and G. Monahan, *Writings of Saint Augustine* 7, FCH [New York 1952] 288).

These thoughts probably inspired the present argument of St. Bonaventure. But there is also a further *development* noticeable in the proof of St. Bonaventure. St. Augustine does not draw the conclusion that man had to be created in such an intermediate way. He also seems to be more cautious in stating man's position, when he says that God "created man with a nature that is, *as it were*, in between angels and beasts."¹⁵⁷ Finally, the notion of order, upon which St. Bonaventure again builds his argument, does not occur in the present chapter of St. Augustine. All this indicates that the idea of man's *necessary intermediate position* in the *order* of creation and the application of this idea has become more definite in St. Bonaventure.

Another reference to this middle position of man is found in one of the sermons on the Ascension of Christ.¹⁵⁸ There St. Bonaventure speaks about the Divine Word which "came forth from the Father" and functions as medium in the entire work of creation, as the Word that pre-ordains, originates, and preserves everything. The *second* one of these three functions concerns the *act of creation*, which St. Bonaventure now unfolds before his listeners while following the words of a passage in the Book of Proverbs.¹⁵⁹ *Who has held the wind in his hand?* These words are brought into connection with the creation of the *spiritual* beings, which God holds in His hands, that is, keeps in continuous existence. *Who has bound up the waters together as in a garment?* This is taken as a reference to the creation of *corporeal* beings, which are fleeting, although they may be preserved for a certain time.

Who has raised up all the borders of the earth? This third question leads to the climax of creation, to the production of *man*. The idea of border or limit reminds us of man because he is the highest creature of the corporeal world and nearest to the realm of spirits. But St. Bonaventure more probably associates the two, because in man the borders or extremes of the entire created world are joined together. For he now repeats the question of Holy Scripture in his own interpretation and asks: "Who is the Creator of *spirits* and *bodies*, and of *man* in whom there is a concurrence of spiritual and corporeal beings?"¹⁶⁰ *What is his*

¹⁵⁷ "Naturam quodammodo mediam." *Ibid.* For the complete text see above, note 155.

¹⁵⁸ *In Ascens. Dom.*, sermo I (IX. 314—8).

¹⁵⁹ *Prov.* 30: 4.

¹⁶⁰ "Quis suscitavit omnes terminos terrae? id est, quis ex terra produxit creaturam, quae habet naturam corporalem et spiritualement, sicut est homo? id est, quis est Creator spirituum et corporum et hominum, in quo est concursus spiritualium et corporalium?" *In Ascens. Dom.*, sermo I. 1. 2 (IX. 316a).

name, and what is the name of his son? St. Bonaventure now turns to the Creator of this magnificent work, saying: "*The name of His Son is 'Word.'* For it is He who *descends* from heaven and *ascends*, the Lord of all things, to whom it belongs to *reach from end to end.*"¹⁶¹ This final quotation from the Book of Wisdom may be an illustration of Christ's descension and ascension. But since all quotations in this part of the sermon are applied to the Divine Word in as far as this Word is medial in the act of creation, this passage is also a further reference to the extremes of the created world, which reach one another by the creation of man.

A third place where the necessary intermediate position of man is prominently mentioned and explained, is the *Breviloquium*. In this case St. Bonaventure has written a special chapter "about the production of man in regard to the entire composite."¹⁶² As we find it everywhere in this work, so also here the reasoning starts from the First Principle. God has made the visible world in order to manifest and express Himself. The particular purpose of this sensible world is to serve as a mirror and vestige through which man is led back to loving God, the Creator, and to praising Him.¹⁶³

But this is only one part of the picture. In order to show and to prove man's true place within the entire creation, St. Bonaventure now widens his view by including both God and all created beings. The principal idea of manifestation and expression prompts him to use a comparison that is very dear to him and employed by Holy Scripture,¹⁶⁴ namely the comparison with a book. He now distinguishes *two books* in which the glory and perfection of God are expressed. One is written *within*, and this is the Eternal Art and Wisdom in God. The other is written *without*, and this book is the visible world.¹⁶⁵ Each one of these two books has its *readers*. God created spiritual beings that have an interior sense and are thus able to read and understand the interior

¹⁶¹ "*Nomen Filii eius est Verbum. Ipse est, qui de caelo descendit et ascendit, Dominus universorum, cuius est attingere a fine usque ad finem* [Wisd. 8: 1]." *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Brevil.* 2. 11: De productione hominis quantum ad totum coniunctum (V. 229a—230a).

¹⁶³ "Primum principium fecit mundum istum sensibilem ad declarandum se ipsum, videlicet ad hoc, quod per illum tanquam per speculum et vestigium reduceretur homo in Deum artificem amandum et laudandum." *Ibid.* (229a).

¹⁶⁴ The *liber scriptus intus et foris* is mentioned in Ezech. 2: 9 and Apoc. 5: 1.

¹⁶⁵ "Et secundum hoc duplex est liber, unus scilicet scriptus *intus*, qui est aeterna Dei ars et sapientia; et alius scriptus *foris*, mundus scilicet sensibilis." *Brevil.* 2. 11 (V. 229a).

book. These are the angels who, under a special illumination from above, see the divine ideas or exemplars. God also created beings which have all their senses exteriorly and can therefore perceive the exterior book of creation, but are unable to reach beyond it. They are the irrational animals.¹⁶⁶

These two groups of "readers" represent the two extreme levels in creation. Between them is man, and his necessary middle position as a composite being is now proved by St. Bonaventure in the following conclusion: "For the perfection of the universe there *ought to be a creature that is endowed with this twofold sense to understand the book written within and that written without*, namely Wisdom and Its work."¹⁶⁷ This creature is man, who possesses *exterior senses* for the perception of the visible world, and who has, at the same time, the *interior sense* of his mind, which reaches the divine ideas with the help of an illumination from above. In this way, man appears again in his role as a necessary link that binds the opposite levels of creation together.

The conclusion of the present passage points to Christ, who is called "the book written within and without" because in Him the Eternal Wisdom and Its work, namely human nature, are united in one Person.¹⁶⁸ Sin has impaired man's ability to read in the books that God has opened before him. But this ability and man's intermediate position among creatures in general were restored through incarnation and redemption.

These few texts, quite different in their content, show how fundamental in St. Bonaventure's doctrine and synthesis is the idea of man's position as a composite being between the other two levels of creation. If certain texts seem to *depart* from this basic threefold order and division, the reason for such an exception lies in the particular context. When speaking about man as the image of God, St. Bonaventure seems to assume only a *twofold* division in creation. "It is necessary," he explains, "that all creatures are made similar to God in *some way*; for the completion of the universe it is also necessary that some are similar to God in a *clear*

¹⁶⁶ "Cum igitur esset una creatura, quae sensum habebat *intus* ad cognitionem libri interioris, ut Angelus; et alia, quae totum sensum habebat *foris*, ut quodlibet animal brutum; . . . debuit fieri creatura . . ." *Ibid.* See also E. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, EPM 4 (2. ed., Paris 1943) 351.

¹⁶⁷ "Ad perfectionem universitatis debuit fieri creatura, quae hoc sensu duplici esset praedita ad cognitionem libri scripti *intus* et *foris*, id est Sapientiae et sui operis." *Brevil.* 2. 11 (V. 229a).

¹⁶⁸ "Et quia in Christo simul concurrit aeterna Sapientia et eius opus in una persona, ideo dicitur *liber scriptus intus et foris* ad reparationem mundi." *Ibid.* — See also *Serm. de reb. theol.*, sermo 4. 14 (V. 571a).

and distinct manner. All creatures are therefore a *vestige*, but some are an *image*."¹⁶⁹

The last-mentioned beings are the rational creatures, and man belongs to this group. The angels are not mentioned now, because they are beyond the scope of the present question. But it is clear that they, too, are images of God and belong, in this respect, to the same group of creatures in which we find man. Besides the vestige and image there is a third and still higher degree which is called similitude. But this term signifies the rational creature in the state of supernatural elevation. It is the supernatural perfection of the image and again comprises both man and angels, so that we are, basically, still in the same twofold division of creation. This difficulty points to a fact which is important for the general understanding. It shows that the famous ternary of vestige, image, and similitude does not coincide with the three basic levels in the order of creation.

As far as this twofold division of creatures in vestige and image is concerned, St. Bonaventure himself shows the way from here to the regular threefold order. With a reference to the same fundamental reason for such an order, he explains on another occasion: "The divine wisdom has decided to create a *twofold rational creature* in the universe, in order that the universe may be complete: one that is *united* with a body, like the rational soul, and another that is *absolute* and spiritual, like the angel."¹⁷⁰ In this text we find the true norm for the division of the rational creatures, which leads to the same threefold order in creation.

In the above-quoted passage of the *Breviloquium* and in the two following texts we also find explicitly stated what has been the basic thought in all of St. Bonaventure's arguments: The intermediate position of man is necessary *for the perfection of the universe*. Man therefore represents the final complement and consummation in the work of creation. St. Bonaventure's frequent reference to the fact that man was created on the sixth day¹⁷¹ and as the last and greatest work of God's

¹⁶⁹ "Necesse est autem, omnem creaturam quoquo modo assimilari Deo; necesse est etiam, aliquam ad complementum universi expresse assimilari Deo: et ideo omnis creatura habet rationem vestigii, sed aliqua habet rationem imaginis." II *Sent.* 16. 1. 1. c. (II. 394 b).

¹⁷⁰ "Decrevit enim divina sapientia in universo facere duplicem creaturam rationalem, ad hoc quod esset universum completum: unam corpori unitam, ut animam rationalem; aliam absolutam et spiritualementem, ut Angelum." II *Sent.* 7. 1. 1. c. (II. 176 b).

¹⁷¹ See e. g. II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. 2. ad 2 (II. 46 b) and 15. 2. 2. c. (384 b—385 b). — A mystical interpretation of the number six, which leads to the same basic thought of man as the perfecting conclusion of creation, is given

wisdom,¹⁷² is a result of this fundamental idea. Man is, as we have seen, the most perfect fulfillment of the first purpose of creation, which is the manifestation of God's infinite perfections as Creator. An excellent summary of these basic thoughts, which serves at the same time as a concluding review of our first chapter, is found in the *Breviloquium*, where the Seraphic Doctor writes:

Because the First Principle is in His act of creation most powerful, wise, and good, and because He manifests this in a certain way in all His effects, it was fitting that He manifested this most of all in the last and most noble effect. Such is man, whom He produced last among all creatures, in order that in this effect there may appear and shine forth in the most excellent way the consummation of the divine works.¹⁷³

(To be continued)

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in *Comment. in Luc.* 1. 26 (no. 41): "Nec etiam senarius numerus vacat a mysterio; quia enim perfectus est, ideo homo, inter cetera opera Dei perfectus, sexta die est conditus" (VII. 20b).

¹⁷² "Et notandum, quod cetera dicit facta solo Verbo, sed hominem sapientia, quasi opus nobilius, quia capax sapientiae tam creatae quam increatae, et ideo quasi opus maiori excogitatione faciendum." *Comment. in Sap.* 9. 2 (VI. 167a).

¹⁷³ "Cum primum principium sit in producendo potentissimum, sapientissimum et optimum, et in omnibus effectibus suis hoc aliquo modo manifestet, potissime debuit hoc manifestare in ultimo effectu et nobilissimo, cuiusmodi est homo, quem inter ceteras creaturas produxit ultimo, ut in hoc potissime appareret et reluceret divinorum operum consummatio." *Brevil.* 2. 10 (V. 228a).

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